IN CLERKt OFFICE This opinion Was filed for record •UPRBC COURT,SniE OF WfKSKMOIQN at Q-6>0gii^on m7e_B£LJJ_2018L (. m JUS7KE SUSAN t: CARLSON SUPREME COURT CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON END PRISON INDUSTRIAL NO. 95307-4 COMPLEX, Respondent, EN BANC V. KING COUNTY, Filed DEC 2 7 2018 Petitioner. GORDON McCLOUD,J.—^End Prison Industrial Complex (EPIC) argues that the ballot title for a King County property tax increase lacked information required byformer RCW 84.55.050 (2012).' To resolve that dispute, the court must compare the ballot title to that measure it describes—King County Ordinance ' RCW 84.55.050 has been amended twice since voters approved the property tax increase at issue in this case. Laws of 2018, ch. 46, § 3; Laws of 2017, ch. 296, § 2. End Prison Industrial Complex v. King County, No. 95307-4 17304—to see if the title lacks some description of the ordinance that former RCW 84.55.050 requires. But RCW 29A.36.090 provides that ballot title objections must be raised within 10 days of the public filing of that ballot title. We therefore hold that epic's claim, which it brought nearly 4 years after the ballot title at issue in this case was filed, is untimely.^ We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the superior court. Factual Background End Prison Industrial Complex v. King County, No. 95307-4

compare the ballot title to the proposed measure to determine whether any objection to the ballot title has merit. This statute also requires superior courts to decide these objections quickly and conclusively. The petition must be filed within 10 days. The superior court must conduct its work "immediately" and resolve the matter "as soon as possible." Id. That court's resolution "is final, and [its] ballot title . . . will be the established ballot title. Id. As we have said of similar statutes,"Timing is clearly important. There is a strong interest in the finality of ballot title decisions." Kreidler v. Eikenberry, 111 Wn.2d 828, 833, 766 P.2d 438 (1989)(commenting on former RCW 29.79.040-.060 (1988)). II. The Alleged Deficiency That EPIC Highlights Could Have Been Raised in 2012, in Compliance with RCW 29A.36.090's 10-Day Deadline EPIC argues that RCW 29A.36.090's 10-day time limit should not govern this claim because nobody could have known in 2012 that King County would ^ But see Kreidler v. Eikenberry, 111 Wn.2d 828, 837, 766 P.2d 438 (1989) ("Despite the unavailability of either direct or discretionary review, we may, in unusual circumstances, exercise our inherent power of review to determine if the trial court's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law."(citing Marino Prop. Co. v. Port Comm'rs, 91 Wn.2d 307, 644 P.2d 1181 (1982))).

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implement the levy lid lift in a manner inconsistent with the ballot title. In other words, the ballot title seemed just fine in 2012: it lacked an express statement about how subsequent levies would be calculated, so one could assume that King County intended to lift the levy lid for 2013 only. Only after King County continued to assess the increased property taxes associated with the levy lid lift in 2014 did EPIC realize that King County intended the levy lid lift to last for nine years. The problem with EPIC's argument is that both the ballot title and Ordinance 17304, the proposed measure underlying the ballot title, were publicly available in 2012. So even in 2012, voters could have figured out whether Ordinance 17304 differed from the ballot title. And even in 2012, voters could have figured out that if they differed, the ballot title would not govern—the ordinance would: Ordinance 17304, if approved, would take on the force oflaw and govern what King County can and cannot do with respect to the levy lid lift. Sane Transit v. Sound Transit, 151 Wn.2d 60, 71-73, 85 P.3d 346(2004); cf. Amalg. Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wn.2d 183, 205, 11 P.3d 762(2000) (recognizing that "a statute [is] enacted through the initiative process"(citing Brower v. State, 137 Wn.2d 44, 52, 969 P.2d 42(1998); Gerberding v. Munro, 134 End Prison Industrial Complex v. King County, No. 95307-4

