Eleanor Schiessle v. Donald E. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983). · Go Syfert
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Eleanor Schiessle v. Donald E. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
282 citation events (109 in the last 25 years) across 60 distinct courts.
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discussed Cited as authority (rule) BLUEPRINT CAPITAL ADVISORS, LLC v. PHIL MURPHY
D.N.J. · 2025 · confidence medium
The burden is considered especially heavy because, in the District of New Jersey, motions to disqualify counsel are generally disfavored and considered a “drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary.” Alexander, 822 F. Supp. at 1114 (quoting Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rothman v. Friedman Vartolo, LLP
Bankr. D.N.J. · 2024 · confidence medium
Courts have cautioned that disqualification should only be imposed when absolutely necessary, see, e.g., Alexander, 822 F. Supp. at 1114 (citing Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983)), and have recognized that disqualifying an attorney because of who the plaintiff chooses to sue “would encourage pleading gamesmanship,” see Tapia v. City of Albuquerque, 10 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1206 (D.N.M. 2014).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) NOBREGA v. TROY-BILT (2×)
D.N.J. · 2023 · confidence medium
Further, the movant's burden is a heavy one as “[m]otions to disqualify are viewed with ‘disfavor’ and disqualification is considered a ‘drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary.’” Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 822 F.Supp. 1099, 1114 (D.N.J. 1993) (quoting Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Reid v. Wrought Washer Manufacturing Inc
E.D. Wis. · 2022 · confidence medium
Id. (quoting Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Tennessee v. Mark Steven Treuchet
Tenn. Crim. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
In Clinard, our supreme court adopted a three-step analysis used in Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420-21 (7th Cir. 1983), to determine whether an attorney’s prior representation mandates vicarious disqualification of the attorney’s new office: 1) whether a substantial relationship exists between the subject matter of the former and present representations. 2) whether the presumption of shared confidences which arises from its determination that the representations are substantially related has been rebutted with respect to the former representation. 3) whether the presumption of sha…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Newman v. Marshall University Police Department (2×)
S.D.W. Va · 2020 · confidence medium
Failure to rebut this presumption would also make disqualification proper. 717 F.2d at 420 (citation and footnote omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. Cook County Sheriff's Office
N.D. Ill. · 2020 · confidence medium
Deciding such a motion requires balancing “the sacrosanct privacy of the attorney-client relationship (and the professional integrity implicated by that relationship) and the prerogative of a party to proceed with counsel of its choice.” Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983). “[D]isqualification is a ‘drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary.’” Id. (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. SHAHEED L. BROWN (18-11-0671 AND 19-04-0235, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 2020 · confidence medium
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 221-22 (1988). "[D]isqualification is considered a 'drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary.'" Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1099, 1114 (D.N.J. 1993) (quoting Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983)); see also Cavallaro v. Jamco Prop.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harris Davis Rebar, LLC v. Structural Iron Workers Local Union No. 1 Pension Trust Fund
N.D. Ill. · 2019 · confidence medium
Disqualification of an attorney may be an appropriate sanction for violation of the attorney’s ethical or other duties, but it is a “drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary.” Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: D.C. (Minor Child) and J.R. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services and Child Advocates, Inc. (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
As the Sykes panel stated, “we must determine whether the attorney whose change of employment created the disqualification issue was actually privy to any confidential information [her] prior law firm received from Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1250 | December 27, 2018 Page 10 of 15 the party now seeking disqualification of [her] present firm.” Id. at 588 (quoting Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983)). [19] Citing comment three to Rule 1.9, for the proposition that “[a] conclusion as to whether a lawyer possesses such confidential informatio…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Singer v. PrimeSource Health Group LLC
N.D. Ill. · 2018 · confidence medium
DISCUSSION As Fleming acknowledges, “disqualification is a drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary.” Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dahleh v. Mustafa
N.D. Ill. · 2018 · confidence medium
Ill. 2012) (quoting Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Valizadeh v. Doe
unknown court · 2017 · confidence medium
Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[Disqualification is a ‘drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary.’ ” (quoting Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 1983))).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Truong v. 325 Broadway Associates LLC (In re Truong)
Bankr. D.N.J. · 2016 · confidence medium
Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983); Commonwealth Ins.
cited Cited as authority (rule) XYZ, D.O. v. Robin Sykes and Thomas Williams, and ABC Hospital
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Id. (quoting Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kramer v. American Bank & Trust Co.
N.D. Ill. · 2013 · confidence medium
On the one hand, there is prerogative of a party to proceed with counsel of its choice, Owen v. Wangerin, 985 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir.1993); Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 419-20 (7th Cir.1983), while on the other, there is the court’s duty “to safeguard the sacrosanct privacy of the attorney-client relationship.” Cromley v. Board ofEdue. ofLockport Tp.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Medgyesy v. Medgyesy
N.D. Ill. · 2013 · confidence medium
Owen v. Wangerin, 985 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir.1993); Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 419-20 (7th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re 444 North Northwest Hwy, LLC
Bankr. N.D. Ill. · 2012 · confidence medium
Disqualification is “a drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary.” Owen v. Wangerin, 985 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting, Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983)). [3,4] In determining whether disqualification is required, courts in this Circuit employ a three-step analysis.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Black Rush Mining, LLC v. Black Panther Mining
