¹ Appellant and J.B. are the biological parents of E.B. Appellant and M.S. are the parents of S.S.-1 and S.S.-2. Neither J.B. nor M.S. are involved in this appeal. Furthermore, M.S. did not participate during the trial court proceedings. ATHENS, 17CA44 2 “THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION AWARDING PERMANENT CUSTODY OF S.S.-(1), S.S.-(2), AND E.B. TO ATHENS COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.” SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO ATHENS COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES WHERE THE RECORD PLAINLY REVEALS THAT PLACEMENT WITH MATERNAL GRANDMOTHER WAS NEVER ACTUALLY CONSIDERED.” {¶ 2} In March 2014, appellee filed neglect and dependency complaints concerning the three children. The complaints alleged that the oldest child, S.S.-1, had been missing school and that appellant has substance abuse issues. Subsequently, the trial court adjudicated the children dependent, dismissed the neglect allegations and granted appellee protective supervision over the children. {¶ 3} Over the next two years, appellant engaged in some case planning services, but did not successfully conquer her drug addiction. She was also unable to maintain a safe residence for the children. Thus, on May 9, 2016, the trial court placed the children in appellee’s temporary custody. Appellee placed the three children with K.B., E.B.’s paternal grandmother. {¶ 4} Approximately one year later, appellee filed a motion to modify the disposition to permanent custody. Appellee alleged that the children cannot be placed with their parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with their parents, that S.S.-1 and S.S.-2's father abandoned them, and that the children have been in ACCS’s temporary custody for at least twelve of the past twenty-two consecutive months. Appellee further asserted that placing the children in its permanent custody would serve the children’s best interest. ATHENS, 17CA44 3 {¶ 5} At the permanent custody hearing, Andrea Bobo, the two oldest children’s school principal during the 2016-2017 school year, testified that before appellee obtained temporary custody of the children, she attempted to work with appellant on the children’s truancy and behavioral issues. Bobo stated that appellant was not consistently responsive and that appellant’s “communication was very inconsistent.” Bobo explained that sometimes appellant would be “very * * * combative and argumentative” and other times Bobo could not contact appellant. {¶ 6} Bobo testified that the children’s truancy and tardiness issues caused transition difficulties for the children and disrupted their routines. Bobo related that the children benefitted from routine. Bobo stated that even when the children’s maternal grandmother was available to assist appellant, the children still had truancy issues, but were “less significant.” {¶ 7} Bobo additionally indicated that the children’s “[h]ygiene was a huge concern [and] * * * there certainly were a lot of signs that indicated * * * that there was some neglect occurring.” She stated that the children had head lice and that S.S.-1 had a large boil on her leg that “had obviously gone unattended for quite some time and she was having difficulty walking.” Bobo further revealed that the children had dental problems, but did not elaborate on the nature of the problems. {¶ 8} Bobo explained that once the children were removed from appellant’s custody and placed with K.B., their overall hygiene improved, they were always clean, they received proper dental care, and they consistently attended school. She additionally stated that K.B. is receptive, attends conferences, is very involved at school, and brings the children to school functions. {¶ 9} Bobo indicated that S.S.-1’s consistent attendance alleviated her transition issues, ATHENS, 17CA44 4 and that although S.S.-2 initially showed improvement, his behaviors declined after the holidays when his routine was disrupted. Bobo further stated that S.S.-2’s behavior continued to decline toward the end of the school year when J.B. apparently had been staying at K.B.’s house. {¶ 10} Appellant’s drug and alcohol counselor, Jessica Frost, testified that in August 2016, she began to work with appellant. Frost explained that appellant’s “treatment plan includes establishing and maintaining sobriety, well-being coping skills, and identifying and working toward goals that will better herself.” Frost related that through her discussions with appellant regarding substance abuse, appellant places blame on “her environment [and the] people around her.” Frost testified that part of her discussion regarding coping skills involved “eliminating toxic people in [appellant’s] life.” Frost stated that appellant identified J.B. as a “toxic” person in her life. Frost also revealed that appellant’s identified goal is to attend school in the fall of 2017. {¶ 11} Frost indicated that although appellant had periods of non-attendance, appellant recently had been attending the majority of her weekly individual and group appointments. Frost further explained that during the earlier stages of appellant’s treatment, appellant appeared “minimally engaged in treatment” or “minimally compliant” with treatment. Frost additionally stated, however, that appellant continued to test positive