Syrous Tashnizi v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 585 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1978). · Go Syfert
Syrous Tashnizi v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 585 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
27 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 13 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Putu Indrawati v. U.S. Attorney General (ca11, 2015-03-02)
Treatment trajectory · 1979 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1979 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Putu Indrawati v. U.S. Attorney General
11th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d 781, 782-83 (5th Cir.1978). 21 When considering the fairness of admitting hearsay, we look to the challenged evidence’s reliability and trustworthiness.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Putu Indrawati v. U.S. Attorney General
11th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d 781, 782-83 (5th Cir. 1978).21 When considering the fairness of admitting hearsay, we look to the challenged evidence’s reliability and trustworthiness.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tomas Alejandro Mancinas-Hernandez v. US Attorney General
11th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
Rather, in immigration proceedings, evidence is admissible “if it is probative and its use is not fundamentally unfair so as to deprive [the] petitioner of due process.” See Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d 781, 782-83 (5th Cir.1978) (concerning hearsay evidence). 2 An IJ may consider evidence in the form of an “oral or written statement that is material and relevant to any issue in the case previously made by the respondent or any other person.” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.46 (b).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Augusto Alfredo Arnesen Cortez v. U.S. Attorney General
11th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
“Uncontradicted hearsay evidence is admissible in deportation proceedings if it is probative and its use is not fundamentally unfair so as to deprive petitioner of due process.” Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d 781, 782-83 (5th Cir.1978) (quotation omitted); see also Galvez-Escobar v. U.S. Att’y Gen. 135 Fed.Appx. 287, 288 (11th Cir.2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lyglenson Lemorin v. U.S. Attorney General
11th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
“Uncontradicted hearsay evidence is admissible in deportation proceedings if it is probative and its use is not fundamentally unfair so as to deprive petitioner of due process.” Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d 781, 782-83 (5th Cir.1978) (quotation omitted); 2 see also Zahedi v. INS, 222 F.3d 1157 , 1164 n. 6 (9th Cir.2000) (persuasive authority holding that, in immigration proceedings, documentary evidence is admissible if it is probative and its admission is fundamentally fair).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alain H. Galvez-Escobar v. U.S. Atty. Gen.
11th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
“Uncontradicted hearsay evidence is admissible in deportation proceedings if it is probative and its use is not ‘fundamentally unfair so as to deprive petitioner of due process.’ ” Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d 781, 782-3 (11th Cir.1978); see also Zahedi v. INS, 222 F.3d 1157 , 1164 n. 6 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that in immigration proceedings, documentary evidence is admissible so long as it is probative and its admission is fundamentally fair); Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d 1053, 1055 (5th Cir.1990) (holding that the due process test for admissibility of evidence in a deportation hearing…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Gun Choe v. Immigration & Naturalization Service (2×)
9th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
It is assumed that most, if not all, of these ten individuals have remained in the U.S." The report does not set forth facts to support this assumption. 14 69 "Uncontradicted hearsay is admissible in deportation proceedings if it is probative and its use is not 'fundamentally unfair so as to deprive [the alien] of due process.' " Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d 781, 782-83 (5th Cir.1978) (quoting Marlowe v. INS, 457 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir.1972)); see also Cunanan v. INS, 856 F.2d 1373, 1374 (9th Cir.1988) ("test for admissibility is whether the hearsay statement is 'probative' and whether its admission …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jorge Soto-Hernandez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
5th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
While uneontra-dicted hearsay may be considered in a deportation hearing, it is only admissible “if it is probative and its use is not ‘fundamentally unfair so as to deprive petitioner of due process.’ ” Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d 781, 782 (5th Cir.1978) (quoting Marlowe v. INS, 457 F.2d 1314, 1315 (9th Cir.1972)).
cited Cited "see" Uzuegbu v. Caplinger
E.D. La. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d 781, 782 (5th Cir.1978) (per curiam); INA § 241(a)(9)(A) (formerly INA § 241(a)(9)), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(9)(A) (formerly 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(9)). .
discussed Cited "see" Raul Quan Young and Grace Larrad De Quan v. The United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service (2×)
5th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Soto-Hernandez v. INS, 726 F.2d 1070, 1072 (5th Cir.1984) (citing Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d 781, 782-83 (5th Cir.1978)) (hearsay evidence). 14 Since Mrs. Quan seeks to repudiate a concession made at a deportation hearing, our focus is on the voluntariness of Mrs. Quan's concession.
discussed Cited "see" DELL PUB. CO., INC. v. Whedon
S.D.N.Y. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tashnizi v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 585 F.2d 781 , 783 n. 1 (5th Cir.1978) (document inadmissible where witness had no personal knowledge of recordkeeping system, was clearly biased in favor of party seeking admission, and document was in his custody for limited purpose of submitting in evidence against petitioner).
discussed Cited "see" Diamax Hawaii, Ltd. v. United States
Ct. Intl. Trade · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tashnizi v. I.N.S., 585 F.2d 781 , 783 n.1 (5th Cir. 1978) (government attorney who obtained letter from private corporation for the limited and temporary use of submitting it in evidence is not a witness qualified to authenticate the document as a business record).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Convenient Food Mart, Inc., No. 3-107 v. United States
6th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.1978); McGray v. United States, 511 F.Supp. 205 (E.D.Mich.1981). 1 I do not believe the "description of clerk" sections of the reports are sufficient evidence because they are inadmissible hearsay.
cited Cited "see, e.g." State v. Davis
Ohio · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See, also, Tashnizi v. Immigration & Naturaliza tion Service (C.A.5, 1978), 585 F.2d 781, 783, fn. 1 ; United States v. Hathaway (C.A.6, 1986), 798 F.2d 902, 906 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Brown v. ASD Computing Center
S.D. Ohio · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence low
Cf.: United States v. Bowers, 593 F.2d 376, 380 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 442 U.S. 852 (1979) [postal report admissible as business record under Rule 803(6)]; see also Tashnizi v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 585 F.2d 781 , 783 n.1 (5th Cir. 1978) (implicitly recognizing that a letter would be admissible under Rule 803(6) if properly identified as having been received in the regular course of business by the Immigration and Naturalization Service).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Syrous TASHNIZI, Petitioner,
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent
78-2303.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Dec 7, 1978.
585 F.2d 781
Sauer & Hormachea, Nancy Hormachea, Houston, Tex., for petitioner., Griffin B. Bell, Atty. Gen., Philip Wilens, Chief, Government Reg. and Labor Section, James P. Morris, Eric A. Fisher, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for respondent., R. W. Heston, Dist. Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Fres-nos, Tex., Troy A. Adams, Dist. Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, New Orleans, La., for other interested parties.
Goldberg, Ainsworth, Hill.
Cited by 27 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

