·F·I~l:E / IN CLERKS OFFICE~ 1UPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON i DATE MAY 1 2 20'16 -hta. eke~ (] . ~-~· CHIEF USTICE . Supreme court Clerk IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

ESTHER KIM, as Personal Representative of the Estate ofHO IM BAE on behalf ofMi-Soon Kim, J ae C. Kim, Chang Soon Kim, Jae Hong Kim, and Kyoung Soon Kim, surviving family members; and the ESTATE OF HO IM BAE, Petitioners/Cross Respondents, v. NO. 91536-9 LAKESIDE ADULT FAMILY HOME; GRETCHEN DHALIWAL INCORPORATION (G.D., INC.), a Washington corporation d/b/a LAKESIDE AFH; and GRETCHEN DHALIWAL, individually; and JANE and JOHN DOES I-V, individually, ENBANC Defendants, ALPHA NURSING AND SERVICES INCORPORATED, a Washington corporation, MAY 1 2 2016 Respondent, and CHRISTINE THOMAS, individually, Respondent/Cross Petitioner. Kim, eta!. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, eta!., 91536-9 STEPHENS, J.-Ho Im Bae died from acute morphine intoxication at Lakeside Adult Family Home. Esther Kim, the personal representative ofBae's estate, brought tort claims against several individuals involved in Bae's care. This appeal concerns claims against Alpha Nursing & Services Inc. and two of its nurses, who did not provide nursing services to Bae, but who are alleged to have observed signs of abuse and physical assault that should have been reported to the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) and law enforcement. The primary issue before us is whether the abuse of vulnerable adults act (AVAA), chapter 74.34 RCW, 1 creates an implied cause of action against mandated reporters who fail to report abuse. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court ., of Appeals affirmed, holding that one of the nurses did not have a duty to report and the other nurse fulfilled her reporting duty by contacting DSHS. Kim v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, 186 Wn. App. 398,416,345 P.3d 850, review granted, 183 Wn.2d 1017, 355 P.3d 1152 P.3d 1152 (2015). We reverse the Court of Appeals on this issue. The AV AA creates a private cause of action against mandated reporters who fail to report abuse, and genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. A separate issue is whether the claims against one of the nurses should be dismissed for insufficient service. The nurse, Christine Thomas, moved to Norway. The plaintiff personally served her there almost a year after filing the amended complaint and properly serving Alpha. The plaintiff also delivered a copy of the Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9

summons and complaint to Norway's designated central authority pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. ^[15], 1965,20 U.S.T. 361 (Hague Convention). The trial court denied Thomas's motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Kim, 186 Wn. App. at 416. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statute oflimitations was tolled but disagree that personal service was proper. Consistent with Norway's ratification of the Hague Convention, however, the plaintiff acted with reasonable diligence in serving Thomas through Norway's designated central authority. We therefore affirm the lower courts' denial of the motion to dismiss. Both parties seek attorney fees, but we deny their requests as premature because neither party has yet prevailed. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY This appeal arises out of an order granting summary judgment to defendants Alpha and Thomas, dismissing claims brought by Esther Kim, the personal representative of the estate ofHo Im Bae (collectively Kim). Presented below are the undisputed facts in this case. Additional facts are provided in the analysis section as necessary. Ho Im Bae, a resident of Lakeside Adult Family Home, 2 died of acute morphine intoxication on March 30, 2009. The state medical examiner ruled the death a Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9

