ARROWOOD, Judge.

Defendant J.D. (“Jeremy1”) appeals from an order finding him delinquent for the offenses of first-degree forcible sexual offense and second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor. For the following reasons, we reverse.

I. Background

IN RE: J.D.

Opinion of the Court

IN RE: J.D.

Opinion of the Court

IN RE: J.D.

Opinion of the Court

IN RE: J.D.

Opinion of the Court

IN RE: J.D.

Opinion of the Court

IN RE: J.D.

Opinion of the Court

IN RE: J.D.

Opinion of the Court

The facts presented at trial do not support Jeremy’s admission of guilt. The bicycle was stolen by two black males. Jeremy, a black male himself, was later found by officers biking down the road with two others who also matched the description. He was described by the prosecutor as “kind of off on his own” from the other two. When asked to stop by the officers, of the three, only Jeremy stopped. Jeremy told officers that he had not stolen the bicycle, that he knew who had, and admitted to having bolt cutters in his back pack. There was not a showing of the requisite intent that defendant intended to steal, or assist others in stealing, the bicycle. Defendant’s counsel argued that defendant loaned someone his book bag, who then placed bolt cutters inside it and left to “do their deed.” The State presented no evidence, except to mention that “I believe the property was recovered.” It is unclear where or from whom the bicycle was recovered. Because the State failed to present sufficient evidence that defendant attempted to steal the bicycle, the trial court erred in accepting Jeremy’s admission of attempted larceny. The adjudication for attempted larceny should be vacated.

IN RE: J.D.

Opinion of the Court

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.

At the end of the video, Jeremy turns his face back towards Dan and the cellphone and gives a “thumbs up” gesture, as he continues his thrusting motion. The video then ends. B. Zane’s Testimony Zane testified at the hearing as follows: He was asleep. He awoke to discover himself on his knees slumped over a piece of furniture, his pants were down, and Jeremy was thrusting into his bare buttocks. He felt someone else holding down the bottom of his legs, restraining his movements. He could feel Jeremy’s penis in his buttocks but did not believe that Jeremy’s penis penetrated his anal opening. Once he fully realized what was happening to him, he struggled and was able to push Jeremy off of him. Shortly thereafter, he, Jeremy, and the other boys went to sleep. He reported the incident sometime later after the video had been uploaded to the internet. C. Jeremy’s Pre-trial Statement Jeremy gave a statement during the investigation of the matter. He stated that the entire encounter was consensual. He described the encounter as “intercourse.” He stated that he had a partial erection and that he could feel his penis pressing against Zane’s anal opening as he was thrusting, but did not believe that his penis actually penetrated Zane’s anus. D. Dan and Carl’s Pre-trial Statements

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.

Dan and Carl were each interviewed by investigators prior to the hearing. Their recorded interviews were offered into evidence by the State without objection. Both testified that Zane had consented to the sexual encounter, that it was Zane’s idea, and that Zane pulled his own pants down. Both stated that they were uncomfortable about what was happening. Dan stated he began recording the encounter because he thought Jeremy and Zane were just joking around. Carl stated that he stood off in the corner because he felt uncomfortable. Both stated that they thought Jeremy and Zane were having “sex.” Dan stated that he understood that “sex” included “penetration.” However, neither witness stated that he was actually able to see exactly where Jeremy’s penis was in relation to Zane’s anal opening. Both described that they all went to sleep after the encounter. II. Analysis Jeremy makes a number of arguments on appeal contesting the trial court’s order. I address each in turn. A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Jeremy argues, and the majority agrees, that there was insufficient evidence that he engaged in the criminal conduct alleged in the petition. In determining whether there was sufficient evidence, our Court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the State.” In re Eller, 331 N.C. 714, 717, 417 S.E.2d 479, 481 (1992) (emphasis added). There was certainly conflicting evidence.

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.

But viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, I conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court judge could find that Jeremy committed these offenses, as explained below. ^[1]. First-Degree Forcible Sexual Offense To prove first-degree forcible sexual offense, the State must prove (a) that the defendant “engage[d] in a sexual act with another person,” (b) “by force and against the will of the other person,” and (c) that there existed at least one of three certain aggravating factors. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.26 (2015). a. Evidence of a Sexual Act The petition in this case alleges that Jeremy committed “anal intercourse[]”, which is a “sexual act” defined in Section 14-27.20(4) of our General Statutes. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.20(4) (2015) (defining “[s]exual act” as including “anal intercourse”). Jeremy argues, and the majority agrees, that there was insufficient evidence that Jeremy’s penis actually penetrated Zane’s anal opening. Indeed, “[a]nal intercourse requires penetration of the anal opening of the victim by the [defendant’s] penis[.]” State v. DeLeonardo, 315 N.C. 762, 764, 340 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1986) (emphasis added). However, the State need not prove that total penetration occurred;

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.

penetration can be very slight to satisfy this element. Id.; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.36 (2015) (“Penetration, however slight, is . . . anal intercourse.”)4. There was certainly some evidence that penetration did not occur. For instance, Zane himself testified that he did not believe that Jeremy penetrated him. However, Zane also stated that he was not fully awake during much of the assault. In any event, there was other evidence from which a fact-finder could find that slight penetration did occur, namely the cellphone video itself and Jeremy’s own statement. Regarding the cellphone video, it admittedly does not offer direct evidence of penetration, as the exact position of Jeremy’s penis is obscured by his pelvis pressed against Zane’s buttocks. The video, though, does constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence of penetration. Specifically, it shows the position and proximity of Jeremy to Zane and his constant thrusting motion towards Zane’s anus. Our Supreme Court has held that penetration can be proven by circumstantial evidence alone. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 310 N.C. 530, 534, 313 S.E.2d 571, 574 (1984) (holding that penetration in a rape prosecution can be proven either by direct testimony “or by circumstantial evidence”); State v. Santiago, 148 N.C. App. 62, 70, 557 S.E.2d 601, 607 (2001) (holding that “circumstantial evidence may be utilized” to prove penetration). Indeed, it is axiomatic in jurisdictions across our country that

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.

“[e]vidence of the condition, position, and proximity of the parties as testified to by eyewitnesses may afford sufficient [circumstantial] evidence of penetration” even where a view of the genitals is obscured. 81 C.J.S. Sodomy § 11, note 42 (1977).5 Accordingly, the video itself was sufficient for the trial court to make a finding that penetration occurred.^[6] Jeremy’s own statement, itself, is evidence of penetration: he admitted that he had a semi-erect penis; that his penis was pressing against Zane’s anus; that he was thrusting; and he described the encounter as “intercourse.” A fact-finder could infer

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.

from this statement that at least the tip of Jeremy’s penis slightly penetrated Zane’s anal opening, though his entire penis may not have penetrated. The trial court weighed what it saw in the video and Jeremy’s statements against the evidence suggesting that penetration did not occur, and the trial court found that at least slight penetration did occur. I see no error here. It is not our role to reweigh the evidence and make a different finding.^[7] b. Evidence of Force and Lack of Consent There was evidence that Zane had not given his consent to Jeremy’s actions and that Jeremy used some degree of force. Specifically, Zane testified at the hearing that the video did not depict the entire assault and that he was asleep when the assault started. He testified that he fully awoke to Jeremy pulling on his hair while thrusting his bare pelvis into Zane’s bare buttocks. Zane testified that he felt someone holding his legs down as the assault was occurring. Zane testified that he pushed Jeremy off of him soon after the recording stopped. There is nothing in the video itself which suggests conclusively that Zane was, in fact, participating willingly.

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.

And there is some evidence in the video that he was being subdued by Jeremy, as Jeremy is seen pulling on Zane’s hair. Admittedly, there was strong evidence that Zane was a willing participant. For instance, Jeremy, Carl, and Dan all stated during the investigation that the incident was Zane’s idea and that Zane and Jeremy each pulled their own pants down. But, again, factual discrepancies were for the trial court, and not our Court, to resolve. Therefore, I conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support that Jeremy acted with force and against Zane’s will. See State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980) (“Contradictions and discrepancies are for the [factfinder] to resolve and do not warrant dismissal.”). c. Evidence that Jeremy was Aided and Abetted The petition alleges that Jeremy committed the sexual act while “aided and abetted by one or more other persons[,]” which is an aggravating factor enumerated in Section 14-27.26(a)(3). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.26(a)(3) (2015). The trial court so found; and for the following reasons, I conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support this finding. Aiding and abetting has been described by our Supreme Court as follows: A person aids when being present at the time and place he does some act to render aid to the actual perpetrator of the crime, though he takes no direct share in its commission; and an abettor is one who gives aid and comfort, or either commands, advises, instigates or encourages another to commit a crime.