N.D. Ill. · 2012 · confidence medium
Disqualification of an attorney is a “drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary.” Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983) (quoting Freeman v. Chi.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. ATI Technologies, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
W.D. Wis. · 2010 · confidence medium
Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983) (footnote omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Shadonna C.
Cal. · 2008 · confidence medium
Instead, the burden is on CLC to show that, through timely, appropriate, and effective screening measures and/or structural safeguards, the confidential information acquired during Unit l’s prior representation of Shadonna has been, and will be, adequately protected during Unit 3’s proposed representation of Charlisse. 11 This burden properly falls on CLC because it has unique access to the relevant information. 12 (Cf. In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 572, 596 [ 283 Cal.Rptr. 732 ] [attorney resisting disqualification “has the burden of showing” effective screen…
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Davenport
Mich. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F. 2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Tucker v. George
W.D. Wis. · 2008 · confidence medium
Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir.1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Valley Stream
2d Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
See also Manning, 849 F.2d at 224-25 ; Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Incorporated Village Of Valley Stream
2d Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
See also Manning, 849 F.2d at 224-25 ; Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir.1983). 57 On the particular facts of this case, with special focus on Englander's double role—of counsel to the Jaspan firm only with regard to the cases he was turning over, while independent of the Jaspan firm as to the matters he retained—coupled with the district court's finding that Englander maintained separate files and shared no confidences relating to his representation of HV with Jaspan, and that Englander and Jaspan adopted measures in September 2003 upon becoming aware of the potential conf…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Maldonado v. New Jersey
D.N.J. · 2004 · confidence medium
Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 822 F.Supp. 1099, 1114 (D.N.J.1993) (citing Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Coburn v. Daimlerchrysler Services North America, L.L.C.
N.D. Ill. · 2003 · confidence medium
(R. 49, Def.’s App., Tab 13, O’Hara Dep. at 151; R. 56, Def.’s App., Tab 37, July 17 Hearing Transcript at 13.) LEGAL STANDARDS Disqualifying an attorney is a “drastic measure which courts should hesi *964 tate to impose except when absolutely necessary.” Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Exterior Systems, Inc. v. Noble Composites, Inc.
N.D. Ind. · 2002 · confidence medium
Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gerald v. TURNOCK PLUMBING, HEATING AND COOLING, LLC. (2×)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983) (citing LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 255-56 (ith Cir.1983)); Speedy, 54 F.Supp.2d at 869 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Exterior Systems, Inc. v. Noble Composites, Inc.
N.D. Ind. · 2001 · confidence medium
Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rohm and Haas Co. v. American Cyanamid Co.
D.N.J. · 2001 · confidence medium
It is well settled that because motions to disqualify can have such drastic consequences, courts disfavor such motions and grant them only “when absolutely necessary.” Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 822 F.Supp. 1099, 1114 (D.N.J. 1993) (citing Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kimberly Caudill v. William Howard Foley
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983); Burnette v. Morgan, 303 Ark.150, 794 S.W.2d 145, 147-48 (1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Coulter
Tenn. Crim. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
However, the court in Clinard, 46 S.W.3d at 183 (footnote omitted), also affirmed that, “[i]n these days of monolithic law firms and increased opportunity and mobility for both clients and attorneys, a per se rule of vicarious disqualification is not feasible.” Accordingly, as an exception to the DR 5-105(D) rule of vicarious disqualification, the court adopted the case-by-case analysis employed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983), in determining whether an attorney’s prior representation mandates vicari…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clinard v. Blackwood (2×)
Tenn. · 2001 · confidence medium
Under Formal Opinion 89-F-118, a three-step analysis adopted from Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420-21 (7th Cir.1983), is used to determine whether an attorney's prior representation mandates vicarious disqualification: 1) whether a substantial relationship exists between the subject matter of the former and present representations. 2) whether the presumption of shared confidences which arises from its determination that the representations are substantially related has been rebutted with respect to the former representation. 3) whether the presumption of shared confidences has been reb…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Eighth Judicial District Court Ex Rel. County of Clark (2×)
Nev. · 2000 · confidence medium
Ass’n, Inc. v. Crossland Sav., FSB, 944 F. Supp. 341, 345 (D.N.J. 1996) (“[A] delicate balance must be maintained between ‘the sacrosanct privacy of the attorney-client relationship . . . and the prerogative of a party to proceed with counsel of its choice.’ ” (quoting Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Larry Coulter
Tenn. Crim. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
However, the court in Clinard, No. M1998-00555-SC-R11-CV, 2001 WL 530834, at *3 (footnote omitted), also affirmed that, “[i]n these days of monolithic law firms and increased opportunity and mobility for both clients and attorneys, a per se rule of vicarious disqualification is not feasible.” Accordingly, as an exception to the DR 5-105(D) rule of vicarious disqualification, the court adopted the case-by-case analysis employed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983), in determining whether an attorney’s pri…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Van Jackson v. CheckN Go of Illinois, Inc.
N.D. Ill. · 2000 · confidence medium
Id., 703 F.2d at 257 ; Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) County of Los Angeles v. United States District Court for the Central District of California
9th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Manning, 849 F.2d at 224-26 ; Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir.1983); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445 (2d Cir.1980) (en banc), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 449 U.S. 1106 , 101 S.Ct. 911 , 66 L.Ed.2d 835 (1981); see also Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 720 F.Supp. 1080, 1086-87 (S.D.N.Y.1989); United States ex rel.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gen-Cor, LLC v. Buckeye Corrugated, Inc.
