Taylor v. Sanford, Adm'r, 193 S.W. 661 (1917). · Go Syfert
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Taylor v. Sanford, Adm'r, 193 S.W. 661 (1917). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
198 citation events (20 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ronald D. Smith and Kimberly Smith v. Kingdom Investments Limited Carl/White Trust Anita Collins Paul O'Farrell Gladys A. Stone Edna A. Avitts Priscilla Wells Johnny M. Glosson Ellen Avitts Management Trust Connie B. Brown Floyd N. Brown, Jr. Ona Mae Worden Stanley and Eloise Brown Revocable Trust Carmie J. Brown Living Trust Charles Richard Avitts Katherine Avitts Gipson Margaret L. Clark And Thomas E. Avitts (texapp, 2022-08-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1918 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1918 1972 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ronald D. Smith and Kimberly Smith v. Kingdom Investments Limited Carl/White Trust Anita Collins Paul O'Farrell Gladys A. Stone Edna A. Avitts Priscilla Wells Johnny M. Glosson Ellen Avitts Management Trust Connie B. Brown Floyd N. Brown, Jr. Ona Mae Worden Stanley and Eloise Brown Revocable Trust Carmie J. Brown Living Trust Charles Richard Avitts Katherine Avitts Gipson Margaret L. Clark And Thomas E. Avitts
Tex. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
See Texas Land & Mortgage Co. v. Cohen, 159 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Tex. 1942) (recording of deed creates presumption deed was delivered and grantee accepted deed); Taylor v. Sanford, 193 S.W. 661, 662 (Tex. 1917) (acceptance of gift deed is presumed unless such presumption is rebutted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Anthony Aguilar and Benita Castillo Villasenor v. Jack Sinton, Richard Rudnick and Dennis Hammett
Tex. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Under Texas law, “no person can be made a grantee of property against his will.” Taylor v. Sanford, 108 Tex. 340, 346 , 193 S.W. 661, 662 (1917).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Panhandle Baptist Foundation, Inc., and Hardin-Simmons University v. Clodfelter, Charles Lee Indiv. and as Successor Trustee of the Beulah M. Pickens Revocable Living Trust (3×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Taylor v. Sanford , 108 Tex. 340 , 193 S.W. 661, 662 (1917) .
examined Cited as authority (rule) Panhandle Baptist Foundation, Inc. v. Clodfelter (3×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Taylor v. Sanford, 108 Tex. 340 , 193 S.W. 661, 662 (1917).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vasquez v. Vasquez
Tex. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Taylor v. Sanford, 108 Tex. 340 , 193 S.W. 661, 662 (Tex.1917); Muller v. Killam, 229 S.W.2d 899, 904 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1949, no writ) (“The fact that she had the *333 power to recall the deed is of no consequence [to the issue of grantor’s intent]”).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Scherer v. Hyland (3×) also: Cited "see"
N.J. · 1977 · confidence medium
Taylor v. Sanford, 108 Tex. 340, 344 , 193 S. W. 661, 662 (Sup. Ct. 1912) (assent to gift of deed mailed in contemplation of death but received after grantor’s death should be presumed unless a dissent or disclaimer appears).
discussed Cited "see" Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. v. Porterfield (2×)
Ohio · 1968 · signal: see · confidence high
See Taylor v. Sanford, 108 Tex. 340 , 193 S. W. 661 ; Waller v. Capper, 143.
examined Cited "see" Anderson v. Vannerberg (3×)
Tex. App. · 1947 · signal: see · confidence high
See Taylor v. Sanford, 108 Tex. 340 , 193 S.W. 661 , 5 A.L.R. 1660 ; Ford v. Hackel, 124 Tex. 402 , 77 S.W.2d 1043 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Estate of Kuenstler v. Trevino (2×)
