Gary Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., an Illinois Corp., 547 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1976). · Go Syfert
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Gary Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., an Illinois Corp., 547 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
73 citation events (39 in the last 25 years) across 20 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: M.L. v. Board of Education of Bourbon County (kyed, 2025-09-04)
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1977 2001 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#4 10 C.F.R. § 210.62 cited 3× in this case · 103 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 49 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) M.L. v. Board of Education of Bourbon County
E.D. Ky. · 2025 · confidence medium
However, it can also be used to return the parties to the “‘last, uncontested status preceding commencement of the controversy.’” Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1976) (quoting Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) FemHealth USA, Inc. v. Rickey Williams, Jr.
6th Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
Preliminary injunctions require courts to make that assessment at an early stage of the litigation so as “to maintain the status quo pending determination of an action on its merits.” Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) TowerCo 2013, LLC v. Berlin Township
S.D. Ohio · 2023 · confidence medium
STANDARD OF REVIEW A preliminary injunction is considered an extraordinary remedy, intended “to maintain the status quo pending determination of an action on its merits.” Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Columbus v. State
Ohio Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(Emphasis sic.) Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Parents Defending Education v. Olentangy Local School District Board of Education
S.D. Ohio · 2023 · confidence medium
Ultimately, a preliminary injunction is considered an “extraordinary remedy,” intended “to maintain the status quo pending determination of an action on its merits.” Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Heid v. Aderholt
S.D. Ohio · 2022 · confidence medium
Preliminary injunctions are a discretionary remedy intended to “maintain[] the status quo pending determination of an action on its merits.” Burniac v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 810 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1976)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Student Resource Center v. Eastern Gateway Community College
S.D. Ohio · 2022 · confidence medium
Preliminary injunctions are a discretionary remedy intended “to maintain the status quo pending determination of an action on its merits.” Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1976). “[T]he preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-reaching power, which is to be applied only in the limited circumstances which clearly demand it.” Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2000) (alteration incorporated, internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ronnoco Coffee LLC v. Castgna
E.D. Mo. · 2021 · confidence medium
See also Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. Yeutter, 956 F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that “once an injunction in a civil case has been invalidated, rights granted under the injunction no longer exist and cannot be enforced”); Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir. 1976) (recognizing and applying United Mine Workers rule); Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 545 F.2d 1336, 1345 (3d Cir. 1976) (affirming rule that “compensatory civil contempt does not survive the abrogation of the underlying decree”); Pac.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Donald Burniac v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
6th Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
A preliminary injunction “maintain[s] the status quo pending determination of an action on its merits.” Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eplus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc. (2×)
Fed. Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351 , 1361 (5th Cir.1978) (vacating contempt orders because the underlying turnover order "was invalid ab initio”); Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir.1976) (concluding that "the remedial con tempt order ... falls with [the relevant provision] of the injunction”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eplus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc. (2×)
Fed. Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351 , 1361 (5th Cir. 1978) (Vacating contempt orders because the underlying turn-over order “was invalid ab initio.”); Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir. 1976) (Concluding that “the remedial contempt order . . . falls with [the relevant provision] of the injunction.”). 9 The Supreme Court denied the petition for certio- rari on May 19, 2014.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lal v. United States Life Insurance
6th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
Dec.7, 2006), citing Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976), and that Lai’s license was not effectively suspended on March 31, 1997.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Niranjan Lal v. United States Life Insurance C
6th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
Mich. Dec. 7, 2006), citing Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976), and that Lal’s license was not effectively suspended on March 31, 1997.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lal v. United States Life Insurance
6th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
Dec.7, 2006), citing Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976), and that Lai’s license was not effectively suspended on March 31, 1997.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co.
