United States v. James L. Griggs, United States of Am. v. Curtis G. Bridges, 713 F.2d 672 (11th Cir. 1983). · Go Syfert
United States v. James L. Griggs, United States of Am. v. Curtis G. Bridges, 713 F.2d 672 (11th Cir. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
52 citation events (27 in the last 25 years) across 19 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Day v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (flmd, 2021-05-26)
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 35 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Day v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
M.D. Fla. · 2021 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
where defendants, prior to trial, had within their knowledge the information by which they could have ascertained the alleged brady material, there is no suppression by the government.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Ruise v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
M.D. Fla. · 2019 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
where defendants, prior to trial, had within their knowledge the information by which they could have ascertained the alleged brady material, there is no suppression by the government.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Andres C.
Conn. · 2024 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 148 (2004); United States v. Rosario-Peralta, 175 F.3d 48 , 56–57 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 65 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 , 97 S. Ct. 732 , 50 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Noor v. Andrewjeski
W.D. Wash. · 2023 · confidence medium
The Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits appear to apply the stricter, “essential facts” standard from Cunningham, see, e.g., United States 22 v. Brown, 582 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 915 (1978); Williams v. Scott, 35 F.3d 159, 163 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir. 1983), while the Third and 23 Tenth Circuits appear to apply the looser, “no due diligence” standard from Amado.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brant v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
M.D. Fla. · 2023 · confidence medium
A defendant cannot advance a claim if he knew about, or should have known about, the evidence that the government withheld. , 432 F.3d 1292, 1315 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Our case law is clear that ‘[w]here defendants, prior to trial, had within their knowledge the information by which they could have ascertained the alleged material, there is no suppression by the government.’ ”) (quoting , 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir. 1983)); , 421 F.3d 1237, 1268 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that there was no violation because the defendant could have obtained the information had he used “reasonable diligen…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John Schondelmeyer v. State of Iowa
Iowa Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
But that unawareness stemmed from McGinn’s own lack of diligence.4 No suppression occurred because the defense, before trial, “had within their knowledge the information by which they could have ascertained the alleged Brady material.” See United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir. 1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Slaughter (Rickie) Vs. State
Nev. · 2020 · confidence medium
"Evidence is not suppressed if the defendant either knew or should have known of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence." United State v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 618 (2d Cir. 1982) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378, 381 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Brown, 628 F.2d 471, 473 (5th Cir. 1980); Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 601 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Stuart, 150 F.3d 935, 937 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir. 1983); People v. Superior Court (John…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Gorge Antonio Vargas
11th Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
And “[o]ur case law is clear that ‘where defendants, prior to trial, had within their knowledge the information by which they could have ascertained the alleged Brady material, there is no suppression by the government.’” Maharaj v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1315 (11th Cir. 2005) (alteration adopted) (quoting United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir. 1983)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Alex Rodger, III
11th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
The government, however, is not obliged to “identify defense witnesses.” United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 673 (11th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Albert Cunningham v. Robert Wong (2×)
9th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
Id. at 804 (citing United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir. 1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lynch v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
M.D. Fla. · 2012 · confidence medium
United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir.1983) (emphasis in original) (“Irrespective of whether the statements here [were] exculpatory evidence under Brady , a question we do not reach, there is no Brady violation when the accused or his counsel knows before trial about the allegedly exculpatory information ....”) (quoting United States v. Gravera, 545 F.2d 406 , 420 (5th Cir.1977)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Yenky Sanchez
11th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Price, 792 F.2d 994 , 998 13 Case: 11-15707 Date Filed: 12/17/2012 Page: 14 of 17 (11th Cir. 1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Michael Antonio Natson