for “THC, buprenorphine, and methamphetamine” and that her continued drug use would render appellant “noncompliant.” {¶ 12} Frost further testified that in August 2016, appellant was discharged from the “Medication Assisted Therapy” program because the doctor wanted appellant to obtain “a proof of pregnancy before prescribing her any medication and [appellant] did not follow-up.” Frost related that appellant takes Suboxone, even though appellant does not have a prescription for it. ATHENS, 17CA44 5 Frost testified that she discussed Vivitrol with appellant and stated that it has “always been an option.” Frost explained that appellant tried to engage in the Vivitrol program, but the program had a ninety-day waiting period before it would accept appellant. Thus, appellant did not start the Vivitrol program and Frost speculated that appellant “just lost enthusiasm by the time the 90-day period was up.” {¶ 13} When appellee’s counsel asked Frost if appellant has made progress maintaining her sobriety, Frost stated that she did not “feel like [she could] answer that.” Frost did indicate, however, that appellant has not made “substantial” progress with her coping skills and has not attained her number one goal to maintain sobriety. {¶ 14} Frost further revealed that appellant’s continued drug use concerns her and that she would like appellant to complete an inpatient treatment program because an inpatient treatment would give appellant “a chance to have a healthy environment. To work on what she needs for sober living skills.” Frost indicated that she discussed inpatient treatment with appellant “in passing,” but she has not yet proposed it as a formal recommendation. Frost related that appellant did not seem willing to consider inpatient treatment. {¶ 15} K.B., J.B.’s mother, testified that J.B. and appellant lived in her home after E.B.’s birth. She explained that appellant left “a couple of different times * * * and stayed at My Sister’s Place for a period of time.” K.B. indicated that after appellant left My Sister’s Place, appellant returned to K.B.’s home “briefly,” and then stayed with appellant’s mother. K.B. stated that after that point, the children alternated between her house and appellant’s mother’s house. K.B. related that there was “lots of back and forth.” {¶ 16} K.B. stated that in April 2015, appellant and J.B. obtained an apartment and the ATHENS, 17CA44 6 family lived together for approximately one year before appellee obtained temporary custody. K.B. testified that “most of the time,” the apartment “was cluttered, dirty, [and] unkept.” K.B. explained that she “was always concerned that [the children] weren’t being cared for as they should be. They just weren’t really taken care of properly.” {¶ 17} K.B. related that the three children have lived in her home since April 2016, when appellee obtained temporary custody. She stated that when the children entered her care, S.S.-1 and S.S.-2 displayed behavioral issues. K.B. explained that S.S.-1 “had a mom [sic] complex * * * where she wants to be very independent,” “does not really want to be told what to do,” “has a hard time not getting her own way in things,” and “likes to be in charge and kind of take charge over the other two kids sometimes.” K.B. related that S.S.-2 “has some defiance issues” and “gets angry very quickly when he’s told that he can’t do something or can’t have something that he wants.” {¶ 18} K.B. stated that S.S.-1 and S.S.-2’s behaviors have gotten “[a] little bit” better since entering her home. K.B. indicated that both children undergo counseling to try to help with the behavioral issues. K.B. related that she “see[s] bits and pieces of progress.” She explained that S.S.-2’s “temper tantrums have lessened. He does still have them but they’re not as frequent.” K.B. stated that S.S.-1 “has let go of that need for control somewhat. It’s still there a little bit but she’s learning also to relax a little bit more and just be a kid." K.B. believes the structure she has provided the children has helped them progress. K.B. testified that she is willing to keep the children and that she would allow appellant and J.B. to visit the children “as often as possible.” {¶ 19} K.B. recognized that the children still “have a desire to be with their mom,” but ATHENS, 17CA44 7 she further related that “overall,” “they are doing okay.” She explained that the children are healthy and “happy most of the time,” but “there’s a long way to go.” K.B. related that S.S.-1 has discussed living with appellant again, and once S.S.-1 mentions it, S.S.-2 "is right on board with her and wants that also." {¶ 20} K.B. stated that the children seem to enjoy visits with appellant. She explained: “[T]hey don’t necessarily want to leave” and have a “higher energy level,” because “they’ve had a good time with her.” K.B. additionally related that appellant calls the children “almost daily” and that S.S.-1 and S.S.