John E. Womack v. James T. Lynn, Sec'y of Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 504 F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1974). · Go Syfert
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John E. Womack v. James T. Lynn, Sec'y of Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 504 F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
128 citation events across 17 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Jaekel v. Equifax Marketing Decision Systems, Inc. (vaed, 1992-06-26)
Treatment trajectory · 1974 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1974 2000 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#1 5 U.S.C. § 7152 cited 1× in this case · 15 total citations of statute #7 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) cited 1× in this case · 34 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jaekel v. Equifax Marketing Decision Systems, Inc.
E.D. Va. · 1992 · confidence medium
See also, e.g., Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 665 (11th Cir.1990) (applying Civil Rights Restoration Act retroactively on the ground that procedural and remedial statutory changes apply retroactively); In re Resolution Trust Corp. and Ward v. Resolution Trust Corp., 888 F.2d 57, 58 (8th Cir.1989) ("If a case is still pending when the new statute is passed, new procedural or jurisdictional rules will usually be applied to it.”); Hastings, 628 F.2d at 93 (“where Congress fails to make its intention absolutely clear, courts are much more inclined to apply retroactively amendments directed …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jaekel v. Equifax Marketing Decision Systems, Inc.
E.D. Va. · 1992 · confidence medium
An employer cannot pay for the right to discriminate because no such `right' has ever existed."). [15] See also, e.g., Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 665 (11th Cir.1990) (applying Civil Rights Restoration Act retroactively on the ground that procedural and remedial statutory changes apply retroactively); In re Resolution Trust Corp. and Ward v. Resolution Trust Corp., 888 F.2d 57, 58 (8th Cir.1989) ("If a case is still pending when the new statute is passed, new procedural or jurisdictional rules will usually be applied to it."); Hastings, 628 F.2d at 93 ("where Congress fails to make its in…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Crumley v. Delaware State College
D. Del. · 1992 · confidence medium
Meyer Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1506 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1057 , 110 S.Ct. 1527 , 108 L.Ed.2d 767 (1990)); see also Robinson, 790 F.Supp. at 330 ; Womack v. Lynn, 504 F.2d 267, 269 (D.C.Cir.1974) (noting the presumption of retroactivity applies to “a procedural statute that affects the remedies available to ... employees suffering from employment discrimination.”); cf. Ettinger v. Johnson, 518 F.2d 648 , 651 n. 7a (3d Cir.1975) (discussing the holding in Womack).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robinson v. Davis Memorial Goodwill Industries
D.D.C. · 1992 · confidence medium
Courts have recognized that the presumption of retroactivity applies in the case of “a procedural statute that affects the remedies available to ... employees suffering from employment discrimination.” Womack v. Lynn, 504 F.2d 267, 269 (D.C.Cir.1974) (emphasis in original).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) National Science & Law Center, Inc. v. Legal Services Corp.
D.D.C. · 1987 · confidence medium
Additionally, LSC contends that Ralis is consistent with Womack v. Lynn, 504 F.2d 267, 269 (D.C.Cir.1974), where this Circuit held that the statutory change merely altered the procedural remedies appurtenant to a pre-existing right, and held that the statute as amended applied.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dorothy M. Thompson v. Danford L. Sawyer, Jr., Public Printer, Individually and as Public Printer of the United States, and His Agents, Assigns and Successors in Office. Dorothy M. Thompson v. Danford L. Sawyer, Jr., Public Printer, Individually and as Public Printer of the United States, and His Agents, Assigns and Successors in Office, Dorothy M. Thompson v. Danford L. Sawyer, Jr., Public Printer, Individually and as Public Printer of the United States, and His Agents, Assigns and Successors in Office, Dorothy M. Thompson v. Danford L. Sawyer, Jr., Public Printer, Individually and as Public Printer of the United States, and His Agents, Assigns and Successors in Office
D.C. Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
Since appellant did not initiate her administrative complaint of sex discrimination until 1974, then, she cannot attribute her post-Act woes to pre-Act grievances." (footnotes omitted) Accord, Brown v. Turner, 212 U.S.App.D.C. 315, 317-318 , 659 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (1981); Siegel v. Kreps, 654 F.2d 773 , 776 n.8 (D.C.Cir.1981); Grubbs v. Butz, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 82, 86 , 514 F.2d 1323, 1327 (1975); Womack v. Lynn, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 198, 200 , 504 F.2d 267, 269 (1974). 170 In concluding that application of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII should antedate the effective dates of the statutes, the majo…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thompson v. Sawyer
D.C. Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
Since appellant did not initiate her administrative complaint of sex discrimination until 1974, then, she cannot attribute her post-Act woes to pre-Act grievances.” (footnotes omitted) Accord, Brown v. Turner, 212 U.S.App.D.C. 315, 317-318 , 659 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (1981); Siegel v. Kreps, 654 F.2d 773 , 776 n.8 (D.C.Cir.1981); Grubbs v. Butz, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 82, 86 , 514 F.2d 1323, 1327 (1975); Womack v. Lynn, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 198, 200 , 504 F.2d 267, 269 (1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thompson v. Boyle (2×) also: Cited "see"
