United States v. Tommie Bell, 505 F.2d 539 (7th Cir. 1975). · Go Syfert
Search
United States v. Tommie Bell, 505 F.2d 539 (7th Cir. 1975). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“when a federal criminal statute uses a common law term without defining it, the term is given its common law meaning.”
43 citation events (18 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Estrada-Fernandez (ca5, 1998-08-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#1 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) cited 1× in this case · 5 total citations of statute #15 18 U.S.C. § 254 cited 1× in this case · 47 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) United States v. Estrada-Fernandez
5th Cir. · 1998 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
when a federal criminal statute uses a common law term without defining it, the term is given its common law meaning.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Terron Bryant
4th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
See generally Evans, 848 F.3d at 245–46 (“Under the categorical approach, we analyze only the elements of the offense in question, rather than the specific means by which the defendant committed the crime.”). 19 coupled with an apparent present ability to do so, causing a reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm.” United States v. Bird, 409 F. App’x 681 , 686–87 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Dupree, 544 F.2d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir. 1976); and United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir. 1974)); see also Knight, 936 F.3d at 500 (applying same common-law definit…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Taylor
1st Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
At common law, assault meant “an attempt to commit a battery” or “an act putting another in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm.” Bayes, 210 F.3d at 68 (quoting United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir. 1974)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Armstrong
1st Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
See 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(33) (listing domestic-violence crimes that are “misdemeanor[s] under Federal ... law”); see, e.g., United States v. Delis, 558 F.3d 177, 178 (2nd Cir.2009); United States v. Guilbert, 692 F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir.1982) (citing United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir.1974)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Enrique Acosta-Sierra (2×)
9th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir.1974).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Bird
4th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
United States v. Dupree, 544 F.2d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir.1976); United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir.1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jeffrey Paul Lewellyn
9th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. McCulligan, 256 F.3d 97, 103-04 (3d Cir.2001); United States v. Ashley, 255 F.3d 907 , 911 n. 4 (8th Cir.2001); United States v. Bayes, 210 F.3d 64, 68 (1st Cir.2000); United States v. Williams, 197 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir.1999); United States v. Chestaro, 197 F.3d 600, 605 (2d Cir.1999); United States v. Calderon, 655 F.2d 1037, 1038 (10th Cir.1981); United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir.1974); Shaffer v. United States, 308 F.2d 654, 655 (5th Cir.1962). 6 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Lewellyn
9th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. McCulligan, 256 F.3d 97 , 103- 04 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Ashley, 255 F.3d 907 , 911 n.4 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Bayes, 210 F.3d 64, 68 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Williams, 197 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Chestaro, 197 F.3d 600, 605 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Calderon, 655 F.2d 1037, 1038 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir. 1974); Shaffer v. United States, 308 F.2d 654, 655 (5th Cir. 1962).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Benjamin Godfrey Chipps, Sr.
8th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
See United States v. Guilbert, 692 F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir.1982) (per curiam); United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir.1974).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Benjamin Chipps, Sr.
8th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
See United States v. Guilbert, 692 F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir. 1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. William P. Trainor (2×)
11th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 , 72 S.Ct. 240, 250 , 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) (“[Wjhere Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.”); United States v. Guilbert, 692 F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir.1982) (“[W]here ‘a federal criminal statute uses a common law term without defining it, t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Bayes
1st Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
Assault had two meanings at common law, "the first being an attempt to commit a battery and the second [being] an act putting another in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm." United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir.1974); see also United States v. Guilbert, 692 F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Gregory Charles Jones and Anthony Tyrone Bailey
7th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
An act putting another in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm is an assault, see United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir.1974), and surely threatening a person at gun point and tying him up constitutes an assault under this definition.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jaime Estrada-Fernandez Jose Valenzuela-Hernandez
5th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
See United States v. Guilbert, 692 F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir.1982) (noting that both of the traditional common-law definitions of “assault" apply to 18 U.S.C. § 113 because the statute does not define the term); United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir.1974) ("When a federal criminal statute uses a common law term without defining it, the term is given its common law meaning.”); cf. United States v. Stewart, 568 F.2d 501, 504 (6th Cir.1978) (noting that the term "simple assault” in § 113 is "no doubt intended to embrace the common law meaning of that term”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Roy Lawrence, A/K/A Roger Lawrence
5th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 177 , 79 S.Ct. 209, 213 , 3 L.Ed.2d 199, 205 (1958); United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir.1974); United States v. Rizzo, 409 F.2d 400, 403 (7th Cir.1969).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jose A. Guilbert
11th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
The term “assault” is not defined by the statute, but where “a federal criminal statute uses a common law term without defining it, the term is given its common law meaning.” United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 , 95 S.Ct. 1357 , 43 L.Ed.2d 442 (1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Raymond Carl Skeet
9th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
While some decisions hold that fear on the part of the victim is not a necessary element, U.S. v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 541 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 UiS. 964, 95 S.Ct. 1357 , 43 L.Ed.2d 442 ; United States v. Frizzi, 491 F.2d 1231, 1232 (1st Cir. 1974); this is not the test in the Ninth Circuit.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Arthur McAvoy
2d Cir. · 1978 · confidence medium
United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 , 95 S.Ct. 1357 , 43 L.Ed.2d 442 (1975); United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279, 1282 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 , 92 S.Ct. 124 , 30 L.Ed.2d 110 (1971).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Terrance Bear Ribs, Sr.
8th Cir. · 1977 · confidence medium
See Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 715-717 , 66 S.Ct. 778 , 90 L.Ed. 962 (1946), and In Re Lane, 135 U.S. 443, 448 , 10 S.Ct. 760 , 34 L.Ed. 219 (1890) (construing predecessors of the current statute). 2 The common law offense of simple assault, on the other hand, requires the showing of an offer or attempt by force or violence to do a corporal injury to another. 3 See United States v. Dupree, 544 F.2d 1050, 1051-1052 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 , 95 S.Ct. 1357 , 43 L.Ed.2d 442 (1975); United States v. Rizzo, 4…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Bennett Masel
7th Cir. · 1977 · confidence medium
We also note that every battery must include or be the culmination of an assault (in the sense of attempt), United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 540 (7th Cir. 1974), citing Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, c. 62, § 1 (6th ed. 1788).
discussed Cited "see" Harrod v. State
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 , 95 S.Ct. 1357 , 43 L.Ed.2d 442 (1975); United States v. Rizzo, 409 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.1959); State v. LaMere (Mont.) 621 P.2d 462 (1980); State v. Barry, 45 Mont. 598 , 124 P. 775 (1912).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Leonard Roland Dupree (2×)
9th Cir. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Bell, supra; United States v. Rizzo, 409 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 911 , 90 S.Ct. 226 , 24 L.Ed.2d 187 (1969).
cited Cited "see" United States v. George H. Alewelt, Jr.
7th Cir. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally, United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539 (7th Cir. 1974).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Tommie BELL, Defendant-Appellant
74-1410.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Mar 3, 1975.
505 F.2d 539
Richard F. Walsh, Federal Defender Program, Chicago, 111., for defendant-appellant., James R. Thompson, U. S. Atty., Gary L. Starkman and Donald G. Newman, Asst. U. S. Attys., Chicago, 111., for plaintiff-appellee.
Fairchild, Sprecher, Tone.
Cited by 32 opinions  |  Published
TONE, Circuit Judge.

