02/01/2017

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs January 4, 2017 TREVOR HOWELL v. KENNEDY SMITHWICK Appeal from the Chancery Court for Anderson County No. 14CH6820 M. Nichole Cantrell, Chancellor ___________________________________ No. E2016-00628-COA-R3-CV ___________________________________ Mother has appealed the trial court’s decisions regarding parenting time, criminal contempt, child support, and the child’s surname. We have determined that the trial court erred in finding Mother in criminal contempt as to one of the three incidents at issue, in setting temporary child support, in failing to order Father to pay child support by wage assignment, and in ordering the child’s surname to be changed to Father’s surname. In all other respects, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in Part, Vacated in Part, Reversed in Part, and Remanded ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., and KENNY W. ARMSTRONG, JJ., joined. Bruce T. Hill, Sevierville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kennedy Smithwick. Trevor Howell, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, appellee, pro se. OPINION FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Trevor Howell (“Father”) and Kennedy Smithwick (“Mother”) are the parents of a child born in December 2014. The parents were no longer together at the time of the child’s birth. Within a week of the birth, Father filed a petition to establish paternity and custody. On January 21, 2015, the parties submitted an agreed order pursuant to which Father would have parenting time every Wednesday for four hours and every Saturday for four hours. After paternity was established, the parties attended mediation. On May 21, 2015, the trial court entered an agreed temporary parenting plan order pursuant to which Father would exercise parenting time every Wednesday from 11:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m., every Friday from 3:30 p.m. until 7:00 p.m., every Saturday from 11:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m., and every other Sunday from 10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. The order provided for approved child care providers while the child was in the care of each parent. The parties also agreed that “Father shall pay child support in the amount of $300.00 per month to Mother” and that “this amount is correct as a deviation from the guidelines given Father’s time with the child.” The agreed order states that “this temporary parenting plan will be modified by agreement, mediation, or hearing upon Father obtaining different employment, Mother discontinuing breastfeeding, or October 1, 2015, whichever occurs first.” On December 3, 2015, Father filed a verified motion for criminal contempt against Mother alleging that she was in criminal contempt for violating the temporary parenting plan agreement entered on May 21, 2015. The details of this petition will be set forth as relevant in the analysis below. On December 9, 2015, the trial court entered a show cause order and notice of rights pursuant to Rule 42 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Father filed an amended verified motion for contempt on December 16, 2015. The case was heard on January 26, 2016. Father, Mother, Patricia Spraker (paternal grandmother), and Ashley McCarter (Father’s girlfriend) testified. The court took the matter under advisement and then made a ruling from the bench, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, on January 27, 2016; the court entered its final order on February 23, 2016. The February order includes a detailed analysis of the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a). The court reached the following relevant conclusions: 3. Breastfeeding does not prohibit Father’s co-parenting time. The minor child is thirteen months old and has the ability to eat baby and solid food as well as drink milk from a sippy cup. ^[4]. The Father is a good parent and shows a willingness to co-parent by testimony of witnesses and both parties. Co-parenting time with the Father, by law, should be maximized. ^[5]. It is in the best interest of the minor child that the Father immediately have overnights with the child but that the extended periods of overnight be on a graduated plan. .... 7. The Mother committed three acts of criminal contempt by failing to comply with an order of this Court as it relates to visitation between the minor child and the Father. The Mother willfully and knowingly failed to comply with an order of this Court on three occasions by not allowing the Father to have visitation with the minor child as contained in the Agreed Temporary Parenting Plan Order. . . . Mother shall pay for reasonable attorney fees for the contempt pending both attorneys submitting an affidavit of times. ^[8]. The minor child’s surname shall be changed to Howell . . . .

