¹ The plaintiff also included allegations relating to the offer of enrollment in the certificate program in health administration, but these allegations are difficult to follow and he does not identify any fact regarding the program that he believes should have been disclosed to him prior to his enrollment in Scholl College. Accordingly, we disregard these allegations. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). - 12 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140952 111112, ¶ 40. Further, a party cannot fraudulently conceal information that it does not know. Stewart v. Thrasher, 242 Ill. App. 3d 10, 16 (1993). ¶ 29 These legal principles eliminate the second and third bases for the fraudulent concealment claim. As to the second alleged basis, the defendants argue that they did not know exactly how many students would be in the class of 2013 until after the plaintiff (and his fellow class members) actually enrolled. The plaintiff has not alleged how they could have disclosed this number before he enrolled. See id. Further, knowledge of RFUMS’s statement that it planned to enroll 90 students per year and of the Council on Podiatric Medical Education’s recommended 98-student limit would have been of little value without any knowledge of the actual class size to compare with these numbers and the number of residencies available. Without knowledge of all these numbers, the absence of information about the as-yet-unknown class size was not material. See Bauer, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 902. Similarly, as to the third alleged basis for the claim, there is no allegation that Meinhardt’s statements about past loan-default rates were inaccurate, and any implied projections about future default rates related solely to future events. The plaintiff does not allege that Meinhardt made any guarantee that past default rates would continue in the future, nor did he ask for her assessment of this risk. In these circumstances, the mere failure to disclose factors that could influence default rates in the future cannot support a claim of fraudulent concealment. See Rasgaitis, 2013 IL App (2d) 111112, ¶ 40. We therefore set aside the second and third bases for the fraudulent concealment claim, and we examine further only the allegations relating to the first basis, the defendants’ failure to disclose the residency shortage. ¶ 30 The defendants argue that the plaintiff has not alleged facts giving rise to a duty to disclose the likely shortfall in residencies available to DPM graduates. The existence of the defendant’s duty to speak is an essential part of the first element. However, not every - 13 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140952 relationship gives rise to a duty to speak. A duty to speak arises where the parties are in a fiduciary relationship, or where one party occupies a position of superiority or influence with respect to the other party. Schrager, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 707; see also Benson v. Stafford, 407 Ill. App. 3d 902, 918-19 (2010). A party may also be subject to a statutory duty to disclose certain facts. See, e.g., Bauer, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 906 (seller’s duty under Residential Real Property Disclosure Act (765 ILCS 77/35 (West 1996)) supported fraudulent-concealment claim). ¶ 31 Here, the plaintiff has alleged that the defendants owed him a statutory duty of disclosure under section 1030.60(a)(7) of Title 23 of the Illinois Administrative Code, requiring postsecondary institutions to “accurately describe the degree programs offered, program objectives, length of program, schedule of tuition, fees, and all other charges and expenses necessary for completion of the course of study, cancellation and refund policies, and such other material facts concerning the institution and the program or course of instruction as are likely to affect the decision of the student to enroll.” 23 Ill. Adm. Code 1030.60(a)(7) (2012). The defendants argue that this provision did not give rise to a statutory duty of disclosure, citing Moy v. Adelphi Institute, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 696, 708 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), but that case is distinguishable as it involved federal statutes and regulations relating to completely different matters. ¶ 32 The defendants also argue that their nondisclosure was not within the scope of their statutory duty to disclose, because the fact at issue (the shortage of residencies available to DPM graduates) related not to the DPM course of instruction itself but only to the availability of certain postgraduate options. However, in count IV of the amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants’ catalog and recruitment materials were not confined to descriptions of the course of study: the defendants also chose to describe various postgraduate options including residencies. The defendants specifically mentioned the need for a residency after graduation, stating that “a PM&S-36 residency program” was “the current state of the art for - 14 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140952 post-graduate training in podiatric medicine and podiatric surgery,” and they also made more general references to the “unprecedented” and “limitless” opportunities to practice podiatric medicine. ¶ 33 The defendants’ voluntary decision to bring up postgraduate opportunities in their recruitment materials suggests that they themselves viewed such opportunities as material to prospective students’ decisions about whether to enroll in the program. Accordingly, we believe that the plaintiff could adequately allege that the defendants’ statutory duty included the obligation to disclose the fact that successful completion of their DPM program did not ensure placement in the necessary postgraduate residency. “A statement that is technically true may nevertheless be fraudulent where it omits qualifying material since a ‘half-truth’ is sometimes more misleading than an outright lie.” W.W. Vincent & Co. v. First Colony Life Insurance Co., 351 Ill. App. 3d 752, 762 (2004) (citing Perlman v. Time, Inc., 64 Ill. App. 3d 190, 195 (1978), quoting St. Joseph Hospital v. Corbetta Construction Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d 925, 953 (1974)). Such half-truths may support a claim of fraudulent concealment. Id. Accordingly, we reject the defendants’ argument that they owed the plaintiff no duty to disclose material facts regarding the availability of postgraduate residencies in podiatric medicine. 2

