Cook v. S. Ry. Co., 96 S.E. 148 (S.C. 1918). · Go Syfert
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Cook v. S. Ry. Co., 96 S.E. 148 (S.C. 1918). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, last quoted 1991 · 2 courts · …when the exercise of free press rights actually tramples upon sixth amendment rights, the former must nonetheless yield to the latter. ⚠ not in text Topic ↗
82 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 30 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: The News-Journal Corporation, a Florida Corporation v. Honorable S. James Foxman, Circuit Judge, Seventh Judicial Circuit, State of Florida (ca7, 1991-08-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1918 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1918 1972 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) The News-Journal Corporation, a Florida Corporation v. Honorable S. James Foxman, Circuit Judge, Seventh Judicial Circuit, State of Florida (3×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see, e.g."
7th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
when the exercise of free press rights actually tramples upon sixth amendment rights, the former must nonetheless yield to the latter.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) In Re United States
11th Cir. · 1990 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
when the exercise of free press rights actually tramples upon sixth amendment rights, the former must nonetheless yield to the latter.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Noriega
11th Cir. · 1990 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
when the exercise of free press rights actually tramples upon sixth amendment rights, the former must nonetheless yield to the latter.
discussed Cited "see" Sioux Falls Argus Leader v. Miller
S.D. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See News-Journal Corp. v. Foxman, 939 F.2d 1499, 1512 (11th Cir.1991) (“The Supreme Court has suggested a restrictive order limiting extrajudicial commentary of trial participants as an alternative to a prior restraint oh the media.” (citing Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 361 , 86 S.Ct. at 1521 , 16 L.Ed.2d 600 )). [¶ 17.] Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 609 , cert denied, 488 U.S. 946 , 109 S.Ct. 377 , 102 L.Ed.2d 365 , represents the majority rule among the federal circuit courts having addressed the question.
cited Cited "see" In re Austin
Bankr. N.D. Ohio · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Education, 844 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 , 109 S.Ct. 377 , 102 L.Ed.2d 365 (1988).
cited Cited "see" In Re Cieslak
Bankr. N.D. Ohio · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Education, 844 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 , 109 S.Ct. 377 , 102 L.Ed.2d 365 (1988).
cited Cited "see" In Re Michael C. Soult, D.M.D., Debtor, Michael C. Soult, D.M.D., Debtor-Appellee v. William C. Maddox, D.D.S., Creditor-Appellant
6th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Education, 844 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 377 , 102 L.Ed.2d 365 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" In re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury Directed to Custodian of Records
11th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 607 (2d Cir.1988) (“the rights of potential recipients of speech, like the news agencies, to challenge the abridgement of speech has already been decided”) (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 , 96 S.Ct. 1817 , 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 377 , 102 L.Ed.2d 365 (1988); cf. Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (11th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury Directed to Custodian of Records, University of Florida Athletic Program. The Gainesville Sun Publishing Corporation, the Tribune Company, Campus Communications, Inc., and the University of Florida Chapter of Sigma Delta Chi, Intervenors-Appellants
11th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603 , 607 (2d Cir.1988) ("the rights of potential recipients of speech, like the news agencies, to challenge the abridgement of speech has already been decided") (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 , 96 S.Ct. 1817 , 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 377 , 102 L.Ed.2d 365 (1988); cf. Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (11th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Carruthers (2×)
Tenn. · 2000 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., In re Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 603, 609 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 , 109 S.Ct. 377 , 102 L.Ed.2d 365 (1988); United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 600 (6th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Focus v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas
3rd Cir. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
