San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-18-00980-CV
IN RE Crystal Gayle CALDWELL-BAYS
Original Habeas Proceeding 1
Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Irene Rios, Justice
Delivered and Filed: March 6, 2019
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS DENIED
Crystal Gayle Caldwell-Bays (“Crystal”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus asserting the trial court abused its discretion by entering an order holding her in both civil and criminal
contempt and confining her to county jail. The dispute centers on whether Crystal violated the terms of two Standing Orders by “encumbering” real property that she owns. Because we conclude
Crystal violated the terms of the Standing Orders, we deny her petition for writ of habeas corpus.
BACKGROUND
On August 19, 2014, Crystal acquired an interest in property located at 916 Lytle Street, Kerrville, Texas (“the Lytle Property”). On September 30, 2014, Crystal acquired an interest in property located at 160 Cherry Bluff Ridge, Comfort, Texas (“the Cherry Bluff Ridge Property”).
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[*3]real estate broker shall be an active member in the Multiple Listing Service with the Kerrville Board of Realtors; (3) [Crystal and Marvin] shall both be notified on any and all showings, offers, and contracts; and (4) The net sales proceeds . . . shall be deposited into the Registry of this Court until further order of the Court.
On May 14, 2018, Crystal and her attorneys entered into an Amended Agreement in which she represented she was the sole owner of the Lytle Property and the Cherry Bluff Ridge Property.
She agreed these properties would serve as security for attorney’s fees and costs due or that may come due, and she agreed to execute all documents necessary to effectuate the agreement.
Additionally, she agreed that if she had an outstanding balance for the payment of fees and costs as of July 31, 2018, she would immediately place the Cherry Bluff Ridge Property on the market to be sold.
On May 30, 2018, the trial court granted Marvin’s motion for partial summary judgment.
On August 28, 2018, Crystal executed a Deed of Trust on the Cherry Bluff Ridge Property to secure payments owed to her attorneys. A month later, Marvin filed a “Motion for Enforcement by Contempt.” Marvin alleged the following two violations of the decretal paragraphs in both
Standing Orders that ordered the parties to refrain from “destroying, removing, concealing, encumbering, transferring, or otherwise harming or reducing the value of the property of one or both parties”:
Violation 1. On May 14, 2018, Crystal knowingly violated the Court’s Order by executing an “Amended Agreement” with Fullenweider Wilhite, PC once again, agreeing to encumber the properties located at [Lytle Street] and [Cherry Bluff Ridge] in violation of the Standing Orders.
Violation 2. On August 28, 2018, Crystal knowingly violated the Court’s Order by encumbering and transferring [the Cherry Bluff Ridge Property] by Deed of Trust to Patrick Upton, Trustee, for Fullenweider Wilhite, P.C. as beneficiary in violation of the Standing Orders.
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Marvin also alleged the following two violations of the decretal paragraph of the Order
to Sell Property that required Crystal to list the property; provide notice of any showings, offers, or contracts; and deposit the net sales proceeds into the court’s registry:
Violation 3. On and after May 4, 2018, Crystal knowingly violated the Court’s Order by failing to list the property located at [Lytle Street].
Violation 4. On and after May 4, 2018, Crystal knowingly violated the Court’s order by failing to notify [Marvin] of any and all showings, offers, and contracts.
On December 10, 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing on Marvin’s “Motion for Enforcement by Contempt.” That same day, the trial court signed an “Order Holding [Crystal] in Contempt, Granting Judgment, and for Commitment to County Jail” (“the Contempt Order”). The trial court found Crystal guilty of the four violations alleged by Marvin and held Crystal in both criminal and civil contempt for each separate violation. For criminal contempt, the trial court ordered Crystal held in county jail for three days for each violation, beginning at 9:00 a.m. on
December 20, 2018, each period of confinement to run concurrently. For civil contempt, the trial court ordered Crystal confined to county jail for a period not to exceed eighteen months or until
she complied with the following order: obtain from Patrick Upton, Trustee, for the benefit of Fullenweider Wilhite, P.C., a full and unconditional release of the Deed of Trust encumbering the Cherry Bluff Ridge Property “and all other liens” on the Cherry Bluff Ridge Property and the Lytle
Property. The trial court also signed a Writ of Commitment commanding any sheriff or constable to take Crystal into custody.