6th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Jurisdiction M&C argues that we lack jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a contempt order, citing Joy & Middlebelt Sunoco, Inc. v. Fusion Oil, Inc., 179 Fed.Appx. 301, 303 (6th Cir.2006), for the proposition that “a civil contempt order ... is not considered a final order in this Circuit.” In Fusion Oil, however, we next immediately quoted McAlpin v. Lexington 76 Auto Truck Stop, Inc., 229 F.3d 491, 500 (6th Cir.2000), in which we stated that “a ‘judgment of civil contempt is not [itself] a final decree,’ and therefore is not appealable in the absence of a final judgment. ” McAlpin, …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Joy & Middlebelt Sunoco, Inc. v. Fusion Oil, Inc.
6th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
As such, it is only appealable where some other basis for jurisdiction exists, such as a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order, Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976), or where the appealing party is not a party to the underlying lawsuit, see Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117 , 26 S.Ct. 356 , 50 L.Ed. 686 (1906); see also United States ex rel Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc. 444 F.3d 462 (6th Cir.2006) (discussing Alexander).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Bob Taft (2×)
6th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
E.g., Morales, 504 U.S. at 382-83 , 112 S.Ct. 2031 (vacating in part an injunction prohibiting state officers from enforcing state law — under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 , 28 S.Ct. 441 , 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908)— “insofar as it restrained] the operation of state laws” that the officers had not threatened to enforce); Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 768 (6th Cir.) (vacating and remanding for further factfinding one part of a preliminary injunction while affirming the other part), cert. de- nied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 361 , 163 L.Ed.2d 68 (2005); PACCAR Inc. v. Tele…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Planned Parenthood v. Taft
6th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Page 12 part and vacating in part a preliminary injunction where “the scope of the injunction [was] too broad”); Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1244, 1253 (6th Cir. 1997) (vacating a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of three statutory sections only “insofar as it applie[d] to” one section); Sheeran v. American Commercial Lines, Inc., 683 F.2d 970, 981 (6th Cir. 1982) (generally affirming a preliminary injunction but modifying it as to one defendant and vacating it as to another); Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir. 1976) (vacating one…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Diabetes Treatment
6th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
It is significant to note, in this respect, that “a judgment of civil contempt is not a final decree and therefore is not appealable in itself.” Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1976) (citing Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105, 107 (1936); McAlpin v. Lexington 76 Auto Truck Stop, Inc., 229 F.3d 491, 500 (6th Cir. 2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States Ex Rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Centers of America, Inc., Hca, Inc. And West Paces Medical Center (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
6th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
It is significant to note, in this respect, that “a judgment of civil contempt is not a final decree and therefore is not appeal-able in itself.” Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976) (citing Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105, 107 , 57 S.Ct. 57 , 81 L.Ed. 67 (1936); McAlpin v. Lexington 76 Auto Truck Stop, Inc., 229 F.3d 491, 500 (6th Cir.2000)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Planned Parenthood v. Taft
6th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
E.g., Morales, 504 U.S. at 382-83 (vacating in part an injunction prohibiting state officers from enforcing state law — under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) — “insofar as it restrain[ed] the operation of state laws” that the officers had not threatened to enforce); Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 768 (6th Cir.) (vacating and remanding for further factfinding one part of a preliminary injunction while affirming the other part), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S. Ct. 361 (2005); PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (affir…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Bob Taft
6th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
E.g., Morales, 504 U.S. at 382-83 , 112 S.Ct. 2031 (vacating in part an injunction prohibiting state officers from enforcing state law — under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 , 28 S.Ct. 441 , 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) — "insofar as it restrain[ed] the operation of state laws" that the officers had not threatened to enforce); Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 768 (6th Cir.) (vacating and remanding for further factfinding one part of a preliminary injunction while affirming the other part), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 361 , 163 L.Ed.2d 68 (2005); PACCAR …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cousins v. Bray (2×) also: Cited "see"
6th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
It is a long-standing rule of appellate jurisdiction that “a judgment of civil contempt is not a final decree and therefore is not appealable in itself.” Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976) (citing Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105, 107 , 57 S.Ct. 57 , 81 L.Ed. 67 (1936)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) David L. Garrison v. Cassens Transport Company
