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Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984
2005
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Jordan v. Redmond
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
CONCLUSION Many creditors have sought non-dischargeability of a debt based solely on a prior judgment; many creditors have been denied that relief on stronger evidence than what Jordan has presented here.11 Frustrating as it may be for creditors, succeeding on a determination of non- 11 See In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir. 1984) (state court jury finding of conversion with punitive damages was not preclusive of the issue of willful and malicious injury); In re Uku, 658 B.R. 812 , 816-18 (Bankr.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Loucks v. Smith (In re Smith)
Miller v. Held (In re Held), 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re the Liquidation of Integrity Insurance
Therefore, the collateral estoppel analysis focuses on the scope of the prior federal adjudication' — that is, whether “the issue at stake is identical to the one involved in the prior litigation.” In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Tri-State Water Rights Litigation
In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Metropolitan Steel, Inc. v. Halversen (In Re Halversen)
According to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, three elements must be present in order for collateral estoppel to apply to the prior decision: “(1) the issue at stake must be identical to the one involved in the prior litigation; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the prior litigation; and (3) the determination of the issue in the prior litigation must have been a critical and necessary part of the judgment in that earlier action.” In re Halpern, 810 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir.1987)(quoting In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Spiwak (In Re Spiwak)
In re Halpern, 810 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir.1987) (citing In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Biscayne Investment Group, Ltd.
Balbirer v. Austin, 790 F.2d 1524, 1526-27 (11th Cir.1986); In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984); Raiford, II v. Abney, 695 F.2d 521, 523 (11th Cir.1983).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Fowler v. Jenkins (In Re Jenkins)
In re Cecchini, 780 F.2d 1440 , 1443 (9th Cir.1986) (citing In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629-30 (11th Cir.1984)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dement v. Gunnin (In Re Gunnin)
Ptnrshp. v. Bilzerian, 100 F.3d at 892 (where collateral estoppel applied to a claim under § 523(a)(2)(A)); Yanks, 931 F.2d at 43 ; Latch, 820 F.2d at 1166 (where collateral estoppel applied to a claim under § 523(a)(6)); Held, 734 F.2d at 629 (where the court found that collateral estoppel did not apply to a claim under § 523(a)(6), because the jury could have awarded punitive damages based on either willfulness or recklessness).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Bova v. United States (In Re Bova)
In re Halpern, 810 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir.1987), citing In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McAlister v. Slosberg (In Re Slosberg)
No. 95-595, p. 365 (1977), and the lower courts have repeatedly noted that legislative decision, see Johnson v. Miera (In re Miera), 926 F.2d 741, 744 (8th *18 Cir.1991); Miller v. Held (In re Held), 734 F.2d 628, 629-30 (11th Cir.1984); Kelt v. Quezada (In re Quezada), 718 F.2d 121, 122-23 (5th Cir. 1983); Hayduk v. Page (In re Page), 197 B.R. 61, 64 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1996); Night Kitchen Music v. Pineau (In re Pineau), 141 B.R. 522 , 526 & n. 19 (Bankr.D.Me. 1992), reversed on other grounds Knight Kitchen Music v. Pineau (In re Pineau), 149 B.R. 239 (D.Me.1993); Denehy v. Zalowski (In re Zalow…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bundy American Corp. v. Blankfort (In Re Blankfort)
Several other circuit courts have followed the Eighth Circuit formulation in In re Long, 774 F.2d 875, 880-81 (8th Cir.1985), which said that the word malice “must apply only to conduct more culpable than that which is in reckless disregard of creditors’ economic interest,” and that “knowledge that legal rights are being violated is insufficient to establish malice, absent some additional ‘aggravated circumstances,’ under Davis [v. Aetna Acceptance Co. 293 U.S. 328, 328, 333 , 55 S.Ct. 151, 151, 153-54 , 79 L.Ed. 393 (1934)] and its recent progeny.” See In re Pasek, 983 F.2d 1524…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rupert v. Krautheimer (In Re Krautheimer)
See In re Pasek, 983 F.2d 1524, 1527 (10th Cir.1993); Hartley, 869 F.2d at 395 ; Reynolds-Marshall v. Hallum, 162 B.R. 51, 55 (D.Me.1993); In re Whitner, 179 B.R. 699, 702 (Bankr.E.D.Okl.1995); cf. In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 630 (11th Cir.1984).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Mickle v. United States (In Re Mickle)
In re Halpern, 810 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir.1987), citing In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Mickle v. United States (In re Mickle)
In re Halpern, 810 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir.1987), citing In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Shelton v. Steering Federal Credit Union
See H.R.Rep., No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5963, 6320-21; In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 630 (11th Cir.1984) (A conversion done without a conscious intent to violate the rights of another or under a mistake or misapprehension is dischargeable even though done recklessly.) In summary, the bankruptcy court misconstrued the requirement of section 523(a)(6) that a conversion of secured property be both willful and malicious before it would result in nondischargeability.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Sims v. Morris (In Re Morris)
See Halpern v. First Georgia Bank (In re Halpern), 810 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir.1987); Miller v. Held (In re Held), 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Sunshine Jr. Stores, Inc.