Crystal filed her petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court on Friday, December 21, 2018, at 3:59 p.m. Due to the late hour and impending Christmas break, this court issued an order on December 21st requesting a response and ordering Crystal released from custody pending final resolution of her petition and the payment of a $4,500.00 cash bond. Marvin subsequently filed a response, to which Crystal replied.
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In her petition, Crystal raises several complaints about the Contempt Order. Her complaints, generally, are that the Standing Orders and Order to Sell Property no longer applied after the informal marriage portion of the case was disposed of via the partial summary judgment; the Standing Orders and Order to Sell Property are not reasonably specific; there is no evidence she violated the Standing Orders and Order to Sell Property; and the Contempt Order is void.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is not to determine the guilt of the contemnor. See
Ex parte Gordon, 584 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1979) (orig. proceeding). A court will issue a writ
of habeas corpus if the contempt order is void. Id. “An order is void if it is beyond the power of the court to enter it, or if it deprives the contemnor of liberty without due process of law.” In re
Stein, 331 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, orig. proceeding) (per curiam). We do not weigh the evidence in reviewing the trial court’s ruling; instead, we determine
only if there is no evidence to legitimize the trial court’s finding of contempt. Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257, 261-62 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding).
Contempt is classified into either civil or criminal contempt. In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 365 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding). The distinction between civil and criminal contempt is based
on the nature and purpose of the penalty imposed. Civil contempt is remedial and coercive in nature—the confinement is conditioned on obedience with the court’s order. Id. Criminal contempt, on the other hand, is punitive in nature, and the court punishes the contemnor for a completed act or omission rather than ordering her confined to compel compliance with an existing order. Id. “A criminal contempt conviction for disobedience to a court order requires proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of: (1) a reasonably specific order; (2) a violation of the order; and (3) the willful intent to violate the order.” Chambers, 898 S.W.2d at 259.
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“To be enforceable by contempt, [the underlying order] must set out the terms for compliance in clear and unambiguous terms.” Ex parte Brister, 801 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tex. 1990)
(orig. proceeding). “The [underlying order] must also clearly order the party to perform the required acts.” Id. The order must be sufficiently specific such that the person charged with obeying it will readily know exactly what duties and obligations are imposed. Chambers, 898
S.W.2d at 260. If the court’s underlying order requires inferences or conclusions about whether particular conduct is encompassed by the order and concerning which reasonable persons might differ, the order is insufficient to support a contempt judgment. Id.
Contempt orders involving confinement may be reviewed by writ of habeas corpus. Tracy v. Tracy, 219 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.); see also In re Long, 984 S.W.2d
623, 625 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); Ex parte Williams, 690 S.W.2d 243, 243 n.1
(Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding). Contempt orders are not appealable and, as such, no adequate remedy by appeal exists. In re Braden, 483 S.W.3d 659, 662 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2015, orig. proceeding) (per curiam). Because Crystal does not have an adequate remedy by appeal, the only remaining question is whether she has shown the contempt order is unenforceable.
If the trial court’s contempt order in this case is not void, then the trial court did not abuse its discretion. In re Office of Atty. Gen., 422 S.W.3d 623, 628 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding).