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.

State v. Holland, 234 N.C. 354, 358, 67 S.E.2d 272, 274-75 (1951). An individual’s mere presence during the commission of a crime, though, does not typically constitute aiding and abetting. State v. Hoffman, 199 N.C. 328, 333, 154 S.E. 314, 316 (1930). However, “when the bystander is a friend of the perpetrator and knows that his presence will be regarded by the perpetrator as an encouragement and protection, presence alone may be regarded as an encouragement.” State v. Goode, 350 N.C. 247, 260, 512 S.E.2d 414, 422 (1999). When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence supports an inference that Jeremy was aided and abetted by his cousin Dan. Specifically, the video depicts them in conversation which could be inferred as joking about the recording being made. Further, towards the end of the video, Jeremy gives Dan a “thumbs up” signal. A fact-finder could certainly infer from their tone and actions that Dan and Jeremy were joking with each other during the assault and that Dan was not simply a passive bystander, but rather a source of encouragement. Further, there was some evidence, though admittedly weak, from which one could infer that Carl aided Jeremy’s assault. Specifically, Zane testified that he felt his legs being held down by someone that he believed was not Jeremy during Jeremy’s assault, testimony which would support a finding that Carl was holding Zane down while Jeremy was engaged in the sexual assault. ^[2]. Sexual Exploitation of a Minor

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.

Sexual exploitation of a minor requires evidence that Jeremy “record[ed]” or “distribut[ed] . . . material that contains a visual representation of a minor engaged in sexual activity.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-190.17 (2017). It is undisputed that Jeremy did not personally record the incident, and there is no direct evidence that Jeremy participated in the publishing of the recording. But again, the evidence in the light most favorable to the State supports an inference that Jeremy acted in concert with Dan to record the incident. Under the acting in concert doctrine, an individual need not personally commit any portion of an alleged crime as long as he is (1) “present at the scene of the crime[,]” and (2) “acts [] together with another who does the acts necessary to constitute the crime pursuant to a common plan or purpose to commit the crime.” State v. Joyner, 297 N.C. 349, 357, 255 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1979). Our Supreme Court has held that a common plan or purpose may “be shown by circumstances accompanying the unlawful act and conduct of the defendant subsequent thereto.” State v. Westbrook, 279 N.C. 18, 42, 181 S.E.2d 572, 586 (1971). “The communication or intent to aid, if needed, does not have to be shown by express words of the defendant but may be inferred from his actions and from his relation to the actual perpetrators.” State v. Sanders, 288 N.C. 285, 290-91, 218 S.E.2d 352, 357 (1975). Here, Jeremy was indisputably present. Though Jeremy is heard telling Dan not to video the incident, a fact-finder could certainly infer from Jeremy’s tone and

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.

the position of the cellphone that Jeremy knew that he was being recorded and was in approval of the recording. Jeremy’s “thumbs up” gesture at the end of the recording can reasonably imply knowledge and approval and that he was working with Dan to get a recording of the assault. Certainly other inferences could be made from the evidence, but the resolution of conflicting inferences is for the trial court to sort out. B. Right of Confrontation The State offered into evidence the recordings of interviews of Carl and Dan, Jeremy’s cousins, by investigators. Jeremy did not object. Indeed, much of their testimony benefited Jeremy as they described the entire encounter as consensual. However, Jeremy argues that portions of their statements were harmful to him and that admission of these statements was in violation of his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him. Specifically, Jeremy contends that Carl and Dan provided some testimonial evidence that actual penetration by Jeremy’s penis of Zane’s anal opening occurred. The State contends that this issue is not properly before us on appeal, as Jeremy failed to object to the entry of Dan and Carl’s statements at trial. It is true that “[t]he constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him is a personal privilege which he may waive expressly or by a failure to assert it in apt time even in a capital case.” Braswell, 312 N.C. at 558, 324 S.E.2d at 246 (emphasis removed).