The defendant Tommie Bell was convicted in a bench trial of assault with intent to commit rape at a place within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a). On appeal he raises only one question, viz., whether it is necessary to the offense of assault that the victim have a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. We answer this question in the negative and affirm the conviction.

It is conceded that while defendant was a patient in the detoxification ward for alcoholic and drug addiction patients[*540] in the Veterans Administration Hospital, Downey, Illinois, he attempted to rape a female geriatric patient. It is also undisputed that the victim was suffering from a mental disease which made her unable to comprehend what was going on. Defendant’s only asserted defense in the trial court and here is that, because the victim was incapable of forming a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm, there was no assault.

Defendant’s contention is squarely contradicted by this court’s statement in United States v. Rizzo, 409 F.2d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 911, 90 S.Ct. 226, 24 L.Ed.2d 187 (1969). There, in sustaining a jury instruction defining assault (taken from W. Mathes and E. Devitt, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 43.07 (1965)), the court recognized that there are two concepts of assault in criminal law, the first being an attempt to commit a battery and the second an act putting another in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. While the second concept was applicable in that case, the court, said with respect to the first:

“There may be an attempt to commit a battery, and hence an assault, under circumstances where the intended victim is unaware of danger. Apprehension on the part of the victim is not an essential element of that type of assault.” (Footnotes omitted.)

We adhere to that statement of the law. When a federal criminal statute uses a common law term without defining it, the term is given its common law meaning. United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411, 77 S.Ct. 397, 1 L.Ed.2d 430 (1957); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). A criminal assault at common law was originally an attempt to commit a battery. 1 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown c. 62, § 1 (6th ed. 1788) states:

“It seems that an assault is an attempt or offer, with force and violence, to do a corporal hurt to another. . . . [E]very battery includes an assault. . . . ”

See also 3 S. Greenleaf, Evidence § 59 (16th ed. Harriman 1899); R. Perkins, Criminal Law 114 et seq. (2d ed. 1969). This is the definition given the term in the federal cases. United States v. Hand, 26 Fed.Cas. 103, 104 (No. 15,297) (C.C.D.Pa.1810); Anderson v. Crawford, 265 F. 504, 507 (8th Cir. 1920). The second concept of assault referred to in Rizzo, an act putting another in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm, originated in the law of torts. R. Perkins, id. at 114. Most jurisdictions recognize both concepts of criminal assault. R. Perkins, id. at 116-117; W. LaFave and A. Scott, Criminal Law § 82 (1972); 2 W. Burdick, Law of Crime § 338 et seq. (1946); 1 F. Wharton, Criminal Law § 799 et seq. (12th ed. 1932); J. Miller, Criminal Law § 98 et seq. (1934); W. Clark and W. Marshall, Law of Crimes § 10.15 (6th ed. 1958); 3 H. Underhill, Criminal Evidence § 684 et seq. (5th ed. 1957).