-2 “look forward to being able to talk to [appellant].” {¶ 21} Appellant testified that for the past six months, she has lived in a camper located on her mother’s property. Before that, she lived at an apartment for approximately two years, but was evicted in March 2017 for nonpayment of rent. Appellant agrees that the apartment condition when she moved out “was pretty bad”; “[i]t was dirty and it had holes in the wall.” Appellee’s counsel asked appellant whether “there were issues with the cleanliness of the apartment during the entire time that [she] * * * lived at the apartment.” Appellant responded, “Technically I guess, yes.” Appellant claimed that the apartment “was decently clean” while the children lived in the home, but after their removal, the apartment became “disgusting.” Appellant explained that “[t]here was trash everywhere” and she “guess[es]” that “[t]here were also dog feces on the floor.” {¶ 22} Appellant knew that the children had truancy and tardiness issues when in her custody, and sometimes the children were late “because [she] was daily dosing at HRS.” Appellant stated that she did not “see how” their tardiness had “an impact on [them] and their success at school.” Appellant agreed, however, that the days they missed school could impact ATHENS, 17CA44 8 their school performance. {¶ 23} Appellant testified that she attends HRS every week for group and individual counseling. Appellant claimed that she attempted to get into the Suboxone program at HRS, but was not successful because: “I missed my period for like four months so I thought that I might be pregnant, and ended up just being a cyst on my ovary. I explained that to the doctor at HRS and he done [sic] a pregnancy test and it came back negative. He called me a liar and just didn’t see me anymore.” Appellant denied Frost’s assertion that appellant was supposed to follow up with some doctor appointments and denied that she was offered Vivitrol or that she tried to enter any Vivitrol programs. {¶ 24} Appellant admitted that some of her drug screens showed the presence of methamphetamine and that her screens “probably” also revealed Suboxone and THC. Appellant indicated that she last used methamphetamine approximately three weeks prior to her testimony, Suboxone the day before, and marijuana a couple of weeks before. Appellant explained that although she continues to use some substances on occasion, she is not dependent on them. Appellant related that “[t]he only times that [she has] used is honestly when [J.B.] was hanging around [her] and he wouldn’t stay away from [her].” Appellant stated that she tested positive for methamphetamine in April, May, and August 2017, most likely because J.B. was around. Appellant indicated that she tends to use when J.B. is around and that she does not use when he is not around. Appellant blamed J.B. for her drug use: “I have responsibility on my own use, but I don’t have responsibility when he is waving it in my face like that.” {¶ 25} Appellant stated that HRS recommended inpatient treatment “one time,” but that she did not follow up. Appellant claimed that in April 2017 a doctor told her to seek inpatient ATHENS, 17CA44 9 treatment. Appellant explained that she “looked for rehab houses,” but she has “not found one yet.” Appellant related that she asked her HRS counselor a few days ago for suggestions. Appellant additionally testified that she is willing and “very able” to go to inpatient treatment. {¶ 26} Appellant also agreed that her camper is not appropriate for the children, but believes that she is capable of caring for the children. Appellant indicated that her mother assists her with transportation and that she will have her own vehicle once she can afford to fix it. Appellant stated that she does not believe that her substance abuse impacts her ability to care for the children. She also agreed she has had some relapses, but thinks that taking Suboxone helps control her drug addiction. Appellant indicated that she takes Suboxone so she can feel “well everyday.” Appellant recognized that she does not have a prescription for Suboxone, but instead, she “buy[s] it from people.” Appellant did state that her goal is to become completely clean at some point. Appellant explained that she “plan[s] to get on Vivitrol shot and be taken off of that as well.” Appellant indicated that she believes it is important for her to stay clean for her children. {¶ 27} Appellant further stated that she plans to obtain more appropriate housing once she starts school in August 2017. Appellant explained that her mother spoke with a landlord and “they’re suppose[d] to be renting me a three bedroom when I get my first school check.” {¶ 28} Appellant also testified that she does not believe the children should be in appellee’s “custody at all.” Appellant claimed that the children were up to date on their shots before appellee obtained temporary custody. With respect to the children’s dental issues, appellant explained that S.S.-1 had a “gagging” problem. Appellant additionally stated that the children “always had behavior problems” and that she does not believe being late to school ATHENS, 17CA44 10 caused their behavioral issues. Appellant related that S.S.-2 “has always acted out” and was in counseling for a few months before appellee received temporary custody. Appellant stated that S.S.