Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.
ENTRY ORDER
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2010-445
MARCH TERM, 2011
In re S.M. & A.M., Juveniles } APPEALED FROM: } } Superior Court, Orange Unit, } Family Division } } DOCKET NO. 16/17-3-09 Oejv
Trial Judge: Thomas J. Devine
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
Mother appeals termination of her parental rights to her daughters, S.M. and A.M., born in December 2003 and May 2006, respectively. On appeal, mother argues that the court erred in failing to assess the appropriateness of the plan of services in her case plan. We affirm.
The court found the following facts by clear and convincing evidence. Mother was sixteen when S.M. was born. She and father1 continued their relationship, married in 2005, and a year later A.M. was born. During the marriage, father was violent and physically abusive to mother. He did not assist in child care. He abused drugs and alcohol and was periodically incarcerated. After S.M. was born, mother’s aunt came to visit and was horrified by the unsanitary conditions in the home. In December 2006, following father’s increasingly violent behavior, mother left the house with the children and went to her mother’s home. After two weeks, in response to father’s demands, mother returned the children to the home and left them in father’s care. She visited two weeks later and observed that the living conditions were abysmal. The home was filthy, there was a water pipe for smoking marijuana in the living room, the children were dirty, and S.M. was hot and feverish to the touch. Mother called father’s probation officer about the marijuana pipe, but she did not contact any social service provider or family member about the children’s welfare, and she did not take the children with her when she left.
In January 2007, father brought the girls to mother’s aunt, who has four children of her own, and asked her to take them for a few weeks. No one knew where mother was at the time. S.M. later reported that during the six weeks in father’s care father had repeatedly sexually abused her and that both girls were extremely neglected. S.M. described how she was forced to eat cat food and scraps from the floor. A.M. was weak and exhausted. The aunt brought the girls to the doctor, who determined that A.M. had extreme muscle atrophy from likely being left in a car seat for long periods of time. She was very underweight, and the doctor diagnosed her with failure to thrive. S.M. had impacted bowels and was suffering from malnutrition. When the aunt eventually spoke with mother on the phone, mother asked the aunt to continue to keep the girls. Mother was homeless and visited the girls sporadically. In March 2007, the aunt sought In September 2009, DCF amended the case plan and recommended that parents’ rights be terminated. In November 2009, following a hearing, the family division denied mother’s motion to re-establish parent-child contact, concluding that it would be harmful to the children. Mother appealed, and this Court affirmed. In re S.M. & A.M., No. 2010-010 (Vt. May 21, 2010) (unpub. mem.), available at http://www.vermontjudiciary.org/d-upeo/upeo.aspx.
[*2]At the initial disposition hearing on August 12, 2010, DCF sought termination. In a written order, the court granted termination based on an evaluation of the statutory best interests factors. The court found that mother shared responsibility for the children’s neglect and abuse by maintaining an unsanitary and unsafe environment prior to her departure from the family home and by leaving her children in the care of a man who she knew was violent, abusive, abused alcohol and drugs, and lacked any experience in caring for children. Despite these actions, the court found that mother had not accepted any significant personal responsibility for her role in the children’s suffering. The court concluded that due to the significant abuse and neglect, “the children’s relationship with mother is very badly damaged and in all likelihood completely beyond repair.” The court also found that the children’s relationship with mother was weakened when she ceased contact with them for five months. On the other hand, the court found that the children have a strong and positive relationship with their foster families and that their behaviors and attitudes have improved. The court concluded that mother will not be able to resume parenting within a reasonable period of time because although she has made some progress, she lacks insight about critical issues for the girls, such as PTSD and child sexual abuse, and the children have an immediate need for permanency. Mother appeals.
When termination is sought at the initial disposition hearing, the trial court is directed to “consider the best interests of the child.” 33 V.S.A. § 5317(d); see In re J.T., 166 Vt. 173, 177 (1997) (observing that parental rights may be terminated “at the initial disposition hearing if the court finds it to be in the best interests of the child to do so”). In assessing the child’s best interests, the court must consider the statutory criteria, including the child’s relationship with his natural parents and foster parents, the child’s adjustment to his community, the likelihood the natural parent will be able to resume parenting within a reasonable period of time, and whether the natural parent plays a constructive role in the child’s life. 33 V.S.A. § 5114(a). The most important factor is whether the parent will be able to resume parenting duties within a reasonable period of time. In re J.B., 167 Vt. 637, 639 (1998) (mem.). On appeal, we will uphold the family court’s conclusions if supported by the findings and affirm the findings unless clearly erroneous. Id.
Mother argues that the court abused its discretion in failing to review the proposed service plan. Mother notes that DCF’s recommended plan of services directed mother to receive counseling and to attend parenting classes, but did not specify that the classes should address issues affecting the girls, such as PTSD, child sexual abuse, and domestic violence. Therefore, mother contends that the court erred in finding that mother could not resume parenting within a reasonable period of time because she had not gained information and insight into these relevant areas. According to mother, the plan of services was deficient because it failed to allow her to address “the causes and conditions which led to the filing of the petition.” Id. (quotation omitted).
We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in this case. The court’s analysis of the statutory best interests factors—the only relevant analysis when termination is requested at the initial disposition hearing—was thorough and supported by the evidence. In particular, the court’s assessment that mother was not able to resume parenting within a reasonable period of time is not undermined by the court’s failure to specifically review the plan of services. “Although a court is not required to find that [DCF] made reasonable efforts to assist a parent, such assistance is a factor in determining whether [DCF] met its burden of showing that a parent is unlikely to be able to resume parental duties within a reasonable period.” In re J.M., 170 Vt. 587, 589 (2000) (mem.). To the extent mother is contending that she did not receive adequate assistance from DCF or that she did not have notice of the steps that were necessary to reunite her family, these arguments are not supported by the record. As early as May 2008, when the probate court first ordered mother to seek counseling and gain insight into her role in the children’s abuse and neglect, mother was on notice as to the steps required to reunify with the children. DCF’s May 2009 initial case plan identified similar goals for mother. That the plan did not specifically direct mother to take parenting classes on PTSD, sexual abuse and domestic violence does not alter the fact that mother was aware of those issues and their significance to S.M. and A.M.’s emotional well-being. DCF did require her to address these issues in her therapy sessions. Based on DCF’s recommendations, mother was offered and took part in services. The family division acknowledged mother’s efforts in taking parenting classes and beginning individualized therapy, but ultimately concluded that more was needed to be able to care for the children. The court concluded that the time necessary to address the issues was not reasonable because the children’s need for permanency and stability could not be postponed any longer. This finding is based on credible evidence provided by both children’s therapists and the family forensic evaluation, and we will not disturb it on appeal.
[*3]Affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
_______________________________________ Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice
_______________________________________ John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
_______________________________________ Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
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