11th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 673-74 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Walker, 559 F.2d 365, 373 (5th Cir.1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bryan F. Jennings v. James McDonough
11th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
In United States v. Gidggs, 713 F.2d 672 (11th Cir.1983) (per curiam), we adopted the rule that, “[w]here defendants, prior to trial, had within their knowledge the information by which they could have ascertained the alleged Brady material, there is no suppression by the government.” Id. at 674.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maharaj v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Our ease law is clear that “[w]here defendants, prior to trial, had within their knowledge the information by which they could have ascertained the alleged Brady material, there is no suppression by the government.” United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir.1983); accord LeCroy, 421 F.3d at 1268 (noting that there was no Brady violation because the defendant could have obtained the information had he used “reasonable diligence”); Haliburton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 342 F.3d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.2003); United States v. Valera, 845 F.2d 923, 927-28 (11th Cir.1988); Uni…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Martini (2×)
N.J. · 1999 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 831 F.2d 46, 48 (3d Cir.1987) (holding Brady violation cured where defendant had knowledge of information withheld by prosecution and willfully failed to disclose it to defense counsel); United States v. Dupuy, 760 F.2d 1492 , 1501 n. 5 (9th Cir.1985) (reasoning there can be no Brady violation where defendant has means of obtaining information but does not pursue it); United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir.1983) (observing that "[w]here defendants, prior to trial, had within their knowledge the information by which they cou…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rippo v. State
Nev. · 1997 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Williams v. Scott, 35 F.3d 159, 163 (5th Cir.) (Brady claim fails where appellant could have obtained exculpatory statement through reasonable diligence), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1137 (1995); United States v. Dupuy, 760 F.2d 1492 , 1501 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985) (“if the means of obtaining the exculpatory evidence has been provided to the defense, the Brady claim fails”); United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir. 1983) (where prosecution disclosed identity of witness, it was within the defendant’s knowledge to have ascertained the alleged Brady material); United States v.…
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Burnside
N.D. Ill. · 1993 · confidence medium
United *1259 States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Filemon Bernal-Obeso
9th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 690 (9th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir.1983) (remanding for an in camera hearing to review the prosecutor’s files for additional exculpatory materials)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Richard Aichele (2×)
9th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
United States v. Dupuy, 760 F.2d 1492 , 1501 n. 5 (9th Cir.1985) (citing United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir.1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. MacDonald
E.D.N.C. · 1991 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Wolf, 839 F.2d at 1391 (“If the means of obtaining the exculpatory evidence has been provided to the defense, however, a Brady claim fails, even if the prosecution does not physically deliver the evidence requested.”); United States v. Page, 828 F.2d at 1479 (“[A] new trial is not warranted by evidence which, with reasonable diligence, could have been discovered and produced at trial.”); United States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47, 59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929 , 107 S.Ct. 3214 , 96 L.Ed.2d 701 (1987) (“no Brady violation occurs if the defendant ... sho…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Lau
D.P.R. · 1986 · confidence medium
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Peters, 625 F.2d 366, 371 (10th Cir.1980); United States v. Brown, 574 F.2d 1274, 1278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 , 99 S.Ct. 720 , 58 L.Ed.2d 704 (1978); United States v. Strahl, 590 F.2d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 918 , 99 S.Ct. 1237 , 59 L.Ed.2d 468 (1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. William Shaffer
9th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Indeed, as the Eleventh Circuit has observed: “[I]f the arguably exculpatory statements of witnesses ... were in the prosecutor’s file and not produced, failure to disclose indicates the ‘tip of an iceberg’ of evidence that should have been revealed under Brady . ” United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir.1983). *691 This conclusion seems directly applicable to the facts in the instant appeal.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sam Anderson, Jr. v. United States
8th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Peters, 625 F.2d 366, 371 (10th Cir.1980); United States v. Brown, 574 F.2d 1274, 1278 (5th Cir.1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Government of the Virgin Islands v. Juan A. Martinez (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
In United States v. Dansker, 565 F.2d 1262, 1265 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1052 , 98 S.Ct. 905 , 54 L.Ed.2d 805 (1978), while remanding an alleged Brady violation to the district court for a hearing, we specifically noted that those defendants who actually possessed the exculpatory information prior to trial, yet failed to present it, would not be able to assert a Brady claim. 118 As we stated in Starusko, "the government is not obliged under Brady to furnish a defendant with information he already has or, with reasonable diligence, he can obtain himself." 729 F.2d at 262 (quoting U…