6th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir.1976) (quoting Salvage Process Corp. v. Acme Tank Cleaning Process Corp., 86 F.2d 727, 727 (2d Cir.1936) (per curiam)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara
5th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
See also Klett v. Pim, 965 F.2d 587, 590 (8th Cir.1992) (finding that “[compensatory civil contempt does not survive if the underlying injunction is vacated because it was issued erroneously”); Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. Yeutter, 956 F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir.1992) (finding that "once an injunction in a civil case has been invalidated, rights granted under the injunction no longer exist and cannot be enforced”); Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir.1976) (recognizing and applying from United Mine Workers rule); La *375 trobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 545 F.2d 1336…
cited Cited as authority (rule) McAlpin v. Lexington 76 Auto Truck Stop, Inc.
6th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dottie Renee McAlpin v. Lexington 76 Auto Truck Stop, Inc., a Kentucky Corporation Marie Mills, as Administratrix of the Estate of Vance Mills Beckham Garland Appalachian Oil Corporation, a Kentucky Corporation G&m Oil Company, Inc., a Kentucky Corporation B&v Realty Corporation
6th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Police Ass'n of New Orleans Ex Rel. Cannatella v. City of New Orleans
5th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976) (quoted in Western Water Management, Inc. v. Brown, 40 F.3d 105 , 108 n. 1 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Bayshore Associates, Inc., 934 F.2d 1391, 1398 (6th Cir.1991); Mercury Motor Express, Inc. v. Brinke, 475 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir.1973)). 8 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Matter Of: Rimsat, Ltd., Debtor. Paul E. Underwood, Trustee v. Carl B. Hilliard, Jr.
7th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
United States v. Bay shore *964 Associates, Inc., 934 F.2d 1391, 1398 (6th Cir.1991); In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee Litigation, 689 F.2d 1150, 1155 (3d Cir. 1982), and cases cited there; New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 763 F.2d 49, 51-52 (2d Cir.1985); Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965-66 (6th Cir.1976); 15B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company v. William L. Hudson
6th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Blaylock v. Checker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Conley v. Whittlesey (2×)
Idaho Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Baune, 534 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.1976); Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965-66 (6th Cir.1976); Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 910 (3d Cir.1975); Inland Steel Co. v. Local Union No. 1545, United Mine Workers of America, 505 F.2d 293, 296-97 (7th Cir.1974); Heyman v. Kline, 456 F.2d 123 (2d Cir.1972).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Bayshore Associates, Inc., a Michigan Corporation
6th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
However, where the validity of the underlying order or injunction is questioned on appeal there may also be an appeal of a remedial civil contempt order." Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976). 5 40 We review a district court's grant of a preliminary injunction under an abuse of discretion standard.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Bayshore Associates, Inc.
6th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
However, where the validity of the underlying order or injunction is questioned on appeal there may also be an appeal of a remedial civil contempt order.” Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976). 5 We review a district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction under an abuse of discretion standard.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Everett Akers v. Charlotte Baldwin, Secretary of Natural Resources, and Environmental Protection Cabinet, and Falcon Coal Company, Intervening
6th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dollar Rent a Car of Washington, Inc. Dollar Rent a Car of Cleveland, Inc. And Dollar Rent a Car Systems, Inc. v. The Travelers Indemnity Company, a Corporation the Travelers Insurance Company of Hartford Connecticut, a Corporation and Constitution State Management Company, a Corporation, Viking Reinsurance Company, Ltd., a Corporation v. The Travelers Indemnity Company, a Corporation the Travelers Insurance Company of Hartford Connecticut, a Corporation and Constitution State Management Company, a Corporation
9th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
See Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Local Union 295, 449 F.2d 586, 590 (2d Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 , 92 S.Ct. 1500 , 31 L.Ed.2d 796 (1972); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 673 F.2d 628, 637 (3d Cir.1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984); Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976); Hyde Construction Co. v. Koehring Co., 348 F.2d 643, 647 (10th Cir.1965), rev'd on other grounds, 382 U.S. 362 , 86 S.Ct. 522 , 15 L.Ed.2d 416 (1966).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dollar Rent A Car of Washington, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.
9th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
See Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Local Union 295, 449 F.2d 586, 590 (2d Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 , 92 S.Ct. 1500 , 31 L.Ed.2d 796 (1972); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 673 F.2d 628, 637 (3d Cir.1982), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984); Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976); Hyde Construction Co. v. Koehring Co., 348 F.2d 643, 647 (10th Cir.1965), rev’d on other grounds, 382 U.S. 362 , 86 S.Ct. 522 , 15 L.Ed.2d 416 (1966).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dore & Associates Contracting, Inc. v. American Druggists' Insurance Co. (In Re Dore & Associates Contracting, Inc.)
Bankr. E.D. Mich. · 1984 · confidence medium
University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 , 101 S.Ct. 1830, 1834 , 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981); Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Marlon Louis Johnson, Timothy Duane Neal, Witness-Appellant
6th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
The statement in Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976), that a "judgment of civil contempt is not a final decree and therefore is not appealable,” is correct as limited to the facts of that case.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jesse Wilson Corbin, D/B/A Corbin's Texaco v. Texaco, Inc.
6th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
It is well established that the purpose of the preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo or relative position of the parties to preserve the ability of the court to make a meaningful decision after trial on the merits. 1 University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 , 101 S.Ct. 1830, 1833 , 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981); Blaylock v. Checker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Toledo Trust Co. v. Poole (In Re Poole)
Bankr. N.D. Ohio · 1981 · confidence medium
The general function of a preliminary injunction being to maintain the status quo pending a determination of an action on its merits, Blaylock v. Checker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1976), a showing of actual or threatened injury must be demonstrated.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Doerr v. B. F. Goodrich Co.
N.D. Ohio · 1979 · confidence medium
In addition, the moving party “must demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits when the case is tried.” Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Printing Specialties & Paper Products District Council No. 2 v. International Printing & Graphic Communications Union
E.D. Tenn. · 1978 · confidence medium
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo “ * * * pending determination of an action on its merits. * * ” Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., C.A. 6th (1976), 547 F.2d 962, 965 [2], later appeal sub nom.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. City of Manchester
E.D. Tenn. · 1978 · confidence medium
Blaylock v. Checker Oil Co., C.A. 6th (1976), 547 F.2d 962, 965 [2].
cited Cited as authority (rule) Union Elec. Co. v. EPA
E.D. Mo. · 1978 · confidence medium
Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mason County Medical Ass'n v. Knebel
6th Cir. · 1977 · confidence medium
Adams v. Federal Express Corp., supra at 323; Cincinnati Electronics Corp. v. Kleppe, 509 F.2d 1080, 1087 (6th Cir. 1975); North Avondale Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority, supra at 488; Garlock, Inc., v. United Seal, Inc.,. 404 F.2d 256, 257 (6th Cir. 1968); American Fed’n of Musicians v. Stein, supra. See also Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1976); Public Interest Research Group of Mich. v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 917, 918 (6th Cir. 1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mason County Medical Association v. Knebel
6th Cir. · 1977 · confidence medium
United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435 , 56 S.Ct. 829 , 80 L.Ed. 1263 (1936); Nashville I-40 Steering Committee v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967). 22 See also Com-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 458 F.2d 1341, 1342 (6th Cir. 1972); Oliver v. School Dist. of City of Kalamazoo, 448 F.2d 635, 636 (6th Cir. 1971); American Fed'n of Musicians v. Stein, 213 F.2d 679, 683 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 873 , 75 S.Ct. 108 , 99 L.Ed. 687 (1954). 23 In determining on appeal whether the District Court abused its discretion in granting or withholding preliminary injunctive relief, this…
discussed Cited "see" ECIMOS, LLC v. Carrier Corporation
W.D. Tenn. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1976); see also United States v. Bayshore Assocs., Inc., 934 F.2d 1391, 1400 (6th Cir. 1991) (“The second kind [of fine for contempt] is payable to the court, but the defendant can avoid paying the contempt ‘fine’ by performing the act required by the court’s order.” (quoting Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 868 (3d Cir. 1990))).
cited Cited "see" Puertas v. Michigan Department of Corrections
E.D. Mich. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962 (6th Cir.1976).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Carrico
6th Cir. BAP · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976) (a civil contempt order generally is considered interlocutory); United States Abatement Corp. v. Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S., Inc. (In re United States Abatement Corp.), 39 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir.1994) (An order of contempt is "final” for appeal purposes only after an appropriate sanction is imposed.) (citations omitted).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Gary BLAYLOCK Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
CHEKER OIL COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, Defendant-Appellant
76-2149, 76-2294.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Dec 2, 1976.
547 F.2d 962
Sherwin J. Malkin, Malkin & Gottlieb, Chicago, 111., for appellant., Samuel D. Carpenter, Verdervoort, Cooke, McFee, Christ, Carpenter & Fisher, Battle Creek, Mich., for appellees.
Edwards, Lively, En-Gel.
Cited by 66 opinions  |  Published
LIVELY, Circuit Judge.