² The dissent suggests that, in reaching this conclusion, we are abandoning our earlier position (in affirming the dismissal of count IV) that these future-oriented statements are not factual statements that can support a claim of fraud. See infra ¶¶ 53-54. This is a misreading of our disposition. We are not stating that these future-oriented statements are themselves actionable misrepresentations. Rather, we are simply pointing out that their inclusion in the Scholl College recruitment materials suggests that they are within the scope of the defendants’ statutory duty to accurately describe any facts that would be material to a prospective student’s - 15 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140952 ¶ 34 That said, as we noted above, the allegations that the 2009-10 Scholl College catalog contained half-truths about the postgraduate opportunities available to DPM graduates were contained in count IV, not count II. Neither count II nor count I (which is incorporated by reference into count II) contains any similar allegations. Without any similar allegations or any express incorporation by reference of the allegations in count IV, we do not read count II as including those allegations. Thus, as presently formulated, count II does not state a claim for fraudulent concealment of the residency shortage. ¶ 35 Nevertheless, we do not affirm the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of this claim. As the supreme court has often noted, “[a] complaint should be dismissed with prejudice under section 2-615 only if it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proven that will entitle the plaintiff to recover.” Cowper v. Nyberg, 2015 IL 117811, ¶ 22 (citing Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 488 (1994)). Thus, even where dismissal is appropriate under section 2-615, a plaintiff should be given leave to replead unless doing so would be futile. Here, the presence of the necessary allegations elsewhere in the complaint suggests that further amendment of this claim would not be futile: the plaintiff could simply expand his count II allegations to include those currently included in count IV. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of this portion of count II but modify the judgment pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) to reflect that the dismissal is without prejudice. See Cowper, 2015 IL 117811, ¶ 22. ¶ 36 Lastly, the defendants attack the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendants’ failure to mention the shortage of residencies in their catalog and recruitment materials prevented him from discovering it. They point out that, to plead a fraudulent concealment claim, a plaintiff decision to enroll. - 16 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140952 must allege either that he could not have discovered the truth through reasonable inquiry or that he was prevented from making reasonable inquiry. Bauer, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 902-03. The plaintiff responds that he did allege that he could not reasonably have discovered the truth, and he notes that, at this point in the case, the allegations of the complaint must be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to him. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 86-87. ¶ 37 Although “a person may not enter into a transaction with his eyes closed to available information,” a plaintiff’s failure to investigate the reliability of the defendant’s representations is not fatal where such inquiries are inhibited by statements creating a false sense of security. Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 156 Ill. App. 3d 154, 166 (1986). “Whether an injured party justifiably relied upon defendants’ words or silence depends on the surrounding circumstances” (id.) and is a question of fact that is best left to the trier of fact (id. at 167). Although the defendants point out that the plaintiff obviously discovered the shortage of residencies at some point—he includes fairly detailed figures about the numbers of residencies and DPM students in his complaint—the complaint does not reveal when the plaintiff learned of the shortage or how difficult it was to obtain this information. Moreover, the complaint contains statistics suggesting that the discrepancy between the number of graduating DPM students and the number of residencies was fairly minor in 2009, when he enrolled, but that discrepancy increased to 17% of the 2013 graduating class nationwide by the time he graduated. A reasonable inference from these allegations is that the plaintiff could not have known when he enrolled that the discrepancy was increasing so rapidly, whereas RFUMS likely had superior knowledge in this respect. ¶ 38 Reading the amended complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, we are not prepared to say that the plaintiff will not be able to prove any set of facts that would demonstrate reasonable reliance on the defendants’ silence. - 17 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140952 See Cowper, 2015 IL 117811, ¶ 22. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of count II of the amended complaint but, as to the claim that, when he was deciding whether to enroll at Scholl College, the defendants fraudulently concealed from him information about the shortfall in residencies, we modify that dismissal to reflect that it is without prejudice. On remand, the plaintiff will have an opportunity to replead this claim. ¶ 39 The dissent laments our decision to allow the plaintiff the opportunity to proceed on one of the many claims he attempted to assert in his amended complaint, and posits that this decision will open the floodgates to disgruntled graduates of professional schools who cannot find work. To the contrary, we view our decision as resting narrowly on the specific circumstances present here, as contained in the allegations of this particular complaint. In reaching this decision, we express no opinion regarding the ultimate merits of the claim. Indeed, it may well be that the plaintiff will be unable to prove his claim of fraudulent concealment, including that his reliance was reasonable. At this point, however, he deserves the opportunity to pursue his claim further. ¶ 40 CONCLUSION ¶ 41 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County as to the dismissal with prejudice of counts I, III, and IV. As to count II, we affirm the dismissal with prejudice of the portions of the count that assert fraudulent concealment based on the failure to state the entering class size or reveal factors that could affect the student-loan default rate. We also affirm the dismissal of count II insofar as it alleges fraudulent concealment of the fact that residencies in podiatric medicine would not be available for all of the graduates of the Scholl College DPM program, but we modify that dismissal to reflect that it is without prejudice. The cause is remanded for further proceedings on that claim only. ¶ 42 Affirmed as modified and remanded. ¶ 43 JUSTICE McLAREN, specially concurring. - 18 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140952 ¶ 44 I specially concur because I believe that the current basis for determining whether a complaint was properly dismissed with prejudice, as described by the majority in paragraph 35, is flawed. Quoting from our supreme court in Cowper, 2015 IL 11781, ¶ 22, the majority states that a motion to dismiss under section 2-615 should be granted with prejudice “ ‘only if it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proven that will entitle the plaintiff to recover.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Supra ¶ 35. ¶ 45 Section 2-615 refers to defects relating to a pleading’s sufficiency at law. There is nothing in section 2-615 that implies that facts need to be proven for a pleading to survive an attack on its legal sufficiency. The issue of proof does not arise under section 2-615, regardless of whether a dismissal is granted with or without prejudice. The basis as related in Cowper conflates proving a set of facts upon which relief can be granted with alleging such a set of facts. ¶ 46 I submit that the proper basis for dismissal with prejudice under section 2-615 should be “only if it is clearly apparent that the plaintiff can allege no set of facts that, even if proved, would entitle the plaintiff to recover.” It is the plaintiff’s ability to allege a legally sufficient cause of action, not his ability to prove some as-of-yet unmade allegations, that must be considered. ¶ 47 Thus, at minimum I would include a “[sic]” after “proven” in paragraph 35. ¶ 48 JUSTICE BIRKETT, concurring in part and dissenting in part. ¶ 49 I concur in all but the majority’s disposition of count II. I would affirm in its entirety the dismissal with prejudice of that count. ¶ 50 The majority believes that the allegations “necessary” to render count II sufficient are contained in count IV and that plaintiff need only incorporate them into count II. Supra ¶ 35. In my view, the majority takes inconsistent positions regarding these allegations. In affirming the dismissal with prejudice of count IV, the majority takes a dim view of them. Surprisingly, - 19 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140952 however, the allegations spring back forcefully some paragraphs later, where the majority finds that they could quicken the moribund count II if added to it. ¶ 51 The allegations in question consist of two statements in the 2009-10 Scholl College catalog (hereinafter “catalog statements”). The first statement is: “While not all students may choose a PM&S-36 residency program, it is the aim of this Office to insure that all students are at least aware that three years of post-graduate training in a PM&S-36 program are considered the current state of the art for post-graduate training in podiatric medicine and podiatric surgery.” The second statement is that there was “unprecedented opportunity for new doctors of podiatric medicine.” ¶ 52 The majority affirms the dismissal with prejudice of count IV, taking what I consider the proper view of the catalog statements. First, regarding the representation that students “may choose a PM&S residency program,” the majority finds that it cannot be read to imply a promise “that all students will have the ability to choose among different types of residencies,” i.e., that all students will receive at least one offer of residency. Supra ¶ 23. I agree entirely. Second, the majority regards defendants’ claim of “unprecedented opportunity” for new podiatry graduates as “puffing” (supra ¶ 25), or an understandably exaggerated representation by a seller as to the quality of his or