S.D. Ind. · 2000 · confidence medium
Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983) (“disqualification is a drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary”) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re: County Of Los Angeles
9th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Manning, 849 F.2d at 224-26 ; Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); see also Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 720 F. Supp. 1080, 1086-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); United States ex rel.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Montgomery Academy v. Kohn
D.N.J. · 1999 · confidence medium
This motion to disqualify Plaintiffs counsel must be carefully scrutinized because “[mjotions to disqualify are viewed with ‘disfavor’ and disqualification is considered a ‘drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary.’ ” Alexander v. Primerien Holdings, Inc., 822 F.Supp. 1099 . 1114 (D.N.J.1993) (citing Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983)); see also Essex Chem., 993 F.Supp. at 246 ; Carlyle Towers, 944 F.Supp. at 345 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re A & T Paramus Co., Inc.
Bankr. D.N.J. · 1999 · confidence medium
In addressing a motion to disqualify, the Carlyle Court recognized that: “[m]otions to disqualify are viewed with ‘disfavor’ and disqualification is considered a ‘drastic measure’ which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary.” Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 822 F.Supp. 1099, 1114 (D.N.J.1993) (citing Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983)). “[Disqualification motions are often made for tactical reasons, but ... ‘even when made in the best of faith, such [disqualification] motions inevitably cause delay’ in the underlying pr…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Essex County Jail Annex Inmates v. Treffinger
D.N.J. · 1998 · confidence medium
As another member of this court has recognized, “motions to disqualify are generally viewed with ‘disfavor’ and disqualification is considered a ‘drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary.’ ” Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 822 F.Supp. 1099, 1114 (D.N.J.1993) (quoting Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co.
Ohio · 1998 · confidence medium
Cromley, 17 F.3d at 1065 ; Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 420-421 (presumption not rebutted because no' “institutional mechanisms” were in effect to insulate quarantined attorney from rest of firm); LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 259 ; United States v. Goot (C.A.7, 1990), 894 F.2d 231, 235-236 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining
Ohio · 1998 · confidence medium
Cromley, 17 F.3d at 1065 ; Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 420-421 (presumption not rebutted because no “institutional mechanisms” were in effect to insulate quarantined attorney from rest of firm); LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 259 ; United States v. Goot (C.A.7, 1990), 894 F.2d 231, 235-236 . {¶ 33} A very strict standard of proof must be applied to the rebuttal of this presumption of shared confidences, however, and any doubts as to the existence of an asserted conflict of interest must be resolved in favor of disqualification in order to dispel any appearance of impropriety.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lemm v. Adams
Tenn. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983); Burnette v. Morgan, 303 Ark. 150 , 794 S.W.2d 145, 147-48 (1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Guillen v. City of Chicago
N.D. Ill. · 1997 · confidence medium
On the other hand, it is well settled that attorney disqualification is “a drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary.” Owen v. Wangerin, 985 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting, inter alia, Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983)); Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marshall v. State of New York Div. of State Police
N.D.N.Y. · 1997 · confidence medium
See Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar and Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 224-26 (6th Cir.1988); Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir.1983); LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Lake County, 703 F.2d 252, 257-59 (7th Cir.1983); Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 720 F.Supp. 1080, 1086-87 (S.D.N.Y.1989); Huntington v. Great Western Resources, Inc., 655 F.Supp. 565, 572 (S.D.N.Y.1987); Yaretsky v. Blum, 525 F.Supp. 24, 29-30 (S.D.N.Y.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co.
N.D. Ill. · 1996 · confidence medium
Miller’s lawyer has done somewhat better on the legal front by pointing not only to LaSalle Nat’l Bank (cited by this Court in Opinion at 506, without its then having undertaken any research beyond its own recollection) but also to two later Seventh Circuit cases that support Miller’s position, Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir.1983) and United States v. Goot, 894 F.2d 231, 234-35 (7th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones & Henry, Engineers, Ltd. v. Town of Orland (2×)
N.D. Ind. · 1996 · confidence medium
Lastly, ... the court must determine whether the knowledge of the [client’s] “confidences and secrets” ... which [the challenged attorney] brought with him has been passed on to or is likely to be passed on to the members of the [new] firm. 7 Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420-21 (7th Cir.1983) (citing Freeman, 689 F.2d at 728 ) (emphasis added), followed, U.S. v. Goot, 894 F.2d 231, 234-35 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 , 111 S.Ct. 45 , 112 L.Ed.2d 22 (1990); Nelson v. Green Builders, Inc., 823 F.Supp. 1439, 1447 (E.D.Wis.1993). 8 HI.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Eleanor SCHIESSLE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Donald E. STEPHENS, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
82-2223.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Sep 16, 1983.
717 F.2d 417
Craig A. Peterson, Evanston, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant., Timothy F. Kocian, Antonow & Fink, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Wood, Eschbach, Coffey.
Cited by 136 opinions  |  Published
COFFEY, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff, Eleanor Schiessle, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, disqualifying her co-counsel, the law firm of Ross, Hardies, O’Keefe, Babcock & Parsons in this antitrust action. The question presented for review is whether, in light of our recent pronouncements on attorney disqualification, the district court erred in its determination that disqualification was required in this case. We hold that the rebuttable presumption rule adopted by this court in Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium, etc. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir.1979) (en banc) and Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.1982), and reaffirmed in LaSalle Nat. Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir.1983), is dispositive of this appeal and consequently we affirm the order of the district court. [1]

