2020 IL 124940

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS (Docket No. 124940) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. DEMARIO D. REED, Appellant. Opinion filed December 3, 2020. JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Kilbride, Garman, Theis, and Neville concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Michael J. Burke specially concurred, with opinion. OPINION ¶1 This case presents the issue of whether a guilty plea prevents a defendant from asserting an actual innocence claim under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)). The Appellate Court, Fourth District, answered in the affirmative and affirmed the denial of defendant’s petition on this basis. See 2019 IL App (4th) 170090. For the reasons below, we reject the appellate court’s conclusion that a guilty plea forecloses a claim of actual innocence under the Act but nevertheless affirm the denial of defendant’s claim on the merits. ¶2 BACKGROUND ¶3 On September 29, 2014, defendant was charged by information with a count of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2014)) in that, while armed with a shotgun, defendant possessed less than 15 grams of cocaine. Defendant was also charged with unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (id. § 24-1.1(a)), unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2014)), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance (id. § 402(c)). ¶4 The charges were supported by an officer’s sworn testimony to the following. While patrolling in a marked patrol car, the officer observed several subjects sitting on the front porch of a residence located in an area that was viewed as a high-crime area and where large amounts of narcotics were sold. Upon seeing an officer exiting the car to make voluntary contact with the subjects, defendant jumped up and ran inside the house. The owner of the residence later informed the officer that defendant did not have permission to enter the residence. ¶5 The officer further observed that, as defendant jumped up, he grabbed the right side of his right leg just above the knee and continued to do so as he ran into the residence. The police report described defendant’s leg as stiff and not bending normally. ¶6 Soon after defendant ran inside, the second subject, Davie Callaway, fled from the couch into the dining room. The third subject stayed seated on the couch with his hands in the air. After the other subjects were secured, the officer located defendant lying facedown on a bed in a bedroom located on the southwest corner of the house. ¶7 The officers then searched defendant’s flight path, which was described by two witnesses inside the residence. By the bed in the northwest bedroom, officers recovered a cellophane wrapper for a cigarette pack that contained 0.4 grams of crack cocaine. Under the bed, the officers discovered a sawed-off shotgun that was

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situated in a manner that indicated it had been thrown underneath the bed. The police report noted moisture in the area of the barrels, which indicated that the shotgun had not been underneath the bed for very long and most likely had been left outside for a period of time. The officer further explained in the police report that “firearms are often concealed outside in a location that is quickly and easily accessible by the offender, but not actually possessed by the offender should the Police arrive.”

¶8 Upon a search incident to arrest, officers further found approximately 1.5 grams of suspected crack cocaine on Davie Callaway and a digital scale on defendant.

¶9 After defendant’s unsuccessful motion to dismiss the charges, the parties presented to the court a plea agreement under which defendant would plead guilty to one count of armed violence in exchange for a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. As its factual basis to support the plea, the State averred that “Officer Daniels would testify that he observed” “the defendant flee upon sight of him. The defendant was running oddly. When he entered the house, he located a shotgun and cocaine. The defendant was located in a bedroom, and the shotgun had the defendant’s DNA on it.” The court then properly admonished defendant pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 2012). After confirming the plea was made knowingly and voluntarily, the court accepted the plea and found defendant guilty of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2014)). On April 13, 2015, defendant was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. The court then granted the State’s motion to dismiss and strike the remaining counts against defendant.

¶ 10 Defendant’s initial post-conviction petition under the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)) asserted an actual innocence claim and an ineffective assistance of counsel claim but was summarily dismissed as frivolous. Subsequently, on January 20, 2016, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition asserting actual innocence. ^[1] Defendant specifically alleges that it is undisputed that he did not reside at the residence in which the gun and drugs were found and that he has “absolutely zero knowledge of what is within that residence.” Also, no DNA links defendant to the drugs. He

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further noted that the gun was found not on his person but under the bed in a different room from where he was apprehended.