Wn.2d 188, 196, 949 P.2d 1366(1998); State ex rel. O'Connell v. Meyers, 51 Wn.2d 454,458, 319 P.2d 828 (1957))). And Ordinance 17304 does not describe the tax increase structure that EPIC advances. Instead, it describes the taxation structure that King County has implemented. We apply our usual rules of statutory interpretation to laws, like Ordinanee 17304, enacted by the people. Amalg. Transit Union, 142 Wn.2d at 205 (eiting Seeberv. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n,96 Wn.2d 135, 139,634 P.2d 303(1981); Gibson v. Dep't ofLicensing, 54 Wn. App. 188, 192, 773 P.2d 110(1989)); see also Dep't ofEcology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 11-12, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)(holding that a statute's plain meaning is determined by its text and context). Under those rules, a ballot title may aid interpretation ofthe underlying measure.^ But we will not consult the ballot title when the meaning ofthe underlying measure is plain. ^ Cf Amalg. Transit Union, 142 Wn.2d at 205-06 ("[I]f there is ambiguity in the enactment, the court may examine the statements in the voters pamphlet in order to determine the voters' intent."(citing State v. Thorne, 129 Wn.2d 736, 763,921 P.2d 514 (1996); Biggs v. Vail, 119 Wn.2d 129, 134, 830 P.2d 350(1992); Lynch v. Dep't ofLabor & Indus., 19 Wn.2d 802, 812-13, 145 P.2d 265 (1944))).

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In this case, the meaning of Ordinance 17304 is plain. Section 3 contains the levy lid lift that voters authorized. That section describes the levy lid lift as "a regular property tax levy in excess ofthe levy limitation contained in chapter 84.55 RCW for nine consecutive years, commencing in 2012, with collection beginning in 2013, at a rate in the first year not to [sic] $0.07 per one thousand dollars of assessed value." CP at 92(Ordinance 17304). That text indicates that the ordinance would authorize a tax increase "for nine consecutive years." Id. There is nothing ambiguous about that. Nor is there anything ambiguous about how high the ordinance would lift the levy lid: "$0.07 per one thousand dollars of assessed value." Id. Context confirms what is apparent in the text ofsection 3. Ordinance 17304 describes the levy lift as lasting nine years. Id. at 88, 91. It also contains suggested ballot title language confirming that the levy lid lift lasts for nine years [This proposition] would authorize King County to levy an additional regular property tax of $0.07 per $1,000 of assessed valuation for collection in 2013. The 2013 levy ^ EPIC urges us to overlook the suggested language because it is "not part ofthe law, since only the prosecuting attorney may draft the ballot title." EPIC's Suppl. Br. at 15. We do not think it appropriate to ignore the suggested language, however. It is, after all, an attempt by the drafters to describe the effect ofthe levy lid lift authorized under section 3.

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amount would become the base upon which levy increases would be computed for each of the eight succeeding years Id. at 93 (Ordinance 17304). That description aligns with section 3 and unambiguously contemplates the taxation structure that King County has implemented. See supra pp. 5-6 (describing King County's implementation of the levy lid lift). Indeed, EPIC recognizes as much. BPIC's Suppl. Br. at 6-7. Accordingly, Ordinance 17304 placed the people on notice of King County's plan. Anybody who thought that the ballot title failed to expressly state something that former RCW 84.55.050 required could have raised that objection when the ordinance and the ballot title first became public, in 2012. BPIC's argument—that RCW 29A.36.090's 10-day time limit should not apply to its claim because nobody could have known what King County would do—therefore fails. III. RCW 29A.36.090's 10-Day Time Limit Applies to Objections to Ballot Titles Based on Former RCW 84.55.050 EPIC also contends that RCW 29A.36.090's 10-day time limit should not apply to its claim because RCW 29A.36.090 does not apply to objections to ballot titles based on former RCW 84.55.050.

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Former RCW 84.55.050 is complicated. As relevant to this case, its subsections (3),(4), and (5)require a ballot title for a levy lid lift to contain an express statement in certain instances. Subsection (3), for example, states. After a levy authorized pursuant to this section is made, the dollar amount of such levy may not be used for the purpose of computing the limitations for subsequent levies provided for in this chapter, unless the ballot proposition expressly states that the levy made under this section will be used for this purpose. ^ Subsections(4) and (5) of former RCW 84.55.050 state, (4)If expressly stated, a proposition placed before the voters under subsection (1) or(2) of this section may: (a) Use the dollar amount of a levy under subsection (1) of this section, or the dollar amount of the final levy under subsection (2) of this section, for the purpose of computing the limitations for subsequent levies provided for in this chapter; (b) Limit the period for which the increased levy is to be made under (a) of this subsection; (c) Limit the purpose for which the increased levy is to be made under (a) of this subsection, but if the limited purpose includes making redemption payments on bonds, the period for which the increased levies are made shall not exceed nine years; (d) Set the levy or levies at a rate less than the maximum rate allowed for the district; or (e)Include any combination of the conditions in this subsection. (5) Except as otherwise expressly stated in an approved ballot . measure under this section, subsequent levies shall be computed as if: (a) The proposition under this section had not been approved; and (b) The taxing district had made levies at the maximum rates which would otherwise have been allowed under this chapter during the years levies were made under the proposition.

