Wash. Rev. Code » Title 4 · Chapter 4.16
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.170 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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For the purpose of tolling any statute of limitations an action shall be deemed commenced when the complaint is filed or summons is served whichever occurs first. If service has not been had on the defendant prior to the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff shall cause one or more of the defendants to be served personally, or commence service by publication within ninety days from the date of filing the complaint. If the action is commenced by service on one or more of the defendants or by publication, the plaintiff shall file the summons and complaint within ninety days from the date of service. If following service, the complaint is not so filed, or following filing, service is not so made, the action shall be deemed to not have been commenced for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations.
[ 1971 ex.s. c 131 s 1; 1955 c 43 s 3. Prior: 1903 c 24 s 1; Code 1881 s 35; 1873 p 10 s 35; 1869 p 10 s 35; RRS s 167, part.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 229 cases (36 in the last 5 years), 1970–2026 · leading case: Nearing v. Golden State Foods Corp., 792 P.2d 500 (Wash. 1990).
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Nearing v. Golden State Foods Corp., 792 P.2d 500 (Wash. 1990). · cites it 39× “The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that CR 3 and 4 did not supersede RCW 4.16.170 and that RCW 4.16.170 controlled.”
Martin v. Triol, 847 P.2d 471 (Wash. 1993). · cites it 22× “3 The filing tolled the statute of limitations and conferred jurisdiction 4 on the court for 90 days until Respondents complied with the service of process requirements of RCW 4.16.170. Respondents first attempted service of process on Petitioners on July 20, 1990, and continued…”
Broad v. Mannesmann Anlagenbau, A.G., 10 P.3d 371 (Wash. 2000). · cites it 23× “We hold that the central authority is not an agent of the defendant, but the 90-day period of RCW 4.16.170 should be extended once required documents are transmitted to the central authority, provided they are sent within 90 days of filing the complaint.”
North Street Ass'n v. City of Olympia, 635 P.2d 721 (Wash. 2006). · cites it 10× “The applicants disagree, arguing that pursuant to RCW 4.16.170, there is an additional 90 days after the filing of the writ.”
Sidis v. Brodie/Dohrmann, Inc., 815 P.2d 781 (Wash. 1991). · cites it 11× “Review of these consolidated cases was granted on one issue only: whether, under RCW 4.16.170, service of process on one defendant tolls the statute of limitation as to unserved defendants.”
Jones v. Stebbins, 860 P.2d 1009 (Wash. 1993). · cites it 13× “RCW 4.16.170. On May 26, 1989, Jones hired a process server to perform personal service on Stebbins.”
Kim v. Lakeside Adult Fam. Home, 374 P.3d 121 (Wash. 2016). · cites it 4× “¶52 In Sidis , this court held that under RCW 4.16.170 (the tolling statute), 15 timely service of one defendant tolls the statute of limitations for serving other defendants in multidefendant actions.”
Broad v. Mannesmann Anlagenbau, AG, 10 P.3d 371 (Wash. 2000). · cites it 24× “We hold that the central authority is not an agent of the defendant, but the 90-day period of RCW 4.16.170 should be extended once required documents are transmitted to the central authority, provided they are sent within 90 days of filing the complaint.”
In re the Marriage of Sagner, 159 Wash. App. 741 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 8× “Rory claims the court did not have jurisdiction to modify the child support order because Karl did not comply with the requirements of RCW 4.16.170, the statute that tolls a statute of limitations by timely filing and serving the petition within 90 days of their daughter’s…”
Lund v. Benham, 109 Wash. App. 263 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 11× “Lund failed to publish the summons within the 90-day tolling period set forth in RCW 4.16.170. Ms. Lund filed a cross-motion for reconsideration with regard to the nonresident motorist statute.”
Kramer v. J.I. Case Mfg. Co., 815 P.2d 798 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 5× “In so ruling, the court relied on RCW 4.16.170, the tentative commencement statute, which establishes when filing the summons and complaint alone can toll a statute of limitations.”
Bosteder v. City of Renton, 117 P.3d 316 (Wash. 2005). · cites it 4× “See RCW 4.16.170; RCW 4.96.020(4). We require strict compliance with the procedural requirements of the claim filing statute.”
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