-1 had been in counseling for six to eight months before her removal. {¶ 29} Appellant indicated that if the children cannot live with her, then she would like the children to live with appellant’s mother until appellant obtains appropriate housing. Appellant testified that she does not believe it will take her long to obtain appropriate housing. Appellant stated that if appellant’s mother “cannot have them [she is] fine with them staying with [K.B.] until [appellant] can get them back.” Appellant explained that her mother “technically” has other grandchildren living with her, but appellant believes that two of the children will soon return home to their mother. Appellant stated that the children “have a really good relationship” with K.B. Appellant does not believe that the children should be placed in appellee’s permanent custody. {¶ 30} Appellant also stated that she visits the children weekly and that they ask her “almost every time they see me when they can come home.” Appellant related that she is “pretty sure” the children “want to come home.” {¶ 31} ACCS caseworker Hannah Jeffers testified that she has worked with the family since October 2015. At that time, appellee had a protective supervision order and a case plan in place. Jeffers stated that the case plan identified the following concerns: housing, maintenance, truancy, medical appointments, and substance abuse. Jeffers explained that when she visited the family’s apartment while the children still were in appellant’s care, the apartment had trash, dirty clothes, dog feces, urine, and an “abundance of dishes.” Jeffers stated that she advised appellant and J.B. to clean the apartment and provided them with cleaning supplies, bug ATHENS, 17CA44 11 spray, toothpaste, toothbrushes, and bed covers. Jeffers indicated that the apartment “sporadically” got better and if she had a scheduled appointment, the apartment would be clean, but if she made an unannounced visit, the apartment would be messy. Jeffers testified that the apartment deteriorated once appellee removed the children. {¶ 32} Jeffers explained that both appellant and J.B. had substance abuse issues. Jeffers stated that in 2017, she screened appellant for drugs seven times, and appellant tested positive six times. Jeffers revealed that appellant tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, THC, and Suboxone. {¶ 33} Jeffers indicated that appellant reported that she attends HRS and that she is working on getting into a Vivitrol program. Jeffers testified that she discussed inpatient treatment with appellant, and appellant “asked if that would make anything change.” Jeffers responded that she did not “know if it would make a change or not but it definitely would be in the positive and anything to better her own life it would definitely be a suggestion.” Jeffers testified that appellant’s continued substance abuse raises concerns about appellant’s ability to safely care for the children. {¶ 34} Jeffers stated that appellant attended S.S.-2’s IEP meeting in December 2016, but she had “limited participation,” and “appear[ed] to be nodding off” during the meeting. {¶ 35} Jeffers also indicated that appellant attended the majority of her visits with the children and that appellee did not identify any major concerns with appellant’s interaction with the children during her visits. Jeffers agreed that the children share a strong relationship with appellant and that they are excited to see their mother. She further testified, however, that “[t]he children had a very hard time when” appellant failed to attend. Jeffers noted that during 2017, ATHENS, 17CA44 12 appellant has had only two “no shows.” Jeffers clarified that appellee did not decide to seek permanent custody due to a lack of relationship between appellant and the children, but instead, due to appellant’s substance abuse and lack of appropriate housing. {¶ 36} Jeffers related that the children seem content in K.B.’s home and described them as “overall happy children.” Jeffers stated that in May 2016 she spoke with the children about their wishes, and they advised her as follows: (1) S.S.-1 stated that she wanted to “live in a hotel or her aunts [sic] home”; (2) S.S.-2 indicated that he wanted to stay at K.B.’s home; and (3) E.B. stated that she “wanted to live in a tree house.” Jeffers indicated that she later asked the children how they would feel if they stayed at K.B.’s house “for a longer period of time.” She stated that the two older children stated “good,” and E.B. “just kind of nodded and smiled.” Jeffers revealed that another time, S.S.-1 “stated that she was happy about [living at K.B.’s] because they got to go on vacation,” and S.S.-2 stated that he “wanted to live with his mother and squirted [Jeffers] in the face with [a] squirt gun.” Jeffers agreed that the children have “at some point” told her that they would like to return home to appellant. {¶ 37} Jeffers testified that she believes that placing the children in appellee’s permanent custody is in their best interest. Jeffers explained that “there’s been consistent, ongoing substance abuse issues throughout the years, housing deterioration, no consistency and structure within the home,” and a failure to prioritize the children’s education. She stated that the children need long-term stability and that appellant cannot currently provide structure or stability due to her lack of appropriate housing and her substance abuse issues. Jeffers noted that appellant has been working on these same issues since 2014. {¶ 38} Jeffers further related that M.H., appellant’s mother, showed interest in kinship ATHENS, 17CA44 13 placement, but appellee denied a prior home study concerning three of her other grandchildren. Jeffers