The trial court entered a new parenting plan giving Mother and Father equal parenting time and naming Mother the primary residential parent. The court established a transitional period, from January 29 through February 24, 2016, during which Father would begin to exercise more overnight parenting time. Then, as of February 24, 2016, the regular parenting schedule would be as follows:

[T]he Mother shall have co-parenting time with the minor child every Monday at 6:00 p.m. until Wednesday at 6:00 p.m. and the Father shall have co-parenting time every Wednesday at 6:00 p.m. until Friday at 6:00 p.m. The parties shall alternate the following block: Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Monday at 6:00 p.m.

Based upon the child support guidelines, Father was required to pay Mother $139.00 per month in child support beginning on February 1, 2016. Mother was awarded a judgment in the amount of $300.00 in retroactive child support.

On March 15, 2016, the trial court entered an agreed amendment to its February 23, 2016 order stating that “each party shall be responsible for their own respective attorney fees on all issues, including, but not limited to, criminal contempt.” This order was entered nunc pro tunc January 26, 2016, the date of the hearing.

On appeal, Mother raises a number of issues, which we summarize as follows: whether the trial court erred in (1) finding Mother in criminal contempt; (2) failing to adopt Mother’s proposed parenting plan; (3) its calculation of temporary child support; (4) failing to require Father to pay child support by wage assignment; and (5) changing the child’s surname to Father’s surname.^[1]

ANALYSIS

(1) Criminal contempt

Mother raises two main arguments on the issue of contempt: lack of notice and failure of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We begin with notice.

A. Notice All courts have the power to punish for criminal contempt pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102(3) in cases of “willful disobedience or resistance of any . . . party . . . to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of such courts.” (Emphasis added). Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b)(1) requires that a criminal contempt be prosecuted on notice, which shall:

A. state the time and place of the hearing; B. allow the alleged contemner a reasonable time to prepare a defense; and C. state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such.

In cases involving indirect contempt, which concern actions committed outside the presence of the court, adequate notice “must be given before the contempt hearing.” Fox v. Fox, No. M2009-01884-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 4244356, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2010); see TENN. R. CRIM. P. 42(b)(1).

Mother asserts that she was not properly served with the original or amended verified motion for criminal contempt because the motions were served on her attorney and not on her personally. Mother likewise argues that the court’s show cause order and notice of Rule 42 rights was not served on her personally.^[2] These arguments are without merit. Rule 49 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure requires service upon “every other party” of written motions (other than ex parte motions) and court orders required by their terms to be served upon the parties. TENN. R. CRIM. P. 49 (a)(1). Rule 49 further provides: “When the law, these rules, or a court order requires or permits service to be made on a party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made on the attorney unless service on the party in person is required by law or is ordered by the court.” TENN. R. CRIM. P. 49 (b)(1). The permissible methods of service include mailing a copy to the attorney’s last known address. TENN. R. CRIM. P. 49(b)(2)(B). Thus, service upon Mother’s attorney constitutes service upon Mother.

Mother further argues that the trial court failed to advise her of her rights prior to her testimony at the hearing, that the show cause order failed to give notice of the specific instances of contemptuous behavior, and that the order’s erroneous mention of the Rules of Civil Procedure in the title is a fatal error. In the show cause order, which was served upon Mother through her attorney, the trial court put Mother on notice of the following:

1. Each violation of the Orders of this Court subjects the Defendant to 10 days in jail and a fifty dollar ($50.00) fine. ^[2]. The Plaintiff seeks contempt sanctions for each failure listed in the pleadings. These allegations must be proven by Plaintiff beyond a reasonable doubt to subject [Mother] to being found guilty of contempt. ^[3]. You are entitled to bail throughout these proceedings. If found guilty of contempt, the Court shall enter an Order setting the punishment for each violation so found. Furthermore, the Defendant is put on notice that she has the following rights pursuant to Rule 42 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure: A. You have the right to be represented by counsel, and if you are unable to afford one, counsel shall be appointed for you. B. You have the right to have guilt proven against you beyond a reasonable doubt with the burden of proof being on the Petitioner. C. You have the right against self-incrimination, which includes the right to remain silent as to the allegations of criminal contempt filed against you. D. You have the right to a presumption of innocence until such time as the allegations of guilt are proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and E. You have all other rights afforded to any other individual charged with violation of a criminal statute except the right for a trial by jury.