Cheker Oil Company (Cheker) appeals from a preliminary injunction and an order holding it in contempt of the preliminary injunction.

This action was filed on November 24, 1975 by three lessees of service stations owned by Cheker and located in neighboring communities in Michigan. The gravamen of the complaint was that Cheker began enforcing lease provisions which required the payment of minimum monthly rentals only after the energy crisis of 1973-1974 created a severe shortage of gasoline. It was charged that although the leases had always required such payments Cheker had not previously enforced these provisions. The complaint charged that Cheker was in violation of a regulation issued by the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) pursuant to the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973,15 U.S.C. § 751 et seq. (EPAA), as amended. Jurisdiction was also asserted under the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and diversity of citizenship.

The FEA regulation referred to in the complaint requires that suppliers deal with purchasers of allocated products in accordance with “normal business practices in effect during the base period. . . . ” 10 C.F.R. § 210.62(a). Sub-section (c) of Section 210.62 provides, in part:

(c) Any practice which constitutes a means to obtain a price higher than is permitted by the regulations in this chapter or to impose terms or conditions not customarily imposed upon the sale of an allocated product is a violation of these regulations. .

The complaint stated that the plaintiffs had filed a complaint with the Chicago office of the Federal Energy Office (FEO) but that a preliminary injunction was required to prevent irreparable injury during the pendency of the FEO proceedings.

The complaint also charged, without specificity, that Cheker’s actions constituted violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2; and of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14. In another count recovery was sought for breach of contract. The leases between the three plaintiffs and Cheker were filed as exhibits with the complaint. The identical (except as to amount of minimum rent) leases were for one year and all expired on August 31, 1974. Each provided for a rental of two cents per gallon for each gallon of gasoline sold on the premises, with a minimum stated monthly rental. Rent was payable daily, with any deficiency in the minimum rent for a given month being due on the first day of the following month. Each lessee was required to make a deposit of $1,000 with Cheker as security for faithful performance of the terms of the lease. No lessee was required to purchase petroleum products from Cheker, and Cheker was not required to furnish any such products. The leases contained no provisions with respect to prices in the event purchases were made by the lessees from Cheker.

In the complaint the plaintiffs charged that Cheker violated a stipulation of the leases which provided—[*964] 8. OPERATION OF LESSEE’S BUSINESS:

None of the provisions of this lease shall be construed as reserving or granting to LESSOR any right to exercise any control over the business or operations of LESSEE conducted on the leased premises, or to direct in any respect the manner in which such business and operations shall be conducted. The entire control and direction of LESSEE’S business on the leased premises shall be and remain with LESSEE. . . .

Among other things it was alleged that Cheker had dictated prices that the plaintiffs were required to charge for retail sales of gasoline.

The parties attempted to negotiate a settlement of their differences, but these negotiations were not successful, and the plaintiffs filed a “Petition for Preliminary Injunction Order” on February 4, 1976. The prayer of this petition was that Cheker be required to continue to sell and deliver gasoline to the plaintiffs at prices and terms discussed but never agreed to by the parties. The basic disagreement was whether prices to the plaintiffs should be “pegged” to those charged at a single company-operated Cheker station or to the average price charged by four such stations. Before the district court acted on the petition for preliminary injunction the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint charging in great detail a conspiracy between Cheker and Marathon Oil Company to create a monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act, a “tying arrangement” by Cheker in violation of the Clayton Act and price discrimination in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act [Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)]. Though the district court did not sign an order permitting the amendment under Rule 14, Fed.R.Civ.P.,' it is obvious that the court treated the afhendment as properly filed.