Tex. App. · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Taylor v. Sanford, 108 Tex. 340 , 193 S.W. 661, 662 (1917); Kiel v. Brinkman, 668 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ); Van v. Webb, 237 S.W.2d 827, 832 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amaril *718 lo 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Pemelton v. Pemelton (2×)
Tex. App. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
Kiel v. Brinkman, 668 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ); see also Taylor v. Sanford, 108 Tex. 340 , 193 S.W. 661, 662 (1917); Van v. Webb, 237 S.W.2d 827, 832 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1951, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Annie Lee Taylor
v.
J.M. Sanford, Administrator.
Apr 4, 1917.
193 S.W. 661
A.S. Rollins and J.C. Hunt, for plaintiff in error. — The trial court erred in giving a peremptory instruction for the plaintiff and not giving a peremptory instruction for the defendant because the evidence is uncontradicted that the deed from R.H. Sanford to Annie Lee Taylor was delivered. McCartney v. McCartney, 53 S.W. 388 ; Newton v. Emerson, Talcott Co., 66 Tex. 147 ; Holliday v. White, 33 Tex. 460 [ 33 Tex. 460 ]; Atkins v. Globe Bank T. Co. (Ky.), 124 S.W. 879 ; Chambers v. Chambers (Mo.), 127 S.W. 86 ; Standiford v. Standiford (Mo.), 10 S.W. 836 ; Munro v. Bowles (Notes), 54 L.R.A., 884; Harmon v. Bowers (Kan.), 16 A. E. Ann. Cases, 121; Sheffield L.I. C. Co. v. Neill (Ala.), 6 So. 1 ; Lewis v. Watson (Ala.), 13 So. 570 ; Chancellor v. Teel (Ala.), 37 So. 665 . The expressed intention of R.H. Sanford, as contained in the letter of June 14, 1911, when taken in connection with the fact that the deed had already been executed, filed and recorded, makes certain the delivery of same to appellant. Martin v. Martin (Neb.), 14 A. E. Ann. Cases, 511; Harmon v. Bowers (Kan.), 16 A. E. Ann. Cases, 121. The fact of the execution of the deed, filing same for record, mailing it to appellant after record, and writing appellant a letter in which R.H. Sanford insists that appellant must keep the property are circumstances tending to show delivery, and such question at least should have been submitted to the jury. Walker v. Erwin, 106 S.W. 164 ; McCartney v. McCartney, 93 Tex. 359 , 53 S.W. 390 ; Lord v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 27 Texas Civ. App. 139[ 27 Tex. Civ. App. 139 ], 65 S.W. 701 ; Emmons v. Harding (Ind.), 1 A. E. Ann. Cases, 864; Boody v. Davis (N.H.), 51 Am. Dec., 210; Blight v. Schenck (Pa.), 51 Am. Dec., 478; Peavey v. Tilton (N.H.), 45 Am. Dec., 365; Lady Superior v. McNamara, 3 Barb. Ch., 375, 49 Am. Dec., 184; Merrills v. Swift, 18 Conn. 257 , 46 Am. Dec., 315. If express acceptance is required appellant had the right to accept the deed after the death of R.H. Sanford. Peters v. Berkmeier, 184 Mo., 393, 83 S.W. 747 . Madden, Truelove, Ryburn Pipkin, W.H. Kimbrough, and Ramsey, Black Ramsey, for defendant in error. — To effect and constitute a valid delivery of the deed to the plaintiff in error, it is essential that she should have accepted the same. A valid delivery in law embraces two elements: First, the act of delivery by the grantor with intent to part with the title; and, second, the acceptance of the delivery by the grantee with intent to take the title. Tuttle v. Turner, 28 Tex. 759 -773; Croom v. Jerome Hill Cot. Co., 15 Texas Civ. App. 328[ 15 Tex. Civ. App. 328 ], 40 S.W. 146 ; Younge v. Guilbeau, 3 Wall., 636-641; Hawkes v. Pike, 105 Mass. 560 , 7 Am. Rep., 554; Union Mutual Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 95 Ill. 267 , 35 Am. Rep., 166; Herbert v. Herbert, 12 Am. Dec., 192; Rittmaster v. Brisbane, 35 P. 736 ; Devlin on Deeds, vol. 1, sec. 285, and authorities cited; Jones on Real Property and Conveyancing, vol. 2, sec. 1276, and authorities cited. The acceptance of a deed by the grantee may be either actual or presumptive, but it is held in this State, as well as generally, that \the presumption that a party will accept a deed because it is beneficial to him will never be carried so far as to consider him as having accepted it.\" Tuttle v. Turner
Phillips.
28 Tex. 773
Mr. Chief Justice PHILLIPS

