In Re Harry W. Rodgers, III, 537 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1976). · Go Syfert
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In Re Harry W. Rodgers, III, 537 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
76 citation events (47 in the last 25 years) across 19 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Kondaur Capital Corporation v. Matsuyoshi (hawapp, 2021-04-09)
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1977 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kondaur Capital Corporation v. Matsuyoshi
Haw. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Matsuyoshi relies on a handful of federal cases in which recusal was granted or ordered under Section 455(b)(2), including Preston, 923 F.2d at 734-35 ; In re Rodgers, 537 F.2d 1196, 1197-98 (4th Cir. 1976); and In re Letters Rogatory, 661 F. Supp. at 1173 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kondaur Capital Corporation v. Matsuyoshi
Haw. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Matsuyoshi relies on a handful of federal cases in which recusal was granted or ordered under Section 455(b)(2), including Preston, 923 F.2d at 734-35 ; In re Rodgers, 537 F.2d 1196, 1197-98 (4th Cir. 1976); and In re Letters Rogatory, 661 F. Supp. at 1173 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Philip Morris USA Inc. v. United States Food and Drug Administration (2×)
D.D.C. · 2016 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Little Rock School Dist., 359 F.3d at 960 (stating that “the phrase ‘matter in controversy’ must mean something other than the word ‘case’”); Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 734-35 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court has never limited recusal requirements to cases in which the judge’s conflict was with the parties named in the suit” and concluding that the judge should have recused under Section 455(b)(2) when his former law firm represented a client who, though not a party to the suit, could have been sued for indemnification and was involve…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Philip Morris USA Inc. v. United States Food and Drug Administration (2×)
D.D.C. · 2016 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Little Rock School Dist., 359 F.3d at 960 (stating that “the phrase ‘matter in controversy’ must mean something other than the word ‘case’ ”); Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 734-35 (9th Cir.1991) (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court has never limited recusal requirements to cases in which the judge’s conflict was with the parties named in the suit” and concluding that the judge should have recused under Section 455(b)(2) when his former law firm represented a client who, though not a party to the suit, could have been sued for indemnification and was involve…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Industries, Inc.
E.D. Va. · 2012 · confidence medium
Thus, even if Kolon’s motion were timely (which it is not), recusal would not be warranted because, under § 455(b)(2), neither the presiding judge nor his former law partners served as a lawyer concerning the same “matter in controversy.” Kolon primarily relies on In re Rodgers, 537 F.2d 1196, 1197-98 (4th Cir.1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kolon Industries, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.
E.D. Va. · 2012 · confidence medium
Kolon primarily relies on In re Rodgers, 537 F.2d 1196, 1197-98 (4th Cir.1976) and United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279 (4th Cir.1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hoffenberg v. United States
S.D.N.Y. · 2004 · confidence medium
No. 1, 839 F.2d 1296, 1302 (8th Cir.1988) (affirming a trial judge's refusal to disqualify himself due to his former law partner’s involvement in an earlier case which was closely related and historically connected to the action pending before him because the earlier involvement consisted of "submission of an amicus brief in a case involving, to a large extent, different issues and different remedies two decades ago,” and holding that the phrase "matter in controversy” is limited to proceedings conducted under the same docket number of the case pending before the court); In re Rodgers, 5…
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Letters Rogatory From Supreme Ct. of Ontario
E.D. Mich. · 1987 · confidence medium
See Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir.1980); In re Hughes Aircraft Co., supra; In re Rodgers, 537 F.2d 1196, 1198 (4th Cir.1976); 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation. Steering Committee
5th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, supra, 517 F.2d at 1051-52; see IBM, supra, slip op. at 1414-16; Bell v. Chandler, 569 F.2d 556, 559-60 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459, 460-65 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 951 , 97 S.Ct. 370 , 50 L.Ed.2d 319 (1976); In re Rodgers, 537 F.2d 1196, 1197-98 (4th Cir. 1976); Scarrella v. Midwest Fed'l Savings & Loan, supra, 536 F.2d at 1210 ; Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 536-44 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 , 92 S.Ct. 2411 , 32 L.Ed.2d 676 (1972); Rosen v. Sugarman, supra, 357 F.2d at 796-800; In re Union Leader Corp.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Steering Committee v. Mead Corp.
5th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
Davis v. Board of School Comm’rs, supra, 517 F.2d at 1051-52; see IBM, supra, slip op. at 1414-16; Bell v. Chandler, 569 F.2d 556, 559-60 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459, 460-65 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 951 , 97 S.Ct. 370 , 50 L.Ed.2d 319 (1976); In re Rodgers, 537 F.2d 1196, 1197-98 (4th Cir. 1976); Scarrella v. Midwest Fed’l Savings & Loan, supra, 536 F.2d at 1210 ; Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 536-44 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 , 92 S.Ct. 2411 , 32 L.Ed.2d 676 (1972); Rosen v. Sugarman, supra, 357 F.2d at 796-800; In re Union Leader C…
examined Cited "see" Smartmatic USA Corp. v. Herring Networks, Inc. (3×)
D.D.C. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See ECF No. 79 at 18 (discussing In re Rodgers, 537 F.2d 1196, 1198 (4th Cir. 1976)).
discussed Cited "see" First Federal Savings Bank v. United States
Fed. Cl. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Rodgers, 537 F.2d 1196, 1197-98 (4th Cir.1976) (former partner’s lobbying efforts were defense evidence, and thus were part of the matter in controversy); In re Letters Rogatory, 661 F.Supp. 1168, 1173-74 (E.D.Mich.1987) (judge disqualified himself where the issue might arise of his former firm’s assertion of an attorney-client privilege over documents sought in discovery). 14 And there is no issue concerning confidential information I may have received from any of the plaintiffs in Winstar-related cases, see United States v. Henke, 222 F.3d 633 , 637 (9th Cir.2000), for I have n…
cited Cited "see" School Dist. of Kansas City, Mo. v. State of Mo.
W.D. Mo. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Rodgers, 537 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1976).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In Re Harry W. RODGERS, III, Et Al., Petitioners
76-1525.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
May 20, 1976.
537 F.2d 1196
Thomas C. Green and William W. Taylor, III, Washington, D. C., for Harry W. Rodgers, III., Arnold M. Weiner, Baltimore, Md., for Marvin Mandel., William G. Hundley, Washington, D. C., for W. Dale Hess., Michael E. Marr, Baltimore, Md., for William A. Rodgers., Norman Ramsey, Baltimore, Md., for Irvin Kovens., Joseph A. DePaul, College Park, Md., for Ernest Cory, Jr., Jervis S. Finney, U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md. (on brief); Barnet D. Skolnik, Ronald S. Liebman, Daniel J. Hurson, Baltimore, Md., for the United States.
Craven, Butzner, Widener.
Cited by 36 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Harry W. Rodgers, III, Marvin Mandel, W. Dale Hess, William A. Rodgers, Irvin Kovens, and Ernest Cory, Jr., have applied for a writ of mandamus against the Honorable Herbert F. Murray, United States District Judge for the District of Maryland. [1] They allege that Judge Murray erred when he declined to recuse himself from presiding over a criminal trial in which all of the petitioners are charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the mail fraud statute, and some with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., the antiracketeering statutes. We grant the writ because we believe his disqualification is required by 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2).