D.D.C. · 1980 · confidence medium
Retroactive application *1173 of § 717(e) to pending claims was justified by the common-law principle that “[procedural statutes that affect remedies are generally applicable to cases pending at the time of enactment.” Roger v. Ball, supra at 706 (footnote omitted); Womack v. Lynn, supra at 269.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Patrick T. Vanella
5th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
See e. g., Hallowed v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508 , 36 S.Ct. 202, 203 , 60 L.Ed. 409 (1916); Bush v. State Indus., Inc., 599 F.2d 780 , 786 n. 9 (6th Cir. 1979); Mahroom v. Hook, 563 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904 , 98 S.Ct. 2234 , 56 L.Ed.2d 402 (1978); United States v. Blue Sea Line, 553 F.2d 445, 448 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mechem, 509 F.2d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir. 1975); Womack v. Lynn, 504 F.2d 267, 269 (D.C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 18 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1326, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8707 Smith E. Carreathers v. Donald L. Alexander, Commissioner, the United States Internal Revenue Service, His Predecessors and Successors
10th Cir. · 1978 · confidence medium
This is because of the two year limit imposed by statute. 41 Finally, the award of the $7095 in attorneys' fees was not an abuse of discretion. 42 The judgment of the district court is reversed in part, affirmed in part, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed herein. * Of the District of Kansas, sitting by designation 1 Place v. Weinberger, 426 U.S. 932 , 96 S.Ct. 2643 , 49 L.Ed.2d 383 (1976); Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 824 , 96 S.Ct. 1961 , 48 L.Ed.2d 402 n. 4 (1976), Aff'g 507 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1974); Mahroon v. Hook, 563 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carreathers v. Alexander
10th Cir. · 1978 · confidence medium
Place v. Weinberger, 426 U.S. 932 , 96 S.Ct. 2643 , 49 L.Ed.2d 383 (1976); Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 824 , 96 S.Ct. 1961 , 48 L.Ed.2d 402 n. 4 (1976), affg 507 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1974); Mahroon v. Hook, 563 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904 , 98 S.Ct. 2234 , 56 L.Ed.2d 402 (1978); Eastland v. TVA, 553 F.2d 364 , 367 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 , 98 S.Ct. 611 , 54 L.Ed.2d 479 (1977); Weahkee v. Powell, 532 F.2d 727, 729 (10th Cir. 1976); Adams v. Brinegar, 521 F.2d 129, 133-34 (7th Cir. 1975); Hackley v. Roudebush, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 376, 380 , 520 F.2d 108 , 112 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dorothy C. Parker v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1977 · confidence medium
See Koger v. Ball, 497 F.2d 702 , 708 n.33 (4th Cir. 1974); Womack v. Lynn, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 198 , 504 F.2d 267, 269 (1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stephenson v. Simon
D.D.C. · 1976 · confidence medium
The law is clear that unless a claim was pending either administratively or judicially at the time the Act took effect, see Womack v. Lynn, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 198 , 504 F.2d 267, 269 (1974), the courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over claims of discrimination in federal employment arising prior to March 24, 1972.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roberts v. Western Airlines
N.D. Cal. · 1976 · confidence medium
Compare Place v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 412, 413-415 (6 Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 426 U.S. 932 , 96 S.Ct. 2643 , 49 L.Ed.2d 383 (1976) (not retroactive), with Adams v. Brinegar, 521 F.2d 129, 131-134 (7 Cir. 1975); Sperling v. United States, 515 F.2d 465, 473-474 (3 Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 , 96 S.Ct. 2623 , 49 L.Ed.2d 372 (1976); Brown v. General Services Administration, 507 F.2d 1300, 1304-1306 (2 Cir. 1974), aff’d on other grounds, 425 U.S. 820 , 96 S.Ct. 1961 , 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976); *422 Womack v. Lynn, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 198 , 504 F.2d 267, 269-270 (1974); Koger v. Ba…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Henry v. Schlesinger
E.D. Pa. · 1976 · confidence medium
The Third Circuit has stated: “This rationale suggests that § 2000e-16(c) would apply as well where discriminatory conduct giving rise to a cause of action antedated March 24, 1972, but no relief, either administrative or judicial, was sought until after that time.” Ettinger, supra, 518 F.2d at 651 , n.7a citing 504 F.2d at 629, n.6 . 5 . “(a) Time limits. (1) An agency shall require • that a complaint be submitted in writing by the complainant or his representative and be signed by the complainant.
cited Cited "see" Shirey v. Devine
D.C. Cir. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Womack v. Lynn, 504 F.2d 267, 269 (D.C.Cir.1974).
cited Cited "see" Shirey v. Devine
D.C. Cir. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Womack v. Lynn, 504 F.2d 267, 269 (D.C.Cir.1974).
