G.K. Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1982). · Go Syfert
G.K. Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
244 citation events (63 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Lilly v. MSPB (cafc, 2023-11-08)
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lilly v. MSPB
Fed. Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
Cir. 2003) (“To establish good cause for a filing delay, an appellant must show that the delay was excusable under the circumstances and that the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to meet the filing deadline.” (emphasis added) (citing Phillips v. U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Scott v. MSPB
Fed. Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
Phillips v. U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1390 (Fed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chong McClenning v. Department of the Army
MSPB · 2022 · confidence medium
Phillips v. U.S. Postal Service, 695 F.2d 1389, 1390-91 (Fed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Martin v. MSPB
Fed. Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
“Delay is excusable where, un- der the circumstances, a petitioner exercises diligence or ordinary prudence.” Id. (citing Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Boyd v. Office of Personnel Management
Fed. Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
Ms. Boyd relies on the “good cause” standard from 5 C.F.R. § 1201.12 , which provides that “[a] judge may, for good cause shown, waive a Board regulation unless a statute requires application of the regulation.” See Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Christian v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
Cir. 1994) (quoting Phillips v. U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1390 (Fed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Batdorf v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
To establish good cause, the petitioner “need not show that it was impossible to file timely, only that the delay was excusable under the circumstances where diligence or ordinary prudence had been exercised.” Phillips v. U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Glasser v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
Bd., 688 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed.Cir.2012); Phillips v. U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir. *568 1982). “[W]hether the regulatory time limit for an appeal should be waived based upon a showing of good cause is a matter committed to the Board’s discretion and this court will not substitute its own judgment for that of the Board.” Mendoza v. Merit Sys.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
Phillips v. U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Escudero v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
Phillips v. U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Goodman v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Phillips v. U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Carroll v. Department of Employment Security
Ill. App. Ct. · 2009 · confidence medium
Phillips v. United States Postal Service, 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Grijalva v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
Cir.1983); Phillips v. U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Crook v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Phillips v. U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Innocent v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
“The [B]oard has held that to establish good cause, the [petitioner must show] that the delay was excusable under the circumstances where diligence or ordinary prudence had been exercised.” Phillips v. U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982). “[W]hether the regulatory time limit for an appeal should be waived based upon a showing of good cause is a matter committed to the Board’s discretion and this court will not substitute its own judgment for that of the Board.” Mendoza v. Merit Sys.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Whitworth v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
In cases such as this where the issue is timeliness of filing, our review “is limited to whether the board’s decision not to waive the regulatory time limit was arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Phillips v. U.S. *965 Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1390 (Fed.Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Griffin v. Merit Systems Protections Board
Fed. Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
DISCUSSION Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114 (f), an untimely petition for review “must be accompanied by a motion that shows good cause for the untimely filing, unless the Board has specifically granted an extension of time.” To establish good cause for a filing delay, an appellant must show that “diligence or ordinary prudence ha[s] been exercised.” Phillips v. U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Triplett v. Office of Personnel Management
Fed. Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
Bd., 966 F.2d 650, 653 (Fed.Cir.1992) (citing Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wright v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
In the absence of such evidence, the Board’s decision was not “arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” See 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (c); Phillips v. U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1390 (Fed.Cir. 1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Bd., 966 F.2d 650, 653 (Fed.Cir. 1993) (en banc); Phillips v. U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chapple v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Bd., 966 F.2d 650, 653 (Fed.Cir.1992) (en banc); Phillips v. U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ollado v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Bd., 332 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed.Cir. 2003) (citing Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir. 1982)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Joyce v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Phillips v. U.S. Postal Service, 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gribcheck v. Merit Systems Protection Board (2×)
Fed. Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Vann v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Bd., 332 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citing Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Harlan v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Zamot, 332 F.3d at 1377 (citing Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Tedesco v. Department of the Air Force
Fed. Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Phillips v. U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1390 (Fed.Cir. 1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ware v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Phillips v. U.S. Postal Sero., 695 F.2d 1389, 1390 (Fed.Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Anderson v. Department of the Army
Fed. Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