The petitioners affirmatively state that Judge Murray has no personal bias or prejudice against them or in favor of the government. Therefore, they do not seek to disqualify him under 28 U.S.C. § 144. [2]

The principal ground for disqualification on which the petitioners rely relates to the professional services rendered by a former law partner of the judge while they were members of the same firm before the judge took office. For many years, Richard W. Case, the judge’s former partner, represented Pimlico race track. Before the judge left the firm, his partner conferred with the owners of Pimlico to formulate their position on the consolidation of Maryland’s one-mile tracks. He also conferred with them about making an offer to purchase Marlboro track. The judge knew nothing about these conferences. After the judge left the firm, his partner continued representing Pimlico in these matters, ultimately participating in drafting a consolidation bill which was passed by the Maryland legislature. He also prepared an offer for the purchase of the Marlboro track which was rejected by the owners because the tendered price was insufficient. Neither the government nor the petitioners[*1198] charge that the judge’s former law partner did anything unlawful or improper.

The petitioners were also interested in the consolidation bill, and they are charged with using unlawful means to secure its passage. They, too, were interested in acquiring the Marlboro race track. After the owners rejected the offer made by the clients of the judge’s former law partner, they sold the track to some of the petitioners.

The evidence also discloses that both the district judge’s former law partner and one of the owners of Pimlico whom he represented will undoubtedly testify about the events that took place before the judge withdrew from his law firm. The petitioners assert that they will attempt to prove that the conduct for which they have been indicted was no more culpable than the conduct of the client represented by the judge’s former law partner. They will attempt to use the partner and his client as witnesses to prove that their goals were identical and legitimate. The government, of course, does not agree with the petitioners. But it acknowledges, at least for the purpose of this proceeding, that this evidence would be relevant.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) provides that a judge shall disqualify himself in the following circumstances:

Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it. [Italics added.]

The government contends that the statute’s terms, “matter” and “matter in controversy,” should be construed to mean the actual case before the court. Even if the government’s reading of the statute is accepted, the services rendered by the judge’s former law partner fall within its terms. This is so because the actual case before the court consists of more than the charges brought by the government. It also includes the defense asserted by the accused. Here, this defense, in part at least, will consist of evidence of matters in which the judge’s former partner served as a lawyer. We hold, therefore, that the former partner’s representation of Pimlico with respect to the consolidation study and his preliminary work for the attempted purchase of Marlboro before the judge withdrew from the firm is a matter in controversy within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2). [3] The legislative history indicates that disqualification under this statutory provision is mandatory. H.Rep. No. 93-1453, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., 3 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News pp. 6351, 6355 (1974). Accordingly, we think the writ should issue.

Since the petitioners disclaim any suggestion that Judge Murray is personally biased or prejudiced, they agree that the decisions he has made on pretrial motions should remain the law of the case and should not be vacated. We therefore hold that the judge who is appointed to preside over the case need not review Judge Murray’s rulings because Judge Murray is disqualified from proceeding further with the case. Counsel indicate that prompt substitution of a judge should not delay the trial, which is set to begin on June 1, 1976. We agree, and have expedited the hearing on this application and the filing of this opinion in order to preserve that schedule. We are confident that Judge Murray will recuse himself without awaiting service of a writ of mandamus.

1

. A refusal to disqualify is reviewable by mandamus. See, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 536 (8th Cir. 1972); Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 384 (1st Cir. 1961); United States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir. 1959); Gladstein v. McLaughlin, 230 F.2d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 1955); cf., Yablonski v. United Mineworkers, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 193, 454 F.2d 1036, 1037-38 (1971); General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 331 F.2d 192, 194 (4th Cir. 1964). Contra, Action Realty Co. v. Will, 427 F.2d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 1970); Albert v. United States District Court, 283 F.2d 61, 62-63 (6th Cir. 1960); Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 594 (3rd Cir. 1958). See generally 9 Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 110.13[10] at 187 & n. 3.

2

. 28 U.S.C. § 144 provides in part:

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
3

. We do not, however, express any opinion as to the validity of this defense or the admissibility of evidence to establish it.