Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A. & Yamaha Parts Distributors, Inc. v. Shadco, Inc., D/B/A Cycle Empire, 762 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1985). · Go Syfert
Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A. & Yamaha Parts Distributors, Inc. v. Shadco, Inc., D/B/A Cycle Empire, 762 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“we agree with the bankruptcy court that both the language of the statute and the case law interpreting the statute militate against applying the exemption to corporate debtors.”
36 citation events (11 in the last 25 years) across 20 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Cota Yellow Brick Road, LLC v. 741, Inc., d/b/a Wisdom Rides of America (cob, 2026-04-29)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Cota Yellow Brick Road, LLC v. 741, Inc., d/b/a Wisdom Rides of America (4×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
Bankr.D. Colo. · 2026 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
we agree with the bankruptcy court that both the language of the statute and the case law interpreting the statute militate against applying the exemption to corporate debtors.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Evette Boyle v. PMA Medical Specialists LLC
3rd Cir. · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
e hold that the exemptions embodied in 11 u.s.c. 523 (a) do not apply to corporate debtors.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Beury v. Hertz Corporation
S.D. Cal. · 2024 · confidence medium
Trading Co., 64 F.3d 1292 , 21 1302 (9th Cir. 1995) (“§ 523 only applies to individual and not corporate debtors.”); 22 Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e 23 hold that the exemptions embodied in 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a) do not apply to corporate 24 25 references the bankruptcy proceeding, (2) Plaintiff does not object to the Court’s consideration of these 26 documents outside of the body of the complaint in connection with the instant motion, and (3) the documents are public records whose authenticity is not contested, the Court takes judic…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Avion Funding, LLC v. GFS Industries, LLC
Bankr. W.D. Tex. · 2022 · confidence medium
Gray, Inc., 912 F.2d 808, 812 (5th Cir. 1990) (“the ‘willful and malicious injury’ exception to discharge, like all of the exceptions to discharge found in section 523(a), applies only to individual, not corporate debtors”) (citing Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir. 1985)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Catt, Jr v. Rtech Fabrications, LLC
Bankr. D. Idaho · 2021 · confidence medium
See In re Spring Valley Farms, Inc., 863 F.2d 832 , 834 (11th Cir. 1989) (“A corporate debtor is not an individual debtor for the purposes of Section 523.”); Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir. 1985) (concluding that applying § 523 to a corporate debtor would “render meaningless employment by Congress of the term ‘individual’”); In re MF Glob.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gaske v. Satellite Restaurants Inc. Crabcake Factory USA
Bankr. D. Md. · 2021 · confidence medium
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit examined this issue and stated unequivocally, “A corporate debtor is not an individual debtor for the purposes of Section 523.” In re Spring Valley Farms, Inc., 863 F.2d 832 , 834 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir. 1985) (concluding that applying Section 523 to a corporate debtor would “render meaningless employment by Congress of the term ‘individual’”) and In re Push & Pull Enter., Inc., 84 B.R. 546, 548 (N.D.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ditech Holding Corporation
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. · 2021 · confidence medium
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir.1985) (applying Section 523 to corporations would “render meaningless employment by Congress of the term ‘individual’”) (citing In re Kuempel Co., 14 B.R. 324, 325 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1981)); In re Push & Pull Enter., Inc., 84 B.R. 546, 548 (N.D.Ind.1988) (“It is almost undebatable and universally held that a corporate Chapter 11 debtor is not subject to the dischargeability provisions of 11 U.S.C.A. § 523 .”); Collier on Bankruptcy, § 523.04 at 523-11 (1988).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United State ex rel. Minge v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp. (In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc.)
S.D.N.Y. · 2014 · confidence medium
Trading Co., 64 F.3d 1292 , 1302 (9th Cir.1995) (“§ 523 only applies to individual and not corporate debtors.”) (citing Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Shadco., Inc., 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir.1985)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Daluz v. Automatic Plating of Bridgeport, Inc. (In Re Automatic Plating of Bridgeport, Inc.)
Bankr. D. Conn. · 1996 · confidence medium
Yamaha Motor Corporation v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir.1985) (citation and internal quotations omitted) (“Congress clearly did not intend the term ‘corporate debtor’ to be used interchangeably with the term ‘individual debtor,’ as such a construction would render meaningless employment by Congress of the term ‘individual’”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Pacific-Atlantic Trading Company
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir.1985) (section 523(a) is applicable to individual debtors and will not be extended to corporate or partnership debtors); Savoy Records, Inc. v. Trafalgar Assocs.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Towers ex rel. Pacific Atlantic Trading Co. v. United States (In re Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co.)