her product—“the truth or falsity of which cannot be precisely determined” (emphasis added) (Avery, 216 Ill. 2d at 173-74). The majority also describes the assertion as a promise of future performance, which is nonactionable because it is properly considered an opinion rather than a statement of present or preexisting fact (Avon Hardware, 2013 IL App (1st) 130750, ¶ 17). Supra ¶ 25. Again, I agree without reservation. Consequently, I concur in the majority’s siding with defendants on the issue before this court as to count IV. As the majority notes, plaintiff frames that issue as whether “the defendants were negligent in presenting these statements, as they failed to convey that the opportunity to practice - 20 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140952 as a doctor of podiatric medicine was in fact limited, given that the number of residency placements was limited.” Supra ¶ 24. The majority does not question plaintiff’s articulation of the issue, but simply disagrees with him on the merits. ¶ 53 However, the majority’s characterization of the catalog statements takes an unexpected turn when the discussion reaches count II. Now the majority regards the catalog statements as “half-truths about the postgraduate opportunities available to DPM graduates” (emphasis added) (supra ¶ 34), a “half-truth” being “[a] statement that is technically true” but that omits “qualifying material” (W.W. Vincent & Co., 351 Ill. App. 3d at 762). The characterization of the catalog statements as “half-truths” is integral to the majority’s holding that defendants had a duty under section 1030.60(a)(7) of Title 23 of the Illinois Administrative Code to disclose the fact that not all graduates would obtain residencies. The majority says: “Such half-truths may support a claim of fraudulent concealment. [Citation.] Accordingly, we reject the defendants’ argument that they owed the plaintiff no duty to disclose material facts regarding the availability of postgraduate residences in podiatric medicine.” Supra ¶ 33. ¶ 54 However, in regarding as a half-truth the statement that there is “unprecedented opportunity for new doctors of podiatric medicine,” the majority abandons its earlier position that the statement cannot be regarded as any kind of truth-claim or verifiable representation and, thus, is mere “puffing.” Supra ¶¶ 24-25. Also, with respect to the statement that “not all students may choose a PM&S-36 residency program ***,” the majority now apparently regards the statement as only half true, and hence misleading, because it implies that all students will have the opportunity to turn down a residency. In this way, the majority retreats from its earlier position that the statement “cannot be read as promising that all students will have the ability to choose among different types of residencies.” Supra ¶ 23. - 21 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140952 ¶ 55 From this new premise that the catalog statements were intended as verifiable representations and were misleading about the availability of residencies, the majority now concludes that, if plaintiff adds the catalog statements to count II, he will have successfully pled that defendants were obligated to qualify the catalog statements with the sober truth about residency opportunities, namely that there was a “likely shortfall in residencies available to DPM graduates” (supra ¶ 30). Thus, the majority now affirms exactly what it positively denied just a few paragraphs earlier—that defendants had a duty “to convey that the opportunity to practice as a doctor of podiatric medicine was in fact limited, given that the number of residency placements was limited” (supra ¶ 24). ¶ 56 In response to this dissent, the majority claims that there is a distinction between viewing the catalog statements as actionable in themselves and “simply pointing out that their inclusion in the Scholl College recruitment materials suggests that they are within the scope of the defendants’ statutory duty to accurately describe any facts that would be material to a prospective student’s decision to enroll.” Supra ¶ 33 n.2. My point is that the majority would not be finding a statutory duty to disclose the likely shortfall in residencies did it not regard the catalog statements as half-truths. Furthermore, it is not simply because the catalog statements touch on the matter of postgraduate opportunities that the majority regards them as half-truths. Are we to believe that, if all the catalog said on the subject was something innocuous, like “a residency is necessary for licensure in most states,” the majority would find a properly pled claim of fraudulent concealment? Not at all, I submit. The majority’s view of the problem is revealed by what it prescribes. According to the majority, defendants had to remedy the effect of the catalog statements by “disclos[ing] the fact that successful completion of their DPM program did not ensure placement in the necessary postgraduate residency.” Supra ¶ 33. This is only because the majority views the catalog statements as implying to some degree a promise that - 22 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140952 each graduate will obtain a residency. Thus the majority contradicts how it described the catalog statements in upholding the dismissal with prejudice of count IV. Supra ¶¶ 23-25, 48. ¶ 57 Moreover, even assuming that the catalog statements were “half-truths,” plaintiff has failed to plead the element of fraudulent concealment that concerns his responsibility for uncovering the allegedly concealed information (namely, the projection of likely residency shortages for the class of 2013). That element, which one may call the “reasonable reliance” element, is: “plaintiff could not have discovered the truth through reasonable inquiry or inspection, or was prevented from making a reasonable inquiry or inspection, and justifiably relied upon the defendant’s silence as a representation that the fact did not exist” (Bauer, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 902-03). Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction (Simpkins v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 2012 IL 110662, ¶ 26), and allegations of fraud must meet an especially high standard of specificity (Merrilees v. Merrilees, 2013 IL App (1st) 121897, ¶ 15). “[The] complaint must allege, with specificity and particularity, facts from which fraud is the necessary or probable inference, including what representations were made, who made them, and to whom.” Addison v. Distinctive Homes, Ltd., 359 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1000 (2005). ¶ 58 Defendants, with specific references to plaintiff’s count II, contend that the allegations pertaining to the reasonable-reliance element consist of conclusory or otherwise inadequate statements. The majority acknowledges defendants’ challenge, but rejects it simply by noting that plaintiff responds in his reply brief that “he did allege that he could not reasonably have discovered the truth.” Supra ¶ 36. Strangely, the majority leaves the matter at that, without identifying where plaintiff pled the reasonable-reliance element with the requisite specificity and particularity. I submit that plaintiff did not allege it properly anywhere. The amended complaint’s paragraph 96 is representative of plaintiff’s failure to plead the element: - 23 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140952 “96. Defendants actively concealed [the] information from plaintiff and other students prior to enrollment by not disclosing it in the [2009-10 catalog], thereby preventing reasonable inquiry by prospective students.” ¶ 59 First, this allegation erroneously equates mere nondisclosure with “active[] conceal[ment].” See Miner v. Fashion Enterprises, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 3d 405, 421 (2003) (“Mere silence does not amount to fraud.”). Second, even if we accepted this thin allegation as establishing a duty to disclose, plaintiff still had to plead specific facts satisfying the reasonable- reliance element. Paragraph 96 makes no effort in that regard, but asserts, without any supporting allegations, that the nondisclosure itself “prevented reasonable inquiry.” The nondisclosure is a given here; it is a further, distinct question whether plaintiff discharged his duty of reasonable prudence. Rather than allege specific facts on that element, plaintiff simply merged it with the element of concealment, thus leaving a fatal gap in the pleading ¶ 60 The majority opens the next paragraph (paragraph 37) of its analysis by relying on Zimmerman for the proposition that, while “ ‘a person may not enter into a transaction with his eyes closed to available information,’ ” the “failure to investigate” is not fatal where “[the plaintiff’s] inquiries are inhibited by a defendant’s statements creating a false sense of security.” Supra ¶ 37 (quoting Zimmerman, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 166). The majority quotes Zimmerman further: “ ‘Whether an injured party justifiably relied upon defendants’ words or silence depends on the surrounding circumstances’ [(Zimmerman, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 166)], and is a question of fact that is best left to the trier of fact (id. at 167).” Supra ¶ 37. ¶ 61 Contrary to what this language might suggest, Zimmerman did not suggest that a plaintiff’s reasonable reliance is always a question of fact. The exact language from Zimmerman was: - 24 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140952 “Under the circumstances presented here, the issue of reasonable reliance is for the trier of fact. Based on the pleadings, we are not prepared to say that plaintiffs will not be able to prove any set of facts which will demonstrate reasonable reliance. [Citations.] Reasonable inferences from the complaint are sufficient to find that an ordinary inspection would not have disclosed the defects at issue here.” (Emphases added.) Zimmerman, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 167. ¶ 62 The court made these remarks in discussing whether the plaintiffs, who purchased a home from the defendants, acted reasonably in accepting, without investigation, the defendants’ representation that the home’s basement had only one prior water leak (where, in fact, as alleged in the complaint, the basement “had suffered massive flooding of up to four feet of water” (id. at 161). The appeal in Zimmerman concerned whether the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged fraud and negligent-misrepresentation claims. The defendants contended that the element of reasonable reliance was not adequately pled, as the plaintiffs acted unreasonably by failing to look behind the basement wall paneling, where they would have discovered evidence of flooding. The appellate court rejected this contention as to both the fraud and negligence claims: “We cannot say as a matter of law that plaintiffs closed their eyes to available information by not ripping down the panelling [sic] in an effort to discover the true extent of the leakage and flooding damage after defendant told them there was only one leak.” Id. at 166. ¶ 63 Critical to the appellate court’s holding was that, based on the pleadings, the plaintiffs could not have discovered the evidence of flooding through an “ordinary inspection” but would have had to tear out paneling―a degree of inspection not reasonably expected of them. Id. at 161, 167. Thus, the court was at pains to note that the