Robert E. Gravenmier, & v. United States of Am., &, 469 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1972). · Go Syfert
Robert E. Gravenmier, & v. United States of Am., &, 469 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1972). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
24 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 13 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: RAUCEO v. PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS (paed, 2020-12-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1973 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1973 1999 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) RAUCEO v. PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS
E.D. Pa. · 2020 · confidence medium
Laws Company, Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1166 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983) (recusal not warranted where judge had represented the defendant in unrelated matters at least six years earlier); Jenkins v. Bordenkircher, 611 F.2d 162 , 165–67 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 943 (1980) (recusal not required where trial judge had prosecuted defendant for several unrelated crimes during the period four to thirteen years prior to the time of trial); Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir. 1972) (recusal not required where trial judge was of counsel in prior pros…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CHAVARRIA v. PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS
E.D. Pa. · 2020 · confidence medium
Laws Company, Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1166 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983) (recusal not warranted where judge had represented the defendant in unrelated matters at least six years earlier); Jenkins v. Bordenkircher, 611 F.2d 162 , 165–67 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 943 (1980) (recusal not required where trial judge had prosecuted defendant for several unrelated crimes during the period four to thirteen years prior to the time of trial); Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir. 1972) (recusal not required where trial judge was of counsel in prior pros…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ACKIE v. PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS
E.D. Pa. · 2020 · confidence medium
Laws Company, Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1166 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983) (recusal not warranted where judge had represented the defendant in unrelated matters at least six years earlier); Jenkins v. Bordenkircher, 611 F.2d 162 , 165–67 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 943 (1980) (recusal not required where trial judge had prosecuted defendant for several unrelated crimes during the period four to thirteen years prior to the time of trial); Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir. 1972) (recusal not required where trial judge was of counsel in prior pros…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DEAN v. PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS
E.D. Pa. · 2020 · confidence medium
Laws Company, Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1166 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983) (recusal not warranted where judge had represented the defendant in unrelated matters at least six years earlier); Jenkins v. Bordenkircher, 611 F.2d 162 , 165–67 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 943 (1980) (recusal not required where trial judge had prosecuted defendant for several unrelated crimes during the period four to thirteen years prior to the time of trial); Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir. 1972) (recusal not required where trial judge was of counsel in prior pros…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) GOODWIN v. PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS
E.D. Pa. · 2020 · confidence medium
Laws Company, Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1166 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983) (recusal not warranted where judge had represented the defendant in unrelated matters at least six years earlier); Jenkins v. Bordenkircher, 611 F.2d 162 , 165–67 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 943 (1980) (recusal not required where trial judge had prosecuted defendant for several unrelated crimes during the period four to thirteen years prior to the time of trial); Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir. 1972) (recusal not required where trial judge was of counsel in prior pros…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frank Konarski v. City of Tucson
9th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
See United States v. Silver, 245 F.3d 1075 , 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2001) (recusal not necessary where district court judge had been a United States Attorney while defendant was being investigated regarding an unrelated offense); Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that a judge, who as United States Attorney was of counsel when a defendant was tried and convicted of a charge, is not disqualified from presiding at the prosecution of the same defendant for an unrelated offense).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) RRCI Constructors, LLC v. Charlie's/Diamond Ready Mix, Inc.
D.V.I. · 2008 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 798 (1980); United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306, 1312 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a magistrate judge who issued a search warrant was not obligated to disqualify himself even though he had prosecuted the defendant three years earlier in an unrelated case); Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that where the trial judge was of counsel in a prior prosecution six years before the present unrelated prosecution, recusal was not required); People v. Curkendall, 12 A.D.3d 710, 714 , 783 N.Y.S.2d 707 (N.Y.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Edmunds v. Wyatt V.I., Inc.