homicide. The autopsy report and a photo in the record reveal visible bruising on Bae' s head and neck. The primary suspect, Fanny IrawatV was one ofBae's caregivers and is not a party to this lawsuit. Alpha is a home health agency that provides nursing services to patients living in adult family homes, assisted living facilities, and private homes. At the time ofBae' s death, Alpha employed two nurses who visited patients at Lakeside: Thomas, RN, and Marion Binondo, LPN. ^[4] Bae was not one of Alpha's patients. Neither Thomas nor Binondo provided her with nursing services. On March 28 or 29, 2009, Binondo was visiting her patient Kerri Salzbrun at Lakeside. Binondo and Salzbrun heard a "thump" or a "thud" from an adjacent room and went into that room. Binondo saw a woman, now identified as Bae, lying on the floor. Binondo at least suggested to Bae's caregiver, Irawati, that she may want to call 911. Irawati responded that Bae "falls a lot" and that she would call Dhaliwal, Lakeside's owner who is also a nurse. Irawati put Bae back in bed, and Binondo saw that Bae was moving her legs. When Binondo left Lakeside, Irawati was on the phone. Binondo did not call either DSHS or 911 emergency services at that time. On March 30, 2009, Thomas visited Salzbrun at Lakeside. During that visit, Salzbrun told Thomas that Irawati had been giving Bae morphine. Thomas observed Irawati dragging or pulling Bae into the bathroom. Bae was not moving her feet. Bae Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9 Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9 Kim, eta!. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9 Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9 Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9 Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9 Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9 Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Sentine!C3, 181 Wn.2d at 140; Folsom, 135 Wn.2d at 663. In this case, there are genuine disputes of material fact that preclude granting summary judgment. As employees of Alpha, Thomas and Binondo are mandated reporters under the AVAA. See RCW 74.34.020(13) (defining "mandated reporter" to include "an employee of a ... home health ... agency"); CP at 447. Although the parties agree on this point, 7 the defendants argue that Binondo had no duty under the A V AA to report suspected abuse because she did not observe signs of abuse. Suppl. Br. of Resp't/Cross-Pet'r at 14-15. They further argue that Thomas had no duty to report to law enforcement, and that reporting to DSHS fulfilled her requirements under the AV AA. Id. The defendants also contend that Kim failed to present any admissible evidence to show Binondo or Thomas had reason to believe abuse was occurring. Id. at 15. 8 Under the A VAA, mandated reporters have a duty to report suspected abuse or neglect to DSHS and, in appropriate circumstances, directly to law enforcement. The statute provides: (1) When there is reasonable cause to believe that abandonment, abuse, financial exploitation, or neglect of a vulnerable adult has occurred, Kim, eta!. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, eta!., 91536-9

mandated reporters shall immediately report to the department [of social and health services]. (3) When there is reason to suspect that physical assault has occurred or there is reasonable cause to believe that an act has caused fear of imminent harm: (a) Mandated reporters shall immediately report to the department; and (b) Mandated reporters shall immediately report to the appropriate law enforcement agency, except as provided in subsection (4) of this section. [9l RCW 74.34.035 (emphasis added). Whether an individual has a duty in the first instance is a question of law. Folsom, 135 Wn.2d at 671. As discussed above, the statute creates an implied cause of action, and its plain language requires mandated reporters to report suspected abuse to either DSHS, or DSHS and law enforcement. The Court of Appeals did not directly address the duty question, instead holding Thomas and Binondo acted reasonably. Kim, 186 Wn. App. at 409-15,415 n.lO. Kim is correct that whether an individual has "reasonable cause" or "reason to suspect" abuse goes to the question of breach, not duty. The Court of Appeals appears to have conflated these issues. See Kim, 186 Wn. App. at 409-15. Alpha and Thomas adopt this faulty reasoning, arguing that Binondo had no duty to report to DSHS and Thomas had no duty to report to law enforcement because they acted reasonably, consistent with the statute. Suppl. Br. ofResp't/Cross-Pet'r at 14-15. We agree with Kim that the court must separate the questions, first identifying the duty the statute unequivocally places on mandated reporters, and then Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9