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(Emphasis added.) When this express-statement requirement applies, the ballot title must comply with it. EPIC argues that objections based on a ballot title's noncompliance with former RCW 84.55.050 are not subject to RCW 29A.36.090 because RCW 29A.36.090 directs a superior court hearing a ballot title objection to "certify to and file with the county auditor a ballot title that it determines will meet the requirements of this chapterP (Emphasis added.) We agree that a superior court must ensure that an objected-to ballot title complies with chapter 29A.36 RCW. That directive does not, however, limit the superior court's ability to ensure that an objected-to ballot title also complies with any other applicable requirements, including those in former RCW 84.55.050. Indeed, RCW 29A.36.090 permits "any . . . dissatisfied" person to object to a local ballot title. That language is broad and does not limit dissatisfactions or objections to those rooted in chapter 29A.36 RCW. EPIC further asserts that objections based on former RCW 84.55.050 are not subject to RCW 29A.36.090's 10-day time limit because former RCW 84.55.050 does more than regulate levy lid lift ballot titles. In EPIC's view, former RCW 84.55.050 imbues the ballot title for a levy lid lift with the force of law. EPIC End Prison Industrial Complex v. King County, No. 95307-4

argues that the phrases "unless the ballot title expressly states," "[i]f expressly stated," and "[ejxcept as otherwise expressly stated" of subsections (3),(4), and (5), respectively, demonstrate that unless the ballot title satisfies the express- statement requirement, a local government's taxing authority is limited. The phrases that EPIC highlights contain strong language, to be sure. But they do not change the fact that a challenge to what a "ballot title expressly state[s]" constitutes a ballot title challenge. And the legislature mandated that ballot title challenges must be brought within 10 days and resolved before the election. RCW 29A.36.090. Moreover, as this case demonstrates, making ballot title objections based on former RCW 84.55.050 subject to the statutory 10-day time limit makes sense from a policy perspective. The levy lid lift at issue in this case increased property taxes to fund a construction project estimated to cost between $200 million and $210 million. CP at 92(Ordinance 17304). As of February 2015, approximately 14 months before EPIC filed its complaint. King County fonned a $154 million contract with a construction company to carry out the project's design and building work. Pet. for Review (Deck of Jim Burt, App. C). As of February 2017, only 10 months after EPIC filed its complaint. King County had already spent more End Prison Industrial Complex v. King County, No. 95307-4

than $31 million on the construction project. Id. If a levy lid lift ballot title were to carry substantive force under former RCW 84.55.050, as EPIC believes it does, and if a ballot title's compliance with former RCW 84.55.050 were subject to adjudication years after the voters approved the levy lid lift, local governments' plans and finances could be thrown into disarray. That, of course, would undermine the will ofthe voters. IV. Our Precedent Requires Objectors To Raise Statutory Ballot Title Challenges within the Statutory Time Limit Finally, EPIC contends that we have previously resolved ballot title objections after an election has taken place and that applying RCW 29A.36.090's 10-day time limit to its claim would break with that precedent. EPIC relies on our decisions in Washington Ass'nfor Substance Abuse & Violence Prevention v. State, 174 Wn.2d 642, 278 P.3d 632(2012)(WASAVP); City ofBurien v. Kiga, 144 Wn.2d 819, 31 P.3d 659(2001); Amalgamated Transit Union, 142 Wn.2d 183; and City ofSequim v. Malkasian, 157 Wn.2d 251, 138 P.3d 943 (2006), for this argument. Those cases do not support EPIC's contention. To start, WASAVP involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a voter-enacted measure on the grounds that End Prison Industrial Complex v. King County, No. 95307-4