After Cheker had responded to the petition for a preliminary injunction the district court conducted a hearing. On August 17, 1976 a preliminary injunction issued, effective ten days thereafter. The injunction is reproduced as Exhibit 1 in the appendix to this opinion. Cheker filed a notice of appeal and a motion for stay of paragraph (d) of the preliminary injunction pending appeal. On September 3, 1976 the plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt order. Following a hearing the district court issued a contempt order which is reproduced as Exhibit 2 in the appendix to this opinion. The notice of appeal was amended to include an appeal from the contempt order.

The district court denied Cheker’s motion for stay of paragraph (d) of the preliminary injunction. The parties agreed at a hearing before a judge of this court to maintain the status quo pending appeal. The issues related to the preliminary injunction and contempt order were argued at a consolidated hearing before this panel.

THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

In its findings of fact and conclusions of law the district court held that there was a likelihood that the plaintiffs would be able to succeed on their breach of contract claim under Michigan law and on their claim for violation of the federal energy regulations. Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the preliminary injunction were based on these findings and conclusions. Paragraph (d) of the preliminary injunction, which deals with prices, was based on the conclusion of the district court that the plaintiffs had made such a showing of Robinson-Patman Act violations as to create a likelihood of success on this issue.

Without in any way expressing or intimating an opinion on the merits of the issues related to the duty of plaintiffs to pay minimum rents, the court concludes that the district court did not act improvidently in including paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) in the preliminary injunction. Though the leases did not require Cheker to sell and deliver gasoline to the plaintiffs, it is reasonable to require that deliveries may not be withheld due to nonpayment of minimum rent pending determination of the minimum rent issue in light of the emergency legislation and regulations relied upon by the plaintiffs.

[*965] The general function of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo pending determination of an action on its merits. Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969); District 50 United Mine Workers v. International Union, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 34, 412 F.2d 165 (1969); Fall v. Copperweld Speciality Steel Co., 380 F.Supp. 1277 (N.D.Ohio 1974). By including paragraph (d) in the preliminary injunction the district court went far beyond freezing the parties in their positions at the time this action was commenced. The “last, uncontested status preceding commencement of the controversy,” Washington Capitols v. Barry, supra, involved no agreement with respect to pricing of gasoline.

In order to be entitled to a preliminary injunction a party must demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits when the case is tried. Cincinnati Electronics Corp. v. Kleppe, 509 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1975); Garlock v. United Seal, Inc., 404 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1968). The inclusion of paragraph (d) in the preliminary injunction was based on the district court’s determination that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a violation by Cheker of the Robinson-Patman Act. The district court predicated this holding on evidence that Cheker sold gasoline to customers at five company-operated stations, located from two to thirty-two miles from plaintiffs’ stations, at prices below the prices at which plaintiffs could sell at a profit after a reasonable mark-up of Cheker’s prices to them. Our review of authoritative decisions leads to the conclusion that the district court erred in concluding that plaintiffs had demonstrated the requisite probability of success on this issue. See Mullis v. Arco Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 1974); American Oil Co. v. McMullin, 508 F.2d 1345,1353 (10th Cir. 1975); Reines Distributors, Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 256 F.Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y.1966). In view of the fact that paragraph (d) goes beyond a restoration of the status quo and imposes new obligations on Cheker not required by its previous contractual relationship with the plaintiffs and our conclusion on the likelihood of success under the Robinson-Patman Act, we are compelled to hold that the district court abused its discretion and acted improvidently in its inclusion of paragraph (d) in the preliminary injunction.