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir.1985) (section 523(a) is applicable to individual debtors and will not be extended to corporate or partnership debtors); Savoy Records, Inc. v. Trafalgar Assocs.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Towers v. United States, Internal Revenue Service (In Re Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co.)
N.D. Cal. · 1993 · confidence medium
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hubert Garrie v. James L. Gray, Inc., and Texaco Inc.
5th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
As explained in Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir.1985), ... both the language of ... [section 523(a) ] and the case law interpreting the statute militate against applying the exemption to corporate debtors.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Parkinson v. E & J Underground, Inc. (In Re E & J Underground, Inc.)
Bankr. M.D. Fla. · 1989 · confidence medium
Congress did not intend the term “corporate debtor” to be used interchangeably with the term “individual debtor,” as such a construction would “render meaningless employment by Congress of the term ‘individual’.” Yamaha Motor Corporation U.S.A. v. Shadco, Inc. 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir.1985) citing In re Kuempel Co, 14 B.R. 324, 325 (Bankr.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Spring Valley Farms, Inc.
11th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir.1985) (applying Section 523 to corporations would "render meaningless employment by Congress of the term 'individual' ") (citing In re Kuempel Co., 14 B.R. 324, 325 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1981)); In re Push & Pull Enter., Inc., 84 B.R. 546, 548 (N.D.Ind.1988) ("It is almost undebatable and universally held that a corporate Chapter 11 debtor is not subject to the dischargeability provisions of 11 U.S.C.A.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Spring Valley Farms, Inc. v. Crow (In re Spring Valley Farms, Inc.)
11th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir.1985) (applying Section 523 to corporations would “render meaningless employment by Congress of the term ‘individual’ ”) (citing In re Kuempel Co., 14 B.R. 324, 325 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1981)); In re Push & Pull Enter., Inc., 84 B.R. 546, 548 (N.D.Ind.1988) (“It is almost undebatable and universally held that a corporate Chapter 11 debtor is not subject to the dischargeability provisions of 11 U.S. C.A. § 523.”); Collier on Bankruptcy, § 523.04 at 523-11 (1988).
cited Cited "see" Lend Lease v. Briggs Transportation Co.
8th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Yamaha, 762 F.2d at 670 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Dugan Meyers v. fanning/howey Assoc., Unpublished Decision (11-9-2000)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Shadco, Inc. 762 F.2d 668 , 670 (C.A. 8 1985) (holding that the application of Section 523 to a corporate debtor would render the legislature's exclusive use of the term "individual" meaningless.) Therefore, the trial court incorrectly utilized 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(3) as a basis for its decision to grant ATEC's motion to dismiss.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Matter of OPM Leasing Services, Inc.
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668 (8th Cir.1985) (Section 523(a) is applicable to individual debtors and will not be read to include the corporate debtor.) Accordingly the disputed claim is of a kind specified in section 507(a)(7) as it is for a tax “not assessed before, but assessable, under applicable law or by agreement, after, the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 507 (a)(7)(A)(iii).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re Timbers Of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.
5th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Shadco, 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir.1985) (creditor "claims that it is entitled to post-petition interest on its claim as an element of 'adequate protection' "); In re Briggs Transportation Co., 780 F.2d 1339 , 1340 (8th Cir.1985); In re Pulliam, 54 B.R. 624, 625-26 (W.D.Mo.1985); In re Deeter, 53 B.R. 623, 629 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.1985) (payments for lost opportunity costs are "interest payments"); In re Vanas, 50 B.R. 988, 993 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1985) (creditor "contends that it is entitled to interest payments ad adequate protection for the delay in enforcing it…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.
5th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Yam-aka Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Shadco, 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir.1985) (creditor "claims that it is entitled to post-petition interest on its claim as an element of ‘adequate protection”’); In re Briggs Transportation Co., 780 F.2d 1339 , 1340 (8th Cir.1985); In re Pulliam, 54 B.R. 624, 625-26 (W.D.Mo.1985); In re Deeter, 53 B.R. 623, 629 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.1985) (payments for lost opportunity costs are "interest payments”); In re Va-nas, 50 B.R. 988, 993 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1985) (creditor "contends that it is entitled to interest payments ad adequate protection for the delay in enf…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Savoy Records, Inc. v. Trafalgar Associates (In Re Trafalgar Associates) (2×)
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668 , 13 B.C.D. 315 (8th Cir.1985) (section 523(a) is applicable to individual debtors and will not be read to include the corporate debtor).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
YAMAHA MOTOR CORPORATION U.S.A. and Yamaha Parts Distributors, Incorporated, Appellants,
v.
SHADCO, INC., D/B/A Cycle Empire, Appellee
84-2126.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
May 20, 1985.
762 F.2d 668
Acie W. Matthews, Sioux Falls, S.D., for appellants., Clair R. Gerry, Sioux Falls, S.D., for appellee.
Ross, Bowman, Schatz.
Cited by 26 opinions  |  Published
ROSS, Circuit Judge.

Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A., and Yamaha Parts Distributors, Inc., (hereinafter collectively referred to as Yamaha) filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court against Shadco, Inc. d/b/a Cycle Empire (hereinafter Shadco), the debtor, requesting relief from the automatic stay, and for adequate protection of Yamaha’s interest in certain collateral. The bankruptcy court dismissed Yamaha’s complaint, and the district court [1] affirmed the dismissal. This appeal followed. We affirm.

FACTS

Yamaha, a manufacturer of motorcycles, snowmobiles, and parts, franchised these items to Shadco, a motorcycle dealer, pursuant to a security agreement. Shadco had a floor plan financing arrangement with Yamaha, but sold motorcycles and snowmobiles “out of trust” and breached the security agreement in an amount in excess of $70,000.00 (pre-petition debts). Conversely, Yamaha owed Shadco an amount in excess of $30,000.00 for returned parts and inventory items and account credits (post-petition debts).

In October 1982, Shadco filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 11, 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., remaining in possession of its property and continuing to operate its business. Yamaha brought an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court alleging that Shadco’s sale of property “out of trust” was a willful and malicious injury to Yamaha under Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Additionally, Yamaha alleged that it was entitled to offset its post-petition debts to Shadco against Shadco’s pre-petition debts owed to Yamaha. Finally, Yamaha demanded interest on its secured claim as an element of adequate protection.

Thereafter, Yamaha and Shadco entered into a stipulation making inventory, parts, and accessories in which Yamaha claimed a security interest available for inspection by Yamaha. The stipulation also provided that Shadco would follow prescribed accounting procedures to protect Yamaha’s interest. The stipulation did not mention interest. By order of November 29, 1982, the bankruptcy court approved the stipulation.

Subsequently the bankruptcy court held: (1) the language of section 523 which provides that individual debtors are not discharged for willful and malicious injuries to creditor’s property does not apply to corporate debtors; (2) pre-petition (bankruptcy) debts may not be offset by post-petition debts; (3) Yamaha must pay all post-petition funds to Shadco; and (4) the stipulation between the parties settled the adequate protection issue concerning post-petition interest, and Yamaha was not entitled to post-petition interest as a matter of law.