“To establish good cause for a filing delay, an appellant must show that the delay was excusable under the circumstances and that the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to meet the filing deadline.” Id. (citing Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Harrelle v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Bd., 802 F.2d 434, 437 (Fed.Cir. 1986); Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1390-91 (Fed.Cir. 1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Casiana v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Phillips v. United States Postal Service, 695 F.2d 1389, 1390 (Fed.Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rafael Zamot v. Merit Systems Protection Board (2×)
Fed. Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lee v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
The scope of our appellate review in cases such as this is limited to whether the Board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (c) (2000); Phillips v. U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1390 (Fed.Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Blanchard v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir. 1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ratcliff v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rosati v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Under 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (c), Congress limited the scope of our appellate review in cases such as this “to whether the board’s decision not to waive the regulatory time limit was arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1390 (Fed.Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Leon J. Modrowski v. Department of Veterans Affairs
Fed. Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1390 (Fed.Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harris v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
The appellant bears the burden of establishing good cause, see Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982), and this court will overturn the Board’s finding of no good cause only if the petitioner establishes that the Board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law, see Mendoza v. Merit Sys.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ramirez v. United States Postal Service
Fed. Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Romala Corp. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1219, 1225 (Fed.Cir.1991); Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Herschell L. Harris v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Phillips v. United States Postal Service, 695 F.2d 1389, 1390 (Fed.Cir.1982) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (c)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Johnny Goldtooth v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Philips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982) ("Laches is an equitable defense separate from any statutory or regulatory time limitation.").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Servillano B. Casilang v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
However, this fact is simply insufficient to excuse his six year delay in the face of the clear instructions from OPM regarding the time limit for appeals. 7 This court may reverse the Board's decision only if it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise unlawful; procedurally deficient; or unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (c) (1994); Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1390 (Fed.Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Steven J. Pepe v. Merit Systems Protection Board (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fed. Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
See 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.22 (c) (1995); Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Paul S. Langa v. United States Postal Service
Fed. Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
We must affirm the Board's decision unless it is: 7 (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; 8 (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or 9 (3) unsupported by substantial evidence. 10 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (c) (1994); Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1390-91 (Fed.Cir.1982). 11 Langa asserts that the Postal Service failed to inform him of his reduction-in-force (RIF) rights, thereby converting his retirement into an improper adverse action.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Daniel R. Krizman v. Merit Systems Protection Board, and United States Postal Service, Intervenor
Fed. Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
The appellant bears the burden of establishing good cause, Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982), and this court will overturn the Board’s finding of no good cause only if the petitioner establishes that the Board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Merrion A. Nettles v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) James J. Subranni v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kim L. Hamilton v. Merit Systems Protection Board (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fed. Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Timeliness The timeliness of Hamilton’s appeal, which involves allegations of discrimination, is governed by 5 C.F.R. § 1201.154 (1993). 4 That regulation states in pertinent part: Appellants who file appeals raising issues of prohibited discrimination in connection with a matter otherwise appealable to the Board must comply with the following time limits: (b) If the appellant has filed a timely formal complaint of discrimination with the agency: (1) An appeal must be filed within 20 days [now 30] after the appellant recéives *643 the agency resolution or final decision on the discriminati…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Vincent J. Lacross v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1390 (Fed.Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matthew A. Morales v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fed. Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Consequently, the issue is whether the Board erred in failing to waive the time limit for appeal. 11 "Whether the regulatory time limit for an appeal should be waived in a particular case is a matter committed to the [B]oard's discretion and this court will not substitute its own judgment for that of the [B]oard." Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1390 (Fed.Cir.1982).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
G.K. PHILLIPS, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Respondent
Appeal 30-81.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Dec 23, 1982.
695 F.2d 1389
Leonard Leeds, Mineóla, N.Y., argued for petitioner. With him on the brief was David S. Heller, Mineóla, N.Y. Jack B. Solerwitz, Mineóla, N.Y., was attorney of record., Glenn E. Harris, New York City, argued for respondent. With him on the brief was Asst. Atty. Gen. J. Paul McGrath. Sherry A. Cagroli and Lori Joan Dym, Washington, D.C., of counsel.
Friedman, Baldwin, Nies.
Cited by 198 opinions  |  Published
BALDWIN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is from the Merit Systems Protection Board’s (board) decision not to waive the regulatory time limit for filing an appeal from a removal action. The board determined that the appellant had not shown good cause for a waiver of the time limit and therefore dismissed the appeal. We affirm.