See Hoskins v. Yanks (In re Yanks), 931 F.2d 42 , 43 n. 1 (11th Cir.1991); Halpern v. First Georgia Bank (In re Halpern), 810 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir.1987); Miller v. Held (In re Held), 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984); Chang v. Daniels (In re Daniels), 91 B.R. 981 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1988).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Celotex Corp. v. AIU Insurance (In Re Celotex Corp.)
See Hoskins v. Yanks (In re Yanks), 931 F.2d 42 , 43 n. 1 (11th Cir.1991); Halpern, 810 F.2d at 1064 ; Miller v. Held (In re Held), 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984); see also Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 939 F.2d 1472 (11th Cir.1991).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Freer v. Weinstein (In Re Weinstein)
E.g., Bender v. Tobman (In re Tobman), 107 B.R. 20, 23-24 (S.D.N.Y.1989); see, e.g., Langanella v. Braen (In re Braen), 900 F.2d 621 , 628 (3d Cir.1990); Miller v. Held (In re Held), 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984); see generally IB MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.409 (James Wm.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Price v. Gaslowitz (In Re Price)
Miller v. Held (In re Held), 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Walters v. Betts (In Re Betts)
See Halpern v. First Georgia Bank (In re Halpern), 810 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir.1987); Miller v. Held (In re Held), 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Adams v. Zentz (In Re Zentz)
Cassidy v. Minihan, 794 F.2d 340, 344 (8th Cir.1986) (“Congress intended to bar the discharge of intentionally inflicted injuries_ Mini- *149 han’s conduct reflected, at most, reckless disregard for the risks involved”); Miller v. Held (In re Held), 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984) (“by adopting the requirement that the conversion be willful and malicious, Congress expressly overruled prior case law that had refused discharge-ability when the conversion occurred innocently or recklessly”); L.D.J. v. L.F.S.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Bybee v. Geer (In Re Geer)
In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Scarfone v. Arabian American Oil Co. (In Re Scarfone)
See Hoskins v. Yanks (In re Yanks), 931 F.2d 42 , 43 n. 1 (11th Cir.1991); Halpern v. First Georgia Bank (In re Halpern), 810 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir.1987); Miller v. Held (In re Held), 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984); Deweese v. Town of Palm Beach, 688 F.2d 731, 733 (11th Cir.1982).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,972 in Re Barry Stephens Yanks, Debtor. Martha Hoskins v. Barry Stephens Yanks
In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984) (quoting Deweese v. Town of Palm Beach, 688 F.2d 731, 733 (11th Cir.1982)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Radle v. Allstate Insurance
In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Blashke v. Standard (In Re Standard)
Halpern v. First Georgia Bank (In re Halpern), 810 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir.1987) (quoting Miller v. Held (In re Held), 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Cain v. Whitley (In re Whitley)
In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jameson v. Reynolds (In Re Reynolds)
In re Halpern, 810 F.2d at 1064 ; In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Yellowstone Valley Properties v. Eames (In re Eames)
See e.g., In re Franklin, 726 F.2d 606 , 610 (10th Cir.1984) (“‘willful and malicious” requires the intentional doing of an act which leads to injury’); In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629-30 (11th Cir.1984) (a finding of recklessness does not resolve the § 523(a)(6) inquiry); Matter of Quezada 718 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir.1983) (‘“willful” means deliberate, a-deliberate and intentional act which necessarily leads to injury’); Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 704 F.2d 241, 245 (5th Cir.1983) (without just cause or excuse).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Herko v. Alba (In re Alba)
The requirements for collateral estoppel were set forth by the Court In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984) which stated: “The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue if three requirements are met: (1) that the issue at stake be identical to the one involved in the prior litigation; (2) that the issue have been actually litigated in the prior litigation; and (3) that the determination of the issue in the prior litigation have been a critical and necessary part of the judgment in that earlier action.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Worrell v. Grim (In Re Grim)
In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984); In re Mueller, 34 B.R. 869 (Bankr.D.Colo.1983).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Pichardo Ex Rel. Pichardo v. Granda (In Re Granda)