visuper · 2007 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 798 (1980) (recusal not required where trial judge had prosecuted defendant for several unrelated crimes during the period four to thirteen years prior to the time of trial); Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir. 1972) (where trial judge was of counsel in prior prosecution six years before present unrelated prosecution, recusal not required); Darlington v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 261 F.2d 903, 906 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 992 , 79 S. Ct. 1121 , 3 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bravo Santiago v. Ford Motor Co.
D.P.R. · 2002 · confidence medium
Laws Company, Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1166 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied 464 U.S. 8 .14, 104 S.Ct. 69 , 78 L.Ed.2d 83 (1983) (recusal not warranted where judge had represented the defendant in unrelated matters at least six years earlier); Jenkins v. Bordenkircher, 611 F.2d 162, 165-67 (6th- Cir.1979), cert. denied 446 U.S. 943 , 100 S.Ct. 2169 , 64 L.Ed.2d 798 , (1980) (recusal not required where trial judge had prosecuted defendant for several unrelated crimes during the period four to thirteen years prior-to the time of trial); Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir.1972) (where …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carner v. City of Miami Beach
Fla. Cir. Ct. · 1990 · confidence medium
Laws Company, Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1166 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 , 106 S.Ct. 69 , 78 L.Ed.2d 83 (1983) (recusal not warranted where judge had represented the defendant in unrelated matters at least six years earlier); Jenkins v Bordenkircher, 611 F.2d 162, 165-67 (6th Cir. 1979(, cert. denied, 446 U.S. 943 , 100 S.Ct. 2169 , 64 L.Ed 2d 798 (1980) (recusal not required where trial judge had prosecuted defendant for several unrelated crimes during the period four to thirteen years prior to the time of trial); Gravenmier v United States, 469 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir. 1972) (where t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cipollone v. Liggett Group
3rd Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Laws Company, Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1166 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 , 106 S.Ct. 69 , 78 L.Ed.2d 83 (1983) (recusal not warranted where judge had represented the defendant in unrelated matters at least six years earlier); Jenkins v. Bordenkircher, 611 F.2d 162, 165-67 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 943 , 100 S.Ct. 2169 , 64 L.Ed.2d 798 (1980) (recusal not required where trial judge had prosecuted defendant for several unrelated crimes during the period four to thirteen years prior to the time of trial); Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir.1972) (where tr…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
3rd Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Laws Company, Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1166 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 , 106 S.Ct. 69 , 78 L.Ed.2d 83 (1983) (recusal not warranted where judge had represented the defendant in unrelated matters at least six years earlier); Jenkins v. Bordenkircher, 611 F.2d 162, 165-67 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 943 , 100 S.Ct. 2169 , 64 L.Ed.2d 798 (1980) (recusal not required where trial judge had prosecuted defendant for several unrelated crimes during the period four to thirteen years prior to the time of trial); Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir.1972) (where tr…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Edward J. Barry v. United States
7th Cir. · 1976 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir. 1972).
discussed Cited "see" United States of America,plaintiff-Appellee v. Robert Silver,defendant-Appellant
9th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66 (9th Cir.1972) (holding that a judge, who as United States Attorney was of counsel when a defendant was tried and convicted of one charge, is not disqualified from presiding at the prosecution of the same defendant for an unrelated offense).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Arocena v. United States
S.D.N.Y. · 1989 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See e.g., Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66, 69 (9th Cir.1972) (it is well established that the trial judge can hear and decide a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 even when the section 2255 motion is based on a claim that the trial judge should have disqualified himself from presiding over the trial); Walters v. United States, 404 F.Supp. 996, 997-98 (S.D.N.Y.1975).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Government of the Virgin Islands v. Briggs
virginislands · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence medium
(See footnote 1.) However, the cases interpreting the “of counsel” clause of § 455 specify that disqualification is necessary only when the judge has served in an “of counsel” capacity in the same case, e.g., Vasilick, supra; see also Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir. 1972).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lawrence Leroy Farrow v. United States (2×)
9th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e. g., Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66, 68 (9th Cir. 1972); Battaglia v. United States, 390 F.2d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1968).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Robert E. GRAVENMIER, Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Respondent and Appellee
71-1620.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Aug 23, 1972.
469 F.2d 66
Richard D. Clyde, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner and appellant., Robert L. Meyer, U. S. Atty., Larry Flax, David R. Nissen, Richard L. Ro-senfield, Asst. U. S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent and appellee.
Chambers, Trask, Crocker.
Cited by 22 opinions  |  Published
[*67] CHAMBERS, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Jurisdiction here is based on 28 U.S.C. § 2253.