considering if genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the reports of abuse Binondo and Thomas received were credible, and whether they acted appropriately. We have already identified the relevant legal duty under the AV AA. The issue ofbreach is quintessentially a question for the trier of fact; it cannot be resolved on summary judgment unless the material facts are undisputed and reasonable minds could not disagree on the question. See Hertog v. City of Seattle, 138 Wn.2d 265, 275, 979 P.2d 400 (1999). In this case, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether (1) Binondo had "reasonable cause to believe" that abuse was occurring and (2) Thomas had "reason to suspect that physical assault had occurred" such that she should have reported directly to law enforcement and DSHS. The terms "reasonable cause to believe" and "reason to suspect" have not been defined in the AVAA, and there appears to be no case law interpreting them. ^[10] In similar contexts, however, whether an individual has "reasonable cause to believe" or "reason to suspect" are questions for the jury. Cf State v. Baker, 30 Wn.2d 601, 606-07, 192 P .2d 839 (1948) ("The question whether the resistance of the complaining witness was prevented by fear of immediate and great bodily harm which she had reasonable cause to believe would be inflicted upon her, was a question of fact to be determined by the jury."). The A V AA defined "abuse" as "the willful action or inaction that inflicts injury, unreasonable confinement, intimidation, or punishment on a vulnerable Kim, eta!. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9

adult. ... Abuse includes ... physical abuse." Former RCW 74.34.020(2) (2008). "Physical abuse" is "the willful action of inflicting bodily injury or physical mistreatment. Physical abuse includes, but is not limited to, ... the use of chemical restraints." Former RCW 74.34.020(2)(b) (2008). Giving a patient morphine without a prescription would qualify as physical abuse by use of a chemical restraint. In addition, it may qualify as assault under chapter 9A.36 RCW, which defines "assault" to include the administration of a "destructive or noxious substance." RCW 9A.36.0ll(l)(b), 9A.36.021(1)(d). Alpha and Thomas argue there is no admissible evidence to support a finding that Binondo had reasonable cause to believe Bae was being abused. Suppl. Br. of Resp't/Cross-Pet'r at 15. This argument overlooks the following evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact: in her call to DSHS, Binondo told DSHS that she noted Bae "had passed out" after the fall. CP at 309-10. 11 Binondo witnessed Irawati pick Bae up after the fall (something Binondo cautioned Irawati against), drag her into bed, and then not examine Bae. I d. Binondo also told DSHS that Salzbrun told her "she thought [Bae] looked doped as she saw [Irawati] crush pills .... I know what they look like because I take them also." Id. at 310. Binondo also indicated that not only did she think Salzbrun was reliable, but that Salzbrun had told her the same thing multiple times. Id. (when asked if Salzbrun was reliable, Binondo Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9

responded, "I think so. . .. Now I think she is pretty reliable. She keeps telling me the same thing over and over. I think she is pretty reliable about it."). Looking at this evidence, a jury could conclude that on the day she heard Bae fall, Binondo had "reasonable cause to believe" Bae was being abused, thus triggering Binondo' s duty as a mandated reporter to immediately report the suspected abuse to DSHS. See RCW 74.34.035(1). There is additional evidence that could support a jury's conclusion that Binondo had reasonable cause to believe Bae was being abused or neglected on the day of the fall. Salzbrun also stated that she told Binondo Bae was "doped up" shortly before Binondo left on the day of the fall. CP at 124. In addition, in her deposition, Binondo stated she "[p]robably" remembered Bae losing consciousness after the fall, id. at 332, and despite knowing the dangers of head strikes after a fall, see id. at 331, Binondo did not insist Bae' s caregiver call 911 nor call 911 herself. Id. at 329. All of this evidence raises questions of material fact that preclude summary judgment. Alpha and Thomas also argue that there is no admissible evidence to support a finding that Thomas had "reason to suspect" that Bae was being abused such that it would require an immediate call to law enforcement in addition to DSHS. The Court of Appeals agreed and held that because Thomas did not actually see Bae being given morphine and because she doubted Salzbrun's credibility, there was insufficient evidence of physical assault to require Thomas to call law enforcement in addition to DSHS. See I<im, 186 Wn. App. at 413-15.

Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9

The Court of Appeals erred in making a credibility determination. "[C]redibility determinations are solely for the trier of fact." Morse v. Antonellis, 149 Wn.2d 572, 574, 70 P.3d 125 (2003). There is sufficient admissible evidence to raise a question of material fact as to whether Thomas had "reason to suspect" that Bae was being abused, such that she was required to report directly to law enforcement. The day ofBae's death, Thomas reported to DSHS that Salzbrun told her she had seen morphine next to Bae's bed, and that Bae had been sedated to the point where she was unable to eat. Thomas told DSHS that Bae did not have an order for morphine and that Thomas had observed Bae, the patient Salzbrun told her was being overmedicated, appearing lethargic and being dragged to the bathroom. Thomas later told DSHS that Salzbrun would recognize morphine, and that although she was not 100 percent sure if Salzbrun was reliable, "something seemed fishy. [Salzbrun] would know what she saw." Id. at 307. Based on her reports to DSHS, a jury could easily conclude that Thomas had "reason to suspect" Bae suffered a physical assault, thus triggering Thomas's duty to immediately call law enforcement and DSHS. See RCW 74.34.035(3). Thomas reiterated much of this information in both her declaration and deposition testimony. Thomas stated that one of her patients told her Bae was being given morphine. CP at 767. Salzbrun also testified she told Thomas Bae "had been given someone else's morphine and was doped up." Id. at 124. While at Lakeside, Thomas observed "[lrawati] dragging a small Korean woman to the bathroom. [Thomas] did not see the Korean woman moving her feet. She appeared to [Thomas] Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9

to be heavily sedated." !d. at 767. Thomas was "a little alarmed" at the situation. !d. at 173. Thomas agreed that on March 30,2009, when she left Lakeside, she was leaving Bae "in the hands of the woman who [she was] told was giving her morphine." !d. at 182. This testimony raises sufficient questions of material fact to defeat summary judgment. Kim also raises a genuine question of material fact as to whether either Binondo or Thomas "immediately" reported to DSHS or law enforcement. !d. at 149-51. Whether an individual acts "immediately" is a question for the jury. See State v. Sherman, 98 Wn.2d 53, 57, 653 P.2d 612 (1982) (holding that in the context of the felony flight statute, '"immediately' means stopping as soon as reasonably possible once signaled by a police officer to halt," and that given the facts of the case, "the trier of fact could well have found he did not meet the requirements of 'immediately'"). In this case, it is undisputed that Binondo did not call DSHS until after Bae' s death, and that neither she nor Thomas ever called law enforcement. Nothing prevented Thomas from calling law enforcement. CP at 182. Thomas called DSHS at approximately 10:00 a.m., five minutes after leaving Lakeside. She got a busy signal and called back approximately an hour and a halflater, at 11 :30 a.m. Whether this constitutes calling "immediately" is a question for the jury. Kim has presented sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment. There are existing questions of material fact as to whether Binondo and Thomas reasonably believed or suspected that abuse was occurring, such that they had to report to either Kim, eta!. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, eta!., 91536-9

DSHS or to DSHS and law enforcement, and whether Thomas reported to DSHS immediately. Summary judgment was improper. III Service of Process on a Defendant in Norway Must Comply with the Hague Convention. Personal Service by an Independent Process Server Does Not Comply with the Convention as Service Must Be Effectuated through Norway's Designated Central Authority Service of process on a defendant in Norway falls under the purview of the Hague Convention. Thomas and Kim appear to agree on this point. Thomas was personally served with process at her home in Nannestad, Norway. CP at 793-97. This service was not effectuated through the Norwegian government. Id. at 744-45. Thomas argues this personal service was improper because it was not completed in accordance with the Hague Convention. See, e.g., id. 803-04; Br. ofResp'ts/Cross-Appellants at 32-33; Suppl. Br. of Resp'ts/Cross-Pet'r at 4-7. Thomas also argues that serving documents written only in English violates Norway's translation requirements. See, e.g., Suppl. Br. ofResp'ts/Cross-Pet'r at 9-10. In the courts below, Kim asserted that personal service was proper under Hague Convention articles 5 and 19, and under Norwegian law. See, e.g., Reply/Cross-Resp. Br. of Appellants at 18-19. Kim now argues "the Hague Convention issue is moot because Kim also served Thomas through the Norwegian Central Authority." Suppl. Br. ofPet'r at 12. The Court of Appeals held, "Because Norway has not objected to personal service and, in fact, such service complied with its laws, there is no reason to invalidate service in this case." Kim, 186 Wn. App. at 406. The Court of Appeals, like Kim, relied on articles 5(a) and 19 of the Hague Convention, and on Norwegian law. Id. at 405-06.

Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9

The court also noted that personal service was proper under Washington's rules of civil procedure, specifically CR 4(i)(l). Id. at 407. "This court reviews de novo if service of process was proper." Scanlan v. Townsend, 181 Wn.2d 838, 847, 336 P.3d 1155 (2014). Although Kim asserts that this issue is moot, the record before us indicates service is still pending in Norway. See CP at 558. Moreover, this court may review a moot issue if it is one "of continuing and substantial public interest." In reMarriage ofHorner, 151 Wn.2d 884, 891, 93 P.3d 124 (2004). Ensuring proper service of process is such an issue. This case addresses matters that are public in nature and for which an authoritative determination is desirable. Furthermore, this is at least the second case this court has seen addressing service under the Hague Convention. See Broad v. Mannesmann Anlagenbau, A G, 141 Wn.2d 670, 10 P.3d 371 (2000) (addressing tolling of the statute of limitations for international service of process in accordance with the Hague Convention). This indicates that issues of international service of process are likely to recur. We therefore choose to address this issue and provide guidance, regardless of mootness. The Hague Convention is a multilateral treaty "intended to provide a simpler way to serve process abroad, to assure that defendants sued in foreign jurisdictions would receive actual and timely notice of suit, and to facilitate proof of service abroad." VolkswagenwerkAktiengesellschaftv. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694,698, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 100 L. Ed. 2d 722 (1988). It applies in all civil cases "where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad" where the address of the person to be served is known. Hague Convention, 20 U.S.T. at 362; see also Broad, 141 Wn.2d Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9

at 675. "[C]ompliance with the Convention is mandatory in all cases to which it applies," and the provisions of the Hague Convention preempt inconsistent methods of service prescribed by state law. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 705; see Broad, 141 Wn.2d at 674-75. The Hague Convention requires each state to designate a central authority, which receives requests for service, and either serves the documents itself or arranges service. Hague Convention, 20 U.S.T. at 362-63. The Hague Convention also establishes alternative methods of service. See id. at 363. 12 Where a state objects to these alternative methods, plaintiffs must use the designated central authority to execute service. See Broad, 141 Wn.2d at 674 ("Germany has objected [to the alternative methods of service in articles 8 and 10], and requires that plaintiffs who sue defendants in Germany must request that the designated central authority execute service of process."). Both the United States and Norway are signatories to the Hague Convention. See Status Table, Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law (last visited Apr. 26, 2016), http://www .hcch.netlindex_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid= 17. Norway has objected to the alternative methods of service, and thus service on defendants in Norway must be through the Royal Ministry of Justice and Public Security, Department of Civil Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9

Affairs, the designated central authority. See id.; Details, Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law (last visited Apr. 26, 2016), http://www.hcch.net/en/states/authorities/ details3/&aid=246; cf Broad, 141 Wn.2d at 674. Kim and the Court of Appeals erroneously relied on articles 5 and 19 of the Hague Convention to establish personal service was proper. "When interpreting a treaty, we 'begin with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are used."' Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699-700 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. US. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 534, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 96 L. Ed. 2d 461 (1987)). Article 5 of the Hague Convention provides in relevant part: The Central Authority of the State addressed shall itself serve the document or shall arrange to have it served by an appropriate agency, either (a) by a method prescribed by its internal law for the service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory, or (b) by a particular method requested by the applicant, unless such a method is incompatible with the law of the State addressed. Subject to sub-paragraph (b) of the first paragraph of this Article, the document may always be served by delivery to an addressee who accepts it voluntarily. If the document is to be served under the first paragraph above, the Central Authority may require the document to be written in, or translated into, the official language or one of the official languages of the State addressed. Hague Convention, 20 U.S.T. at 362. This article's structure is clear: the options for service in subsections (a) and (b) are available only if the central authority either serves the documents itself or arranges for their service. See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699 ("Once a central authority Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9

