in Re Wayne Dex Honea, 415 S.W.3d 888 (Tex. App. 2013). · Go Syfert
in Re Wayne Dex Honea, 415 S.W.3d 888 (Tex. App. 2013). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“texas rules of civil procedure applicable to the filing of an original lawsuit apply to a suit for modification under this chapter”
33 citation events (33 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: in Re: Jerry Hunter Keener (texapp, 2021-11-23)
Treatment trajectory · 2015 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2015 2020 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) in Re: Jerry Hunter Keener (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Tex. App. · 2021 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
texas rules of civil procedure applicable to the filing of an original lawsuit apply to a suit for modification under this chapter
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Thomas Earl Whitfield v. the State of Texas (2×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Analysis “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only in limited circumstances involving manifest and urgent necessity and not for grievances that may be addressed by other remedies.” In re Honea, 415 S.W.3d 888, 890 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, orig. proceeding) (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) in Re Mark A. Cantu
Tex. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.053(b) (“Except as provided by Subsection (d) [governing the assignment of judges or justices who were defeated in the last primary or general election], each party to the case is only entitled to one objection under this section for that case.”); In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d at 703 (discussing the rationale and history of the statutory limitation for objections); In re Honea, 415 S.W.3d 888, 890 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.) (“Except as specifically provided, each party to the case is entitled to only one objection under the statute.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Perkins
Tex. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
See In re Perritt, 992 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex.1999) (orig.proceeding); In re Mendoza, 467 S.W.3d 76, 78 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding); In re Honea, 415 S.W.3d 888, 890 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2013, orig. proceeding); Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) in Re Electric Transmission Texas, LLC
Tex. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
See In re Perritt, 992 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding); In re Honea, 415 S.W.3d 888, 890 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, orig. proceeding); In re Cullar, 320 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2010, orig. proceeding).
cited Cited as authority (rule) in the Interest of L.A.F.
Tex. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
CODE ANN. § 156.004 (West 2014); In re Honea, 415 S.W.3d 888, 890 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Marla Cuellar v. Omar Maldonado
Tex. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Id. § 74.053(b); In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 701 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding); In re Honea, 415 S.W.3d 888, 890 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, orig. proceeding).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rey Ortiz v. Luis Manuel Singleterry
Tex. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Id. § 74.053(b); In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 701 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding); In re Honea, 415 S.W.3d 888, 890 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, orig. proceeding).
cited Cited "see" in Re: Rodney Wayne Morrison
Tex. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 889 ; see also TEX.
discussed Cited "see" in Re J. Michael Moore (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Tex. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally id.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." in Re Magnolia Property Management
Tex. App. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See id. 8 If a properly filed objection under this statute is timely, “the assigned judge’s disqualification is automatic.” In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d at 701 ; see id. § 74.053(b) (stating that “the judge shall not hear the case”); Flores, 932 S.W.2d at 501 (“When a party files a timely objection to an assigned judge under section 74.053 of the Texas Government Code, the assigned judge’s disqualification is mandatory.”); see also In re Honea, 415 S.W.3d 888, 890 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, orig. proceeding).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." in the Interest of B.T., a Child (2×)
Tex. App. · 2015 · signal: see also · confidence low
To the extent that Mother relies on In re Honea 13 to argue that Judge Cleveland lacked authority to rule on the modification (and, for that matter, the protective order) matters pending through February 26, 2013, we point out that Honea was not concerned with the expiration of Judge Cleveland’s plenary power, and therefore jurisdiction, but with the timeliness of an objection to him serving as a visiting judge in a third family law action pursuant to an assignment order signed after the second action began. 14 Honea contains no suggestion that the parties filed a postjudgment motion after t…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In Re Wayne Dex HONEA
11-13-00300-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas.
Oct 31, 2013.
415 S.W.3d 888
Judson K. Woodley, Woodley & Dudley, Comanche, for Relator., Brad Stephenson, Eastland, for Real Party in Interest., David Cleveland, Senior Judge, Respondent.
McCall, Willson, Chew, Wright.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

TERRY McCALL, Justice.

This mandamus proceeding arises from an objection to an assigned senior judge filed under Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.053(b) (West 2013). Relator, Wayne Dex Honea, seeks mandamus relief requiring the assigned judge, Honorable David Cleveland, Senior District Judge of the 29th District Court, to withdraw from presiding over Relator’s recently filed petition to modify the parent-child relationship. He additionally seeks an order requiring the presiding judge of the 8th Administrative Judicial Region, Honorable Jeff Walker, to assign a different judge to preside over the matter. We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.

