OPINION No. 04-11-00318-CV
IN RE Donovan George GREEN
Original Mandamus Proceeding 1
Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice Rebecca Simmons, Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 24, 2011
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS CONDITIONALLY GRANTED IN PART
On May 5, 2011, relator Donovan Green filed a petition for writ of mandamus, contending the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over him with regard to the divorce proceeding, lacks jurisdiction over the suit affecting the parent-child relationship, issued an order in violation of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, and that Texas is an inconvenient forum.
We conclude the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the suit affecting the parent-child relationship and deny all other relief sought in the petition for writ of mandamus. Therefore, we conditionally grant mandamus relief in part.
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ANALYSIS
I. Suit Affecting the Parent Child Relationship
The Texas Supreme Court has held that mandamus review is appropriate in child custody cases where there is a jurisdictional dispute. Geary v. Peavy, 878 S.W.2d 602, 603 (Tex. 1994)
(orig. proceeding); In re Burk, 252 S.W.3d 736, 738-39 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]). Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928
(Tex.1998); see also Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 324-25 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding);
Burk, 252 S.W.3d at 738-39.
Donovan contends Texas lacks jurisdiction over the SAPCR. The Texas Family Code provides that a child’s home state has primary jurisdiction over child custody proceedings. See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.201(a) (West 2008). A child’s home state is “the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 152.102(7) (West 2008). Because Texas law prioritizes home state jurisdiction, a Texas court can make an initial custody determination only if Texas is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 152.201(a)(1).
It is undisputed that the child D.G.G. has never lived in Texas. D.G.G. has resided in Germany since his birth, with the exception of when Donovan was stationed in Virginia from 04-11-00318-CV
[*3]2002 to 2008. The parties indicate the child currently resides in Germany and has since 2008.
Therefore, Texas is not the child’s home state under section 152.201(a)(1). Id.
Because Texas cannot claim jurisdiction under section 152.201(a)(1), a Texas court could have asserted jurisdiction only if a court of another state did not have home state jurisdiction or a court of the home state of the child had declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under section 152.207 or 152.208, and the child and at least one of the child’s parents has significant connections to Texas. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 152.201(a)(2). However, “‘[t]his ‘significant connection’ jurisdiction should only be employed when Texas is not the home state and it appears that no other state could assert home state jurisdiction.’” In re Barnes, 127 S.W.3d 843, 848 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding) (quoting In re Oates, 104 S.W.3d 571, 578 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, orig. proceeding)). Maria does not assert Germany lacks home state jurisdiction or that Germany has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that Texas is the more appropriate forum. See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.201(a)(2). To the contrary, the parties have indicated there is an
ongoing child custody proceeding in Germany. As a result of the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the SAPCR.
II. Divorce Proceeding
Donovan next contends the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over him with regard to the divorce proceeding. To be entitled to mandamus relief, Donovan must establish the trial court clearly abused its discretion and he lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). An abuse of discretion with respect to factual matters occurs if the record establishes the trial court could reasonably have 04-11-00318-CV reached only one decision. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. However, “[a] trial court has no
[*4]‘discretion’ in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts,” and “a clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion.” Id.
Donovan contends the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over him because he is not a resident in accordance with section 6.301 of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 6.301 (West 2006) (General Residency Rule for Divorce Suit). However, the residency
requirement under section 6.301 is not jurisdictional, but instead involves the right to maintain suit. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 86 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); Cook v. Mayfield, S.W.2d 840, 841 (Tex. App.—Waco 1994, no writ); Oak v. Oak, 814 S.W.2d 834, 837
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied). The requirements of domicile and residence under section 6.301 are fact issues for the trial court to determine, which will not be
disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Griffith v. Griffith, No. 04-10-00174-CV, 2011 WL 17382, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 5, 2011, no pet. h.). Based on the record before us and the record presented to the trial court, we cannot determine at this time the trial court clearly abused its discretion in failing to grant Donovan’s plea to the jurisdiction or plea in abatement.
III. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act
Next, Donovan contends the Honorable Cathy Stryker granted Maria temporary orders which affect the child in violation of the stay issued under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.
See 50 U.S.C. § 522(b). However, Donovan fails to direct this court to temporary orders in the record signed by Judge Stryker. It is a relator’s burden to file with the petition a certified or sworn copy of any order complained of. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k) & 52.7(a). The record does, however, contain an order granting a temporary injunction signed by Judge Nellermoe.
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However, Donovan fails to provide any specific argument as to how the temporary injunction was improper under the stay. Furthermore, to the extent that Donovan’s argument is that the trial court erred in issuing an order in violation of the stay because such order affects the child, this
argument is now moot based on this court’s finding that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the SAPCR. Based on the foregoing, we conclude Donovan has failed to establish he is entitled to mandamus relief against Judge Stryker.
IV. Inconvenient Forum
Finally, Donovan contends Texas is an inconvenient forum. However, there is no indication in the record that this argument was ever presented to and ruled on by the trial court.
Without a proper motion presented to and ruled on by the trial court in accordance with Texas
Family Code § 152.207, this court cannot grant mandamus relief on this basis. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 152.207 (West 2008).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold the trial court clearly abused its discretion in failing to dismiss the SAPCR for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus in part and all other relief sought is denied. The trial court is ordered to withdraw the portion of the March 30, 2011 order denying the plea to the jurisdiction as to the SAPCR and enter an order dismissing the SAPCR. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply within fourteen days.
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
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