Although the show cause order erroneously referenced the Rules of Civil Procedure in the title, the body of the order sets forth the pertinent provisions of Rule 42 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and gave Mother notice of her rights under Rule 42. At the hearing, Mother took advantage of the rights afforded to her under Rule 42 by invoking her Fifth Amendment right not to answer questions that might incriminate her. Moreover, although the order did not detail the specific acts of contempt alleged, the amended motion for contempt filed on December 16, 2015 and served on Mother through her attorney specifies the three incidents of contempt, as will be discussed below.

We find no merit in Mother’s arguments that she did not receive adequate notice of the criminal contempt motion or the show cause order.

B. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt

Convictions for criminal contempt are punitive in nature, and “their primary purpose is to vindicate the court’s authority.” Long v. McAllister-Long, 221 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); see also Thigpen v. Thigpen, 874 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Gunn v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 296 S.W.2d 843, 844 (Tenn. 1956)). A person charged with criminal contempt enjoys a presumption of innocence and must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Long, 221 S.W.3d at 13 (citing Black v. Blount, 938 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Tenn. 1996)). A person found guilty of criminal contempt may be imprisoned for up to ten days for each offense, fined $50, or both. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 9-103; Thigpen, 874 S.W.2d at 53. Sanctions for criminal contempt are imposed for no reason other than punishment, so a person imprisoned for contempt cannot win freedom by complying with the court’s order. Long, 221 S.W.3d at 12-13 (citing Robinson v. Fulliton, 140 S.W.3d 304, 310 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)).

Once a person is convicted of criminal contempt, he or she loses the presumption of innocence and must overcome the presumption of guilt on appeal. Thigpen, 874 S.W.2d at 53. “‘Appellate courts do not review the evidence in a light favorable to the accused and will reverse criminal contempt convictions only when the evidence is insufficient to support the trier-of-fact’s finding of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Moody v. Hutchison, 159 S.W.3d 15, 25 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Barber v. Chapman, No. M2003-00378-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 343799, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2004)).

There are three elements to criminal contempt: “‘(1) a court order, (2) the defendant’s violation of that order, and (3) proof that the defendant willfully violated that order.’” Pruitt v. Pruitt, 293 S.W.3d 537, 545 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Foster v. Foster, No. M2006-01277-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4530813, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2007)). In the context of criminal contempt, willfulness requires that an act be “‘done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids.’” Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 357 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting State v. Braden, 867 S.W.2d 750, 761 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)); see also In re Carolina M., M2014-02133-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 6427853, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2016) (stating that “[w]illfulness, in the context of criminal contempt, requires both (1) intentional conduct, and (2) a culpable state of mind”).

The trial court found Mother guilty of three acts of criminal contempt alleged to have occurred on July 31, 2015, November 7, 2015, and November 18, 2015. With respect to November 7, 2015, Father made the following allegations in his amended motion for criminal contempt:

Mother refused Father’s visitation on November 7, 2015. The Mother advised Father that she would not allow him visitation on this date because she had plans. The Father had not agreed to forgo his visitation with the minor child nor had the Mother consulted him prior to her denial of the Father’s visitation with the minor child. The Defendant willfully violated section 1 of the Agreed Temporary Parenting Plan Order on November 7, 2015.

At the hearing, Mother stated that she and her boyfriend went to the Dixie Stampede on November 7, 2015, a Saturday. She further testified:

Q. And do you recall having a discussion about having plans with Mr.

Howell? A. Yes. Q. And he said what? A. He said okay. And I told him you can get her another Sunday or throughout the week to make up the visit. He said okay. Q. Did you have any reason to believe when Mr. Howell said okay that he really was not in agreement with that? A. No, because I didn’t think—he wasn’t okay—he was okay with it at the time, but then when he found out what we were doing and who we were doing it with, then that’s when he got mad about it, because I didn’t tell him we had plans to go to Dixie Stampede. I just said, hey, we have plans on November 7th, and he said okay. Q. So it wasn’t until later that he then objected? A. Right.

