Amber Wray v. Jonathon A. Papp, 434 S.W.3d 297 (Tex. App. 2014). · Go Syfert
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Amber Wray v. Jonathon A. Papp, 434 S.W.3d 297 (Tex. App. 2014). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
20 citation events (20 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Wanda Joyce Smith v. Casey Lending, LLC (txctapp1, 2026-01-29) · Strongest negative: Tommy Lee Brown, Jr. v. Sandra Ann Brown (texapp, 2019-12-11)
Treatment trajectory · 2014 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2014 2020 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Tommy Lee Brown, Jr. v. Sandra Ann Brown
Tex. App. · 2019 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Wray v. Papp, 434 S.W.3d 297, 299 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (reversing trial court’s judgment in suit involving the parent-child relationship where party was not present or represented by counsel at the hearing and no record was made) (citing TEX.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wanda Joyce Smith v. Casey Lending, LLC
txctapp1 · 2026 · confidence medium
Stancu v. S. Methodist Univ., No. 05-21-00666-CV, 2022 WL 2763354 , at *2 (Tex. 3 App.—Dallas July 15, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Wray v. Papp, 434 S.W.3d 297, 299 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest of D.Z.C., a Child v. the State of Texas (2×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Cf. In re L.A.S., No. 04-22-00368-CV, 2023 WL 8440518 , at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 6, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting SAPCR order inaccurately stated that parties waived the making of a record); Wray v. Papp, 434 S.W.3d 297, 299 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) -3- 04-24-00565-CV (same).
examined Cited as authority (rule) In Re L.A.S., a Child v. . (3×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
CODE ANN. § 105.003(c); Wray v. Papp, 434 S.W.3d 297, 299 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (citing Stubbs v. Stubbs, 685 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tex. 1985)); Interest of J.W., No. 01-18-00932-CV, 2020 WL 573259 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 6, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest of A.G.B., G.A.B., and J.M.B v. the State of Texas
Tex. App. · 2023 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See In re D.J.M., 114 S.W.3d at 639 ; cf., e.g., Wray v. Papp, 434 S.W.3d 297, 299 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (making of a record cannot be waived by party who is “neither present nor represented by counsel at the hearing”).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Mateo Perez v. Gabrielle Mejia (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Tex. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
The parties do not dispute the non-existence of a reporter’s record, and the divorce decree confirms that a record was not made of the hearing: “The making of a record of testimony was waived by the parties with the consent of the Court.” “A record is required to be made in all suits involving the parent-child relationship unless waived by the parties with the consent of the court.” Wray v. Papp, 434 S.W.3d 297, 299 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (citing TEX.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ex Parte K.S.
Tex. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Because this is a restricted appeal, our sole remaining inquiry is whether “error is apparent on the face of the record.” See Wray v. Papp, 434 S.W.3d 297, 299 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ex Parte Damon L. Walker
Tex. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Because this is a restricted appeal, our sole remaining inquiry is whether “error is apparent on the face of the record.” See Wray v. Papp, 434 S.W.3d 297, 299 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Office of the Attorney General of Texas v. Darrick Koponen
Tex. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
See Arbogust, 2018 WL 3150996 , at *1 n.2; Wray v. Papp, 434 S.W.3d 297, 299 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.); see also In re K.B.R., No. 07-07-00098-CV, 2008 WL 2467375 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 20, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[W]here a party is neither present nor represented by counsel at the hearing, the making of the record cannot be waived as to the absent party and a trial court commits error in consenting to the waiver of a record.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) FJR Sand, Inc. v. Essex Insurance Company
Tex. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
P. 10.5(b), 26.3; see also Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997) (holding motion for extension of time is implied when appellant, acting in good faith, files notice of appeal beyond rule 26.1 deadline but within rule 26.3 fifteen-day extension period); Wray v. Papp, 434 S.W.3d 297, 299 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (discussing extension of time to file notice of restricted appeal) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Elishah Sawyers, Pax Crate & Freight, Inc. and Robin Sawyers v. Marc Carter and Sally Carter
Tex. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
The court further noted that “[a] motion for extension of time is implied when an appellant acting in good faith files a notice of appeal beyond the time allowed by Rule 26.1, but within the fifteen-day grace period.” Wray v. Papp, 434 S.W.3d 297, 299 (Tex. App.– San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (citing Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex.1997)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Albert Ralph Velasquez, Associated Transportation Services, LLC, and P5 Management Group v. Lisa Ramirez
Tex. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Wray v. Papp, 434 S.W.3d 297, 299 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.); see Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Amber WRAY, Appellant
v.
Jonathon A. PAPP, Appellee
04-13-00374-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas.
May 21, 2014.
434 S.W.3d 297
Sunny Middleton, San Antonio, TX, for Appellant., Rafael Leal, San Antonio, TX, for Appel-lee.
Stone, Barnard, Alvarez.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

Opinion by: PATRICIA 0. ALVAREZ, Justice.