¶ 11 Unlike his initial petition, defendant attached the affidavit of Davie Callaway to support his claim of innocence, which was dated October 15, 2015. Callaway averred that he was the sole owner of the cocaine found in the residence and that defendant had zero knowledge of the presence of cocaine in that residence. Callaway’s testimony lacked any reference to the shotgun.

¶ 12 The circuit court allowed leave to file the petition. The State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that defendant could not assert a freestanding claim of innocence. It relied on People v. Barnslater, 373 Ill. App. 3d 512, 527 (2007), rev’d on other grounds, People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 55, which stated in dicta that “defendant’s postconviction claim of actual innocence cannot be deemed to deprive him of his due process rights in the face of the fact that the defendant previously confessed to the commission of the crime in his plea.”

¶ 13 Defendant’s petition proceeded to a third stage evidentiary hearing, where Callaway testified in accordance with his affidavit. On cross-examination, Callaway admitted he did not write the affidavit until he was imprisoned with defendant. He further acknowledged speaking with defendant about his intention to provide the affidavit while imprisoned together but claimed that defendant never requested him to write it. Callaway explained that he felt bad that defendant was charged with possession because of him.

¶ 14 On January 20, 2017, the circuit court denied defendant’s petition. It found Callaway’s testimony was new but not credible, specifically noting that he did not come forward until after he pled guilty and was in the same prison as defendant. It also found that Callaway’s affidavit was not of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial because, at the time of defendant’s plea, defendant knew pointing the fault at codefendants for possessing the drugs was a viable defense. Defendant appealed.

¶ 15 The appellate court affirmed but on different grounds. It found that a valid guilty plea forecloses a post-conviction claim of actual innocence. See 2019 IL App (4th) 170090. In support of its holding, the appellate court relied upon People v. Cannon, 46 Ill. 2d 319, 321 (1970), wherein this court stated: “ ‘Before his plea of

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guilty was accepted, the defendant, represented by appointed counsel, was fully and carefully admonished by the trial judge, and in the light of that admonition, the defendant’s present [innocence] claim cannot be entertained.’ ” 2019 IL App (4th) 170090, ¶ 19 (quoting Cannon, 46 Ill. 2d at 321). Although it acknowledged this statement was obiter dicta, without an explicit decision from this court to the contrary, it found it was bound to follow Cannon. Therefore, in agreement with the First District in Barnslater, it found defendant’s innocence claim cannot be entertained because he knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty to the charge of which he now claims to be innocent. Id. ¶ 17. Furthermore, the appellate court found that to allow defendant to knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty and then turn around to complain to a reviewing court that the trial court found him guilty is “paradoxical if not duplicitous.” Id. ¶ 26. If there is any error, it is an error that defendant invited himself by pleading guilty to armed violence. Id.

¶ 16 We granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315 (eff. July 1, 2018).

¶ 17 ANALYSIS

¶ 18 This appeal arises from defendant’s post-conviction petition under the Act, which provides a statutory remedy to defendants who claim substantial violations of their rights occurred in the proceedings that resulted in their conviction. People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 21. A post-conviction petition is not a substitute for appeal but, rather, is a collateral attack. Id. Accordingly, issues that were raised and decided on direct appeal are barred by res judicata, and issues that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are forfeited. Id. ¶ 22. Defendant bears the burden of proving that a substantial violation occurred. Id. ¶ 21.

¶ 19 Over 20 years ago, in People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996), this court found a freestanding claim of actual innocence is cognizable under the Act. We reasoned that the “[i]mprisonment of the innocent would also be so conscience shocking as to trigger operation of substantive due process.” Id. at 487-88. Also, to ignore such a claim would be fundamentally unfair in terms of procedural due process. Id. at 487.

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¶ 20 This case presents the issue of whether a guilty plea prevents a defendant from asserting an actual innocence claim under the Act. This issue involves questions of law that are subject to de novo review. Brunton v. Kruger, 2015 IL 117663, ¶ 72.