Father gave the following pertinent testimony:

Q. You had said you missed a visit because Ms. Smithwick told you that she had plans and really she was at Dixie Stampede with her boyfriend? A. Right. Q. Did you ever ask her what her plans were? A. No. Q. Going to Dixie Stampede is having plans. A. Right. Q. Did you ever say no? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Did you say anything? A. I think I just said okay. Q. So if you said okay, is that not agreeing? A. Yes, it is.

Based upon the evidence that Father agreed for Mother to exercise parenting time on November 7, 2015, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding Mother in criminal contempt for deviating from the temporary parenting plan on that day.

The allegations regarding July 31, 2015 are that Mother willfully refused Father’s visitation as follows:

Father advised Mother that his designee would be receiving the child for this visitation as allowed by the order. His designee and approved child care provider, Ashley McCarter, who had a valid driver’s license, arrived at the designated time and place with proper equipment to transport the minor child. When Ms. McCarter arrived to pick up the child, not only was she denied the ability to leave with the child, but Mother attempted to instigate an altercation with Ms. McCarter and the Defendant’s mother, the maternal grandmother, vandalized Ms. McCarter’s vehicle. The Defendant willfully and intentionally violated the Agreed Temporary Parenting Plan Order, specifically section 1, section 5, and section 6 on July 31, 2015.

Similarly, with respect to November 18, 2015, the amended motion for criminal contempt alleges that Mother delayed Father’s visitation time in the following manner:

The Father’s designee and approved child care provider, his mother, Patricia Spraker, was to pick the child up at the designated place and time. Patricia Spraker had a valid driver’s license and proper equipment to transport the minor child on November 18, 2015. When Patricia Spraker contacted Mother prior to the pickup, Mother advised the paternal grandmother she would not be at the location to exchange the child. Mother did not allow Father to begin visitation this day until 4:00 p.m. absent agreement with the Petitioner. The Defendant willfully violated section 1, section 5, and section 6 on November 18, 2015.

Section one of the agreed temporary parenting plan order, referenced in Father’s motion for criminal contempt, sets forth the parenting schedule. Section five provides that the receiving parent or his or her designee “will transport the child for visitation, so long as the transporting individual has a valid driver’s license and proper equipment for transport of a child this age.” Section six states that “approved child care providers while child is in Father’s care [are] Ashley McCarter, Trina Howell, or Patricia Spraker.” Mother attempts to justify her actions on July 31 and November 18, 2015 by emphasizing that Father’s work schedule had changed, that his girlfriend and mother were caring for the child for much of his parenting time, and that mediation should have occurred to change the parenting schedule. Mother argues that “[s]he understood that the mediated agreement was based upon times that the father could actually exercise his co-parenting time.”

Mother’s arguments are contrary to the actual language of the agreed temporary parenting plan, which explicitly provides for approved child care providers while in the other parent’s care. Moreover, the temporary parenting plan states that it “will be modified by agreement, mediation, or hearing upon Father obtaining different employment, Mother discontinuing breastfeeding, or October 1, 2015, whichever occurs first.” Thus, contrary to Mother’s position, mediation was not the only means for modification of the agreement. Furthermore, she had the option of requesting mediation, or a hearing, if she felt that modification was necessary. Until then, Mother was bound by the terms of the temporary parenting plan. We find no error in the trial court’s decision to find Mother in criminal contempt for her actions on July 31 and November 18, 2015.3

(2) Parenting Plan

Mother argues that the trial court erred in failing to adopt her proposed parenting schedule, pursuant to which Father would have six overnight visits every two weeks. Mother’s plan also required each parent to give the other parent the right of first refusal to keep the child in the event that the parent himself or herself could not personally care for the child for a period of four or more hours.^[4] Mother asserts, in particular, that the trial court failed to give proper consideration to the fact that she is still breastfeeding and to the parties’ employment schedules.

