United States v. Larry Wilson & Lloyd Cox, 438 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1971). · Go Syfert
United States v. Larry Wilson & Lloyd Cox, 438 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1971). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
21 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Murphy-Ellis (ca9, 2002-09-26)
Treatment trajectory · 1971 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1971 1998 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Murphy-Ellis
9th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
See United States v. Kent, 945 F.2d 1441 , 1446 & n. 9 (9th Cir.1991) (no mens rea element for § 261.10(b) (occupying National Forest lands for residential purposes without a permit) because (“the words of the regulation speak solely of action, with no reference to volition,” and the regulation was a “ ‘public welfare offense’ as described in Morissette ”)); United States v. Wilson, 438 F.2d 525, 525 (9th Cir.1971) (per curiam) (no mens rea element for § 261.6(a) (cutting or damaging any timber or forest product without a permit)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Harold Larson
8th Cir. · 1984 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. United States v. Wilson, 438 F.2d 525, 525-26 (9th Cir.1971) (violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261 .-6(a)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Robert W. Launder (2×)
9th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
See Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 69-70 , 30 S.Ct. 663, 666-667 , 54 L.Ed. 930 (1910); United States v. Wilson, 438 F.2d 525, 525-26 (9th Cir.1971) (per curiam). 38 Consideration of the other Holdridge factors also supports my position that we should not infer a criminal intent requirement into section 1856.
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Lavon R. Kent (2×)
9th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Wilson, 438 F.2d 525 (9th Cir.1971).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Larry WILSON and Lloyd Cox, Appellants
26797.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Feb 11, 1971.
438 F.2d 525
Glenn D. Ramirez (argued), for Ramirez & Hoots, Klamath Falls, Or., for appellants., D. Richard Hammersley (argued), Asst. U. S. Atty., Sidney I. Lezak, U. S. Atty., Jack G. Collins, Asst. U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., for appellee.
Hamley, Browning, Hufstedler.
Cited by 16 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Appellants, Larry Wilson and Lloyd Cox, were convicted of cutting and removing timber from a national forest in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.6(a), an offense made punishable as a misdemeanor by 16 U.S.C. § 551.

Appellants cut and removed timber from national forest land while otherwise lawfully engaged in gathering Christmas trees on adjoining land. Appellants assert that they were unaware that they had strayed onto federal land and hence were not removing the timber wilfully. All of the arguments of substance presented on appeal turn on the validity of their assertion that wilfulness is one of the elements of the offense for which they were convicted.

The regulation that defines the crime does not make wilfulness an element of the offense. “Cutting, killing, destroying, girding, chipping, chopping, boxing, injuring or otherwise damaging or removing any timber or forest product except as authorized by law or regulation of the Secretary of Agriculture” are forbidden without any reference to the state of mind of the violator. [1] There is reason to believe that the omission of mens rea was intentional. The necessity of proving in each instance that the trespasser knew that he had crossed the often poorly marked boundaries of a national forest might make the regulatory scheme excessively difficult to enforce. We must, therefore, decline appellants’ invitation to read a requirement of criminal intent into the offense with which they are charged. See Holdridge[*526] v. United States (8th Cir. 1960) 282 F.2d 302; cf. Morissette v. United States (1952) 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288.

Appellants’ other contentions do not merit discussion.

The judgment is affirmed.

1

. In an effort to support their position that the omission of an element of wilfulness from the crime was inadvertent, appellants refer us to the Forest Service manual which in turn refers to state law, in this case Oregon, to define damages collectible in a civil case for wilful trespass. This regulation is too far removed from the Department of Agriculture regulation in question persuasively to support an argument for parallel interpretation.