discussed Cited "see" James A. Bethel, Jr. v. Burtell M. Jefferson, Chief of Police, Metropolitan Police Department. Ernest E. Hemby v. Burtell M. Jefferson, Chief of Police, Metropolitan Police Department (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Womack v. Lynn, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 198, 199-200 , 504 F.2d 267, 268-269 (1974) 9 Discussed in Part III Infra 10 Discussed in Parts IV, V Infra 11 Discussed in Part II Infra 12 Part VI Infra 13 D.C.Code § 4-121 (1973) 14 As of January 2, 1975, the title of the chief executive officer of the District of Columbia Government was officially changed to "Mayor." D.C.Code §§ 1-131, 1-161(a) (Supp.
cited Cited "see" Bethel v. Jefferson
D.C. Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Womack v. Lynn, 164 U.S. App.D.C. 198, 199-200, 504 F.2d 267, 268-269 (1974). .
discussed Cited "see" Ettinger v. Johnson (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
3rd Cir. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See 504 F.2d at 269, n. 6 .
discussed Cited "see" 10 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1243, 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,228 Linda Ettinger, on Her Own Behalf and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Donald E. Johnson, Director, Veterans Administration, Washington, D. C. And S W. Melidosian, Director, Veterans Administration Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
3rd Cir. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See 504 F.2d at 269, n. 6 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Max Ralis v. Rfe/rl, Inc
D.C. Cir. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Womack v. Lynn, 504 F.2d 267, 269 (D.C.Cir.1974) (Title VII’s applicability to federal civil service employees, effected by Congress in 1972, given retroactive effect because the amendment was “merely a procedural statute that affects the remedies available to federal employees suffering from employment discrimination.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
John E. WOMACK, Appellant
v.
James T. LYNN, Secretary of Department of Housing and Urban Development, Et Al.
72-1827.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
Oct 1, 1974.
504 F.2d 267
Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Washington, D. C., for appellant., Garey G. Stark, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Harold H. Titus, Jr., U. S. Atty. at the time the brief was filed, and John A. Terry, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellees., Lawrence D. Levien and John L. Burke, Jr., Washington, D. C., filed a brief on behalf of Washington Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as amicus curiae. Roderic V. 0. Boggs, Washington, D. C., entered an appearance for amicus curiae.
Wright, Tamm, Wil-Key.
Cited by 66 opinions  |  Published
[*268] J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether Section 717(c) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. 92-261, 86 Stat. Ill, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16(e) (1974), which amends Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255, to grant federal employees the right to bring employment discrimination claims 'against the Government in United States District Courts, applies retroactively to actions pending on March 24, 1972, the effective date of the amendment. The District Court denied appellant, a federal employee, leave to amend his complaint to include the newly established Title VII claim and granted summary judgment for the Government. Because it is our view that Section 717(c) applies retroactively to actions pending on March 24, 1972, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-appellant John E. Womack is a black employee of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), a division of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). In bare-bones outline, Womack’s complaint of racial discrimination is that he has been repeatedly denied the opportunity to advance himself in the FHA while a white coworker with less experience and a lower GS grade has been promoted to a position that rightfully should have been his. In a chain of administrative proceedings commencing in 1968, Womack has exhausted his administrative remedies by pressing his claim through the various levels of the HUD and Civil Service Commission superstructure. The substance of his claim was sustained early on by Samuel J. Simmons, HUD Assistant Secretary for Equal Employment Opportunity. On October 28, 1969 Simmons adopted the finding of the hearing officer that Womack had been denied equal opportunity in his employment by reason of racial discrimination in violation of Executive Order 11246, 30 Fed.Reg. 12319 (1965). [1] Simmons ordered Womack promoted, but denied him the back pay and retroactive seniority to which he claimed he was entitled. All further proceedings, including the present one, have challenged only the adequacy of this remedy. On December 3, 1969 Womack requested that HUD reconsider its corrective action. Unsatisfied with HUD’s minor modification in its remedy, announced on April 24, 1970, Womack appealed to the Board of Appeals and Review (BAR) of the Civil Service Coipmission. BAR rejected his appeal on September 8, 1970, and on May 14, 1971 Womack filed this suit against the Secretary of HUD and others, seeking back pay and retroactive seniority. The suit was based on various federal statutes, regulations, and constitutional provisions. [2] On May 31, 1972, after the effective date of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, appellant sought to amend his complaint to add Section. 717(e) as a basis of jurisdiction. [3] The District[*269] Court denied appellant’s motion for leave to amend on June 9, 1972 and on the same day granted summary judgment to the Government while denying appellant’s summary judgment motion. No opinion accompanied any of these rulings. This appeal followed.

