¹ We have not yet addressed whether 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c), which precludes removal of claims arising under the worker’s compensation laws of any state, applies when a plaintiff sues a non-subscriber under the Texas Worker’s Compensation Act. See Gomez v. O’Reilly Auto. Stores, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 3d 569, 572 (W.D. Tex. 2017). We do not address this issue here. Improper removal under § 1445(c) is a procedural defect that requires the non-removing party to move for remand within thirty days. Williams v. AC Spark Plugs No. 19-20670 arguing that it owed no duty to accommodate Poux’s medical restrictions, that it did not breach any duty owed to Poux, and that its alleged failure to accommodate Poux’s restrictions was not the proximate cause of Poux’s injuries. The district court granted Home Depot’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Milligan failed to meet her burden of showing that Home Depot had a duty to accommodate Poux’s health restrictions or raising a material fact dispute that Home Depot breached its duty to provide a reasonably safe work environment. Milligan timely appealed. II. Standard of Review We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and apply the same standard as the district court. Howell v. Town of Ball, 827 F.3d 515, 521 (5th Cir. 2016). In so doing, “[w]e view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Ferraro v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 796 F.3d 529, 531 (5th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “We may affirm for reasons other than those relied upon by the district court.” LLEH, Inc. v. Wichita Cty., 289 F.3d 358, 364 (5th Cir. 2002) (brackets omitted). III. Discussion Because Home Depot is a worker’s compensation non-subscriber, Milligan must establish negligence by Home Depot to recover. Werner v. Colwell, 909 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex. 1995). To establish negligence, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant had a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached that duty, and (3) damages proximately resulted from that breach. Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 793, 794 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 985 F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1993). Milligan did not move to remand and therefore waived that right. We thus have jurisdiction regardless of whether removal was appropriate. No. 19-20670 Milligan argues that “Home Depot had a duty to exercise ordinary care and abide by Poux’s prior health care accommodations which it had been aware of.” Texas law does impose a duty on employers to “use ordinary care in providing a safe workplace.” Elwood, 197 S.W.3d at 794. But Home Depot argues that this duty does not require employers to accommodate employees’ work restrictions. See generally Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 465 S.W.3d 193, 213 (Tex. 2015) (holding that, despite rules limiting an employer’s use of defenses based upon employee conduct, an employer owes no duty to an employee who was aware of the dangers associated with their job duties). Assuming arguendo that the duty to provide a safe workplace requires employers to accommodate employees’ health requirements,2 we hold that Milligan failed to raise a material fact dispute as to whether Home Depot failed to accommodate Poux’s work restrictions. Milligan argues that Home Depot did not adhere to Poux’s work restrictions because it put Poux to work in the lumber department, which she contends is Home Depot’s most physically strenuous department. While the lumber department does require some strenuous work, Milligan provided no evidence suggesting that Poux was required to do such work. The lumber department supervisor testified that the strenuous aspects of the job are lifting bags of concrete and loading wood into the back of customers’ trucks. But Poux was indoors cutting lumber with a wood saw at the time of his stroke.3 Milligan provided no evidence that cutting lumber with a wood saw contradicted Poux’s doctor’s recommendation that Poux do no work that required using more than twenty to thirty pounds of force.

² We do not decide whether an employer’s duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace requires an employer to accommodate an employee’s medical restrictions.

³ While there is some dispute as to what exactly Poux was doing at the time of his stroke, we view the “facts and evidence in the light most favorable to” Milligan. Ferraro, 796 F.3d at 531.