delivered the opinion of the court.

The suit was by J. M. Sanford, administrator of the estate of R. H. Sanford, deceased, to cancel a deed of R. H. Sanford to Annie Lee Tajdor conveying certain property in Canyon, Texas. The deed was executed and acknowledged by R. H. Sanford on June 14, 1911. It recited that Miss Taylor was to assume the payment of three vendor’s lion notes against the property, aggregating $750, principal, and that a part of its consideration was the conveyance by Miss Taylor to Sanford of a lot in the town of Hamlin, in Jones County, and a 40-acre tract of land in Presidio County. Sanford was the sheriff and tax collector of Randall County. Miss Taylor was his office clerk and stenographer. There was evidence tending to show that Sanford and she had been engaged to be married. She had loaned Sanford some of her private means, which had not been repaid. Sanford was due the State of Texas and Randall County approximately $1000 for taxes which he had collected and for which he had not accounted, and was in a state of some financial embarrassment. He committed suicide on June 15, 1911, the day following his execution of the deed to Miss Taylor.

[*344] After executing the deed on June 14, Sanford immediately filed it for record in "the office of the county clerk, and, on the same day, following its record, mailed it to Miss Taylor, who at that time was visiting her home in another county of the State. He likewise immediately mailed her in the same or a separate enclosure two deeds for her execution conveying to him the lot in Hamlin and the tract of land in Presidio County, mentioned in his deed to her. Accompanying the deed to Miss Taylor was the following letter from Sanford addressed to her:

“Canyon, Texas, June 14, ’ll.

“Dear Lee: I am sending you some deeds to sign, herewith, also enclosed a lot of other papers which are yours. Yours to keep. I want you to have them as I am deeding to you my house and the 4 lots where Cannon lives. The deed I am putting on record here and as soon as it is recorded it will be sent to you. I want you to have the house as it will make you a good living and also funish you- a home. Keep it, darling, as a gift from me. Hnder no circumstances don’t give it up unless you sell it in order to support yourself. You will see from the deed that there are. three notes standing against it that will fall due, one this fall on Sept. 10th, for $250. Also the interest on the other two will become due at that time, the 2nd note will be due one year from that date and one year later the last one will be due. Of course you can pay them sooner if you choose. Please execute the two deeds to the Hamlin and the Presidio property as drawn, sign them before a notary public and send them to the Co. Clerk at Anson and Marfa to have recorded. Send a dollar with each and have them returned to me here. This is to show a consideration in your deed and is made a part of the consideration. I know you will not feel like you should accept this from me, but you must as it is my wish and I can’t think of doing otherwise. It costs me more to write this than you will ever know, but the only satisfaction that I am to get is to know that I am leaving you provided for as my foster and adopted sister. ... I will send you a draft for $400. Will send it to the bank there or may send it direct. This will leave you in good shape as the house is well worth" $4000 and should rent for from $30 to $40 per month. I am sure you can get it insured for $3000 next time after this policy runs out. I will just leave everything I have in the house and that you and Mack can dispose of. When you return to see about it, bring this letter and show it to him, and he will understand all. I have foreseen this for some time, but| thought I could get it all shaped up. I see that I can’t and it is no fault of mine. If I-could have gotten it all adjusted, we would have gotten married and lived as happy as is the lot of any couple. I could not marry you tho’ unless I could provide for you as I wanted to and now this is the only course for-me to pursue. You know how some of the people here feel toward me since the city election, and but for that I could go through. They will swear anything and can and will ruin me if I try to stay. How, Darling,[*345] I know you will forgive me for all the little worries I have caused you in the last few months when it seemed to you that I had changed toward you. It was not that but I just could not tell you. It hurt me more than it did you. No matter what some may think, I know you to be a pure Christian girl sure as there are only very few. Eemember me kindly always. Good-bye Darling, Lovingly, Dick.