The question of the retroactivity of the amendments of Title VII that apply to the federal government has generated a spate of litigation, both in this circuit and elsewhere. [4] *Nonetheless, to date only two circuits have spoken on the is-use. The Sixth Circuit, in Place v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 412 (1974), found that Section 717(c) did not apply retroactively, while the Fourth Circuit, in Koger v. Ball, 497 F.2d 702 (1974), found just the opposite. Having examined carefully both opinions, as well as the many District Court opinions and the arguments of the parties before us, we are persuaded that the Fourth Circuit’s analysis is the better, both standing alone and in light of its convincing rebuttal of the statutory construction linchpin of the Place decision. Accordingly, we adopt the reasoning of Koger. Section 717(c) is merely a procedural statute that affects the remedies available to federal employees suffering from employment discrimination. Their right to be free of such discrimination has been assured for years. [5] We hold that this remedial statute applies retroactively to proceedings already pending at the time of its effective date, March 24, 1972. [6]

Since we are without the benefit of an opinion from the District Court, we cannot be certain why appellant’s motion to amend was denied and summary judgment entered against him. The transcript of the proceedings on June 9[*270] strongly suggests, however, the reason was that the District Court did not believe Section 717(c) to be retroactive. [7] Since this belief was erroneous, this case must be

Reversed and remanded.

1

. Executive Order 11246 lias been superseded by Executive Order 11478, 34 Fed.Reg. 12985 (1969).

2

. Appellant alleged the case arose under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, 5 U. S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970), 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1970), 5 U.S.C. § 7152 (1970), 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), and Executive Orders 11246 and 11478. Jurisdiction was invoked under 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970), 28 U. S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970), and 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). Appendix at 3.

