Dupre v. Tilghman Lumber Co., 103 S.E. 526 (S.C. 1920). · Go Syfert
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Dupre v. Tilghman Lumber Co., 103 S.E. 526 (S.C. 1920). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“ourts invoke a 'presumption' that jurors understand and follow their instructions.”
34 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States Ex Rel. Hall v. Washington (ilcd, 1996-02-22) · Strongest negative: United States Ex Rel. Hampton v. DeTella (ilnd, 1998-08-05)
Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" United States Ex Rel. Hampton v. DeTella
N.D. Ill. · 1998 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 311 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (“Any claim sufficiently novel that it was unavailable during the state proceedings must be a ‘new rule’ under Teague.”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 899 , 114 S.Ct. 269 , 126 L.Ed.2d 220 (1993).
discussed Cited "but see" Dean C. Dauw v. United States
7th Cir. · 1995 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 311 (7th Cir.) (en banc) ("Any claim sufficiently novel that it was unavailable during the state proceedings must be a 'new rule' under Teague."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 269 (1993). 4 We need not consider whether Hughey constitutes a "new rule" entitling Dauw to habeas relief, see Williams v. Chrans, 945 F.2d 926, 942 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3002 (1992), however, because we find Dauw's claim barred by Turino.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) United States Ex Rel. Hall v. Washington
C.D. Ill. · 1996 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
ourts invoke a 'presumption' that jurors understand and follow their instructions.
discussed Cited "see" Parker v. Shecut
S.C. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Du Pre v. Tilghman Lumber Co., 114 S.C. 269, 272 , 103 S.E. 526, 527 (1920) (holding trespass not sufficient to sustain an action for forcible entry and detainer).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Carl Green, Movant
6th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 310-11 (7th Cir.) (post-Teague, a petitioner who argues that his claim was novel [lacked a reasonable basis in law] in order to establish cause, merely pleads himself out of court because such a claim must also be a “new rule” under Teague ), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 899 , 114 S.Ct. 269 , 126 L.Ed.2d 220 (1993); Selvage v. Collins, 975 F.2d 131, 135 (5th Cir.1992) (“Since a claim that lacks a ‘reasonable basis’ plainly is not ‘dictated" by precedent,’ a petitioner that meets the cause requirement cannot receive the benefit of the rule”), cert. d…
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Rocky Ernesto Bascope-Zurita, United States of America v. Jorge Enrique Zurita-Franco, Also Known as Coco
8th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. George, 986 F.2d 1176, 1179 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 269 , 126 L.Ed.2d 220 (1993); United States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 707, 711-15 (8th Cir.1989) (Lay, C.J., concurring).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Melvin E. Stierwalt
8th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. George, 986 F.2d 1176, 1178-79 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 269 , 126 L.Ed.2d 220 (1993).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Donald Ray Mitchell
8th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
United States v. Bender, 33 F.3d 21, 23 (8th Cir.1994). " 'The focus for sentencing purposes under Sec. 2F1.1 should be on the amount of possible loss the defendant attempted to inflict on the victim.' " United States v. Mills, 987 F.2d 1311, 1316 (8th Cir.) (citing United States v. Prendergast, 979 F.2d 1289, 1292 (8th Cir.1992)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 403 (1993); see also United States v. George, 986 F.2d 1176, 1179 (8th Cir.) ("the amount of loss relevant to sentencing purposes is either the amount of loss that the defendant intended to inflict or the actual loss resulting from the fraud…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Girvies L. Davis v. Warden Jim Greer and Neil F. Hartigan
7th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Gacy v. Wellborn, 994 F.2d 305, 306-07 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 269 , 126 L.Ed.2d 220 (1993). *1142 Davis first contends that the jurors in his case were not instructed that they could consider nonstatutory mitigating factors.
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Mervyn T. Butler
7th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 313 (7th Cir.1993), certiorari denied, 114 S.Ct. 269 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Dupre
v.
Tilghman Lumber Company.
10468.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Jun 28, 1920.
103 S.E. 526
Messrs. Townsend Rodgers , for appellants, cite: Action for forcible entry and detainer was brought under sections 4064-4072, I Civil Code. Man cannot advance his legal claim by entry, but ought to bring his action. The purpose of the statutes in regard to forcible entry and detainer being to require people to settle their disputes about land, not by their own force, but by the peaceable process of law: 1 Brev. 120; 101 S.C. 129 , 133 . But force may be used to gain possession if it could not otherwise be gained: 1 Brev. 120. Proof here sufficient to bring the case within the civil statutes: 101 S.C. 130 . Every unlawful entry upon the possession of another is in law a forcible entry, but the possession must be actual and not constructive: 3 Brevard 413; 87 S.C. 531 . Not necessary to constitute forcible entry that it be with a multitude of people: 87 S.C. 531 : Proof that agent is in possession is sufficient to support suit of forcible entry and detainer in the name of the principal: 10 Cal. 107 . Messrs. L.D. Lide and H.S. McCandlish , for respondents, cite: Plaintiffs' case rests upon sections 4068-4069, I Civil Code. What constitutes entry and detainer: 87 S.C. 527 . Entry to cut and remove timber without objection 19 Cyc. 1140; 11R. C.L. 1148.
MR. JUSTICE WATTS..
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Ms. Justice Watts.

This is an action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for cutting and removing the timber. The complaint contains two causes of action, one for forcible entry and detainer, and the other for wilful and malicious trespass. When the case was called for trial before Judge Mclver, and a jury, plaintiffs’ counsel announced that they would go to trial upon the cause of action for forcible entry and detainer. At the conclusion of the evidence for the plaintiffs, defendant moved for a nonsuit on the ground, practically, that there was no evidence to sustain the action for forcible entry and detainer. This motion was granted, and plaintiffs appeal.

1 The exceptions complaining of his Honor in granting the nonsuit which are 1, 2, 3, and 4, must be overruled. The evidence in the case does not show any force used for entry and detainer, and there is no allegation in the complaint to that effect, and the plaintiffs’ evidence fails to make out a case of forcible entry.and detainer under Code of Laws 1912, vol. I, secs, 4068 and 4069, and under the decisions of the Court in DeLaine v. Alderman, [*272] 31 S. C. 267, 9 S. E. 950; State v. Bates, 87 S. C. 527, 70 S. E. 170, and Sease v. Barnwell Lumber Co., 113 S. C. —, 101 S. E. 567.

The entry upon the land for the purpose of cutting and removing timber merely would make the defendant a trespasser only, and would not be sufficient to sustain an action of forcible entry and detainer.

2 The law of trespass provides a remedy for an unlawful entry, cutting and removing timber. As to the fifth exception, the plaintiff had elected to go to trial upon the cause of action for forcible entry and detainer, and after nonsuit was granted he moved to reinstate the cause of action for trespass, which was refused, We think plaintiffs should have been allowed to do so, provided the case should be continued or then tried if the other side consented.

The order of nonsuit appealed from is modified, and the case remanded for trial of the cause of action for trespass quare clausum fregit or if plaintiffs see fit to apply to the Circuit Court for an order' aniending the cause of action.

Affirmed.