[*670] The district court affirmed the order of the bankruptcy court. This appeal followed. ISSUES

(1) Whether the language of section 523 which refers to the nondischargeability of debts of “individual debtors” applies to a corporate debtor; and

(2) Whether Yamaha is entitled to post-petition interest. [2]

DISCUSSION

A. Dischargeability of Corporate Debt

Shadco filed a plan for reorganization pursuant to Chapter 11. The statutory language pertinent to this appeal provides:

§ 1141. Effect of Confirmation
(a) Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this section, the provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor * * * and any creditor * * * whether or not the claim or interest of such creditor * * * is impaired under the plan and whether or not such creditor * * * has accepted the plan.
* * * * sk *
(d)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in the plan, or in the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan—
(A) discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation * * *.
(2) The confirmation of a plan does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt excepted from discharge under section 523 of this title.

11 U.S.C. § 1141 (emphasis added). Section 523 provides several exceptions to discharge. The exception relied upon by Yamaha states:

§ 523. Exceptions to discharge
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt—
# # # * # *
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity;

11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6) (emphasis added). Yamaha asserts that Shadco’s debt is not discharged because the sales “out of trust” amount to a “willful and malicious injury by the debtor.” The bankruptcy court rejected Yamaha’s position because Shadco is a corporate debtor and by its terms the exemption applies to “individual debtors.”

We agree with the bankruptcy court that both the language of the statute and the case law interpreting the statute militate against applying the exemption to corporate debtors. See In re Kuempel Co., 14 B.R. 324, 325-27 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1981). See also In re Lucas, 21 B.R. 585 (Bankr.W.D.Penn.1982). Congress clearly did not intend the term “corporate debtor” to be used interchangeably with the term “individual debtor,” as such a construction would “render meaningless employment by Congress of the term 'individual'.” Kuempel, supra, 14 B.R. at 325. Accordingly, we hold that the exemptions embodied in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) do not apply to corporate debtors.

B. Post-Petition Interest

Yamaha claims that it is entitled to post-petition interest on its claim as an element of “adequate protection.” Courts that have addressed the issue of allowing interest as a part of “adequate protection” are divided on the matter. Compare In re American Mariner Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 434-35 (9th Cir.1984) (interest allowed), with In re Aegean Fare, Inc., 34 B.R. 965, 969 (Bankr.D.Mass.1983) (interest not given) and In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 B.R. 803, 810 (D.Utah 1981) (rejecting equity cushion analysis). This circuit has not before addressed this issue, and we decline to do so at this time.

As the bankruptcy court held “the stipulation between the parties settled the adequate protection issue raised by [Yamaha][*671] in its complaint respecting * * * post-petition interest * * In re Shadco, Inc., No. 482-00294, slip op. at 3-4 (Bankr.D.S.D. May 8, 1984). The stipulation, which is in the form of a settlement, was submitted to, and approved by, the bankruptcy court, and as such it is binding upon the parties. See Consolidated Grain and Barge Co. v. Archway Fleeting & Harbor Service, Inc., 712 F.2d 1287, 1289 (8th Cir.1983) (per curiam); Carpenters’ District Council v. Anderson, 619 F.2d 776, 778 (8th Cir.1980). The stipulation as agreed to by the parties settled the adequate protection issue. There is no mention of post-petition interest in the stipulation. Yamaha was satisfied that the agreement adequately protected its interest. Accordingly, the court’s denial of Yamaha’s request for post-petition interest is affirmed.

CONCLUSION

We have examined the appellant’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

1

. The Honorable John B. Jones, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota.

2

. The appellant raises additional issues which we decline to address as they are without merit, and were not presented to the district court. See Johnson v. Nordstrom-Larpenteur Agency, 623 F.2d 1279, 1281 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042, 101 S.Ct. 622, 66 L.Ed.2d 504 (1980).