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.

However, Section 7B-2405 of our General Statutes provides that our courts are to protect the rights of a juvenile defendant during a delinquency hearing and has been considered a “statutory mandate.” Matter of J.B., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 820 S.E.2d 369, 371 (2018); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2405 (2015). “The plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2405 places an affirmative duty on the trial court to protect the rights delineated therein during a juvenile delinquency adjudication.” In re J.R.V., 212 N.C. App. 205, 210, 710 S.E.2d 411, 414 (2011). And, “when a trial court acts contrary to a statutory mandate and a defendant is prejudiced thereby, the right to appeal the court's action is preserved, notwithstanding defendant's failure to object at trial.” State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 39, 331 S.E.2d 652, 659 (1985). Therefore, this issue is properly before this Court. Section 15A-1443 provides that when a preserved issue is based on a statute, it is the defendant’s burden on appeal to show that there is a reasonable possibility that, but for the error, a different result would have occurred. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A- 1443(a) (2015). However, where the preserved issue is based on a constitutional right, the burden is on the State to show that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(b). Of course, some errors may be based on both a constitutional right and a statutory right. And it could be argued that the error Jeremy complains of is technically statutory in nature, and, therefore, Jeremy is only entitled to “reasonable

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.

possibility” review. That is, Jeremy has waived his constitutional argument by not objecting; and, therefore, it is only Jeremy’s statutory right under Section 7B-2405 that is preserved for appellate review. But our jurisprudence compels us to review violations of the statutory right under Section 7B-2405 with “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” review, which is otherwise reserved only for preserved constitutional errors. See In re J.B., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 820 S.E.2d 369, 371 (2018) (holding that “failure to follow the statutory mandate when conducting an adjudication hearing constitutes reversible error unless proven to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”). But even based on the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, I conclude that the inclusion of Dan and Carl’s statements which suggested that penetration occurred does not justify a new hearing. Indeed, neither boy described in any detail that they saw Jeremy’s penis actually penetrate Zane’s anus. Dan stated that he thought Jeremy and Zane were just joking around. Carl stated that he stood away from the action in the corner. Rather, I am convinced that the trial court made its finding regarding penetration based on the video itself, which provided no better view than the view Dan and Carl had, and based on Jeremy’s own admission that he could feel his penis press against Zane’s anal opening while he was thrusting, something that Carl and Dan could not see from their vantage points. C. Attempted Larceny Admission

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.

Sometime after the adjudication but before the disposition hearing, Jeremy allegedly stole a bicycle. At the disposition hearing, Jeremy admitted to attempting the theft, as he was caught with bolt cutters next to a bicycle. The trial court used Jeremy’s admission to the attempted larceny to support its ultimate disposition. Jeremy argues, and the majority agrees, that there was an insufficient factual basis to support the admission, and therefore the trial court should not have accepted Jeremy’s admission. I disagree. To be sure, the trial court must determine that there is a sufficient factual basis for a juvenile’s admission of guilt before accepting the admission, though this factual basis may be based on statements presented by the attorneys. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2407(c) (2017); In re C.L., 217 N.C. App. 109, 114, 719 S.E.2d 132, 135 (2011). Attempted larceny requires proof that the defendant took affirmative steps, but did not succeed, to take another’s property with no intent to return it. See State v. Weaver, 123 N.C. App. 276, 287, 473 S.E.2d 362, 369 (1996) (reciting elements of attempted larceny). In this matter, the trial court heard a recitation of facts from the State regarding Jeremy’s attempted theft of the bicycle before accepting Jeremy’s admission of guilt. The recitation showed that two young males stole a bicycle using bolt cutters. Jeremy was later found by police in the company of two young males

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.

