v.
MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY PATROL, Appellant
Allen Killian filed a petition “pursuant to Section 589.400(7)” to remove his name from Missouri’s sex offender registry. [1] The local prosecutor, notified per § 589.400.9, offered rio objection. After a brief hearing at which only Killian and his attorney appeared, the trial court entered an order in Killian’s favor.
Shortly thereafter,. the Missouri State Highway Patrol (MSHP) “and the State of Missouri, through the Attorney General’s Office” moved to intervene as a matter of right. Their motion was denied. Eventually, a final [1] judgment was entered in favor of Killian:'
MSHP appeals, assérting in part trial court error in denying its motion to intervene. [2] We must, agree. Under Dunivan (decided after the trial court’s ruling), MSHP satisfies Rule 52.12(a)(2)’s elements and was entitled to intervene in Killian’s case below. -See 466 S.W.3d at 519-20. We grant MSHP’s third point, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and remand for further proceedings. [3]
. Statutory citations are to RSMo as amended through 2012; rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2014). Since there is no .§ 589.400(7), we presume Killian meant to cite § 589.400.7. Killian did not request relief from registering under the federal Sex Offender Registration >and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq.; compare Dunivan-v. State, 466 S.W-3d 514, 516 n.l (Mo. banc 2015).
. The "State of Missouri, through the Attorney General’s Office” did not join the notice of appeal.
. As in Dunivan, wesdo not reach MSHP’s other, merit-based points because MSHP will have the opportunity to present those arguments to the trial court on remand.