² The trial court noted: At the hearing on March 17, 2014 both parties stipulated . . . that they were both incarcerated. . . . Mother [was] incarcerated for an indefinite period of time . . . . Father [was] incarcerated until at least July 27, 2014[;] however, he [was] facing probation revocation proceedings in Union County and is not guaranteed to be paroled on his eligibility date. Trial Ct. Op. in Support of Finding of Dependency, 6/2/14, at 2. 3 The Juvenile Act defines a “dependent child” as, inter alia, a child who “is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1). If the court finds that the child is dependent, then the court may make an appropriate disposition of the child to protect the child’s physical, mental and moral welfare, including allowing the child to remain with the parents subject to supervision, transferring temporary legal custody to a relative or public agency, or transferring custody to the juvenile court of another state. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a). In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 617 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc) (some citations omitted).

⁴ “If the court finds the parent to have perpetrated abuse, the relevant CYS agency would file with the Department of Public Welfare a ‘founded report’[, see 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a),] which would trigger inclusion on the statewide ChildLine Registry,” see 23 Pa.C.S. § 6331. L.Z., 2015 WL 1332597 at *9. Inclusion on the registry “restricts an individual’s ability to engage in employment related to children.” 2015 WL 1332597 at *3. 5 The CPSL was amended, effective December 31, 2014, to broaden the term “child abuse.” L.Z., 2015 WL 1332597 at *2 n.3. - 10 - J-A03035-15 body.” Id. (emphasis removed). The two sisters lived and cared for the child together. Id. “[T]he presentation of these injuries was consistent with abuse and inconsistent with several explanations given by [the two women,] which led the treating physicians to suspect that the injuries were non- accidental.” Id. Mother did not testify at the adjudicatory hearing, but “[a] caseworker testified [the m]other acknowledged at the hospital that she and [the a]unt were [L.Z.’s] primary caregivers, but claimed that she had been staying with her paramour for the two days prior to the hospital visit,” and L.Z. was with the aunt. Id. The trial court found, inter alia, L.Z. was dependent and a victim of child abuse under Section 6303. Id. The court further found the mother was the perpetrator of abuse, where the “[c]hild’s injuries would not have occurred but for [the m]other’s omissions as his primary caretaker,” whether “she inflicted the injuries directly was irrelevant,” and “[s]he failed to act and protect the [c]hild from the serious physical injuries he suffered.” Id. at **2-3. The court thus found aggravating circumstances against the mother. Id. at *2. On appeal, an en banc majority of this Court vacated the abuse determination, holding, inter alia, the trial court erred in finding the mother was the perpetrator of abuse. Id. at *3. The en banc panel considered Section 6381(d) of the CPSL, “Prima facie evidence of abuse:” Evidence that a child has suffered child abuse of such a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained or exist except - 11 - J-A03035-15 by reason of the acts or omissions of the parent or other person responsible for the welfare of the child shall be prima facie evidence of child abuse by the parent or other person responsible for the welfare of the child. Id. (quoting 23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(d)). The panel held this subsection did not “permit the court to designate a parent a perpetrator of abuse where the record fails to establish that the child was in the parent’s care at the time of the injury.” L.Z., 2015 WL 1332597 at *4. The panel then credited the testimony that the “[m]other had not seen [L.Z.] for two days before [the a]unt told her that [the c]hild’s penis was bleeding” and found “the injury ‘was inflicted at a time when [L.Z.] was not in [the m]other’s care.’” Id. Three judges dissented from the majority. Id. at **5-6. L.Z.’s guardian ad litem successfully petitioned for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court on, inter alia, the question of whether the Superior Court misconstrued the evidentiary presumption of Section 6381(d) and specifically, “whether the Superior Court erred in rejecting the trial court’s determination that [the m]other perpetrated the abuse.” Id. at **6, 9. The Supreme Court reversed the majority’s decision, agreeing with the dissent. Id. at **1, 17. The Supreme Court stated: While a petitioning party must demonstrate the existence of child abuse by the clear and convincing evidence standard applicable to most dependency determinations, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(c) (recognizing clear and convincing evidence as the necessary standard for concluding that a child is dependent), the identity of the abuser need only be established through prima facie evidence in certain situations[.] - 12 - J-A03035-15 Id. at *8. The Court found the Superior Court’s interpretation of Section 6381(d) would “require[e] a CYS agency to prove that, at the moment of injury, the parent or caregiver was physically present and that no other adult was responsible for the child.” Id. at *9. The Court found this interpretation essentially “[wrote] the statutory mandated presumption out of the law.” Id. The Court opined: [In dependency proceedings, the Juvenile Act] generally require[s] CYS agencies to meet a relatively high standard of proof, demanding . . . clear and convincing evidence to find a child dependent . . . . The Legislature, however, carved out a very limited exception to