plaintiffs’ reliance as alleged was reasonable. - 25 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140952 ¶ 64 Unfortunately, I do not see the majority showing the same regard as did the Zimmerman court for our jurisdiction’s pleading requirements. The majority says: “Although the defendants point out that the plaintiff obviously discovered the shortage of residencies at some point—he includes fairly detailed figures about the numbers of residencies and DPM students in his complaint—the complaint does not reveal when the plaintiff learned of the shortage or how difficult it was to obtain this information.” (Emphasis added.) Supra ¶ 37. ¶ 65 I disagree on two scores. First, the amended complaint does indeed illuminate the sources from which plaintiff obtained information about the residency shortage. Paragraphs 1 through 7 list multiple sources, many of them referenced by Internet link. Second, to the extent that the complaint is silent about when or how plaintiff obtained the information, it is elementary that the omission must be held against plaintiff, whose burden it was to plead that he “could not have discovered the truth through reasonable inquiry or inspection, or was prevented from making a reasonable inquiry or inspection, and justifiably relied upon the defendant’s silence as a representation that the fact did not exist” (Bauer, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 902-03). The majority considers it a “reasonable inference” that plaintiff “could not have known when he enrolled that the discrepancy [between the numbers of podiatry graduates and available residencies] was increasing so rapidly, whereas RFUMS likely had superior knowledge in this respect.” Supra ¶ 37. The majority overlooks the requirement that a plaintiff must plead the elements of fraud with specificity and particularly (Addison, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 1000). Plaintiff’s citation of Internet sources leads to only one inference: his access was equal to that of defendants. It was plaintiff’s burden to specify otherwise, and he did not do so. To read the complaint as sufficiently pleading the element of reasonable reliance is not to infer substance from the complaint but to impose substance upon it. This court has no authority to relieve plaintiff of the - 26 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140952 burden of alleging that the sources he consulted after the fact were not reasonably available to him when he made his decision to enroll in defendants’ podiatry school. We view allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; gaps we do not. Although all pleadings are to be liberally construed, a complaint must nonetheless state a cause of action by alleging facts. A failure to do so cannot be aided by any principle of liberal construction. Contrary to the majority’s approach, in ruling on a section 2-615 motion to dismiss, we are to disregard “mere conclusions of law or fact unsupported by specific factual allegations.” Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 232 Ill. 2d 463, 473 (2009). Plaintiff has secured himself a windfall through slovenly pleading. ¶ 66 To close, I submit that it is simply farcical to suppose that an individual of plaintiff’s education and experience could expect that his possession of a DPM degree would be a guaranteed entrée to a residency. The majority is sending this case back for plaintiff to replead, but I am confident that defendants said nothing to legitimate so naïve a belief. Therefore, I would uphold the dismissal with prejudice of all counts. ¶ 67 I would also comment on the policy aspects of today’s decision. When do causes of action like this end? Plaintiff essentially claims that defendants’ podiatry school had a duty to admit only enough students to fill the residencies available upon graduation. This is a practical impossibility. In fact, many professions—law, medicine, architecture, etc.—rely on the cream rising to the top. Factors such as the applicant’s experience, attitude, motivation, judgment, integrity, class rank, and grade point average play an essential role in securing postgraduate placement. There is no way to predict those students who will make it. The inability of educational institutions to guarantee academic success (and, a fortiori, placement in residencies) was the reason the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that, if presented with the issue, our supreme court would hold that Illinois does not recognize the tort of - 27 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140952 educational malpractice or negligent admission. See Ross v. Creighton University, 957 F.2d 410, 415-16 (7th Cir. 1991). Subsequently, in Waugh v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 2012 IL App (1st) 102653, ¶¶ 40, 42, the First District Appellate Court adopted Ross’s reasoning and held that the tort of educational malpractice is not cognizable in Illinois. The reasoning of both courts was that academic success cannot be scientifically predicted, subject as it is to intangible factors such as the student's attitude, motivation, temperament, experience, and home environment. Id. ¶ 37; Ross, 957 F.2d at 414. It would be equally poor policy to hold defendants accountable for plaintiff’s failure to obtain a residency, which depends not only on academic success (which itself is not subject to scientific prediction) but on other factors tangible and intangible. Thus, even if there had been no residency shortage, defendants could not have guaranteed plaintiff a residency. Notably, plaintiff’s complaint tells us nothing about his performance in the podiatry program other than the vague allegation that he received “adequate to excellent ‘grades’ in his coursework.” - 28 -