further noted, however, that even though appellee denied the prior home study, the court nevertheless placed the three other grandchildren in her care. {¶ 39} The children’s guardian ad litem, Tara Huffman, testified that she believes that placement in appellee’s permanent custody is in the children's best interest. Huffman explained that appellant’s substance abuse and housing have been ongoing concerns for the past three years and appellant has failed to completely resolve those issues. Huffman stated that she does not believe that the children can safely return to appellant’s care. Huffman indicated that she also spoke with the children about their wishes, but Huffman did not believe that they understood the import of permanent custody. Huffman did not elaborate upon what the children expressed as their wishes. {¶ 40} M.H., the children’s maternal grandmother, testified that she is willing to care for the children. Although she currently has three other grandchildren who live with her, she expects the children's mother soon will regain custody of the two older children. M.H. stated that the other grandchildren’s mother is a recovering heroin addict who spent two years in prison, but is now studying to be an addiction counselor. {¶ 41} M.H. does not believe children services needs to be involved because both she and K.B. are willing to help appellant. M.H. indicated that her “only concern with the kids being [placed] with [K.B.] is [she has] not * * * been able to have involvement because [K.B.]’s schedule is so busy.” {¶ 42} M.H. stated that the children “love” appellant and “have a very strong attachment” to appellant. M.H. believes appellant has been “trying very hard” and has “made major ATHENS, 17CA44 14 improvements” in her quest to regain custody of the children. M.H. explained that appellant avoids people who will tempt her with drugs and is trying to get into a Suboxone program. {¶ 43} On October 4, 2017, after hearing all of the evidence and counsels' arguments, the trial court granted appellee permanent custody of the children. The court found that the children have been in appellee’s temporary custody for more than twelve months out of the past twenty-two consecutive months and that placing the children in appellee’s permanent custody is in their best interest. The court considered the children’s interactions and interrelationships and stated: The children are placed together, and have a reasonable sibling bond. They have been in the care of E.B.’s paternal grandmother for more than one year, and are comfortable, bonded, and well cared for. The children have a bond with their mother. They also have a relationship with maternal grandmother; however, she is in no position to provide for their daily care. {¶ 44} The court next considered the children’s wishes: “The children wish to stay with their grandmother [K.B.], where they are placed, and the oldest is mature enough to voice that mother cannot provide an appropriate home.” The court also considered the children’s custodial history: All three children have been continuously placed in the custody of ACCS since April 7, 2016. Prior to that they lived with their mother (and sometimes [J.B.]), often with a protective supervision order in place. During that time, the Court denied requests from ACCS to grant temporary custody until it became clearly necessary in April 2016. The court additionally examined the children’s need for a legally secure permanent placement: The children need and deserve a legally secure placement which can only be accomplished with a grant of permanent custody to ACCS, and the termination of parental rights. The grandparents with whom they are living have expressed a willingness and desire to adopt, and while that ultimate outcome cannot be ATHENS, 17CA44 15 guaranteed, it would clearly be in their best interests. The court thus placed the children in appellee’s permanent custody. This appeal followed. {¶ 45} Appellant’s two assignments of error challenge the trial court’s decision to grant appellee permanent custody of the children. Appellant’s first assignment of error disputes the trial court’s best-interest determination, while her second assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred by failing to consider whether placing the children in their maternal grandmother’s custody would be in their best interest. Because the two assignments of error involve related issues, we combine our discussion of them. {¶ 46} In her first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court’s decision to place the children in appellee’s permanent custody is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In particular, she contends that the weight of the evidence fails to establish that placing the children in appellee’s permanent custody is in their best interest. Appellant argues that (1) the best-interest factors weigh in favor of maintaining her parental rights to the children, (2) the evidence shows that she shares positive interactions and interrelationships with the children, (3) she and the children share a strong bond and that they had positive interactions during visits, (4) the evidence shows that the children would like to return home, and (5) she has made progress in showing that she can provide the children with a legally secure permanent placement, but