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Albert Dupuy, United States of America v. Christie Buzard, United States of America v. Juan Antonio Tercero (4×)
9th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
The Eleventh Circuit has expressed this rule succinctly, in rejecting a Brady argument based on failure to disclose the statement of a witness, since the prosecution disclosed the identity of the witness; "Where defendants ... had within their knowledge the information by which they could have ascertained the supposed Brady material, there is no suppression by the government." United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Juan Navarro, Andres Mugercia and Guillermo Perdomo (2×)
7th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
Nor were defendants able to elicit any testimony from Gutierrez or Arreguin suggesting the existence of a cooperation agreement. 8 Thus, the present case is distinguishable from cases such as United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir.1983), and United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir.1973), where in each a remand was ordered for in camera inspection of government files based on trial testimony and out-of-court witness statements strongly suggesting the existence of Brady material.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Andres C. (Concurrence & Dissent)
Conn. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir. 1983) (remanding case to District Court for in camera review of prosecu- tor’s files because, ‘‘although appellants . . . pointed to no specific exculpatory evidence that may have been suppressed,’’ presence of potentially exculpatory state- ments of witnesses in prosecutor’s files that were not produced could reveal ‘‘the ‘tip of an iceberg’ of evi- dence that should have been revealed under Brady’’); United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 65 (3d Cir. 1976) (when Brady claim first raised on appeal, Court of Appe…
discussed Cited "see" David R. Desimone v. State of Iowa
Iowa · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir.1983) (stating a Brady violation does not exist where the defendant or his attorney knew of the alleged exculpatory information); Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 522 (holding although the defendant had knowledge of the existence of the police reports, the defendant “did not have the ‘essential facts’ of the police reports so as to allow the defense to wholly take advantage of this evidence [and] ‘only access to the documents themselves would have provided the range and detail of information necessary to fully understand the implication…
discussed Cited "see" Atwood v. Schriro
D. Ariz. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Dupuy, 760 F.2d 1492 , 1502 n. 5 (9th Cir.1985) (“Where defendants ... had within them knowledge the information by which they could have ascertained the supposed Brady material, there is no suppression by the government.”) (citing United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir.1983)).
discussed Cited "see" Landano v. Rafferty (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
D.N.J. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Griggs, supra, at 674 .
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Roberto Valera
11th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672 (11th Cir.1983) (rejecting idea that, unless the prosecution has doubts as to the non-existence of Brady material, a district judge has no power to conduct an in camera inspection).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." David A. Raley v. Eddie Ylst, Acting Warden of the California State Prison at San Quentin
9th Cir. · 2006 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (holding that the prosecutor did not violate Brady by failing to turn over statements by government witnesses where the defendant had access to a list of potential government witnesses).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Raley v. Ylst
9th Cir. · 2006 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that the prosecutor did not violate Brady by failing to turn over statements by government wit- nesses where the defendant had access to a list of potential government witnesses).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Raley v. Ylst
9th Cir. · 2006 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (holding that the prosecutor did not violate Brady by failing to turn over statements by government witnesses where the defendant had access to a list of potential government witnesses).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
James L. GRIGGS, Defendant-Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Curtis G. BRIDGES, Defendant-Appellant
82-8319, 82-8449.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Aug 29, 1983.
713 F.2d 672
James S. Schuster, Marietta, Ga. (Court Appointed), for defendant-appellant, James L. Griggs., Gerrilyn G. Brill, Asst. U.S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellee., Michael K. McIntyre, Federal Defender Program, Inc., Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellant, Curtis G. Bridges.
Hill, Krayitch, Henderson.
Cited by 45 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Appellant Curtis Bridges was convicted on three counts of executing a scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain money by false representations and use of the United States mail in.violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and seven counts of attempting to execute said scheme by inducing, by means of misrepresentations, persons to travel and be transported in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 2314. Appellant James Griggs was convicted of five counts under 18 U.S.C. § 2314; one mail fraud count, 18 U.S.C. § 1341; and two counts of violating 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a) and 77x, by using transportation and communication in interstate commerce wilfully to obtain money by means of untrue statements of and omission to state material facts.