Trial courts have “broad discretion” to fashion parenting plans, as the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained:

Because decisions regarding parenting arrangements are factually driven and require careful consideration of numerous factors, Holloway v. Bradley, 190 Tenn. 565, 230 S.W.2d 1003, 1006 (1950); Brumit v. Brumit, 948 S.W.2d 739, 740 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), trial judges, who have the opportunity to observe the witnesses and make credibility determinations, are better positioned to evaluate the facts than appellate judges. Massey- Holt v. Holt, 255 S.W.3d 603, 607 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). Thus, determining the details of parenting plans is “peculiarly within the broad discretion of the trial judge.” Suttles v. Suttles, 748 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tenn. 1988) (quoting Edwards v. Edwards, 501 S.W.2d 283, 291 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973)). “It is not the function of appellate courts to tweak a [residential parenting schedule] in the hopes of achieving a more reasonable result than the trial court.” Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001). A trial court’s decision regarding the details of a residential parenting schedule should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court ... appl[ies] an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice.”

Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011).

Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 693 (Tenn. 2013). Thus, the Armbrister Court concluded, an appellate court will not find that a trial court has abused its discretion unless the trial court’s parenting arrangements “‘fall[ ] outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standards to the evidence found in the record.’” Id. (quoting Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001)).

On the breastfeeding issue, Mother objects to the following statements made by the trial court in the final order:

The Court has concerns about the Mother’s ability to facilitate a relationship with the Father as she testified that her relationship with the child is more important than the Father’s relationship with the child, and that she, the Mother, has custody of the child, and the Father only has visitation with the child, and the Mother’s sworn testimony that her relationship with the child was more important than the Father having a relationship with the child.

It should be noted that these statements were made in the context of the court’s analysis regarding changing the child’s surname, discussed below. Mother asserts that she explained her deposition testimony about being “more important” at the hearing:

Q. And you were asked [at her deposition] if you are more important of a parent and you testified yes. Why at this time or prior to this time did you think that? A. To sustain her life, she has to eat and she eats through me. Again, I’ve tried to feed her and she refuses. She’s very independent. She knows what she wants. Q. So the only reason for saying that is because you are her food source? A. Yes, I’m her food source. I feel like me and Trevor are—we love her equally. I know that he’s just as important as a parent than I am, but unfortunately, he can’t feed her breast milk.

Mother further testified that she had difficulty pumping breast milk, had developed numerous infections, and had been advised by her doctor to stop pumping. Mother argues that there was no medical proof that her breastfeeding regimen was inappropriate and that the trial court failed to give proper consideration to the fact that she is still breastfeeding the child.

In considering the best interest of the child and all of the statutory factors pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a), the trial court made the following finding: - 10 -

“Breastfeeding does not prohibit Father’s co-parenting time. The minor child is thirteen months old and has the ability to eat baby and solid foods as well as drink milk from a sippy cup.” The factual findings stated by the court are supported by the evidence.

Mother further asserts that the trial court failed to properly consider the parties’ work schedules. Citing In re Connor S.L., No. W2013-00668-COA-R3-JV, 2013 WL 5230258, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2013), she argues that she should have received more parenting time because of her greater availability. We disagree. Decisions regarding parenting time are “factually driven.” Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693. In In re Connor S.L., both parents worked; the mother’s job at the child’s day care allowed her to be more available for parenting time than the father, who had two jobs, would be. In re Connor S.L., 2013 WL 5230258, at[*11] . In the present case, Mother has chosen not to work in order to stay at home with the child; Father is working two jobs in an effort to support himself and the child. The trial court stated that, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(14), it took Father’s work schedule into account “in the formulation of the day to day co-parenting schedule.”

