PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of felonious assault, MCL 750.82. Defendant was sentenced, as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 4 to 15 years’ imprisonment. We affirm.

On appeal, defendant claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. We disagree.

“Whether a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law.” People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 187; 891 NW2d 255 (2016), citing People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). “Generally, a trial court’s findings of fact, if any, are reviewed for clear error, and questions of law are reviewed de novo.” Solloway, 316 Mich App at 188 (citation omitted). However, where defendant did not move for a new trial or a Ginther1 hearing, and a factual record was not created concerning defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “this Court’s review is limited to mistakes apparent on the lower court record.” Id. (citation and footnote omitted).

“Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise.” People v Lockett, 295 Mich App 165, 187; 814 NW2d 295 (2012) (citation omitted). When claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, it is defendant’s burden to prove “(1) counsel’s performance was deficient, meaning it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) but for counsel’s error, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of . . . defendant’s trial would have been different.” Solloway, 316 Mich App at 188 (citations omitted). “[D]efendant has the burden of establishing the factual predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel[.]” People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999).

Trial counsel’s performance is evaluated by an objective standard of reasonableness and without the benefit of hindsight. People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 188, 190; 774 NW2d 714 (2009). “[D]efendant must overcome the strong presumption that [trial] counsel’s performance” resulted from sound trial strategy. People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 52; 826 NW2d 136 (2012) (citation omitted). “A particular strategy does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel simply because it does not work.” People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 61; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).

Defendant first argues that trial counsel’s assistance was constitutionally deficient where a “trial stipulation” was not admitted during trial. The stipulation provided, in pertinent part, as follows: admitted for an improper purpose in contravention of MRE 404(b)(1). As defendant was convicted, we recognize that trial counsel’s trial strategy was ultimately unsuccessful. However, although a trial strategy may fall short, it does not necessarily amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Matuszak, 263 Mich App at 61. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Solloway, 316 Mich App at 188.

Finally, defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Allen with his prior convictions related to theft. See MRE 609. As noted above, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the existing lower court record. Solloway, 316 Mich App at 188. Moreover, decisions regarding how to cross-examine witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy. In re Ayres, 239 Mich App 8, 23; 608 NW2d 132 (1999). During cross- examination, trial counsel inquired of Allen whether “[w]ithin the last ten years,” Allen had been convicted of any crimes dealing with theft or dishonesty. In response, Allen stated, “I don’t remember.” Defendant has attached to his brief on appeal a copy of Allen’s offender profile under the Offender Tracking Information System (OTIS), which confirms that Allen had several theft-related prior convictions. However, defendant simply has not overcome the presumption that trial counsel’s choice not to pursue the admission of Allen’s prior convictions was sound trial strategy. Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 52. Specifically, trial counsel may have surmised that some or all of Allen’s convictions did not meet the requirements of MRE 609 or that the trial court would not allow the evidence of the prior convictions. The trial took place September 14, through September 16, 2015. Under MRE 609(c), the time limit is ten years from the LATER OF the date of conviction or the date of release from confinement. Therefore the convictions could go back to September 14, through September 16, 2005. The offense also has to be punishable by “in excess of one year or death” under MRE 609(a)(2)(A). According to OTIS (Offender Tracking Information System), there are only two offenses that would be admissible to be used against the victim:

Sentence 1: Larceny, MCL 750.356(3)(a) (max 3 years, discharged 10/08/2009)

Sentence 5: B&E vehicle, MCL 750.356a(2)(c)(i) (max 3 years 3 mos, discharged 08/31/2009)

“Sentence 5” was imposed in 2004, and “Sentence 1” was imposed on the date the victim was discharged for “Sentence 5”, so it was clearly intended to be consecutive. Therefore, if the victim was asked about “convictions” and interpreted that as the date he was convicted rather than discharged, ONLY Larceny would fit the actual question. The victim’s lack of recollection is not implausible.

Further, we observe that trial counsel did strenuously attack Allen’s credibility, and his recollection of the events of April 17, 2014, during cross-examination and closing argument. Thus, even without referring specifically to Allen’s prior convictions, trial counsel thoroughly challenged Allen’s credibility. At one point, trial counsel went so far as to ask Allen if he understood the need to testify in a completely truthful manner, and if Allen understood what perjury was. Accordingly, defendant’s claim that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness is without merit.^[3]

Affirmed.

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh /s/ Amy Ronayne Krause