3

. Section 717(c), 42 U.S.O.A. § 2000e-16(c) (1974), reads:

Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken by a department, agency, or unit referred to in subsection (a) of this section, or by the Civil Service Commission upon an appeal from a decision or order of such department, agency, or unit on a complaint of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin, brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, Executive Order 11478 or any succeeding Executive orders, or after one hundred and eighty days from[*269] the filing of the initial eharge with the department, agency, or unit or with the Civil Service Commission on appeal from a decision or order of such department, agency, or unit until such time as final action may be taken by a department, agency, or unit, an employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his complaint, may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title, in which civil action the head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant.
4

. A majority of District Court cases have found § 717(c) to apply retroactively. See Fears v. Catlin, D.Colo., 377 F.Supp. 291 (1974) ; Henderson v. Defense Contract Administration Services Region, S.D.N.Y., 370 F.Supp. 180 (1973) ; Jackson v. United States Civil Service Com’n, S.D.Tex., 379 F.Supp. 589 (1973) ; Gautier v. Weinberger, D.D.C., 7 FEP Cases 473 (1973) ; Grubbs v. Butz, D.D.C., 6 FEP Cases 432 (1973), appeal pending, D.C.Cir. No. 73-1955; Hackley v. Johnson, D.D.C., 360 F.Supp. 1247 (1973), appeal pending on other issues, D.C.Cir. No. 73-2027; Harrison v. Butz, D.D.C., 375 F.Supp. 1056 (1973) ; Pointer v. Sampson, 62 F.R.D. 689 (1973), appeal pending on other issues, D.C.Cir. No. 73-1937; Walker v. Kleindienst, D.D.C., 357 F.Supp. 749 (1973) ; Johnson v. Froehlke, D.Md., 5 FEP Cases 1138 (1973). But see Feiger v. Warner, S.D.Cal., 7 FEP Cases 784 (1974) ; Palmer v. Rogers, D.D.C., 6 FEP Cases 892 (1973), appeal pending, D.C.Cir. No. 73-2110; Hill-Vincent v. Richardson, N.D.Ill., 359 F.Supp. 308 (1973) ; Mosely v. United States, S.D.Cal., 6 FEP Cases 462 (1973) ; Freeman v. Defense Constr. Supply Center, S.D.Ohio, 5 FEP Cases (1972), appeal dismissed, 6 Cir. No. 72-2157 (April 20, 1973).

5

. The right has been assured by a series of Executive Orders dating back at least to 1948. See E.O. 9980, 13 Fed.Reg. 4311 (1948) ; E.O. 10590, 20 Fed.Reg. 409 (1955) ; E.O. 10925, 26 Fed.Reg, 1977 (1961) ; E.O. 11246, 30 Fed.Reg. 12319 (1965) ; E.O. 11478, 34 Fed.Reg. 12985 (1969).

6

. While Koger involved a proceeding pending administratively on March 24, 1972, we see no reason why its rationale should not apply to eases which were properly pending in District Courts on that date and in which’ all administrative remedies had been exhausted. See Henderson v. Defense Contract Administration Services Region, supra note 4, 370 F.Supp. at 181-183; Walker v. Kleindienst, supra note 4, 357 F.Supp. at 752.

7

. MR. POLHAUS [counsel for plaintiff] : * * * TT ]here is a motion which the plaintiff has filed for leave to amend the complaint to include as a basis for recovery the recently enacted Equal Employment Opportunity Act, which was passed subsequent to the filing of the original complaint. We believe it is applicable.

THE COURT : Would it apply?
MR. POLHAUS: We believe it would, Your Honor.
THE COURT: What does the defendant say?
MR. SCHWEITZER [counsel for the Government] : Your Honor, we believe the Equal Employment Opportunity Act is not retroactive; * * *
THE COURT: Do you oppose the motion for leave to amend ?
MR. SCHWEITZER: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You don’t oppose it?
MR. SCHWEITZER: Well, we would oppose the motion for leave to amend in that we don’t believe—
THE COURT: Wéll, do you or don’t you?
MR. SCHWEITZER: Certainly, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. If you oppose it I won’t allow it.

Transcript 2-3.