Miller v. Held (In re Held), 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
McNierney v. McNierney (In Re McNierney)
In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 630 (11th Cir.1984).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Singer Island Hotel, Ltd.
In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bear, Stearns & Co. v. Powell (In Re Powell)
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
In re Halpern, 810 F.2d at 1064 ; In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Hoskins v. Yanks (In Re Yanks)
Miller v. Held (In re Held), 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Shaver Motors, Inc. v. Mills (In Re Mills)
Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1442, citing In re Franklin, 726 F.2d 606, 610 (10th Cir.1984); In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629-30 (11th Cir.1984); Matter of Quezada, 718 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir.1983); Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 704 F.2d 241, 245 (5th Cir.1983).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Leeb v. Guy (In Re Guy)
Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1442, citing In re Franklin, 726 F.2d 606 , 610 (10th Cir.1984); In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629-30 (11th Cir.1984); Matter of Quezada, 718 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir.1983); Seven Elves Inc. v. Eskenazi, 704 F.2d 241, 245 (5th Cir.1983).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Epic Realty Services, Inc. v. Turner (In re Turner)
However, collateral estoppel is applicable in such cases to bar the relitigation of facts which are relevant here if three requirements are met: “(1) that the issue at stake be identical to the one involved in the prior litigation; (2) that the issue have been actually litigated in the prior litigation; and (3) that the determination of the issue in the pri- or litigation have been a critical and necessary part of the judgment in that earlier action.” In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Kenneth Earl Latch, Helen Doris Latch, Debtors. Sunco Sales, Inc. v. Kenneth Earl Latch, Helen Doris Latch
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
This case is thus distinguished from In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 630 (11th Cir.1984), in which we held that a state court award of punitive damages in a conversion action did not end the inquiry into the question of the “willful and malicious injury” element.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jones v. Wilson (In Re Wilson)
Id. at 1064 , citing, In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Howard I. Halpern, Debtor. Howard I. Halpern v. First Georgia Bank
In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir. 1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Peter J. Wrenn, Debtor. American Cast Iron Pipe Company v. Peter J. Wrenn
Miller v. Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629-30 (11th Cir.1984); Barclays American/Business Credit, Inc. v. Long, 774 F.2d 875, 881 (8th Cir.1985); Farmers Insurance Group v. Compos, 768 F.2d 1155, 1157 (10th Cir.1985); Kelt v. Quesada, 718 F.2d 121 , 122-23 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1217 , 104 S.Ct. 2662 , 81 L.Ed.2d 368 (1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gerald Balbirer, Norman Brainin v. Jack Austin, B.J. Apparel Corporation v. Jack Austin
The basic test for collateral estoppel or issue preclusion was recently articulated by this court in In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984): The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue if three requirements are met: (1) that the issue at stake be identical to the one involved in the prior litigation; (2) that the issue have been actually litigated. in the prior litigation; and (3) that the determination of the issue in the prior litigation have been a critical *1527 and necessary part of the judgment in that earlier action.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
M.P. Industries, Inc. v. Holzman (In re Holzman)
Miller v. Held (In re Held), 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Carbajo v. Aviles (In re Aviles)
It is clear, however, since the enactment in 1978 of the present Code that: “Congress expressly overruled prior caselaw that had refused dischargeability when the conversion occurred innocently or recklessly.” In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir.1984).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Sunco Sales, Inc. v. Latch
In Re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 630 (11th Cir.1984).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In Re Jack David HELD, Debtor. Ann F. MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Jack David HELD, Defendant-Appellee. in Re Robert Ray HELD, Debtor. Ann F. MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert Ray HELD, Defendant-Appellee
v.