receives a request in the proper form, it must serve the documents by a method prescribed by the internal law of the receiving state or by a method designated by the requester and compatible with that law." (emphasis added)). The same is true for direct, voluntarily accepted service, which is permissible only if service has been accomplished through the central authority. Paragraph two does not create a separate method of service outside of the central authority. ^[13] Similarly, the Hague Convention does not convert a country's domestic laws on service of process into laws governing service of process of documents coming from abroad. Article 19 states, "To the extent that the internal law of a contracting State permits methods of transmission, other than those provided for in the preceding articles, of documents coming from abroad, for service within its territory, the present Convention shall not affect such provisions." Hague Convention, 20 U.S.T. at 365 (emphasis added). This provision refers only to a country's laws that specifically deal with service of process of documents coming from abroad. It does not pertain to the general service of process laws that apply to wholly domestic actions. See Shenouda v. Mehanna, 203 F.R.D. 166, 171 (D.N.J. 2001) ("Article 19 provides that the internal law of a signatory with respect to service from abroad within its territory is not affected by the Convention."). There are apparently no Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9

Norwegian laws that govern service of process of documents from abroad; thus, service of such documents must conform with the methods outlined (and not objected to) in the Hague Convention. Because Norway has objected to alternative methods of service, service must be accomplished by or through the Royal Ministry. Kim's attempt to serve Thomas by direct personal service was improper because it did not comply with the Hague Convention. However, because Kim is also serving Thomas through the Royal Ministry, see CP at 558,631-33, service will be proper once the Royal Ministry completes it. As addressed below, the statute of limitations has tolled. Contrary to Thomas's argument, the fact that the documents were written only in English is of no consequence. Although Norway generally requires documents to be written in Norwegian, Danish, or Swedish, "the Ministry of Justice may ... permit the service of [untranslated] documents if it is convinced that the addressee understands the language used in the document." Details, supra. In this case, the documents did not need to be translated from English. Matora Yoga, executive officer of the Royal Ministry, informed Kim that "[d]ue to that the addressee understands the language, it is sufficient to enclose the English language document." CP at 633. 14 Thus, the documents may be served in English.

Kim, eta!. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, eta!., 91536-9

We reverse the Court of Appeals' decision insofar as it held that personal service without going through the central authority is proper in Norway. However, we affirm the Court of Appeals' conclusion that service on Thomas will be proper once the central authority completes it. IV. The Statute ofLimitations Was Tolled as to Thomas Independent of the insufficient service issue, Thomas argues she was not timely served. See Br. ofResp'ts/Cross-Appellants at 34; Suppl. Br. ofResp't/Cross-Pet'r at 12-13. Thomas admits that under Sidis v. Brodie/Dohrmann, Inc., 117 Wn.2d 325, 815 P.2d 781 (1991), proper and timely service on one defendant tolls the statute of limitations as to any other defendant. Suppl. Br. of Resp't/Cross-Pet'r at 11-13. However, Thomas argues that the circumstances presented in this case go beyond the permitted tolling because Kim was not sufficiently diligent in attempting service on Thomas. See id. Kim argues that she has timely proceeded with her case; that there is no due diligence requirement under Sidis; and that even if there was, she has met it, and any delay in service was due to Thomas fleeing toNorway and her attorney's deception as to Thomas's whereabouts. Suppl. Br. ofPet'r at 14-16. In Sidis, this court held that under RCW 4.16.170 (the tolling statute),^[15] timely service of one defendant tolls the statute of limitations for serving other defendants in Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9 Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9 Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9 Kim, eta!. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, eta!., 91536-9 Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9 Kim, eta!. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, eta!., 91536-9 Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9 Kim, et al. v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, et al., 91536-9