This is a restricted appeal from a final divorce wherein Appellant Amber Wray defaulted. We reverse the trial court’s order and remand the cause to the trial court for a new hearing.

Factual and ProceduRAl Background

Appellant Amber Wray and Appellee Jonathon Papp married on December 28, 2007, and are the parents of a minor child born May 12, 2004. Wray and Papp separated in August 2011, and Papp moved to Texas with the minor child. On August 3, 2012, Papp filed for divorce and on September 11, 2012, Wray filed her answer. The following month, on October 14, 2012, Papp filed an amended divorce petition and mailed a certified copy of such to Wray, notifying Wray of the final hearing on the merits set for December 13, 2012. Although Papp offered a United States Postal Service tracking sheet indicating Wray received the certified letter on Octo[*299] ber 25, 2012, the record does not contain a copy of the return.

Papp appeared pro se at the hearing. However, Wray was still living in Mississippi and did not appear. Wray was not present; yet, the divorce decree indicates “[t]he making of a record of testimony was waived by the parties with the consent of the Court.” Papp was appointed sole managing conservator of their minor child and Wray was ordered to pay $200 per month in child support and $25 per month for health insurance. Wray did not sign or agree to the final divorce decree. On June 14, 2013, Wray filed this restricted appeal.

Restricted Appeal

A party can prevail in a restricted appeal only if: (1) it filed notice of the restricted appeal within six months after the judgment was signed; (2) it was a party to the underlying lawsuit; (3) it did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of and did not timely file any postjudgment motions or requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (4) error is apparent on the face of the record. Ins. Co. of State of PA v. Lejeune, 297 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex.2009) (per curiam). The record clearly demonstrates that Wray satisfies elements two and three. Papp appears to challenge both the first and fourth requirements.

A. Restricted Appeal Must Be Filed within Six Months after the Judgment is Signed

The trial court signed the divorce decree on December 13, 2012. Wray’s restricted appeal was filed June 14, 2013. A restricted appeal must be filed within six months after the trial court signs its judgment. Tex.R.App. P. 26.1(c). An appellate court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal if, within fifteen days after the deadline for filing the notice, the appealing party files a notice of appeal with the trial court and a motion for extension of time. Tex.R.App. P. 26.3. A motion for extension of time is implied when an appellant acting in good faith files a notice of appeal beyond the time allowed by Rule 26.1, but within the fifteen-day grace period. Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex.1997). On August 19, 2013, this court determined Wray’s explanation that the late filing was due to a mistake in calculation and her inability to timely secure legal counsel was satisfactory. We, therefore, conclude Wray’s notice of appeal was timely filed. Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(c), 26.3.

B. Error is Apparent on the Face of the Record

A record is required to be made in all suits involving the parent-child relationship unless waived by the parties with the consent of the court. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 105.003(c) (West 2014). Although the order in question recites the parties waived the making of a record, Wray was neither present nor represented by counsel at the hearing; therefore, the making of the record could not be waived as to Wray, and the trial court erred in consenting to the waiver of the record. In re K.B.R., No. 07-07-0098-CV, 2008 WL 2467375, at *2 (Tex.App.-Amarillo June 20, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re Vega, 10 S.W.3d 720, 722 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.). The trial court’s error is reversible and constitutes error on the face of the record because we cannot evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s order without a reporter’s record. See Stubbs v. Stubbs, 685 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tex.1985); Baker v. Baker, No. 03-09-00455-CV, 2010 WL 2010817, at *1 (Tex.App.-Austin May 18, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re M.E.P., No. 2-05-148-CV, 2006 WL 417096, at *3 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Feb. 23, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.).

[*300] Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand the cause for a new hearing.