Kidwell v. Kidwell, 181 So. 3d 1190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). · Go Syfert
Kidwell v. Kidwell, 181 So. 3d 1190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
6 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Elizabeth Estevill v. Tomas Estevill (fladistctapp, 2024-11-20)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Elizabeth Estevill v. Tomas Estevill
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Kidwell v. Kidwell, 181 So. 3d 1190, 1190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hanna-Mack v. Bank of America, N.A.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Kidwell v. Kidwell, 181 So.3d 1190, 1190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." ALINER J. HARRIS v. HGA-LAND HOLDINGS, LLC
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see also · confidence medium
App. P. 9.200(e)); see Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) (explaining that “[i]n appellate proceedings the decision of a trial court has the presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error,” so “the lack of a trial transcript or a proper substitute” results in record that is “inadequate to demonstrate reversible error” and requires affirmance); Butler v. Metropolitan Dade County, 298 So. 2d 552, 552-53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (affirming final summary judgment because material portions of record upon which trial …
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
David Lee KIDWELL, Petitioner,
v.
Desiree Molina KIDWELL, Respondent
3D15-2065.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Nov 25, 2015.
181 So. 3d 1190
David Lee Kidwell, in proper person., Lawrence E. Harkenrider, for respondent.
Lagoa, Per Curiam, Salter, Scales.
Cited by 3 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

Petitioner David Lee Kidwell seeks a writ of prohibition, essentially challenging a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage with a Minor Child that adjudicated issues of child support and parental responsibility. Kidwell asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the couple’s child, pursuant to the Florida Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Fla. Stat. § 61.501-61.542 (2014). We deny the petition.

The Florida Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the issuance of a writ of prohibition is an extraordinary measure and ought to be used only in very narrow circumstances. English v. McCrary, 348 So.2d 293, 296 (Fla.1977). The writ of prohibition “is preventive and not corrective_ Its purpose is to prevent the doing of something, not to compel the undoing of something already done. It cannot be used to revoke an order already entered.” Id. at 296-97. See also State ex rel. Harris v. McCauley, 297 So.2d 825 (Fla.1974); State ex rel. R.C. Motor Lines, Inc. v. Boyd, 114 So.2d 169 (Fla.1959).

In this case, the challenged final judgment was entered by the trial court before Kidwell filed a petition for a writ of prohibition. Thus, irrespective of any merit to Kidwell’s petition, prohibition is not an available avenue to a remedy.

Additionally, we are without jurisdiction to treat the petition as an appeal under rule 9.040(c) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, because the petition was not timely filed. The trial court issued the final judgment on June 15, 2015. Kidwell filed the petition for a writ of prohibition on September 9, 2015, well beyond the thirty-day jurisdictional window for an appeal of a final judgment. Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b). Thus, we cannot review Kid-well’s petition as an appeal.

Although pro se litigants are often given leniency on certain procedural technicalities in how they draft motions or request relief, they are still subject to the rules of procedure. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). “Notwithstanding the fundamental principle of allowing pro se litigants procedural latitude, a practice effected to ensure access to the courts for all citizens, pro se litigants are not immune from the rules of procedure.” Barrett v. City of Margate, 743 So.2d 1160, 1162 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

Petition denied.