Jack David HELD, Defendant-Appellee. in Re Robert Ray HELD, Debtor. Ann F. MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert Ray HELD, Defendant-Appellee
83-3583, 83-3584.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jun 18, 1984.
Elihu H. Berman, Clearwater, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant in both cases., Frank Quesada, Clearwater, Fla., for defendants-appellees.
Godbold, Ro-Ney, Tjoflat.
Cited by 107 opinions | Published
GODBOLD, Chief Judge:
Defendants were pawnbrokers who operated B.E.Z. pawnshop. Plaintiff obtained a loan from defendants by either pledging her jewelry or selling it with an option to repurchase. Defendants converted plaintiffs jewelry. Plaintiff then sued defendants in state court for conversion. The jury awarded her $35,000 in compensatory damages and $37,000 in punitive damages. Defendants filed for bankruptcy thereafter.
Plaintiff brought this action in the bankruptcy court requesting a determination that the state court judgment was not dis-chargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1982), which excepts from dischargeability debts “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.” The court found that Jack Held disposed of the jewelry in good faith under the mistaken assumption that his agreement with plaintiff justified his actions. The court thus held that this debt was discharged. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff argues that the bankruptcy court ignored the collateral estoppel effect of the state court judgment for plaintiff on conversion and the accompanying award of punitive damages. She contends that the state jury’s award of punitive damages necessarily included a finding that the conversion was willful and malicious, which would except the debt from dischargeability under § 523(a)(6).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue if three requirements are met:
(1) that the issue at stake be identical to the one involved in the prior litigation; (2) that the issue have been actually litigated in the prior litigation; and (3) that the determination of the issue in the pri- or litigation have been a critical and necessary part of the judgment in that earlier action.
Deweese v. Town of Palm Beach, 688 F.2d 731, 733 (11th Cir.1982).
Although the plaintiff raised the issue of willfulness in the state court proceeding, the award of punitive damages does not necessarily include a finding that defendants acted willfully and maliciously. The state court charged the jury that it could award punitive damages if the acts of the defendants “were willful or showed a reckless indifference to the rights of the plaintiff.” (emphasis added). The jury might have based its verdict on recklessness.
A finding of recklessness does not resolve the § 523(a)(6) inquiry. In fact, by adopting the requirement that the conversion be willful and malicious, Congress expressly overruled prior caselaw that had refused dischargeability when the conversion occurred innocently or recklessly. See H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 365[*630] (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5787, 5963, 6320-21 (“reckless disregard” standard of Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902), and progeny, which refused dis-chargeability to conversions recklessly done, overruled); see also 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 523.16[3] (L. King 15th ed. 1984) (conversion without conscious intent to violate rights of another or under mistake or misapprehension is dischargeable even though debtor acted recklessly). Since the state court award of punitive damages did not necessarily decide the question of willfullness and malice, principles of collateral estoppel did not preclude the bankruptcy court from considering whether the conversion was willful and intentional under § 523(a)(6) so as to deny dischargeability to the judgment. Upon considering this question the bankruptcy court found that the conversion was not willful or malicious and that defendants acted in a good faith though mistaken belief that their agreement with plaintiff authorized their actions. These findings are not clearly erroneous. [1]
AFFIRMED.
1
. Since the court correctly found the debt from Jack Held to plaintiff dischargeable, we need not decide whether the district court erred in dismissing the complaint against his brother Robert seeking a determination of nondis-chargeability based on the vicarious liability of Robert for his partner Jack’s actions.