I.

Eleanor Schiessle commenced this action in August of 1979 against eighteen defendants including Arthur Swanson, Carl Swanson and Paul Swanson (individually and as Arthur Swanson and Associates) alleging that various acts taken by the defendants to condemn and to redevelop property owned by the plaintiff in Rosemont, Illinois, violated, inter alia, federal antitrust law. The plaintiff retained the law firm of Ross, Hardies, O’Keefe, Babcock & Parsons (Ross) to represent her in this action, and Tobin Richter, a partner in the Ross firm, appeared on behalf of Schiessle in proceedings before the district court. On August 14, 1979, prior to an official appearance being filed on behalf of the Swansons, Michael King, at that time a partner at the Anto-now & Fink law firm, contacted Attorney Richter by phone asking that the lawsuit be dismissed as to the Swanson defendants. In a subsequent phone conversation two days later, Attorney Richter informed King that Schiessle would not dismiss the Swan-sons as defendants but offered that there was a possibility of settlement with the other defendants and that consideration would be given to taking the Swansons’ depositions at an early date. However, subsequent to the phone conversations between Attorneys Richter and King on August 30, 1979, Kenneth Lodge, of the law firm of Burke, Nash and Shea, Ltd., filed an appearance on behalf of the Swansons. Attorney Lodge remained as the Swansons’ attorney of record until October 19, 1979, when the district court granted his motion to withdraw from the case and to substitute Attorneys William Goldberg and Timothy Kocian of the Antonow & Fink firm as counsel for the defendant Swansons.