On September 8, 1966, petitioner Robert E. Gravenmier was convicted of possession of a sawed off shotgun in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5851, § 5854, and § 5821. This was case No. 1. Judge Manuel L. Real, then United States Attorney Real at Los Angeles, was recorded as “of counsel,” with actual appearances made by an assistant United States attorney. On direct appeal, the conviction was affirmed (Gravenmier v. United States, 380 F.2d 30, 9th Cir., 1967). During the hiatus between conviction and affirmation two events occurred. On November 14, 1966, United States Attorney Real was appointed to the federal district bench. On February 20, 1967, while free on bail pending the outcome of the appeal in the firearm conviction, Gravenmier was again indicted in the district court. This was case No. 2. He was charged in two counts with two separate armed bank robberies. Judge Réal presided over the ensuing trial, which resulted in conviction on count two of case No. 2. The bank robbery sentence in case No. 2 was set at twenty years, to run concurrently with the four-year sentence for the firearm conviction in case No. 1.

Petitioner subsequently brought this motion to vacate the bank robbery sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, contending that Judge Real should have disqualified himself from the bank robbery trial in accordance with the mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 455. We call this case No. 3. In this appeal from Judge Real’s order denying that motion, petitioner also contends that it was improper for Judge Real to entertain the § 2255 motion because it was his impartiality that was under scrutiny in that motion.

I. As we have said, appellant contends that 28 U.S.C. §.455 required that Judge Real disqualify himself from presiding over the bank robbery trial, case No. 2. The code section reads as follows:

“Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.” (Emphasis added.)

While it is true that the United States attorney is “of counsel” for all criminal cases within his district, United States v. Amerine, 411 F.2d 1130 (6th Cir., 1969), the cases interpreting that clause of § 455 specify that disqualification is necessary only when the judge has served in an “of counsel” capacity in the same case, e.g., United States v. Vasiliuk, 160 F.2d 631 (3rd Cir., 1947). Therefore, this clause of § 455 does not require disqualification in our case.

As for the “substantial interest” clause, the mere fact that Judge Real was the United States attorney while petitioner was being prosecuted for a totally unrelated offense is not a sufficient reason to conclude that Judge Real has a “substantial interest” in this prosecution. * Since this clause of § 455 is also not applicable, we conclude that this claim is without merit.

Further, we point out that everything in this rehash of the conviction could have been presented during the course of trial and of the appeal in case No. 2.

[*68] II. Petitioner’s other contention' is that it was improper for the trial judge to preside over this particular § 2255 motion.

It is well established in this circuit that the trial judge can hear and decide motions made pursuant to 28 U. S.C. § 2255. Dukes v. United States, 407 F.2d 863 (9th Cir., 1969), rehearing denied April 9, 1969, cert. denied 396 U. S. 897, 90 S.Ct. 193, 24 L.Ed.2d 174; Odom v. United States, 455 F.2d 159 (9th Cir., 1972). The same rule applies even when the § 2255 motion is based on a claim that the trial judge should have disqualified himself from presiding over the trial. Judge Real was not infected or infested for life because he was of counsel in case No. 1.

Affirmed.

*

In United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728 (9th Cir., 1972), it was also claimed that Judge Real had a “substantial interest” in the case because of an earlier case which was on appeal while he was the United States attorney. Although this court rejected that claim, the majority concluded that the Ryan case “stemmed” from the earlier case. That is an important difference between Graven-mier’s case and the Ryan case. Here, the second prosecution is in no way related to the first prosecution.