matching the description of the thieves. Jeremy admitted to knowing about the theft and was found to be in possession of the bolt cutters which were used to facilitate the larceny. The stolen bicycle was ultimately recovered. I conclude that this recitation is sufficient to show that Jeremy directly participated, or at least acted in concert, in the commission of the attempted theft of the bicycle. Indeed, Jeremy’s attorney and his parents each stated that Jeremy was present when the bicycle was stolen and was found in actual possession of the bolt cutters. See State v. Agnew, 361 N.C. 333, 336, 643 S.E.2d 581, 583 (2007) (“The [] sources listed in [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(c)] are not exclusive, and therefore the trial judge may consider any information properly brought to his attention.”); In re Mecklenburg Cty., 191 N.C. App. 246, 248, 662 S.E.2d 570, 572 (2008) (acknowledging the parallels between N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-2407 and 15A-1022). D. Level 3 Order Jeremy next makes essentially three arguments with respect to his Level 3 disposition. I address each in turn. ^[1]. Sufficiency of the Findings First, Jeremy contends that the trial court failed to make required findings of fact as to each of the factors listed in Section 7B-2501 of our General Statutes. Whether the trial court properly complied with its statutory duty to make findings is

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.

a question of law to be reviewed de novo. See In re G.C., 230 N.C. App. 511, 516-17, 750 S.E.2d 548, 551 (2013). Under Section 7B-2501, the trial court is required to make findings of fact as to a number of enumerated factors regarding the best interests of the delinquent child and the protection of the public, as follows: (1) The seriousness of the offense; (2) The need to hold the juvenile accountable; (3) The importance of protecting the public safety; (4) The degree of culpability indicated by the circumstances of the particular case; and (5) The rehabilitative and treatment needs of the juvenile indicated by a risk and needs assessment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2501 (2017). Further, “[t]he dispositional order shall be in writing and shall contain appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2512 (2017). The trial court need not expressly track each of the factors enumerated in Section 7B-2501; rather, it need only enter “appropriate” findings. Matter of D.E.P., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 796 S.E.2d 509, 516 (2017). Here, the trial court checked form boxes indicating that the juvenile’s delinquency history level was “low,” and that it considered a number of reports and assessments submitted by the parties. It then added the following findings of fact in a space labeled “Other Findings:” Juvenile was adjudicated on a B1 felony. Juvenile’s level of regulation in the short term is low. Juvenile continued to engage in delinquent behavior despite this pending charge (see admission to attempted

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.

larceny, date of offense 4/7/17). Juvenile requires personal accountability for his actions. Juvenile requires more structure. Juveniles [sic] [Youth Detention Center] commitment and treatment will protect the public and provide juvenile the opportunity to mature regarding opportunistic and impulsive behavior. Jeremy cites a number of cases to show that the brevity of the trial court’s findings reflects a lack of appropriate consideration for each of the required factors. See Matter of I.W.P., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 815 S.E.2d 696, 704 (2018) (remanding for further findings where the trial court considered only three of the five factors in Section 7B-2501); In re V.M., 211 N.C. App. 389, 392, 712 S.E.2d 213, 216 (2011) (reversing and remanding where the trial court’s order contained insufficient findings of fact). But these cases are distinguishable from the case before us. For instance, in In re V.M., the trial court checked boxes indicating receipt of the parties’ documents and stated that “[t]he juvenile has been adjudicated for a violent or serious offense and Level [3] is authorized by G.S. 7B-2508,” but left the “Other Findings” space blank and made no additional findings of fact at all. In re V.M., 211 N.C. App. at 392, 712 S.E.2d at 215. Similarly, in Matter of I.W.P., the trial court made some findings of fact but failed to make findings as to the seriousness of the juvenile’s offense and his or her culpability. Matter of I.W.P., ___ N.C. App. at ___, 815 S.E.2d at 704. Here, though, not only did the trial court make multiple, additional findings of fact, but each of the five factors in Section 7B-2501 are reflected in the findings. The

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.

seriousness of the juvenile’s offense is listed as commission of a B1 felony. The findings show a high need to hold the juvenile accountable, as he continues to engage in delinquent behavior and requires accountability and structure. The findings show that Jeremy’s disposition will protect the public while he matures, develops personal accountability, and is prevented from continual delinquent behaviors. Jeremy’s culpability is described as adjudication of a violent offense for which he exhibits concerns with personal accountability. Lastly, the order shows that the trial court considered risks and needs assessments submitted by the parties and ultimately determined that commitment with the Youth Detention Center (“YDC”) would provide Jeremy an opportunity for treatment and positive growth and provide protection for the public. I conclude that the trial court’s findings were “appropriate” under Section 7B-2501. 2. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Those Findings Jeremy contends that the evidence did not support the trial court’s findings. I conclude that the evidence supported the trial court’s findings. Jeremy scored below the median score on an Adolescent Self-regulatory Inventory assessment, showing that “his levels of self-regulation are less developed in the short-term.” Further, Jeremy elected to engage in further delinquent behavior following the sexual assault. Though reports suggested that Jeremy had adequate supervision at home, there was evidence that Jeremy’s mother was unaware that the