Background

Mr. Phillips was officially removed from his position as a postal inspector for the United States Post Office on August 8, 1980. A decision letter from the board dated July 28,1980, notified Mr. Phillips of the August 8 removal date and of his right to appeal within twenty days of the removal[*1390] date. [1] The decision letter further explained that Mr. Phillips would lose his light to appeal if he did not do so within the twenty-day time period. On September 3, 1980, six days after the time for appeal had expired, appellant’s attorney posted a letter to the board appealing the August 8 removal.

The board informed Mr. Phillips’ attorney that the appeal was untimely and of his client’s right to submit evidence and arguments that would show good cause for waiving the regulatory time limit. To establish good cause for the delay, appellant’s attorney submitted an affidavit stating that the decision letter was received by the attorney’s law firm on August 4,1980. The attorney reviewed the notice on August 10, 1980, upon his return from vacation and requested written documentation from Mr. Phillips regarding his defenses to the removal action. On August 16, 1980, Mr. Phillips sent an envelope containing the requested information by express mail post office to post office, although he knew the attorney’s address. The envelope arrived at the appropriate post office on August 18 but the postal authorities did not contact Mr. Phillips’ attorney until the end of August. The letter appealing Mr. Phillips’ removal was posted after the Labor Day holiday on September 3, 1980.

OPINION

Our consideration of this case is limited to whether the board’s [2] decision not to waive the regulatory time limit was arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (Supp. IV 1980). Appellant does not suggest that the board failed to follow appropriate procedures or that the procedures followed were unfair. There is no assertion that the board’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence. Rather, appellant argues that the equities weigh so heavily in the appellant’s favor that the board’s decision should be reversed for being arbitrary or capricious.

Whether the regulatory time limit for an appeal should be waived in a particular case is a matter committed to the board’s discretion and this court will not substitute its own judgment for that of the board. The statutory provisions for appeals to the board give the board broad discretion in handling appeals and controlling its own docket by requiring that appeal's be processed in accordance with regulations pre[*1391] scribed by the board. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a) (1980). The board has issued regulations that require an appeal to be filed within twenty days of the date a removal action is effective. 5 CFR 1201.22(b) (1980). This twenty-day time period may be waived by a presiding official if good cause is shown, placing the burden on the appellant to show a reasonable excuse for a delay in filing an appeal. 5 CFR 1201.12 (1980).

The board has held that to establish good cause, the appellant need not show that it was impossible to file timely, only that the delay was excusable under the circumstances where diligence or ordinary prudence had been exercised. Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force, MSPB DA0752089131 (November 24, 1980). After carefully considering the facts presented in the affidavit from Mr. Phillips’ attorney, the board found that no adequate reason was presented to explain why a law firm that received notice on August 4, 1980, of the impending termination did not perfect an appeal by August 28,1980. The inexcusable lack of diligence by appellant’s attorney, as well as Mr. Phillips’ carelessness in transmitting information to his attorney, were established by the affidavit rather than explained away.

When the attorney did not receive a timely reply from Mr. Phillips, all he had to do was make a telephone call to Mr. Phillips. If the attorney was unable to reach his client, he could have requested an extension of time from the board or file an appeal based upon the information he then had. Instead,, he did nothing, and allowed the deadline for appealing to pass.

The board’s dismissal of Mr. Phillips’ appeal is a customary sanction which cannot be characterized as arbitrary or' capricious on the basis of this record.

Appellant’s attempt to analogize this case to cases involving a laches defense, where both unreasonable delay and prejudice to the party asserting laches must be shown, is not persuasive. Laches is an equitable defense separate from any statutory or regulatory time limitation. Here the government is simply requesting us to affirm the dismissal of this appeal because the decision not to hear the untimely appeal after the appellant failed to show good cause for the delay was not abuse of discretion.

For the foregoing reasons, the board’s decision dismissing Mr. Phillips’ appeal is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

1

. 5 CFR 1201.22(b) (1980) provides in pertinent part:

Filing of petitions for appeal and response.
¡fe#**-**
(b) Time of filing. Petitions for appeal must be filed anytime during the period beginning with the day after the effective date of the action being appealed until not later than 20 days of the effective date. * * * The date of filing shall be determined by date of mailing indicated on the certified mail. If the filing is by personal delivery, it shall be considered filed on the date it is received in the field office.
2

. Contrary to the requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(2), petitioner incorrectly designated the U.S. Postal Service as the respondent rather than the board. An employing agency is named as respondent when judicial review is sought of a board decision issued under 5 U.S.C. § 7701 which considers the merits of an employing agency’s action. Here, only the board’s decision not to hear an appeal from the employing agency’s action is reviewed, not the action of the U.S. Postal Service. This does not, however, affect our standard of review which is set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c), as amended by Act of April 2, 1982, Pub.L. No. 97-164: '

(c) In any case filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court shall review the record and hold unlawful and set aside any agency action, finding, or conclusions found to be—
(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or
(3) unsupported by substantial evidence; * * * * * *

This section refers to our authority to review and set aside “agency action,” findings, or conclusions, without specifying that “agency action” includes action by the board apart from the merits of a case. However, in view of the above requirement to name the board as a respondent in some appeals brought under § 7703, we conclude that the term “agency” encompasses actions by the board as well as the employing agency.