it failed to comply with the "single-subject and subject-in-title rules found in article II, section 19 of the Washington State Constitution." 174 Wn.2d at 646. Because that constitutional provision applies equally to the legislature's work as to the people's work and because the legislature may amend the titles of bills as it considers them, see, e.g., 1 Senate JOURNAL, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 427(Wash. 2008)(recording Senate's approval of motion to amend bill title); Engrossed S.B. 6641, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess.(Wash. 2008), we have always permitted claims based on article II, section 19 to be raised postenactment. Cf. Brown v. Owen, 165 Wn.2d 706, 720-24, 206 P.3d 310(2009)(detailing limits on the judiciary's ability to examine the internal workings of the legislature). WASA VP did not involve an objection to a voter-enacted law on the basis that its ballot title failed to comply with statutory requirements. Our decisions in Kiga and Amalgamated Transit Union are similar to our decision in WASA VP in that respect. They resolved postenactment, article II, WASA VP did not involve an objection to a voter-enacted law on the basis that its ballot title had failed to comply with former ROW 84.55.050's express-statement requirement. But the voter-enacted law at issue in that case was not a property tax inerease, so former ROW 84.55.050 had no bearing on the ballot title. 174 Wn.2d at 646-47 (describing an initiative concerning liquor laws).

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section 19 constitutional challenges. Kiga, 144 Wn.2d at 822-23; Amalg. Transit Union, 142 Wn.2d at 206-27. They did not involve objections based on statutory requirements.'^ Kiga, 144 Wn.2d at 822-23; Amalg. Transit Union, 142 Wn.2d at 206-27. Our decision in Malkasian did not involve an objection to a ballot title based on statutory requirements either.'^ That decision addressed the scope of the local initiative power. 157 Wn.2d at 254. We noted that whether a court considered that question preenactment or postenactment,"the subject matter of the initiative is either proper for direct legislation or it is not." Id. at 260 (citing Coppernoll v. Reed, 155 Wn.2d 290, 299, 119 P.3d 318 (2005)). And if a local initiative exceeds the scope ofthe local initiative power, superior courts can grant relief either " Kiga and Amalgamated Transit Union did not involve objections based on former RCW 84.55.050's express-statement requirement. But like WASAVP,they did not involve measures that would increase property taxes, so former RCW 84.55.050 had no bearing on the ballot titles. Kiga, 144 Wn.2d at 822-23 (describing an initiative concerning the reduction and limitation of property taxes); Amalg. Transit Union, 142 Wn.2d at 193 (describing an initiative concerning license tab fees). Like the other three decisions on which EPIC relies, Malkasian could not have involved an objection based on former RCW 84.55.050's express-statement requirement because the measure at issue in that case would not have increased property taxes. 157 Wn.2d at 255 (describing an initiative concerning voter ratification of city-issued bonds).

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preenactment(by ordering it off the ballot) or postenactment(by striking down the measure). Id. at 260-61. But postenactment review of that type does not involve the ballot title's clarity or accuracy—issues that are subject to quick and conclusive resolution. RCW 29A.36.090. In fact, another decision, Washington Federation ofState Employees v. State, shows precisely how our review of these types of claims differs. 127 Wn.2d 544, 901 P.2d 1028 (1995). In that case, we addressed a postenactment challenge to the constitutionality of a voter-enacted law under article II, section 19 ofthe Washington Constitution. Id. at 555-57. At the same time, we declined to consider the postenactment objection to the law's ballot title based on its alleged noncompliance with the clarity and accuracy requirements of former RCW 29.79.040 (1992). Id. at 560.'^ Thus, Washington Federation confirms that Former RCW 29.79.040(1992) is substantively similar to current statutory accuracy and clarity requirements: it required the ballot title at issue in Washington Federation to be true, impartial, and concise. 127 Wn.2d at 557-58. We held that the objectors' "failure to timely challenge the ballot title [before the election] under [former RCW 29.79.060 (1992)] preclude[d] their claim of noncompliance with [former] RCW 29.79.040." Id. at 560. Just as former RCW 29.79.040 is substantively similar to present statutory accuracy and clarity requirements, former RCW 29.79.060 is substantively similar to current RCW 29A.36.090. Former RCW 29.79.060 provided a five-day window within which to object to a ballot title drafted by the attorney general, and it directed the superior court to give "first priority" to resolving the objections. Like End Prison Industrial Complex v. King County, No. 95307-4

challenges to a ballot title based on failure to comply with statutory accuracy and clarity requirements must be raised during the statutory time limit. Conclusion We hold that EPIC's claim is untimely. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the superior court is affirmed. current RCW 29A.36.090, former RCW 29.79.060 provided that the superior court's resolution of the objections would be "final."

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WE CONCUR: Nk AJrsryvN^ i