The trial court analyzed all of the other statutory factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) as follows:

a. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(1), the strength, nature, and stability of the child’s relationship with each parent: The Mother has performed most of the day to day parenting because of her own decision to restrict the Father’s co-parenting time. b. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(2)[,] each parent’s or caregiver’s past and potential for future performance of parenting responsibilities: the Mother is not attempting to facilitate a relationship with the Father. Based on a reading of the text messages exchanged between the parties and submitted as a collective exhibit to the Court, the Mother has a practice of limiting the Father’s co- parenting time due to reasons because it is cold outside to the Father cannot make up his visitation because the Mother said so. No proof was proffered as to any just reason to restrict the Father’s co-parenting time. The Court has concerns about the Mother’s ability to foster a relationship between the child and the Father. c. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(3), refusal to attend a court ordered parent education seminar: while not a factor for ruling as no parenting class was previously ordered, both parents shall complete a parenting class within sixty days. . . . d. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(4), the disposition of each parent to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, education and other necessary care: Both parents are willing and able

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to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, education and other necessary care. e. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(5), the degree to which a parent has been the primary caregiver: the Mother has been the primary caregiver since the child’s birth and the Court takes this into consideration. f. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(6), the love, affection, and emotional ties existing between each parent and the child: The child is bonded with both parents. This is not a determining factor. g. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(7), the emotional needs and developmental level of the child: The child is developing well and maximization of co-parenting should occur . . . for the emotional and developmental needs of the child. h. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(9), the child’s interaction and interrelationships with siblings, other relatives and step-relatives, and mentors, as well as the child’s involvement with the child’s physical surroundings, school, or other significant activities: The child has a sibling, a half-brother, and this relationship needs to be fostered. Further, both parents have extended family and the child needs as much contact with extended family as possible to foster those relationships. i. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(10), [t]he importance of continuity in the child’s life and the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment: The child is young, being thirteen months old, and while the Mother has been the primary residential parent, the child will adapt to the co-parenting schedule. j. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(11), evidence of physical or emotional abuse . . . . There has been no evidence as to any abuse. k. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(12), the character and behavior of any other person who resides in or frequents the home of a parent and such person’s interactions with the child: There are no concerns in either of the parent’s homes. The only concern is the Mother’s lack of knowledge of her boyfriend’s history of drug abuse. A reasonable parent would fully inform themselves regarding the drug abuse history of a paramour, if not for current concerns, but to know what to look for in the future. l. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(13), the reasonable preference of the child if twelve (12) years of age or older: This factor does not apply. .... n. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(8), the moral, physical, mental and emotional fitness of each parent as it relates to their ability to parent the child: There are no concerns with either parent’s fitness - 12 - as a parent.

The trial court found that Father “is a good parent and shows a willingness to co- parent.” Therefore, the court stated, “Co-parenting time with the Father, by law, should be maximized.” The trial court concluded that, “It is in the best interest of the minor child that the Father immediately have overnights with the child but that the extended periods of overnight be on a graduated plan.”

We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to adopt the parenting schedule proposed by Mother and in adopting the parenting schedule incorporated in the final order. Under the permanent parenting plan enacted by the trial court, each parent has equal parenting time and an equal number of overnight visits, but the regular parenting time is staggered so that the child is never away from either parent for more than three days. The trial court considered all of the relevant statutory factors and entered a parenting plan that does not “‘fall[ ] outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standards to the evidence found in the record.’” Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693 (quoting Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 88).5

(3) Temporary Child Support

The agreed temporary parenting plan order entered by the trial court on May 21, 2015, based upon the parties’ agreement reached in mediation, provides: “Father shall pay child support in the amount of $300.00 per month to Mother . . . , beginning in June, with no arrearage owing. Parties agree that this amount is correct as a deviation from the guidelines given Father’s time with the child.” Mother asserts that the trial court erred in