"The $400 is bal. payment on the $500 I owe you. Dick.”

Miss Taylor received the deed and other documents at Canyon on June 39th, where she immediately went on learning of Sanford’s death, his letter or letters to her having been forwarded to her at that place. Her testimony upon the trial was that it was her intention, as soon as she learned of the deed, to accept the property under it and on the terms therein stipulated. She paid off one of the vendor’s lien notes against the property, and on July 21, 1911, executed and acknowledged the two deeds which Sanford had sent her for execution in mailing his deed to her. Neither of her deeds was delivered nor tendered for delivery to anyone representing Sanford’s estate prior to the time of the trial of the present suit, but during its trial both were tendered by her in open court, the trial occurring in November, 1911.

The only question in the case is whether there was a delivery of the deed from Sanford to Miss Taylor.

The law prescribes no form of words or . action to constitute the delivery of a deed. It will not divest a grantor of his title by declaring his deed effective when his purpose was to withhold it from the grantee. Neither will it deprive the grantee of his rights where it was the grantor’s intention to invest him with the title, though there be no manual delivery of the instrument. The question in all such cases is that of the grantor’s intention. If the instrument be so disposed of by him, whatever his action, as to clearly evince an intention on his part that it shall have effect as a conveyance, it is a sufficient delivery. 2 Jones, Law of Eeal Property, sec. 1220; 1 Devlin on Deeds, sec. 269.

That such was Sanford’s intention with respect to the deed in controversy is, we think, unmistakable. It is clear that the deed was executed, caused to be recorded, and was mailed by him in contemplation of his death, and so as to at once invest Miss Taylor with the title. It is equally certain that he intended the property as a gift to her. ' Nothing could be more plainly revealed. The property was Sanford’s, and, no rights of creditors being involved, he had the power to give it away if he chose. If such was his intention, the law should effectuate it, rather than indulge in nice' distinctions and thereby thwart what was plainly his purpose. That it was within Sanford’s power, at any time before his .death, to recall the deed from the mail where he had placed it for transmission to the grantee, and thereby prevent its physical delivery to her, is immaterial. He did not recall it. Nor did he make any attempt to do so. On the contrary, everything about the transaction shows that at the time his letter was written,—the day[*346] before his death, he regarded it as an executed gift. With this true and clearly evidencing an intention that the deed should have immediate effect, it is of no consequence that it did not reach the hands of the grantee before his death, or that it was within his power to regain its physical possession. If what the law regards as a delivery had been accomplished, his regaining physical custody of the instrument would not have defeated it. Brown v. Brown, 61 Texas, 56; Henry v. Phillips, 105 Texas, 459, 151 S. W., 533.

True, the gift imposed upon Miss Taylor the assumption of the payment of the three notes against the property and her conveyance to Sanford of the lot in Hamlin and the 40-acre tract in Presidio County, and required her acceptance of it, since no person can be made a grantee of property against his will. But she accepted it. She .could not be expected to either accept or reject the gift until she knew of it; and since she did not know of it until after Sanford's death, her acceptance of it then sufficed. Burkey v. Burkey (Mo. Sup.), 175 S. W., 623. As a rule of reason and common sense, a delivered instrument plainly amounting to a deed of gift should operate by a presumed assent until a dissent or disclaimer appears-. Dikes v. Miller, 24 Texas, 417.

The judgments of the District Court and Court of Civil Appeals are reversed, and judgment is here rendered for the plaintiff in error.

Reversed and rendered.