Attorney King left the Antonow & Fink law firm and joined the Ross law firm as a partner on October 1, 1979. Attorney King changed firms prior to the withdrawal of Attorney Lodge and the substitution of An-tonow & Fink as counsel for the Swanson[*419] defendants. Antonow & Fink raised no objection to the Ross firm’s representation of the plaintiff Schiessle at the time Anto-now & Fink became counsel of record for the Swansons and did not object until nearly two years later. In August of 1981, Attorney Kocian of the Antonow & Fink law firm informed Richter of the Ross firm that if Schiessle refused to dismiss the Swansons as defendants, Antonow & Fink (Kocian) would inter alia, move to disqualify the Ross firm as counsel for plaintiff Schiessle on the ground that Attorney King had participated in the Swansons’ defense while at Antonow & Fink, thereby disqualifying the entire Ross firm from participating in the case on behalf of Schiessle.

The Ross firm refused to dismiss the Swansons and filed a motion with the district court in September of 1981, requesting a declaration of qualification as counsel for the plaintiff. In conjunction with that motion, the Ross firm filed affidavits of Attorneys King and Richter. In his affidavit, Attorney King averred that although he did some work on the present action on behalf of the Swansons during his affiliation with Antonow & Fink, he never filed either an appearance on behalf of the Swansons or an answer, nor did he conduct any “detailed investigation into the case.” In fact, according to King, he never met the Swan-sons. With regard to his contact with his case after he left the Antonow & Fink firm, he averred:

“Since the time I joined Ross, Hardies, I have, of course, not worked on the Schiessle case, have not filed an appearance, have not discussed the merits of the case, nor have I informed anyone of any conversations or information, if any, which occurred during my time at Anto-now & Fink. At this time, I know nothing of the merits of the case, have not worked on the case, have billed no time to Mrs. Schiessle, met Mrs. Schiessle, nor participated in any discussion of the merits of the case with her.
“Notwithstanding that I would not recognize the Swansons or Mrs. Schiessle if they walked into my office, I will continue as I have in the past to have absolutely no contact with the case.”