The notion that a reasonable apprehension on the part of the victim is an essential element of criminal assault probably originated with Bishop, who confused the two concepts in a single definition of the offense and included the element of creating a reasonable apprehension of immediate physical injury in that definition. 2 J. Bishop, Criminal Law § 23 (9th ed. 1923). Bishop, whose definition has been criticized as' not supported by the cases, J. May, Criminal Law § 148, at 247 n. 1 (4th ed. 1838), and Note, The Misuse of the Tort Definition of Assault in a Criminal Action, 11 Rocky Mt.L.Rev. 104,' 105 (1939), seems to be the only authority who defines reasonable apprehension as a necessary element of the offense. The other commentators referred to above and the many cases they cite show that the two separate types of assault, attempted battery and putting the victim in reasonable apprehension, have been generally recognized. * Bishop’s defini[*541] tion was discussed and rejected in Commonwealth v. Slaney, 345 Mass. 135, 185 N.E.2d 919, 922-923 (1962) (cited in Rizzo, 409 F.2d at 403 n. 4), which applies the original common law definition of assault, that of attempted battery, and holds that apprehension is unnecessary.

Since an attempted battery is an assault, it is irrelevant that the victim is incapable of forming a reasonable- apprehension. Occasions for so holding seem rarely to have been presented. Alder-son, B., in The Queen v. Camplin, 1 Cox C.C. 220, 221 (1845), reports that there was such a case in his experience. Regina v. March, 1 Car. & K. 496 (1844), was a conviction for assault against a newborn infant. There are many statements to the effect that an attempt upon an unconscious or otherwise insensitive victim is an assault, both in the cases, e. g., People v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 521, 5 N.W. 982, 985 (1880); People v. Pape, 66 Cal. 366, 5 P. 621 (1885); Ross v. State, 16 Wyo. 285, 93 P. 299, 303 (1908); Woods v. State, 14 Md.App. 627, 288 A.2d 215, 216 (1972), and in the treatises, e. g., W. LaFave and A. Scott, supra, § 82 at 610; 2 W. Burdick, supra § 339 at 3; 1 F. Wharton, supra § 809 at 1104.

The defendant relies upon the Court’s statement in Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 177, 79 S.Ct. 209, 213, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1959), that “an assault is ordinarily held to be committed merely by putting another in apprehension of harm whether or not the actor actually intends to inflict or is capable of inflicting that harm.” The quoted words do not indicate that the Court was undertaking to define the offense of assault. Moreover, it is apparent from the context that this was not the Court’s intention. The question to be decided was whether the firing of a single shot at two federal officers was one assault or two under 18 U.S.C. § 254, now 18 U.S. C. § 111. In holding that a single offense was committed the Court reasoned that, since an assault can be committed merely by putting another in apprehension of harm, a holding that pointing a gun at five officers, putting all of them in apprehension of harm, constituted five assaults would subject the actor to a penalty five times as great as the penalty for shooting and seriously wounding a single officer. Finally, the authorities cited by the Court in support of the quoted statement all specifically recognize the two concepts of assault described in the Rizzo case. See 2 W. Burdick, Law of Crime §§ 340, 341, 342 (1946); J. Clark and J. Marshall, Law of Crimes §§ 10.15, 10.16 (1958); J. Miller, Criminal Law §§ 98, 99 (1934). The first cited, Burdick, expressly states:

“Moreover, it is not always necessary that the unlawful attempt should create in the person assaulted ‘a reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm’, because an assault may be committed upon a person without his knowledge of it as in case of an assault upon an unconscious sleeping person, or even upon an infant just born. The rule in a civil action that apprehension of harm is usually required has no sound foundation in the criminal law of assaults.” (Footnotes omitted.) 2 W. Burdick, supra § 339 at 3-4.

Defendant’s attempt to rape an insensitive victim was an assault under 18 U. S.C. § 113(a). His conviction is affirmed.

Affirmed.

*

By statute in Illinois assault is defined as the reasonable-apprehension offense (111. Rev.Stat., Ch. 38, § 12-1 (1973)) and the attempted-battery offense is covered by the[*541] general attempt section (id. § 8-4). A similar approach is adopted in the proposed bill to revise the Federal Criminal Code. See Revised Committee Print of Amended S. 1, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 1001, 1613, 1614 (Oct. 15, 1974). In the statutes of other states assault is defined as an attempted battery, but most state statutes, like the federal, do not define the term assault. See Comments to § 201.10, ALI, Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 9, p. 83 (1959). Appendix H to the Comments lists and classifies the state statutes. Id. at 141. ALI, Proposed Official Draft of the Model Penal Code (1962), p. 134, with some refinements not relevant here, recognizes both the attempted-battery and reasonable-apprehension types of assault as offenses.