In this deportation proceeding the immigration judge found the petitioner deporta-ble for failure to comply with the conditions of his nonimmigrant student status, a violation of Section 241(a)(9), Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(9). The judge ordered that the petitioner be granted voluntary departure, and, in case the petitioner failed to depart voluntarily, the judge further ordered deportation.

The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal by the petitioner and ordered the petitioner’s departure or deportation as provided in the immigration judge’s orders.

The decisions of the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals were based on two grounds. First, it was determined that the petitioner had been employed without the permission of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), a violation of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(6). Second, it was determined that the petitioner failed to “pursue a full course of study,” a violation of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(la) and Section 101(a)(15)(F)(i), Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i). Both these violations are grounds for deportation under 241(a)(9), Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(9).

Since we affirm the Board’s order and its dismissal of the appeal on the first ground, dealing with the employment of the petitioner, we do not reach the second ground, dealing with the petitioner’s pursuit of his studies.

8 C.F.R. § 214.2(F)(6) provides that a nonimmigrant student, while school is in session, may work up to 20 hours per week with the authorization of the INS. Based on evidence presented at the hearing, the immigration judge determined that the petitioner had been working up to 40 hours a we,ék and without any employment authorization from the INS.

The Board of Immigration Appeals correctly ruled that some of the evidence of the petitioner’s employment was inadmissible because it was elicited from the petitioner on the stand after he was improperly denied his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Board was also correct in finding that the letter from the Southland Corporation was admissible even though it was hearsay. Uncontradicted hearsay evidence is admissible in deportation proceedings if it is probative and its use is not “fundamentally unfair so as to deprive petitioner of due proc[*783] ess.” Marlowe v. INS, 457 F.2d 1314, 1315 (9th Cir. 1972). [1]

The determination that the petitioner was employed without INS authorization is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(4). Thus, we affirm the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals providing for the voluntary departure of the petitioner, and in the event of a failure to depart as ordered by the Board, the deportation of the petitioner. In so affirming, we do not reach the finding by the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals that the petitioner violated 8 C.F.R. Section 214.2(f)(la) by failing to complete 12 credits of work in the fall semester of 1977.

AFFIRMED.

1

. However, the Board was wrong to rule, apparently in the alternative, that the immigration judge properly admitted the Southland letter under the business record exception to hearsay, Fed.R.Evid. 803(b). Specifically, the immigration judge was wrong to put on the stand the counsel for the immigration service, and to accept him as a trustworthy and qualified “custodian” for the document. It is clear from the transcript that the immigration lawyer had no personal knowledge that the letter was prepared, received or kept in the ordinary course of Southland or INS business. It is also clear that the letter was in his custody for the limited and temporary purpose of submitting it in evidence against the petitioner. In addition, we can not overlook the profound, though entirely proper, adversary bias of an attorney in such a situation.