⁴ In 2003, the citizens of this Commonwealth voted to amend Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The amendment changed the right of an accused to confront his accuser “face to face” to the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Commonwealth v. Kriner, 915 A.2d 653, 660 (Pa. Super. 2007). Based on the hearing testimony discussed above, we discern no error in the trial court’s conclusion that J.H.’s testifying in Appellant’s presence would result in J.H. suffering serious emotional distress that would impair substantially her ability to communicate reasonably. Having satisfied this standard, Appellant’s right to confront the witnesses against him was not violated by J.H.’s closed-circuit television testimony, as Appellant had the - 11 - J-S24037-20 opportunity to observe and hear J.H., confer with counsel regarding his defense, and the examination and cross-examination of J.H. occurred as if she were in the courtroom. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to permit J.H. to testify by closed-circuit television pursuant to section 5985 did not violate the Confrontation Clause, and Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim. Expert testimony We next review Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth’s expert witness to testify “that Appellant had committed a sexual assault of the alleged victim, where that testimony went to the ultimate issue in the case and invaded the province of the jury[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 7. Specifically, Appellant argues that Dr. Elcock- Messam’s statement that the laceration was consistent with J.H.’s description of Appellant’s conduct was a determination that could have been made by the jurors based on their “common sense assessment of the facts, without the aid of expert testimony.” Appellant’s Brief at 32. We review this claim mindful of the following. The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not reverse a trial court’s decision concerning admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. An abuse of discretion will not be found based on a mere error of judgment, but rather exists where the court has reached a conclusion which overrides or misapplies the law, or where the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. To the extent that this case presents a question of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope is plenary. - 12 - J-S24037-20 Commonwealth v. Alicia, 92 A.3d 753, 760 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted). Pennsylvania courts permit expert testimony as an aid to the jury when the subject matter is distinctly related to a science, skill, or occupation beyond the knowledge or experience of the average layman. Conversely, expert testimony is not permitted on matters of common knowledge. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, [] 615 A.2d 1337, 1343 ([Pa. Super.] 1992). Expert testimony may not be used to bolster the credibility of witnesses because witness credibility is solely within the province of the jury. In determining the admissibility of expert testimony on matters related to sexual assaults, our courts have distinguished between testimony regarding physical facts and testimony regarding the behavior of victims. Generally, the conduct or behavior of victims has been held not to be a proper subject for expert testimony because such testimony tends to encroach upon the jury's function of evaluating witness credibility. Testimony regarding physical facts, however, has been held to be admissible. For example, in Hernandez, a panel of this Court held that “a pediatrician ..., qualified as a medical expert, may testify that the physical facts observed and reported by the treating physician were consistent with the allegation of anal sodomy.” Id. [] at 1343. In making this determination, we did not expressly state whether the pediatrician testified regarding the absence of evidence of physical trauma or the presence of such evidence. We also concluded that this testimony concerned a matter that was not within the common knowledge of an average juror. Id. Further, because the witness was informing the jury about objective and verifiable physical facts, we concluded that his testimony did not impermissibly withdraw “the issue of witness credibility from the jury.” Id. In other words, because the witness was testifying about the physical condition of the victim, the purpose of his testimony was not simply to bolster the credibility of the victim. Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Seigrist, [] 385 A.2d 405, 410 n. 7 ([Pa. Super.] 1978), we concluded that an expert medical witness could testify that the physical condition of an alleged rape victim was consistent with her rape allegations. - 13 - J-S24037-20 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 690 A.2d 274, 276 (Pa. Super. 1997). At trial, Dr. Elcock-Messam testified on direct examination and redirect examination that the laceration was consistent with J.H.’s proffered history of Appellant’s conduct, i.e., digital penetration of J.H.’s genitalia. N.T., 1/12/2017, at 31, 44. Specifically, the following exchanges occurred. [ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY (ADA)]: Within a reasonable degree of medical certainty is that scratch consistent with a fingernail? [DR. ELCOCK-MESSAM]: That scratch could be consistent with a fingernail. [ADA]: And within a reasonable degree of medical certain[t]y is that scratch consistent with digital penetration of the genitalia? [DR. ELCOCK-MESSAM]: Of the genitalia yes. [ADA]: And with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, doctor, is that scratch consistent with the history that [J.H.] gave you, what [J.H.] says happened to her? [DR. ELCOCK-MESSAM]: It is consistent with that history. *** [ADA]: So the labial adhesions were something else you found, but to keep our eye on the ball is the laceration consistent or inconsistent with digital penetration of the genitalia? [DR. ELCOCK-MESSAM]: It is consistent with digital penetration. Id. Appellant’s counsel did not object to this testimony at the time of trial. “We have long held that [f]ailure to raise a contemporaneous objection to the evidence at trial waives that claim on appeal.” Commonwealth v. - 14 - J-S24037-20 Thoeun Tha, 64 A.3d 704, 713 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Because Appellant’s counsel failed to object at trial, this claim is waived.7 Weight of the evidence We next review Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence for his convictions because “the Commonwealth presented [Stepmother] who clearly perjured herself, and there were glaring inconsistencies in the account of [J.H.]” Appellant’s Brief at 7. “A verdict is against the weight of the evidence ‘where certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.’” Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A.3d 298, 312 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 258 (Pa. Super. 2003)). We examine challenges to the weight of the evidence according to the following standard. A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. When a trial court considers a motion for a new trial based upon a weight of the evidence claim, the trial court may award relief only when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so 7Even if not waived, it was clearly the type of testimony that is permissible by an expert witness in a sexual abuse case. See Johnson, 690 A.2d at 276. Accordingly, Appellant would not be entitled to relief on this claim. - 15 - J-S24037-20 that right may be given another opportunity to prevail. The inquiry is not the same for an appellate court. Rather, when an appellate court reviews a weight claim, the court is reviewing the exercise of discretion by the trial court, not the underlying question of whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The appellate court reviews a weight claim using an abuse of discretion standard. Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1080 (Pa. 2017) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Instantly, Appellant raised boilerplate weight challenges in his post- sentence motion, arguably preserving this issue for appeal. See Post- Sentence Motion, 4/19/2017, at ¶¶ 5(VII), 5(VIII), 5(VIX). However, Appellant failed to raise a weight issue in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Scott, 212 A.3d at 1112 (observing that “issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived for review”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, this issue is waived. Sufficiency of the Evidence We next review Appellant’s claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his EWOC conviction. Appellant’s Brief at 8. The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for [that of] the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined - 16 - J-S24037-20 circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 192 A.3d 1149, 1155 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Instantly, the trial court found this issue waived because Appellant failed to specify which elements of which crimes he intended to challenge on appeal in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/16/2019, at 5; Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 10/18/2017, at ¶ 4 (“The evidence presented at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to support the convictions of the defendant on the charges of Aggravated Indecent Assault of Child, Indecent Assault Person Less than 13 Years of Age, Endangering Welfare of Children, Parent/Guardian/Other Commits Offense[.]”). We have repeatedly held that [i]n order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, an appellant’s [Rule] 1925(b) statement must state with specificity the element or elements upon which the appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient. … Therefore, when an appellant’s 1925(b) statement fails to specify the element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient[,] ... the sufficiency issue is waived on appeal. Commonwealth v. Ellison, 213 A.3d 312, 320-21 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, we agree with the trial court that Appellant has waived any sufficiency claim he attempted to raise in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. - 17 - J-S24037-20 However, Appellant’s purported sufficiency claim on appeal is actually a challenge to the grading of his EWOC conviction. See Appellant’s Brief at 33. “[A] claim that the court improperly graded an offense for sentencing purposes implicates the legality of a sentence. [A] challenge to the legality of sentence is never waived and may be the subject of inquiry by the appellate court sua sponte.” Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 198 A.3d 1112, 1123 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge to the grading of his EWOC conviction is properly before us, and we sua sponte review the grading of his convictions for aggravated indecent assault and indecent assault, as well. “Our standard of review is de novo, and the scope of our review is plenary.” Id. (citation omitted). Instantly, Appellant was charged with EWOC pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a), as a felony of the third degree. The version of the EWOC statute applicable from the time of Appellant’s conduct until his sentencing provided as follows. (a) Offense defined.-- (1) A parent, guardian or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of age, or a person that employs or supervises such a person, commits an offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or support. (2) A person commits an offense if the person, in an official capacity, prevents or interferes with the making of a report of suspected child abuse under 23 Pa.C.S. Ch. 63 (relating to child protective services). - 18 - J-S24037-20 (3) As used in this subsection, the term “person supervising the welfare of a child” means a person other than a parent or guardian that provides care, education, training or control of a child. (b) Grading.