these more stringent evidentiary standards, allowing for the possibility of identifying the perpetrator of abuse based on prima facie evidence in cases where the abuse is “of such a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or omissions of the parent or other person responsible for the welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(d). To read this section as only applying when one parent or one responsible person is present would so restrict its applicability as to negate its existence. Id. at *17. In reaching this conclusion, our Supreme Court also considered: [C]hild abuse cases often involve a child presenting to a hospital with significant injuries that are entirely consistent with common types of child abuse and entirely inconsistent with the implausible explanations concocted by the parents and responsible persons to avoid allegations of child abuse. As noted, in cases where multiple caregivers are involved, the individuals frequently “circle the wagons” or alternatively point fingers at each other. As the children may be too young or fearful to describe the abuse, CYS agencies are left to prove their case with only the physical evidence of injuries that would not ordinarily be sustained but for the action of the parents or responsible persons and the implausible statements of the parents and - 13 - J-A03035-15 responsible persons. Thus, while they can prove the existence of abuse rather easily, they have no ability to assign responsibility for the heinous act among the responsible adults. As Judge Tamilia observed in 1993, “the Legislature deemed it wise and necessary to establish a different evidentiary standard” by enacting Section 6381(d)’s presumption to avoid this evidentiary conundrum and protect children from future abuse. [Interest of J.R.W., 631 A.2d 1019, 1023 (Pa. Super. 1993).] We emphasize that, when a child is in the care of multiple parents or other persons responsible for care, those individuals are accountable for the care and protection of the child whether they actually inflicted the injury or failed in their duty to protect the child. Id. at *18. The Court further held the presumption was rebuttable by the parent: Moreover, the Legislature balanced the presumption of Section 6381(d) by making it rebuttable as it merely establishes “prima facie evidence” that the parent perpetrated the abuse. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(d). As commonly understood, prima facie evidence is “[s]uch evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party’s claim or defense, and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.” Black’s Law Dictionary 825 (6th ed. Abridged 1991). Accordingly, evidence that a child suffered injury that would not ordinarily be sustained but for acts or omissions of the parent or responsible person is sufficient to establish that the parent or responsible person perpetrated that abuse unless the parent or responsible person rebuts the presumption. The parent or responsible person may present evidence demonstrating that they did not inflict the abuse, potentially by testifying that they gave responsibility for the child to another person about whom they had no reason to fear or perhaps that the injuries were accidental rather than abusive. The evaluation of the validity of the presumption would then rest with the trial court evaluating the credibility of the prima facie evidence presented by the CYS agency and the rebuttal of the parent or responsible person. - 14 - J-A03035-15 Id. The Supreme Court found the mother failed to rebut the presumption by presenting evidence or testimony that L.Z. “was not in her care when the injuries were suffered and that she had no reason to question her decision to leave” L.Z. in the aunt’s care.6 Id. It held either the mother or the aunt “inflicted the abuse [L.Z.] suffered or failed to protect him from the other’s abuse,” and held that “ample, uncontested, unrebutted evidence existed for the trial court to presume that [the m]other perpetrated” the abuse. Id. at **18-19. Thus, the Court reversed the Superior Court’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s order, which found the mother abused L.Z. and which found aggravating circumstances against her. Id. at *19. In the case sub judice, as stated above, only the Superior Court’s en banc decision in L.Z. was published at the time the trial court considered CYS’ petition for a finding of aggravating circumstances against Mother. The trial court’s opinion cited the en banc majority’s decision: [After establishing by clear and convincing evidence that a child is a victim of child abuse,] the Agency need only show prima facie evidence that the abuse normally would not have occurred except by reason of acts or omissions of the caretakers . . . . However, the Court is not permitted to designate a parent a perpetrator of abuse where the record fails to establish that the child was in the parent[‘]s care at the time of the injury. Where the record is unclear as to which parent or person was 6 The Court stated that the mother’s and aunt’s “self-serving claims made at the hospital were neither under oath nor subject to cross-examination” and thus “were outside-the-record and do not constitute rebuttal evidence.” L.Z., 2015 WL 1332597, at *18. - 15 - J-A03035-15 responsible for the child at the time of the abuse, the viability of the presumption is questionable. In re: L.Z., 91 [A.3d] 208 (Pa. Super. 