she just needs more time. In her second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by granting appellee permanent custody of the children without examining whether placing the children with their maternal grandmother would be in their best interests. She contends that had the trial court engaged in this best-interest analysis, it would have decided to place the children in the maternal grandmother’s custody. ATHENS, 17CA44 16 A STANDARD OF REVIEW {¶ 47} Generally, a reviewing court will not disturb a trial court’s permanent custody decision unless the decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. E.g., In re B.E., 4th Dist. Highland No. 13CA26, 2014–Ohio–3178, ¶27; In re R.S., 4th Dist. Highland No. 13CA22, 2013–Ohio–5569, ¶29. “Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief.’” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012–Ohio–2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶12, quoting State v. Thompkins,78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990). {¶ 48} When an appellate court reviews whether a trial court’s permanent custody decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court “‘“weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”’” Eastley at ¶20, quoting Tewarson v. Simon, 141 Ohio App.3d 103, 115, 750 N.E.2d 176 (9th Dist.2001), quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983); accord In re Pittman, 9th Dist. Summit No. 20894, 2002–Ohio–2208, ¶¶23–24. ATHENS, 17CA44 17 {¶ 49} The question that we must resolve when reviewing a permanent custody decision under the manifest weight of the evidence standard is “whether the juvenile court’s findings * * * were supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re K.H., 119 Ohio St.3d 538, 2008–Ohio–4825, 895 N.E.2d 809, ¶43. “Clear and convincing evidence” is: the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established. It is intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not mean clear and unequivocal. In re Estate of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 101, 103–04, 495 N.E.2d 23 (1986). In determining whether a trial court based its decision upon clear and convincing evidence, “a reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990); accord In re Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368, 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985), citing Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954) (“Once the clear and convincing standard has been met to the satisfaction of the [trial] court, the reviewing court must examine the record and determine if the trier of fact had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy this burden of proof.”); In re Adoption of Lay, 25 Ohio St.3d 41, 42–43, 495 N.E.2d 9 (1986). Cf. In re Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d 163, 165, 492 N.E.2d 140 (1986) (stating that whether a fact has been “proven by clear and convincing evidence in a particular case is a determination for the [trial] court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless such determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence”). Thus, if the children services agency presented competent and credible evidence upon which the trier of fact reasonably could have formed a firm belief that permanent custody is warranted, then the court’s decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re ATHENS, 17CA44 18 R.M., 4th Dist. Athens Nos. 12CA43 and 12CA44, 2013–Ohio–3588, ¶62; In re R.L., 2nd Dist. Greene Nos. 2012CA32 and 2012CA33, 2012–Ohio–6049, ¶17, quoting In re A.U., 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 22287, 2008–Ohio–187, ¶9 (“A reviewing court will not overturn a court’s grant of permanent custody to the state as being contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence ‘if the record contains competent, credible evidence by which the court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the essential statutory elements * * * have been established.’”). Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, the court may reverse the judgment only if it appears that the fact-finder, when resolving the conflicts in evidence, “‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing court should find a trial court’s permanent custody decision against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the [decision].’” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175; accord State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St.3d 479, 483, 721 N.E.2d 995 (2000). {¶ 50} Furthermore, when reviewing evidence under the manifest weight of the evidence standard, an appellate court generally must defer to the fact-finder’s credibility determinations. Eastley at ¶21. As the Eastley court explained: “[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of facts. * * * If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.” ATHENS, 17CA44 19 Id., quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn.3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 60, at 191–192 (1978). {¶ 51} Moreover, deferring to the trial court on matters of credibility is “crucial in a child custody case, where there may be much evident in the parties’ demeanor and attitude that does not translate to the record well.” Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 419, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997); accord In re Christian, 4th Dist. Athens No. 04CA10, 2004–Ohio–3146, ¶7. As the Ohio Supreme Court long-ago explained: In proceedings involving the custody and welfare of children the power of the trial court to exercise discretion is peculiarly important. The knowledge obtained through contact with and observation of the parties and through independent investigation can not be conveyed to a reviewing court by printed record. Trickey v. Trickey, 158 Ohio St. 9, 13, 106 N.E.2d 772 (1952). {¶ 52} Furthermore, unlike an ordinary civil proceeding in which a jury has no contact with the parties before a trial, in a permanent custody case a trial court judge may have significant contact with the parties before a permanent custody motion is even filed. In such a situation, it is not unreasonable to presume that the trial court judge had far more opportunities to evaluate the credibility, demeanor, attitude, etc., of the parties than this court ever could from a mere reading of the permanent custody hearing transcript. {¶ 53} In the case at bar, as we explain below, we are unable to conclude that the evidence weighs heavily against the trial court’s decision. B PERMANENT CUSTODY PRINCIPLES [Cite as In re S.S., 2018-Ohio-1349.] {¶ 54} A parent has a “fundamental liberty interest” in the care, custody, and management of his or her child and an “essential” and “basic civil right” to raise his or her children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990); accord In re D.A., 113 Ohio St.3d 88, 2007–Ohio–1105, 862 N.E.2d 829, ¶¶8-9. A parent’s rights, however, are not absolute. D.A. at ¶11. Rather, “‘it is plain that the natural rights of a parent * * * are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’” In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979), quoting In re R.J.C., 300 So.2d 54, 58 (Fla.App.1974). Thus, the State may terminate parental rights when a child’s best interest demands such termination. D.A. at ¶11. {¶ 55} Before a court may award a children services agency permanent custody of a child, R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) requires the court to hold a hearing. The primary purpose of the hearing is to allow the court to determine whether the child’s best interests would be served by permanently terminating the parental relationship and by awarding permanent custody to the agency. Id. Additionally, when considering whether to grant a children services agency permanent custody, a trial court should consider the underlying purposes of R.C. Chapter 2151, which include: “To provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of children subject to Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code, whenever possible, in a family environment, separating the child from the child's parents only when necessary for the child's welfare or in the interests of public safety.” R.C. 2151.01(A). C PERMANENT CUSTODY FRAMEWORK [Cite as In re S.S., 2018-Ohio-1349.] {¶ 56} A children services agency may obtain permanent custody of a child by (1) requesting it in the abuse, neglect or dependency complaint under R.C. 2151.353, or (2) filing a motion under R.C. 2151.413 after obtaining temporary custody. In this case, the agency sought permanent custody of the children by filing a motion under R.C. 2151.413. When an agency files a permanent custody motion under R.C. 2151.413, R.C. 2151.414 applies. R.C. 2151.414(A). {¶ 57} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) specifies that a trial court may grant a children services agency permanent custody of a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child’s best interest would be served by the award of permanent custody, and (2) one of the following conditions applies: (a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned or has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents. (b) The child is abandoned. (c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody. (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999. (e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any court in this state or another state. {¶ 58} Thus, before a trial court may award a children services agency permanent custody, it must find (1) that one of the circumstances described in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) applies, ATHENS, 17CA44 22 and (2) that awarding the children services agency permanent custody would further the child’s best interests. D R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) {¶ 59} In the case sub judice, the trial court determined that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) applies. Appellant does not dispute that the children have been in appellee’s temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period. Instead, appellant disputes the trial court’s best-interest finding. We limit our review accordingly. E BEST INTEREST {¶ 60} R.C. 2151.414(D) directs a trial court to consider “all relevant factors,” as well as specific factors, to determine whether a child’s best interests will be served by granting a children services agency permanent custody. The listed factors include: (1) the child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the child’s wishes, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the child’s