THE CONTEMPT ORDER

The contempt proceedings were instituted after plaintiffs began withholding one cent per gallon from the invoice price of gasoline delivered by Cheker and Cheker responded by terminating deliveries to the plaintiffs. Though there was 'no evidence produced at the contempt hearing that plaintiffs were suffering damages remotely approaching $10,000 per day, the district court assessed a contempt fine of this amount and directed that it be paid to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs argue that a civil contempt order is not appealable. It is true that a judgment of civil contempt is not a final decree and therefore is not appealable in itself. Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105, 107, 57 S.Ct. 57, 81 L.Ed. 67 (1936). However, where the validity of the underlying order or injunction is questioned on appeal there may also be an appeal of a remedial civil contempt order. The order granting the preliminary injunction in this case was appealable as of right under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Though this court required an appealable final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as a prerequisite to appealability of a civil contempt order in Peabody Coal Co. v. Local Union Nos. 1734, 1508 and 1548, U.M.W., 484 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1973), that case is distinguishable from the present one. In Peabody the validity of the underlying order upon which the contempt order was based was not challenged. Actually, the parties stipulated that it had been “providently granted.” 484 F.2d at 80. In addition, the contempt fine in Peabody was payable to the court to coerce compliance rather than to the opposing party as compensation. Under these circumstances it was proper to require that a final judgment be entered before the contempt order could be appealed.

[*966] The situation in the present case is quite different. The defendant Cheker has insisted that the preliminary injunction was improvidently granted, and we have concluded that this view is correct with respect to that portion of the injunction which is the basis of the contempt order. Furthermore, Cheker was ordered to pay an amount far in excess of any proven damages — not into court, but to the plaintiff— and no bond was required. In United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 294-95, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947), the Supreme Court referred to such a situation as follows:

It does not follow, of course, that simply because a defendant may be punished for criminal contempt for disobedience of an order later set aside on appeal, that the plaintiff in the action may profit by way of a fine imposed in a simultaneous proceeding for civil contempt based upon a violation of the same order. The right to remedial relief falls with an injunction which events prove was erroneously issued, Worden v. Searls, supra, 121 U.S. at pages 25, 26, 7 S.Ct. at page 820, 30 L.Ed. 853; Salvage Process Corp. v. Acme Tank Cleaning Process Corp. [86 F.2d 727 (2 Cir. 1936)]; S. Anargyros v. Anargyros & Co. [191 F. 208 (C.C.1911)]; and a fortiori when the injunction or restraining order was beyond the jurisdiction of the court, (footnote omitted).

Since “[t]he right to remedial relief falls with an injunction which events prove was erroneously issued, . . . ” id., logic dictates that the appellate court which rules on the validity of the injunction should deal with the contempt issue. See United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), where the court of appeals entertained an appeal from a civil contempt order along with an appeal from an amended preliminary injunction and reversed both orders. Compare Winner Corporation v. Caesar & Co., 511 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir. 1976).

In Inland Steel Co. v. Local No. 1545, United Mine Workers, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974), the court noted the difference between a coercive civil contempt order and one designed to compensate the party injured by the alleged contumacious activity. The court concluded that a coercive civil contempt order is similar to a criminal contempt order, but that the remedial contempt order under consideration stood “on a different footing,” and quoted from United States v. United Mine Workers, supra. This distinction was also made in Salvage Process Corp. v. Acme Tank Cleaning Process Corp., 86 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1936), where the court stated:

A conviction for criminal contempt may indeed survive the reversal of the decree disobeyed; the punishment is to vindicate the court’s authority which has been equally flouted whether or not the command was right. But the same cannot be true of civil contempts, which are only remedial. It is true that the reversal of the decree does not retroactively obliterate the past existence of the violation; yet on the other hand it does more than destroy the future sanction of the decree. It adjudges that it never should have passed; that the right which it affected to create was no right at all. To let the liability stand for past contumacy would be to give the plaintiff a remedy not for a right but for a wrong which the law should not do. (citations omitted).

The court concludes that it has jurisdiction to review the remedial contempt order which arose out of an appealable preliminary injunction and that it falls with paragraph (d) of the injunction.

The preliminary injunction is affirmed with respect to paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) thereof and reversed with respect to paragraph (d), which is vacated. The contempt order of September 15,1976 is reversed and vacated in its entirety. All sums withheld by plaintiffs pursuant to paragraph (d) or the contempt order will be paid promptly to Cheker. Any fines paid by Cheker pursuant to the contempt order will be refunded by the plaintiffs immediately. This action is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The parties will bear their respective costs on this appeal.