The standing issue arises in this ease because the gag orders merely constrain the speech of the parties and the attorneys to the Baby Byron case; the plaintiffs do not complain that the orders affirmatively constrain their speech in any way. 2 Of course, that alone does not mean the plaintiffs’ case fails for lack of standing. ‘We have routinely found, as have other courts, that third parties have standing to challenge protective orders and confidentiality orders in an effort to obtain access to information or judicial proceedings.” Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 777 (3d …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Focus v. Allegheny County Court Of Common Pleas
3rd Cir. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
"We have routinely found, as have other courts, that third parties have standing to challenge protective orders and confidentiality orders in an effort to obtain access to information or judicial proceedings." Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 777 (3d Cir.1994) (footnote omitted); see also In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 607 (2d Cir.) (noting the rights of potential recipients of speech to challenge the abridgment of that speech), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 , 109 S.Ct. 377 , 102 L.Ed.2d 365 (1988). 17 That putative recipients of speech usually have standing to challenge orders…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Del Fierro v. Pepsico International
E.D.N.Y · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603 , 606 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 , 109 S.Ct. 377 , 102 L.Ed.2d 365 (1988).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Cook
v.
Southern Ry. Co.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Apr 12, 1918.
96 S.E. 148
Messrs. W.H. Cobb, A.F. Spigner and D.W. Robinson , for appellant, cite: As to petition for removal: 239 U.S. 500 ; 60 L.Ed. 406 ; 232 U.S. 52 58 L.Ed. 547 ; 229 U.S. 113 ; 57 L.Ed. 1096 ; 212 U.S. 319; 54 L.Ed. 212 ; 243 U.S. 302 ; 61 L.Ed. ___; Advance Ops. 1916, p. 277; 232 U.S. 146 ; 58 L.Ed. 544 ; 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 278 ; 236 U.S. 311 ; 59 L.Ed. 594 ; 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357 . Federal Employers' Liability Act covers car repairers: 229 U.S. 151-2; 57 L.Ed. 1127 ; 239 U.S. 501 ; 60 L.Ed. 406 ; 232 U.S. 259-60; 58 L.Ed. 595-6; 208 Fed. 869; 126 C.C.A. 27-30; L.R.A. 1915c, 19-29; 204 Fed. 751; 124 C.C. 240-1; 234 Fed. 1; 148 C.C.A. 222; Fed. Employers' Liability and Safety Appliance Acts; Thornton (2d Ed.), sec. 31, pp. 61-2; sec. 28, p. 75; 171 S.W. 95; 115 Ark. 308 ; 98 Atl. (Md.) 225; 160 N.W. 1057; 180 Fed. 832; 113 C.C.A. 379; 192 Fed. 901; 198 U.S. 1 ; 49 L.Ed. 363 ; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 158 ; 17 Am. Neg. Rep. 412; 229 U.S. 151 , 152 ; 57 L.Ed. 1127 , 1128 ; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 648 ; Ann. Cas. 1914c, 153; 3 N.C.C.A. 779; 228 Fed. 263; 142 C.C.A. 557-8 (3d Cir.); 239 U.S. 558 ; 60 L.Ed. 438 ; 241 U.S. 180 ; 60 L.Ed. 942 ; 228 Fed. 226; 142 C.C.A. 561; 204 Fed. 751; 124 C.C.A. 505; 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 8; 238 U.S. 262 ; 59 L.Ed. 1299 . As to operatives: 238 W.S. 51-2; 60 L.Ed. 139-40; 244 U.S. ___; 61 L.Ed. Advance Ops. 1916, p. 557; 242 U.S. 303 ; 61 L.Ed. ___; Adv. Ops. 1916, p. 118; 242 U.S. 292 ; 61 L.Ed. ___; Adv. Ops. 1916, 122; U.S. ___; 61 L.Ed. ___; U.S. Adv. Ops. 1916, p. 515; 241 U.S. 179-180; 60 L.Ed. 942 ; 233 U.S. 476-8; 53 L.Ed. 1054-5; 238 U.S. 263 ; 59 L.Ed. 1299 ; 239 U.S. 354 ; 60 L.Ed. 326 ; 101 S.C. 108; 240 U.S. 439 ; 60 L.Ed. 730 ; 229 U.S. 159-60; 57 L.Ed. 1134 . As to repairers of interstate instrumentalities: 229 U.S. 151-2; 57 L.Ed. 1127 ; 239 U.S. 501 ; 60 L.Ed. 406 ; 208 Fed. 860; 126 C.C.A. 27; 30 L.R.A. 1915c, 19-20; 198 Fed. 1; 117 C.C.A. 240-1; 234 Fed. 1; 148 C.C.A. 222; ___ U.S. ___; 61 L.Ed. ___; Adv. Ops. 1916, pp. 704-5. Other employees not entitled — when: 239 U.S. 558 ; 60 L.Ed. 438 ; 243 U.S. 43 ; 61 L.Ed. ___; U.S. Adv. Ops. 1916, p. 269; ___ U.S. ___; 61 L.Ed. ___; Adv. Ops. 1916, 248. Question for jury: 106 S.C. 219; 99 S.C. 420; 101 S.C. 108; 239 U.S. 354 ; 60 L.Ed. 327 ; 232 U.S. 260-1; 58 L.Ed. 596 ; 239 U.S. 54 ; 60 L.Ed. 139-40; ___ U.S. ___; 61 L.Ed. ___; U.S. Adv. Ops. 1916, p. 620; 242 U.S. ___; 61 L.Ed. ___; Adv. Ops. 1916, p. 5. State Court has jurisdiction of question: 79 S.C. 204; 200 U.S. 215-18; 50 L.Ed. 446-7; 238 U.S. 601 ; 59 L.Ed. 1482 ; ___ U.S. ___; 61 L.Ed. ___; U.S. Adv. Ops. 1916, pp. 704-5; 239 U.S. 500 ; 60 L.Ed. 406 ; 232 U.S. 259-60; 58 L.Ed. 595-6; Fed. Jud. Code, chap. III, sec. 28. Mr. Frank G. Tompkins , for respondent, submits: Case not appealable: 200 U.S. 221 ; 190 U.S. 326 ; 183 U.S. 53 ;.
Cage.
and safe and suitable ways and appliances at which and with which the. intestate was required h> and did work; and failed to make ahd keep the said place and appliances safe and suitable

