Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 99,686 Kenneth A. Carter v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Mario T. Ribeiro v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 726 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1983). · Go Syfert
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 99,686 Kenneth A. Carter v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Mario T. Ribeiro v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 726 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
12 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Michael A. Rooms v. Securities and Exchange Commission (ca10, 2006-04-25)
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael A. Rooms v. Securities and Exchange Commission
10th Cir. · 2006 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Carter v. SEC, 726 F.2d 472, 473-74 (9th Cir.1983) (rejecting as inadequate defense that registered representative charged with NASD rules violation did not know sales violated NASD rules; registered representative is assumed to have knowledge of rules).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rooms v. Securities & Exchang
10th Cir. · 2006 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Carter v. SEC, 726 F.2d 472, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting as inadequate defense that registered representative charged with NASD rules violation did not know sales violated NASD rules; registered representative is assumed to have knowledge of rules).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brownson v. Securities & Exchange Commission
9th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 726 F.2d 472, 474 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Daniel Joseph ALDERMAN, Petitioner, v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Respondent
9th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Carter v. SEC, 726 F.2d 472, 474 (9th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clinton Hugh Holland, Jr. v. Securities and Exchange Commission
9th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
We review the SEC's affirmance of the NASD's imposition of sanctions for abuse of discretion, and will not disturb those sanctions "unless they are either unwarranted in law or without justification in fact." Cater v. SEC, 726 F.2d 472, 474 (9th Cir.1983) (quoting Hinkle Northwest, Inc. v. SEC, 641 F.2d 1304, 1310 (9th cir. 1981)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Thomas Alton v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Thomas Alton v. Securities and Exchange Commission (3×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1), and we deny the petition. 3 The SEC's findings of fact, "if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive." 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(4); Carter v. SEC, 726 F.2d 472, 473 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert Lester Gardner v. Securities and Exchange Commission
9th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Before: ALL, THOMPSON and RYMER, Circuit Judges. 1 MEMORANDUM ** 2 Robert Lester Gardner petitions pro se for review of the Security and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") decision affirming disciplinary sanctions imposed against Gardner by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD"). 1 Gardner contends that the Commission erred by finding that he made an unauthorized purchase of stocks in a customer's account while working as a salesman for Toluca Pacific Securities Corp. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Section 25(a)(1) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78y(a…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alan H. GOLD, Petitioner, v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Respondent
7th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Carter v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 726 F.2d 472, 474 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam); see also Sloan v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 489 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir.1973) (“when appellants became members of the [NYSE] they consented, quite knowingly and intelligently to [its] disciplinary procedures....”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Donald Hateley, the Cambridge Group, and Wendy Seretan v. Securities and Exchange Commission
9th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Carter v. SEC, 726 F.2d 472, 474 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Kenneth A. CARTER, Petitioner,
v.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Respondent; Mario T. RIBEIRO, Petitioner, v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Respondent
82-7387, 82-7396.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Dec 1, 1983.
726 F.2d 472
Kenneth A. Carter, Mario T. Ribeiro, San Diego, Cal., for petitioner., David A. Sirignano, Securities & Exchange Comm., Washington, D.C., for respondent.
Browning, Norris, Per Curiam, Schnacke.
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Kenneth A. Carter and Mario T. Ribeiro, formerly registered representatives of the San Diego branch office of Independent Securities Corporation (ISC), seek to set aside an opinion and order of the Securities and Exchange Commission affirming disciplinary action by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD). The Commission found that Carter and Ribeiro had violated Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e, by selling securities without complying with the registration requirements of that Act. The Commission also found that Carter and Ribeiro had violated Article III, Section 1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice, NASD Manual (CCH) para. 2151, by failing to provide their employer with prior written notification of unauthorized, • private sales. The Commission affirmed the sanctions imposed on Carter and Ribeiro for these violations by the Board of Governors of the NASD, including censure, fines of $2,500 and $10,-000 respectively, and costs of $275.70 assessed against Carter. We affirm the decision of the Commission.

A reviewing court “cannot overturn the Commission’s findings of fact unless convinced that they are not supported by substantial evidence.” Sartain v. SEC, 601 F.2d 1366, 1372 (9th Cir.1979); 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(4). Carter and Ribeiro do not challenge the SEC’s findings regarding registration violations, nor do they argue that they did not engage in sales of the securities in question after their employer withdrew its authorization for those sales. They contend instead that they were unaware these sales were in violation of •[*474] NASD rules and the requirements stated in the ISC compliance, manual. This defense is inadequate. As employees, Carter and Ribeiro are assumed as a matter of law to have read and have knowledge of these rules and requirements. Sirianni v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir.1982). Ribeiro contends also that he did not conceal these sales from his employer, claiming that the authorization he received from the San Diego branch manager was tantamount to the required authorization from ISC. The ISC compliance manual, however, specifically requires employees to submit details of their sales to the home office compliance department for review. In addition, Ribei-ro’s testimony submitted in evidence before the Commission indicates that he did not, in fact, confuse informing the San Diego branch manager of these sales with notifying ISC. We hold that the findings of the Commission as to both Carter and Ribeiro are supported by substantial evidence.

Carter and Ribeiro assert that the Commission erred in denying them oral argument. Congress has, however, committed to the discretion of the Commission the decision as to whether to allow oral argument in disciplinary hearings. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e)(1). Pursuant to this statutory authority, the Commission has provided by rule that it has the discretion to “grant or deny any request for oral argument .... ” 17 C.F.R. 240.19d-3(f). The Constitution does not require an oral hearing before an administrative tribunal. FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265, 276, 69 S.Ct. 1097, 1103, 93 L.Ed. 1353 (1949).

Carter and Ribeiro were given the opportunity to submit written statements to the Commission. They do not allege that they were denied the opportunity to present any specific matters of fact or law in connection with their case. We hold that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying oral argument.

Ribeiro and Carter contend that the Commission erred in affirming the monetary sanctions imposed on them. A reviewing court “will not disturb SEC sanctions unless they are either unwarranted in law or without justification in fact.” Hinkle Northwest, Inc. v. SEC, 641 F.2d 1304, 1310 (9th Cir.1981). The fines and costs imposed in this case were warranted in law. NASD Manual (CCH), para. 2301, 2303. They were also justified in fact. This court has previously found that violations of the type committed in this case constitute serious misconduct, warranting more severe penalties than those imposed here. Sirianni v. SEC, 677 F.2d at 1288-1289.

Carter and Ribeiro also contend that the fines are invalid because the Commission failed to impose sanctions on allegedly similarly placed individuals. The NASD found, however, that the salesmen mentioned in the petitioners’ briefs did not engage in the same conduct as did Carter and Ribeiro. In any event, “absent discrimination based upon an invidious classification or in retaliation for a petitioner’s assertion of his federal rights,” an otherwise authorized sanction is not invalid simply because it is more severe than a sanction imposed in a similar case. Sartain v. SEC, 601 F.2d at 1374-75.

AFFIRMED.