The Swanson defendants responded by filing a cross-motion for disqualification of the Ross firm. Attached to the Swansons’ cross-motion was an affidavit of Attorney Goldberg of the Antonow & Fink firm reciting (1) that during August and September of 1979 Michael King was the Antonow & Fink “partner in charge” of representing the Swansons in the antitrust lawsuit; (2) that on “four separate occasions [King] had conversations with Paul Swanson concerning [the] lawsuit;” and (3) that King had “numerous conferences concerning this lawsuit and the Swansons with other attorneys of Antonow & Fink.”

On June 29,1982, the district court granted the defendants’ cross-motion and disqualified the Ross firm as counsel for the plaintiff Schiessle in her action against the Swansons relying exclusively on the parties’ affidavits and without benefit of an evidentiary hearing. The district court, relying on Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir.1978), concluded that because the representation of the Swansons by Attorney King and his former firm (An-tonow & Fink) and the representation of Schiessle by the Ross firm (King’s present firm) involved the identical antitrust lawsuit, the court would irrebuttably presume that confidences were shared between King and the other members of the Ross firm. Therefore, according to the court, the Ross firm was precluded from acting as Schies-sle’s counsel in the instant action. Schiessle now appeals the district court’s order of disqualification.

II.

Questions of ethical propriety like those presented in this appeal have been addressed by this court within the past year. See, e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.1982); LaSalle Nat. Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir.1983); and Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir.1983). In those cases we noted two important considerations invoked in[*420] motions to disqualify counsel and emphasized the delicacy of the balance that must be maintained between them: the sacrosanct privacy of the attorney-client relationship (and the professional integrity implicated by that relationship) and the prerogative of a party to proceed with counsel of its choice. Freeman, 689 F.2d at 721. Accordingly, this court adopted an approach for resolution of disqualification questions which accommodated these important considerations and we have continuously maintained that disqualification is a “drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary.” Freeman, 689 F.2d at 721.

The analysis outlined in our prior decisions concerning attorney disqualification comprises three steps. First, we must determine whether a substantial relationship exists between the subject matter of the prior and present representations. If we conclude a substantial relationship does exist, we must next ascertain whether the presumption of shared confidences with respect to the prior representation has been rebutted. [2] If we conclude this presumption has not been rebutted, we must then determine whether the presumption of shared confidences has been rebutted with respect to the present representation. Failure to rebut this presumption would also make disqualification proper. LaSalle Nat. Bank, 703 F.2d at 255-56.

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the subject matter of the prior and present representations are substantially related — indeed the subject matter is identical as it concerns the same antitrust litigation. The only factor that has changed is that Attorney King is now a partner of. the Ross firm rather than the Antonow & Fink firm. Therefore, we find no difficulty in concluding that the representation involved is substantially related.

The second step in our analysis requires us to ascertain whether the presumption of shared confidences which arises from our determination that the representations are substantially related has been rebutted with respect to the prior representation. In other words, we must determine whether the attorney whose change of employment created the disqualification issue was actually privy to any confidential information his prior law firm received from the party now seeking disqualification of his present firm. The evidence presented to rebut this presumption must “clearly and effectively” demonstrate that the attorney in question had no knowledge of the information, confidences and/or secrets related by the client in the prior representation. Freeman, 689 F.2d at 723. In the case at bar, the affidavit of Attorney Goldberg of the Antonow & Fink firm stands uncontra-dicted in its recital that King, while a partner at Antonow & Fink, was (1) “partner in charge” of representing the Swansons in the Schiessle litigation; (2) that King dis[*421] cussed the lawsuit on four occasions with Paul Swanson; and (3) that King had taken part in numerous discussions at Antonow & Fink regarding the antitrust lawsuit. Accordingly, we conclude that Attorney King has not rebutted the presumption of shared confidences with respect to his involvement in the case while he was a partner at Anto-now & Fink.