Appellants allege a violation of the precepts of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Prior to trial appellant Bridges requested that the prosecutor produce all information in her files which was “exculpatory in nature or favorable to the accused or which may lead to exculpatory material including” information in the following categories:

1) any and all information concerning the number of dealerships sold;
2) the addresses of any dealerships still in existence;
3) any representations made by the defendant to the alleged victims which were true;
4) any promises made by the Defendant to the alleged victims which were kept;
5) any statements made by the Defendant to the alleged victims which arguably indicates that there was no intent to defraud; and
6) any other information or material which arguably shows there was no intent to defraud by the Defendant.

The prosecutor declared that no such information existed. She did produce a list of all witnesses she intended to call at trial.

During trial, on cross-examination of several of these witnesses, defense counsel evoked arguably exculpatory testimony, going to the witnesses’ beliefs that defendants were hard-working and attempting to run a legitimate business, in the success of which they believed. A defense witness informed defense counsel that he also had disclosed similar arguably exculpatory material to the prosecutor prior to trial.

Based on these occurrences, counsel for both defendants asserted that the prosecutor had failed to comply with the pretrial Brady request and asked the trial court to conduct an in camera inspection of the prosecutor’s files. The district court denied the request on the basis that unless the prosecutor has doubts as to the non-existence of Brady material the district court has no power to conduct an in camera inspection. Supplemental Record on Appeal, Vol. 2, page 6.

Appellants argue (1) that the prosecutor should have disclosed prior to trial the exculpatory statements extracted at trial, and (2) that the failure to do so may indicate the “tip of the iceberg” of other nondisclosed Brady material that was never brought out at trial.

As to the first argument, Brady does not give defendants a right to have the government construct the defense and identify defense witnesses. United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161, 1168 n. 11 (5th Cir.1981); [1] United States v. Brown, 628 F.2d[*674] 471, 473 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Prior, 546 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599,604 (2d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939, 93 S.Ct. 2772, 37 L.Ed.2d 398 (1975) (cited with approval in United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 420 n. 46 (5th Cir.1977)). Where defendants, prior to trial, had within their knowledge the information by which they could have ascertained the alleged Brady material, there is no suppression by the government. “Irrespective of whether the statement[s] here [were] exculpatory evidence under Brady, a question we do not reach, there is no Brady violation when the accused or his counsel knows before trial about the allegedly exculpatory information .... ” United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 420 (5th Cir.1977) (Emphasis added).

Pretrial, defendants were given the list of potential government witnesses and had within their knowledge the names of all former employees of their companies from whom the allegedly exculpatory information was extracted at trial. Accordingly, while the better course may have been for the government to disclose the statements if it had knowledge thereof, no new trial is warranted for failure to do so.

As to the second prong of the Brady claim, although appellants have pointed to no specific exculpatory evidence that may have been suppressed, there is some merit to the contention that, if the arguably exculpatory statements of witnesses discussed supra were in the prosecutor’s file and not produced, failure to disclose indicates the “tip of an iceberg” of evidence that should have been revealed under Brady. It would have been appropriate for the trial court to conduct an in camera review of the files to detect any such suppression. United States v. Brown, 574 F.2d 1274, 1278-79 (5th Cir.1978), affirmance after remand, 628 F.2d 471 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir.1973). Cf. United States v. Crockett, 534 F.2d 589, 602 (5th Cir.1976) (where any suppressed information could not have been material to the defense, no remand to determine whether evidence was suppressed or whether prejudice resulted therefrom is necessary).

Following the procedure set forth in several prior cases, we remand for the limited purpose of the trial court conducting an in camera review. See United States v. Brown, 574 F.2d at 1278-79; United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d at 58. Cf. United States v. Rivero, 532 F.2d 450 (5th Cir.1976). A new trial is not warranted unless material information actually was suppressed. Materiality is to be adjudged in this situation, where general requests for categories of exculpatory information were made, by whether the evidence is exculpatory and of sufficient significance to have affected the result of the trial. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2402, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). If no suppression of material information occurred, judgment of conviction should be reentered to allow appellants an opportunity to appeal from disposition of this one issue. If material information was suppressed, a new trial should be granted.

A careful review of the record reveals all other claims raised by both appellants are without merit, and, but for the Brady issue discussed supra, the convictions would be affirmed by operation of Rule 25 of this court.

REMANDED.

1

. The Eleventh Circuit, in the en banc decision Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.1981), adopted as precedent decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981.