maturity; (3) the child’s custodial history; (4) the child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; and (5) whether any factors listed under R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11) apply.2 2 R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11)(7) state: ATHENS, 17CA44 23 The parent has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one of the following: (a) An offense under section 2903.01, 2903.02, or 2903.03 of the Revised Code or under an existing or former law of this state, any other state, or the United States that is substantially equivalent to an offense described in those sections and the victim of the offense was a sibling of the child or the victim was another child who lived in the parent's household at the time of the offense; (b) An offense under section 2903.11, 2903.12, or 2903.13 of the Revised Code or under an existing or former law of this state, any other state, or the United States that is substantially equivalent to an offense described in those sections and the victim of the offense is the child, a sibling of the child, or another child who lived in the parent's household at the time of the offense; © An offense under division (B)(2) of section 2919.22 of the Revised Code or under an existing or former law of this state, any other state, or the United States that is substantially equivalent to the offense described in that section and the child, a sibling of the child, or another child who lived in the parent's household at the time of the offense is the victim of the offense; (d) An offense under section 2907.02, 2907.03, 2907.04, 2907.05, or 2907.06 of the Revised Code or under an existing or former law of this state, any other state, or the United States that is substantially equivalent to an offense described in those sections and the victim of the offense is the child, a sibling of the child, or another child who lived in the parent's household at the time of the offense; (e) An offense under section 2905.32, 2907.21, or 2907.22 of the Revised Code or under an existing or former law of this state, any other state, or the United States that is substantially equivalent to the offense described in that section and the victim of the offense is the child, a sibling of the child, or another child who lived in the parent's household at the time of the offense; (f) A conspiracy or attempt to commit, or complicity in committing, an offense described in division (E)(7)(a), (d), or (e) of this section. (8) The parent has repeatedly withheld medical treatment or food from the child when the parent has the means to provide the treatment or food, and, in the case of withheld medical treatment, the parent withheld it for a purpose other than to treat the physical or mental illness or defect of the child by spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets of a recognized religious body. (9) The parent has placed the child at substantial risk of harm two or more times due to alcohol or drug abuse and has rejected treatment two or more times or refused to participate in further treatment two or more times after a case plan issued pursuant to section 2151.412 of the Revised Code requiring treatment of the parent was journalized as part of a dispositional order issued with respect to the child or an order was issued by any other court requiring treatment of the parent. (10) The parent has abandoned the child. (11) The parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of the child pursuant to this section or section 2151.353 or 2151.415 of the Revised Code, or under an existing or former law of this state, any other state, or the United States that is substantially equivalent to those sections, and the parent has failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child. [Cite as In re S.S., 2018-Ohio-1349.] {¶ 61} Determining whether granting permanent custody to a children services agency will promote a child’s best interest involves a delicate balancing of “all relevant [best interest] factors,” as well as the “five enumerated statutory factors.” In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007–Ohio–1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶57, citing In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006–Ohio–5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶56; accord In re C.G., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 24097 and 24099, 2008–Ohio–3773, ¶28; In re N.W., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 07AP–590 and 07AP–591, 2008–Ohio–297, 2008 WL 224356, ¶19. However, none of the best interest factors requires a court to give it “greater weight or heightened significance.” C.F. at ¶57. Instead, the trial court considers the totality of the circumstances when making its best interest determination. In re K.M.S., 3rd Dist. Marion Nos. 9–15–37, 9–15–38, and 9–15–39, 2017–Ohio–142, 2017 WL 168864, ¶24; In re A.C., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27328, 2014–Ohio–4918, ¶46. In general, “[a] child’s best interest is served by placing the child in a permanent situation that fosters growth, stability, and security.” In re C.B.C., 4th Dist. Lawrence Nos. 15CA18 and 15CA19, 2016–Ohio–916, 2016 WL 915012, ¶66, citing In re Adoption of Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d 319, 324, 574 N.E.2d 1055 (1991).