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Cage.

Appeal from an order of the Circuit Court which directed the removal of the cause to the Federal Court. The action is by the administratrix of an employee of the defendant company for a tort to the person of the deceased alleged to have resulted from an unsafe place to work and unsafe appliances to work with. The employee, it is alleged in the complaint, was a car repairer, and at the instant was mounted on a ladder, working upon a passenger coach, when the ladder fell, and precipitated the .workman to his death on a cement floor.

The counsel for defendant, stated at the bar that if the complaint had set out a cause of action under the act of Congress, then in that event there would have been no motion for a removal, but the 'motion would have been a nonsuit on failure of proof. The same counsel admitted that if the complaint sets out a case under the act of Congress, it is not removable. And the same counsel further said, there is nothing in the complaint to exclude the idea that car would be used in State as well as interstate commence; and if the car was to be used in commerce of both sorts, then the cause is not removable;.

[*384] 1 [*383] So the only issue to be decided is, Has the complaint alleged circumstances which, if true, show that the work[*384] man at the instant of his hurt was engaged in commerce betwixt the States? Ret the complaint be reported. The second paragraph alleged that the defendant was at the time in question engaged in the business of a common carrier both of passengers and freight in interstate and intrastate commerce.

The fourth paragraph alleges that the workman was a car repairer, and at the time in question was at work on a passenger coach in defendant’s division shops in Richland county, South Carolina.

The sixth paragraph alleges that the car referred to was used in commerce of both sorts, and was brought to the shops for repairs a short time before the accident, with a view to its being returned and continued in such interstate and intrastate commerce. If that be true, and for the purposes of the motion it is assumed to be so, then the case is the same as if the car had been stopped on the railroad highway for repair, in which event there will be no question but that in such an instance the repair was being done while the car was in interstate service.

2, 3 It matters not that the allegations are that the car had been and was to be used in both services; the plaintiff could not know in which; the defendant’s liability, under the act of Congress or under the statute of the State, would follow the proof as to that matter. If it turns out by the testimony that the car was to be forthwith turned to State service, then the State law fixes the rights and duties of the litigants. If it turns out that the car was to be forthwith turned to interstate service, then the act of Congress fixes the rights and duties of the parties, and upon the judicial ascertainment of that fact the State Court shall proceed to the trial of the cause as is specially provided by the act of Congress.

The judgment is reversed.