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DILLON, J., dissenting.

assault had occurred within her home until two weeks after the event, that Jeremy was allowed to spend time with others who engaged in criminal activity, and that his mother referred to the assault as simply “kids being kids.” Psychological testing showed signs of immaturity, and Jeremy’s assessments concluded that his “risk factors suggest that his referring offense behaviors were opportunistic and impulsive.” The assessments also reflected that Jeremy only partially expressed remorse and/or guilt for his actions. The evidence shows that removing Jeremy from his current circumstances and committing him to the YDC would allow an opportunity to grow and mature away from a potentially negative environment. ^[3]. Sufficiency of Conclusions to Support Level 3 Disposition Jeremy contends that he “could have received a Level 2 disposition” and that a Level 2 disposition would have been “most appropriate in this case.” “The decision to impose a statutorily permissible disposition is vested in the discretion of the juvenile court and will not be disturbed absent clear evidence that the decision was manifestly unsupported by reason.” In re K.L.D., 210 N.C. App. 747, 749, 709 S.E.2d 409, 411 (2011); see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2506 (2017). Here, the trial court adjudicated Jeremy delinquent for commission of a Class B1 felony, and the trial court found that his delinquency history level was “low.” Class B1 felonies are considered “violent” offenses, and juveniles who commit violent offenses with a “low” delinquency history may receive either a Level 2 or 3 disposition.

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.

N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-2508(a), (f) (2017). Therefore, it was within the trial court’s discretion to enter a Level 3 disposition in this case. “The existence of [evidence of Jeremy’s good behavior], although it might have supported a decision by the trial court to impose a Level 2 disposition, does not support a conclusion that the trial court's decision to impose a Level 3 disposition was unreasonable.” Matter of D.E.P., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 796 S.E.2d 509, 516 (2017). E. Confinement Pending Appeal Upon entering his appeal, Jeremy also filed a motion requesting release from the YDC while his appeal was pending. The trial court entered an order denying this motion. Jeremy contends that the trial court failed to state compelling reasons for its denial, in violation of Section 7B-2605. I disagree.^[8] Section 7B-2605 of our General Statutes states that a juvenile must be released pending appeal, unless the trial court states written, compelling reasons otherwise: Pending disposition of an appeal, the release of the juvenile, with or without conditions, should issue in every case unless the court orders otherwise. For compelling reasons which must be stated in writing, the court may

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DILLON, J., dissenting.

enter a temporary order affecting the custody or placement of the juvenile as the court finds to be in the best interests of the juvenile or the State. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2605 (2017). While compelling reasons are required, the court need not be verbose. For instance, this Court has upheld denial of release pending appeal where the trial court simply listed that the defendant committed “first degree sex offenses with a child.” In re J.J.D.L., 189 N.C. App. 777, 781, 659 S.E.2d 757, 760-61 (2008). Most commonly, orders denying release are vacated where the trial court simply checks a box on a form in lieu of making any written findings at all. See In re J.J., Jr., 216 N.C. App. at 376, 717 S.E.2d at 66. Here, the trial court’s order acknowledged in writing that Jeremy had a “lack of structure in the home” and “continued delinquent behavior after being charged with a B1 felony.” Jeremy entered an admission of guilt in regard to his subsequent delinquent behavior following his adjudication for sexual offenses. Further, the order decrees that Jeremy “shall remain in [YDC custody] pending appeal for . . . protection of the public.” I conclude that the trial court’s order sufficiently noted compelling reasons for Jeremy’s continued confinement pending his appeal. III. Conclusion My vote is to affirm the order of the trial court. While I may have made different findings, there was evidence to support the findings that the trial court made. Accordingly, I dissent.

IN RE J.D.

DILLON, J., dissenting.