Rita Garcia-Perez v. Jefferson Sessions, 702 F. App'x 622 (9th Cir. 2017). · Go Syfert
Rita Garcia-Perez v. Jefferson Sessions, 702 F. App'x 622 (9th Cir. 2017). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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Rita Bety GARCIA-PEREZ, Petitioner,
v.
Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent
14-73276.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Nov 17, 2017.
702 F. App'x 622
Ramin Ghashghaei, Attorney, Attorney at Law, Los Angeles, CA, Dennis James Eoffe, Attorney, Law Office of Dennis Eoffe, Alhambra, CA, for Petitioner, Virginia Gordon, Esquire, Trial Attorney, OIL, Tim Ramnitz, Trial Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office, of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent
Nguyen, Hurwitz, Logan.
Unpublished  |  Agency

MEMORANDUM ***

Rita Bety Garcia-Perez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing her appeal from a decision by an Immigration Judge (IJ) denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

1.Substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion that the untimely filing of Garcia’s asylum application was not excused by “extraordinary circumstances.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). Contrary to her assertions, Garcia received sufficient notice of the one-year asylum bar and evidentiary burden to show extraordinary circumstances both through the asylum application instructions and Notice to Appear.

2. Substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion that Garcia failed to establish a nexus between her claimed persecution and a statutorily protected ground. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b), 1231(b)(3). [1] Substantial evidence also supported the BIA’s conclusion that Garcia had not proved that threats against her were motivated by her political opinion instead of gang members’ desire to increase their own power and influence.

3. Substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion that Garcia had not demonstrated that her feared persecution would rise to the level of torture, an “extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment.” Zhou v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 860, 871 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence also supported the BIA’s determination that Garcia had not shown the Salvadoran government’s acquiescence in any threatened torture. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).

PETITION DENIED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. Garcia's opening brief raises for the first time an argument that threats to her child were gender discrimination. Because this argument was not raised before the agency, we lack jurisdiction to consider it, See Sola v. Holder, 720 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).