Background Facts

On January 7, 2010, Judge Walker assigned Judge Cleveland to preside over the divorce between Relator and the Real Party in Interest, Angelia Faye Phillips. The divorce between Relator and the Real Party in Interest became final in 2010 pursuant to an agreed final decree of divorce entered on May 14, 2010, by Judge Cleveland. After the entry of the final decree of divorce, further litigation occurred between Relator and the Real Party in Interest. Relator filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship on January 5, 2012. On January 19, 2012, Presiding Judge Walker entered an order assigning Judge Cleveland to preside over the modification proceeding. On July 3, 2013, Judge Cleveland entered a final order denying Relator’s requested modification.

On August 19, 2013, Relator filed another petition to modify the parent-child relationship. Relator’s counsel alleges that he[*890] received actual notice that Judge Cleveland was assigned to preside over the case by the court coordinator on September 6, 2013. Relator filed an objection to the assignment of Judge Cleveland on September 9, 2018. Relator subsequently wrote Judge Walker on September 16, 2013, informing him that Judge Cleveland refused to honor the objection. Relator additionally requested Judge Walker to assign a different judge.

Judge Walker responded in writing to Relator in a letter dated September 20, 2013. Judge Walker advised Relator that he assigned Judge Cleveland to preside over the “case” between Relator and the Real Party in Interest in his assignment order dated January 19, 2012. He further stated that Relator waived his right to object to Judge Cleveland by filing his objection after Judge Cleveland had issued previous rulings in proceedings between the parties arising from their divorce. Thus, Judge Walker took the position that Judge Cleveland’s assignment to previous proceedings arising from the divorce between the parties also served as his assignment to future proceedings between the parties arising from the divorce.

Analysis

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only in limited circumstances involving manifest and urgent necessity and not for grievances that may be addressed by other remedies. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex.1992). To be entitled to relief, the relator must demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion or the violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no other adequate remedy at law. See Republican Party of Texas v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tex.1997). Additionally, the relator must satisfy three requirements, to-wit: (1) a legal duty to perform; (2) a demand for performance; and (3) a refusal to act. Stoner v. Massey, 586 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex.1979).

Section 74.053 governs objections to the assignment of trial judges. Except as specifically provided, each party to the case is entitled to only one objection under the statute. Gov’t § 74.053(b). If a properly filed objection is timely, the assigned judge’s disqualification is automatic. Id.; In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 701 (Tex.2001). An objection to the assignment of a trial judge under Section 74.053 must be filed not later than the earlier of the seventh day after the date the party receives actual notice of the assignment or of the date the first hearing or trial, including pretrial hearings, commences. Gov’t § 74.053(c).

The issue in this proceeding is the timeliness of Relator’s objection to Judge Cleveland. Judge Walker determined that Relator’s objection to modify was untimely because Judge Cleveland had presided— without objection — over previous proceedings between the parties arising from their divorce.

Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 156.004 (West 2008) provides that, in a suit to modify an order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, “[t]he Texas Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to the filing of an original lawsuit apply.” Relying upon this provision, the court in Bilyeu v. Bilyeu, 86 S.W.3d 278, 280 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, no pet.), determined that a suit to modify an order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship is a new cause of action. See Normand v. Fox, 940 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex.App.-Waco 1997, no writ); Katerndahl v. Haberman, No. 04-96-00444-CV, 1996 WL 411194, at *1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio July 24, 1996, orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication) (“A motion to modify is an original lawsuit filed in the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.”). Thus, a motion to modify an order[*891] entered in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship is a new case or new cause of action under the Texas Family Code. There is no authority that an assignment order entered in a previous case between the parties governs a subsequent case. Accordingly, Relator’s consent to Judge Cleveland in a previous proceeding has no bearing on a new case.

We conclude that Relator’s objection to Judge Cleveland was timely and that Judge Cleveland had a mandatory obligation to withdraw from the case. We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. Judge Cleveland is directed to withdraw from presiding over the motion to modify filed by Relator, and Judge Walker is directed to assign a different judge to preside over the proceeding. The writ of mandamus will issue only if Judge Cleveland and Judge Walker fail to act by November 21, 2018.

WRIGHT, C.J., not participating.