2014). Trial Ct. Op. at 6. Examining the evidence, the trial court found Grandmother’s testimony “extremely creditable” and found she did not perpetuate any of the injuries to Child. Id. The court further found CYS did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that Mother committed the abuse: In this case [M]other [and Father were] constantly present during the time periods when the injuries to the child were sustained, except for brief periods when the child was watched by [G]randmother. . . . The Court does not believe [CYS] established by clear and convincing evidence that [M]other was the perpetrator of the injuries to the child. Either [F]ather or [M]other could have been the perpetrator . . . . Id. at 6-7. However, the court found aggravating circumstances against Mother based on her omissions: In this case it was obvious that the child had sustained serious injuries on or before October 9, 2013. [G]randmother called both parents[‘] attention to the injuries consisting of a twitching arm, a black and blue scrotum, bruises on the child and a cut on the child’s forehead. All this time the child was fussy and upset. With this information the parents had a duty to seek medical care for the child. [M]other indicated an awareness of the need to get medical care and actually left saying she was actually taking the child to the doctor. The [c]ourt is of the opinion that [M]other returned and did not seek medical care because it is likely that she knew what a medical provider would find. This however could be indicative of the fact - 16 - J-A03035-15 that she knew the severity of the injuries because she caused them or she was aware that they were caused by [F]ather. In any event, she had knowledge of serious injuries and failed to take any steps to obtain medical care until October 10th when she took the child to the family physician. Id. at 7. At the times the parties filed their briefs with this Court and appeared for oral argument, the Supreme Court’s decision in L.Z. was not filed, and thus the Superior Court’s decision remained binding. In her appellate brief, Mother avers the trial court’s opinion is unclear as whether its finding of aggravated circumstances was “based upon the standard of prima facie evidence or other acts of omissions were found by clear and convincing evidence [sic].” Mother’s Brief at 44. Mother does not, however, aver the court’s conclusion contravened the Superior Court’s decision. Nevertheless, on March 25, 2015, our Supreme Court issued its opinion in L.Z., and we are now bound by that decision. We agree with the trial court that the evidence established that both Mother and Father were responsible for Child’s caregiving and were with him from October 8 through 10, 2013. The court noted there were periods when Child was in Grandmother’s exclusive care, but the court credited Grandmother’s testimony and found she did not perpetrate any of the injuries to Child. We reject Mother’s appeal to this Court to reassess Grandmother’s credibility, as the court’s findings are supported by competent evidence. See In re J.C., 5 A.3d at 287-88. A careful review of - 17 - J-A03035-15 Mother’s argument reveals she does not deny that she perpetrated the abuse or allege definitively that Father or Grandmother committed the abuse. Instead, her repeated argument is that there were three caregivers, each of whom was alone with Child, who was then seven weeks old, at some point. This claim is evocative of Supreme Court’s concern of parents and responsible persons “circl[ing] the wagons” where there are multiple caregivers for a child and an agency has “no ability to assign responsibility for the heinous act among the responsible adults.” See L.Z., 2015 WL 1332597 at *18. Furthermore, Mother’s narration of the facts and her claim “that it would be difficult, if not possible, for [her] to know the nature and extent of [C]hild’s injuries,” ignores evidence presented. See Mother’s Brief at 35. Mother fails to acknowledge the following evidence cited by the trial court. On October 9, 2013, Grandmother observed a scratch on Child’s forehead, that his right arm was “twitching,” and “that his scrotum was ‘black and blue,’” and “advised [Father] that the child needed to be taken to the emergency room because there was something wrong with” him. Trial Ct. Op. at 3. “[M]other told [G]randmother that [she and Father] just had the child to the doctor and she saw no reason to take the child to the doctor” again. Id. Grandmother then “threatened that if they did not take the child,” she would. Id. When Grandmother returned Child to the parents “and said the child needed to go to the hospital, [M]other packed the child’s - 18 - J-A03035-15 things up, put him in the car seat and told [F]ather she was taking him to the hospital.” Id. at 3-4. Shortly thereafter, however, she returned without seeking medical attention “because she was not going to allow [G]randmother to tell her how to raise her kid or what was wrong with him.” Id. at 4. Mother then waited until the following day to take Child to the doctor. Mother did not offer any evidence in rebuttal of CYS’ allegations against her. See L.Z., 2015 WL 1332597 at *18. After considering the entire record, we agree with the trial court that Mother’s conduct amounted to “omission in the care of a child which results in a life-threatening condition or seriously impairs the child’s functioning.” See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302. Mother thus committed aggravated physical neglect, as defined by the Juvenile Act. See id. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding aggravated circumstances against her. See id. For the foregoing reasons, we find no relief due on Mother’s claims. Finally, we note the court would have found Father equally culpable for aggravated physical neglect; it stated: “The [c]ourt is completely baffled given this record as to why [CYS] has not filed for a finding of aggravating circumstances against [F]ather and would encourage the Agency to review this case regarding that issue.” Trial Ct. Op. at 8. - 19 - J-A03035-15 Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 6/2/2015 - 20 -