United States v. Donald Antonio Ragghianti, 527 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1976). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Donald Antonio Ragghianti, 527 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
29 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Roybal (nmctapp, 1992-10-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Roybal
N.M. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See State v. Saavedra, 103 N.M. 282 , 705 P.2d 1133 (1985); cf. Ragghianti, 527 F.2d at 587-88 (dealing with joinder of offenses).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Gregory Lewis
9th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1123 , 103 S.Ct. 3095 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1354 (1983); United States v. Ragghianti, 527 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir.1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Mark Irvine
9th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Cf. Bronco, 597 F.2d at 1303 (prejudice from not severing two instances of counterfeiting); United *713 States v. Ragghianti, 527 F.2d 586, 587-88 (9th Cir.1975) (prejudice from not severing. two counts of bank robbery).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Edward Ford, Robert Little, John Felix, Solomon Johnson, Phillip Usquiano, Marcus Thompson, E. Dene Armstrong
9th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
United States v. Adams, supra, 581 F.2d at 198 ; United States v. Ragghianti, 527 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir.1975); Parker v. United States, 404 F.2d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1004 , 89 S.Ct. 1602 , 22 L.Ed.2d 782 (1969).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Decker
Mo. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
United States v. Ragghianti, 527 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Johnson, 462 F.2d 608, 609 (8th Cir. 1972).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Eddie Roy Gay, United States of America v. Sammie Jud Dixon
9th Cir. · 1978 · confidence medium
Parker v. United States, 404 F.2d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1004 , 89 S.Ct. 1602 , 22 L.Ed.2d 782 (1969).” United States v. Ragghianti, 527 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir. 1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 95,827, 1 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1285 United States of America v. Hunter Brooks Brashier, United States of America v. John Michael Coughlan, Sr. (2×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
See, e. g., United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733, 736 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Ragghianti, 527 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir. 1975). 22 See, e. g., S. Greenleaf, Evidence § 373 (1842); 2 Wigmore on Evidence § 520 (3d ed. 1940) 23 See, e.g., Matthews, Criminal Prosecutions Under the Federal Securities Laws and Related Statutes: The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 901 (1971); Herlands, Criminal Law Aspects of the Exchange Act of 1934, 21 Va.L.Rev. 139, 145-46, 148-49 (1934) Proof of specific intent is not necessary to uphold a conviction for the willful viola…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Brashier (2×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
See, e. g., United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733, 736 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Ragghianti, 527 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir. 1975). .
cited Cited "see" State v. Burke
Ohio Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d 340, 343-344 (1981), citing United States v. Ragghianti, 527 F.2d 586 (9th Cir.1975) and United States v. Catena, 500 F.2d 1319 (3d Cir.1974).
cited Cited "see" State v. Echols
Ohio Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d at 343-344, 20 O.O.3d at 314-315 , 421 N.E.2d at 1291 , citing United States v. Ragghianti (C.A.9, 1975), 527 F.2d 586 . 22 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jonathan Fuller v. Ernie Roe, Warden State of California
9th Cir. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See United States v. VonWillie, 59 F.3d 922, 930 (9th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Ragghianti, 527 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir.1975) (holding that the trial judge has great discretion in ruling on severance motions, and review on appeal is limited to whether “the joint trial (was) so prejudicial ... as to require the exercise of that discretion in only one way, by ordering a separate trial”) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Randy Lee Closs v. Walter Leapley, Warden, South Dakota State Penitentiary, and Mark W. Barnett, Attorney General, State of South Dakota
8th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence medium
A less tangible, but perhaps equally persuasive, element of prejudice may reside in a latent feeling of hostility engendered by the charging of several crimes as'distinct from only one.” Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C.Cir.1964); see also United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733, 736-37 (4th Cir.1976), and United States v. Ragghianti, 527 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir.1975).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Donald Antonio RAGGHIANTI, Defendant-Appellant
75--2062.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Feb 2, 1976.
527 F.2d 586
Thomas M. Schneiger (argued), Portland, Or., for defendant-appellant., G. Frank Noonan, Asst. U. S. Atty. (argued), Portland, Or., for plaintiff-appellee.
Choy, Hufstedler, Real.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published

[*587] OPINION

Before HUFSTEDLER and CHOY, Circuit Judges, and REAL, * District Judge. CHOY, Circuit Judge:

Ragghianti appeals from his conviction of bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). He argues, inter alia, that the district court erred in not granting his motion to be tried separately on the two counts on which he was indicted. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

Background

On October 18 and 22, 1974, banks were robbed in Portland, Oregon. On both occasions the robber was seen getting into a red Fiat sportscar. Shortly after the October 22 robbery, Ragghianti was arrested while driving such a car. He had been seen dropping off a passenger matching the description of the robber at an apartment under surveillance in relation to the October 18 robbery. When arrested, Ragghianti was in possession of a large amount of cash, including marked “bait money” taken in the October 22 heist. He was indicted by the grand jury on two counts charging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), one count for each of the robberies.

The district court ordered a joint trial on the two counts under F.R.Crim.P. 8(a) and denied Ragghianti’s motion for severance. The court also denied a motion for acquittal made following the Government’s presentation. Ragghianti presented no evidence, and the Government’s evidence on both counts went to the jury which convicted him on both counts. The court subsequently granted Ragghianti’s F.R.Crim.P. 29(c) motion for acquittal and acquitted him on Count I, finding the evidence insufficient to support that portion of the verdict.

Failure to Sever

Ragghianti argues that the district court erred in not granting his F.R. Crim.P. 14 motion to sever the two counts. [1] In light of the weakness of the evidence against him, we agree.

The trial judge has great discretion in ruling on Rule 14 motions, and review on appeal is limited to whether “. • . the joint trial [was] so prejudicial . . . as to require the exercise of that discretion in only one way, by ordering a separate trial . . ..” Parker v. United States, 404 F.2d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1004, 89 S.Ct. 1602, 22 L.Ed.2d 782 (1969). While “the mere fact that the trial court entered judgment of acquittal on [one] count does not mandate a finding of prejudicial misjoinder of charges,” United States v. Johnson, 462 F.2d 608, 609 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 952, 93 S.Ct. 1396, 35 L.Ed.2d 602 (1972), where a charge justifying joinder turns out to lack evidence, the trial judge should be particularly sensitive to the possibility of prejudice. Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 516, 80 S.Ct. 945, 4 L,Ed.2d 921 (1960) (dictum).

Professor Wright notes three possible kinds of prejudice which can grow out of joinder of similar offenses not- arising out of the same transaction: 1) the jury may consider that the defendant must be bad to have been charged with so many things; 2) inadmissible proof of one offense may be admissible through a joined offense; and 3) the defendant may wish to testify on one count but not another. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal, § 222 (1969). While the lack of evi[*588] dence introduced by the Government on Count I reduces the second danger, it also reduces the value of having a joint trial. The first and third dangers remain. This does not establish a per se case of prejudice, and, if the evidence on Count II had been stronger we would be inclined to hold any error harmless. Cf. United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 901 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924, 91 S.Ct. 883, 27 L.Ed.2d 828 (1971). Given the facts here, however, we hold that the appellant was so prejudiced as to be entitled to a new trial.

We do not reach his other allegations of error, all having to do with the conduct of his trial.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

1

. The Government argues that Ragghianti waived his right to object to the joinder by failing to renew his motion for severance during the trial. Without delving into the correctness of the Government’s assertion of law— see Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal § 221 (1969) — we note that the motion was renewed. Reporter’s Transcript at 295-96.