WHETHER THE STANDING ORDERS APPLY TO AN ALLEGED MARRIAGE
Crystal’s first three issues challenge the Standing Orders as they apply to an alleged marriage. She first asserts there is no evidence she violated the Standing Orders because they apply only to “both parties to the marriage” and there is no indication they apply to “both parties
to an alleged marriage.” Crystal contends that because Marvin has consistently denied the existence of any marriage and the trial court has not adjudicated them to be married, the orders do not apply. Alternatively, Crystal asserts that if the Standing Orders do apply, they became 04-18-00980-CV inapplicable after the summary judgment disposed of the issue of an informal marriage. According to Crystal, the following language in the Standing Orders, when read together, contemplate that the orders terminated on May 30, 2018, when the trial court rendered the partial summary judgment: 04-18-00980-CV
[*7][*8]the pleadings was the case he was called upon to defend. See Bones, 741 S.W.2d at 622. Marvin defended against Crystal’s case, in part, by denying the existence of a marriage. Therefore, Marvin’s denial of any marriage did not change the nature of the case filed by Crystal. Nor did the partial summary judgment affect the applicability of the Standing Orders. The partial summary
judgment is an interlocutory order that is not yet final; therefore, there is no “final judgment” or “final decree” on the issue of whether the parties were married. Finally, Crystal’s argument ignores the pending suit affecting the parent-child relationship and the Children Standing Order
that prohibits both parties from “encumbering . . . the value of the property of one or both of the parties.” Accordingly, we conclude the Standing Orders apply to the case filed by Crystal.
ENCUMBRANCE OF PROPERTY
Both Standing Orders provided as follows:
If this is a divorce case, both parties to the marriage are ORDERED to refrain from doing the following acts:
3.1 Destroying, removing, concealing, encumbering, transferring, or otherwise harming or reducing the value of the property of one or both parties.
The Amended Agreement provides in pertinent part that the two properties “shall serve
as security for the payment of attorney fees and cost” and Crystal “agree[d] to execute any and all documents necessary to effectuate [the] Amended Agreement.”
The trial court found the following two violations:
Violation 1. On May 14, 2018, Crystal knowingly violated the Court’s Order by executing an “Amended Agreement” with Fullenweider Wilhite, PC once again, agreeing to encumber the properties located at [Lytle Street] and [Cherry Bluff Ridge] in violation of the Standing Orders.
Violation 2. On August 28, 2018, Crystal knowingly violated the Court’s Order by encumbering and transferring [the Cherry Bluff Ridge Property] by Deed of Trust to Patrick Upton, Trustee, for Fullenweider Wilhite, P.C. as beneficiary in violation of the Standing Orders.
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In her fourth issue regarding Violation 1, Crystal asserts there is no evidence she violated the Standing Orders’ prohibition against encumbering the Cherry Bluff Ridge Property or the Lytle
Property because she did not “encumber” the properties, she merely “agreed” to encumber the properties. Crystal contends the Amended Agreement does not constitute a violation of paragraph
3.1’s prohibition against “encumbering” property because the agreement does not constitute an actual encumbrance of the properties. Other than these conclusory contentions, Crystal provides no authoritative support for her argument as to Violation 1. Therefore, this issue is inadequately briefed.
Execution of the August 28, 2018 Deed of Trust was the subject of Violation 2. Crystal does not dispute that the August 28, 2018 Deed of Trust is an encumbrance of the Cherry Bluff
Ridge Property, and, at the hearing, she admitted she executed a deed of trust in favor of her attorneys. The deed states, in pertinent part, as follows:
This Deed of Trust secures: [1] the payment of the retainer due to Fullenweider Wilhite, P.C., in the amount of $15,000.00, as set forth in the Agreement; [2] the payment of all fees and expenses due to Fullenweider Wilhite, P.C., under the terms of the Amended Agreement at the time this this [sic] Deed of Trust is executed, [3] all fees and expenses that come due under the terms of the Amended Agreement; and [4] the performance of covenants and agreements under this Deed of Trust. ...
This deed of trust is given to comply with the Amended Agreement entered into between Crystal Bays and Fullenweider Wilhite, P.C., on May 21, 2018, wherein Fullenweider Wilhite, P.C., agreed to provide legal services pursuant to the terms of the Amended Agreement and Crystal Bays agreed to pay the firm in accord with the terms of the Amended Agreement as well as provide the property located at 160 Cherry Bluff Ridge, N. Comfort, Texas 78013, as well as provide such property as security for the payment of fees.
In support of her argument regarding Violation 2, Crystal relies on her arguments under her first three issues, which challenged whether the Standing Orders apply to an alleged marriage.