Lastly, the district court must determine whether the presumption of shared confidences has been rebutted with respect to the present representation. In other words, the court must determine whether the knowledge of the “confidences and secrets” of the Swansons which King brought with him has been passed on to or is likely to be passed on to the members of the Ross firm. In LaSalle Nat. Bank, 703 F.2d at 259, we held that the presumption of shared confidences could be rebutted by demonstrating that “specific institutional mechanisms” (e.g., “Chinese Walls”) had been implemented to effectively insulate against any flow of confidential information from the “infected” attorney to any other member of his present firm. Such a determination can be based on objective and verifiable evidence presented to the trial court and must be made on a case-by-case basis. Factors appropriate for consideration by the trial court might include, but are not limited to, the size and structural divisions of the law firm involved, the likelihood of contact between the “infected” attorney and the specific attorneys responsible for the present representation, the existence of rules which prevent the “infected” attorney from access to relevant files or other information pertaining to the present litigation or which prevent him from sharing in the fees derived from such litigation. LaSalle Nat. Bank, 703 F.2d at 259.

We hold that the district court erred in relying on an irrebuttable presumption to find that confidences and secrets had been shared between King and other members of the Ross firm because our decisions in Freeman and LaSalle make it clear that the presumption of shared confidences can be rebutted. LaSalle Nat. Bank, 703 F.2d at 257. However, we reach the same conclusion as the district court that the Ross firm must be disqualified from representing Schiessle because: (1) Attorney King obviously had knowledge of the Swansons’ case as he failed to answer the affidavit of the Antonow & Fink firm reciting (a) that he was the “partner in charge” of representing the defendants, (b) that he discussed the lawsuit on four occasions with Paul Swanson, and (c) that he had taken part in numerous discussions at the firm regarding the antitrust litigation; and (2) no evidence exists in the record establishing that the Ross firm has “institutional mechanisms” in effect insulating King “from all participation in and information about [the] case.” LaSalle Nat. Bank, 703 F.2d at 257. It should be noted that counsel for the plaintiff informed the court at oral argument that the Ross firm was without “formal institutionalized] ... screening” insulating Attorney King from the members of the firm representing Schiessle.

We hold that at the time Attorney King changed firms he had knowledge of the Swansons’ case and that there were no “institutional mechanisms” in existence at the Ross firm to protect the sacrosanct privacy of the defendants’ attorney-client relationship. The LaSalle decision requires that when an attorney with knowledge of a prior client’s confidences and secrets changes employment and joins a firm representing an adverse party, specific institutional mechanisms must be in place to ensure that information is not shared with members of the new firm, even if inadvertently. LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 259. The record in this ease shows that the Ross firm at the time of Attorney King’s transfer did not have specific institutional mechanisms under La-Salle to insure that King would have no contact with the Schiessle case. We hold that the Ross firm must be disqualified from the continued representation of Schiessle.

III.

The order of the district court is Affirmed.

1

. This court’s most recent pronouncement regarding attorney disqualification, Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir.1983), does not control the resolution of this appeal as noted in footnote 2, infra.

2

. The existence of a substantial relationship gives rise to a presumption of shared confidences. See Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium, etc. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir.1979) (en banc).

The present fact situation should be distinguished from that found in our recent decision in Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir.1983) where we held that the presumption of shared confidences was irre-buttable. In that case we stated:

“There is an exception for the case where a member or associate of a law firm (or government legal department) changes jobs, and later he or his new firm is retained by an adversary of a client of his former firm. In such a case, even if there is a substantial relationship between the two matters, the lawyer can avoid disqualification by showing that effective measures were taken to prevent confidences from being received by whichever lawyers in the new firm are handling the new matter. See Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 197 (7th Cir.1979) (en banc); Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., supra, 689 F.2d at 722-23; LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir.1983). The exception is inapplicable here; the firm itself changed sides.”

Analytica, 708 F.2d at 1267. Unlike Analytica, only one attorney has moved from the law firm now representing some of the defendants to the law firm representing the plaintiff. Since the present fact situation falls within the exception recognized in Analytica, our analysis does not conflict with that decision.