--An offense under this section constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree. However, where there is a course of conduct of endangering the welfare of a child, the offense constitutes a felony of the third degree. 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304 (effective 1/29/2007 to 8/27/2017).8 8 The current version of the statute altered subsection (b) as follows. (b) Grading.-- (1) Except as provided under paragraph (2), the following apply: (i) An offense under this section constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree. (ii) If the actor engaged in a course of conduct of endangering the welfare of a child, the offense constitutes a felony of the third degree. (iii) If, in the commission of the offense under subsection (a)(1), the actor created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, the offense constitutes a felony of the third degree. (iv) If the actor’s conduct under subsection (a)(1) created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury and was part of a course of conduct, the offense constitutes a felony of the second degree. (2) The grading of an offense under this section shall be increased one grade if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the child was under six years of age. 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304 (effective 8/28/2017). - 19 - J-S24037-20 According to Appellant, the evidence could not support a finding of course of conduct required for a third-degree-felony grading because the allegations comprised a single event, and thus he could only be charged and convicted of EWOC as a misdemeanor of the first degree. Appellant’s Brief at 33. In Commonwealth v. Popow, 844 A.2d 13 (Pa. Super. 2004), we addressed this issue. In that case, Popow was charged with various offenses including endangering the welfare of a child, following an altercation between him, his ex-girlfriend, and others. Id. at 15. At one point during the altercation, Popow picked up his four-year-old daughter, and when his ex-girlfriend and others tried to retrieve the child from him, Popow fell down a flight of stairs while holding the child. Id. Popow was convicted and sentenced on the endangerment charge graded as a felony. Id. On appeal, he challenged the legality of his sentence, asserting (1) neither the information nor the evidence made out a course of conduct that would raise the charge from a misdemeanor to a felony and (2) the jury was not instructed to make a finding on course of conduct. Id. We agreed, concluding that “in order to be graded as a third-degree felony, the Commonwealth must allege in the information and present evidence at trial of the additional factor of ‘course of conduct,’ and the jury must be instructed on such.” Id. at 18. We thus remanded for resentencing. Id. at 18. Hoffman, 198 A.3d at 1123-24. Here, Appellant proceeded to trial on charges of aggravated indecent assault of a child, indecent assault, and EWOC based on allegations of a single event wherein Appellant kissed J.H. and digitally penetrated her genitalia. At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence of that single event. The Commonwealth did not request, and the trial court did not provide, a jury instruction on course of conduct related to any of Appellant’s - 20 - J-S24037-20 charges. As such, we conclude that the trial court erred when it sentenced Appellant for EWOC as a felony of the third degree. See id. As noted supra, Appellant’s charge for indecent assault was amended at trial to indecent assault of a child pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7), graded as a felony of the third degree. The indecent assault statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows. (b) Grading.--Indecent assault shall be graded as follows: *** (3) An offense under subsection (a)(7) is a misdemeanor of the first degree unless any of the following apply, in which case it is a felony of the third degree: (i) It is a second or subsequent offense. (ii) There has been a course of conduct of indecent assault by the person. (iii) The indecent assault was committed by touching the complainant’s sexual or intimate parts with sexual or intimate parts of the person. (iv) The indecent assault is committed by touching the person’s sexual or intimate parts with the complainant’s sexual or intimate parts. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(b). The record does not support a finding that this was a second or subsequent offense, a course of conduct, or that Appellant’s sexual or intimate parts came into contact with J.H.’s. Accordingly, the trial court erred in sentencing Appellant for indecent assault as a felony of the third degree. - 21 - J-S24037-20 Based on the foregoing, we vacate the judgment of sentence imposed for EWOC and indecent assault and remand for resentencing with consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines for those charges graded as misdemeanors of the first degree. See Hoffman, 198 A.3d at 1125; 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304; 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(b). Because the trial court ordered Appellant’s sentences to run consecutively, we remand for resentencing on all counts,9 as our ruling may upset the court’s overall sentencing scheme.10 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Serrano, 61 A.3d 279, 287-88 (Pa. Super. 2013)). Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 8/7/20 9 In doing so, we observe that Appellant’s amended charge of aggravated indecent assault of a child was graded properly as a felony of the first degree. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(c)(2) (“An offense under subsection (b) is a felony of the first degree.”). 10 In light of our disposition, Appellant’s discretionary-aspects-of-sentencing claim is moot. See Commonwealth v. Tanner, 61 A.3d 1043, 1046 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2013). - 22 -