[*967] EXHIBIT 1

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

(Filed August 17, 1976)

Pursuant to the decision of this court,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a preliminary injunction be and the same is hereby granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that a preliminary injunction, to take effect within ten (10) days of the issuance of this order, is hereby issued against Defendant, Cheker Oil Co., its divisions, related companies, directors, officers, agents, servants, employees, successors, and assigns, and all those in active concert or participation with them, herein called Defendant, as follows:

Defendant is enjoined from:

(a) Discontinuing the supply of gasoline to these plaintiffs, Gary Blaylock, operating a station at Route 1 and U.S. 31, Berrien Springs, Michigan; Donald Crago, operating a station on Red Arrow Highway in Stevensville, Michigan; and Steven Linn, operating a station at 1242 M-139, Benton Harbor, Michigan; based on plaintiff’s refusal to pay past due or presently accruing minimum rent or to maintain their security deposits at $1,000, or because any of the plaintiffs have previously deducted money from general merchandise monies for minimum rent which they claim was wrongfully charged. The Defendant is not to make further charges or deductions for such minimum rent pending the final resolution of this lawsuit. The plaintiffs, of course, are to continue to pay the 2 cents per gallon rent as they have done since May 1972, and plaintiffs must make remittances therefor pursuant to the customary arrangements.

(b) From charging these plaintiffs minimum rent where charged as a means to obtain higher prices for gasoline to the Defendant lessor-supplier than otherwise allowed under the Energy Allocation Act in violation of 10 C.F.R. § 210.62(c) (1976); or from discontinuing the supply of gasoline to these plaintiffs because they have in the past refused to pay minimum rent allegedly in violation of the Act.

(c) From charging these plaintiffs minimum rent where such charge of minimum rent is a change in normal business practices in violation of 10 C.F.R. § 210.62(a) (1976); or from discontinuing the supply of gasoline to these plaintiffs because they have in the past refused to pay minimum rent allegedly in violation of the Act.

(d) From further discrimination in price and price supports between these plaintiffs and Defendant’s five company-operated stations, located in Hartford, South Haven, Dowagiac, Cassopolis, and Benton Harbor (Territorial Road), all in Michigan, in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (Supp.1976). This court will view as price discrimination a tankwagon price (not including rent of 2 cents per gallon) to these plaintiffs in excess of 4 cents below the retail price per gallon at which Checker sells its respective grades of gasoline at its five above-named company-operated stations, as determined from an average of the prices charged at a given time at these five stations. This court will also view as price discrimination the failure of Cheker Oil Co. to give these plaintiffs temporary price supports as were previously given these dealers and as are given Cheker’s company-operated stations to meet their immediate competition. Defendant is in all manner and ways to deal with plaintiffs’ stations the same as its company-operated stations.

No bond will be required.

Dated: August 17th, 1976.

/s/ NOEL P. FOX Chief District Judge

EXHIBIT 2

ORDER

(Filed September 15, 1976)

Based upon the findings of fact in the attached opinion, Cheker Oil Co. is hereby found in contempt of the injunction issued by this court in this matter on August 17, 1976, effective August 27, 1976.

(1) Cheker Oil Co. is to collect no rent for gasoline from plaintiffs during the period that they are without a supply of gasoline.

[*968] (2) Pending a final determination of damages upon a hearing before this court, plaintiffs may treat one-half of the amount they have withheld from daily remittances as their damages and use this amount for day-to-day expenses. The remaining one-half of withheld money is to be deposited in an interest-bearing account, pending such determination. Withdrawal from this account shall only be upon the counter-signatures of each plaintiff and their attorney.

(3) Plaintiffs are hereby awarded $750 in attorney fees and costs.

(4) Until such time as Cheker Oil Co. purges itself of its contempt by resuming gasoline deliveries to plaintiffs, it will pay a fine to plaintiffs of $10,000 per day, effective immediately upon the termination of the hearing on Friday, September 10, 1976.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Effective date — September 10, 1976. [1] Dated: September 15th, 1976.

/s/ NOEL P. FOX Chief District Judge

1

. There was an oral opinion from the bench on Friday, September 10, 1976. This written order was not signed until today because I have been in Madison, Wisconsin and Marquette, Michigan since the date of the hearing. The attorneys for both parties were notified of this circumstance.