¶ 21 The appellate court relied on Cannon, which considered claims in defendant’s petition that were not argued on appeal after determining the issue before the court lacked merit. Cannon, 46 Ill. 2d at 321. The Cannon court found the unargued claims “amount basically to an unsupported assertion that the accusation against him was false and that his daughter and two of his sons were coerced by threats from their mother, the defendant’s wife.” Id. The court further noted: “Before his plea of guilty was accepted, the defendant, represented by appointed counsel, was fully and carefully admonished by the trial judge, and in the light of that admonition, the defendant’s present claim cannot be entertained.” Id.

¶ 22 However, not all Illinois decisions agree that Cannon controls this issue. In People v. Shaw, 2019 IL App (1st) 152994, ¶ 54, the First District disagreed with the appellate court decision here and found that a guilty-plea defendant may bring an actual innocence claim without challenging the validity of the plea. It first determined that Washington made no distinction between defendants whose convictions arise out of a trial or out of a guilty plea in holding that “no person convicted of a crime should be deprived of life or liberty given compelling evidence of actual innocence” and that it believed the tenet should apply equally in either circumstance. (Emphasis omitted.) Id. ¶ 45. In explaining its departure from Reed, 2019 IL App (4th) 170090, the Shaw court found that the statement in Cannon was not only dicta but too imprecise to express this court’s explicit intention to create such a significant rule. Shaw, 2019 IL App (1st) 152994, ¶ 52. It also noted that Reed is only the third case to cite Cannon for any purpose and that no other case has read Cannon to create “a categorical bar.” Id. ¶ 49. Therefore, in light of this court’s more recent statements in Washington, Cannon’s dicta cannot be read to prohibit actual innocence claims following guilty pleas in all circumstances. Id. ¶ 52.

¶ 23 The issue of actual innocence was not briefed nor argued before the court and was not essential to the disposition in Cannon. As acknowledged by the Fourth and First Districts, Cannon’s statements are therefore dicta, which is not binding on this court. Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 236 (2010). This

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statement was made in the context of an unsupported claim and before this court recognized that a freestanding claim of innocence was cognizable under the Act as a matter of due process. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 487-88. We therefore find the scant analysis and resulting obiter dicta of Cannon does not control this case.

¶ 24 Consequently, the issue of whether defendants who plead guilty waive any claim of actual innocence under the Act is one of first impression. To determine whether there is waiver, we must consider the motives behind and consequences of a plea in light of the precise challenge asserted by an actual innocence claim. People v. Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d 54, 62 (2010). Issues of waiver are construed liberally in favor of the defendant. Id.

¶ 25 Negotiated guilty pleas are the result of an agreement between the State and defendant, in which both parties benefit and make concessions. People v. Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d 146, 151-52 (1989). The State benefits from the prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases, which preserves prosecutorial and judicial resources for cases in which there are substantial issues of proof. People v. Boyt, 109 Ill. 2d 403, 416 (1985); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). These benefits motivate the State to make certain concessions, including sacrificing the opportunity to present the entirety of the evidence, dismissal of certain charges, and ceasing further investigation that may result in additional charges.

¶ 26 Defendants also incur substantial benefits and burdens as the result of a plea agreement. To defendants’ benefit, they can obtain a favorable sentence and dismissal of other charges. Talarico v. Dunlap, 177 Ill. 2d 185, 195 (1997); People v. Jones, 144 Ill. 2d 242, 269-70 (1991). They also avoid the agony and cost of trial. Talarico, 177 Ill. 2d at 195; Brady, 397 U.S. at 752.

¶ 27 The consequences of a plea for a defendant, however, are severe. People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 326 (1996). A guilty plea is an admission of guilt and a conviction in and of itself. People v. White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶ 17 (“The plea obviates the prosecution’s burden of proof. It supplies both evidence and verdict, ending controversy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). It is specifically designed to waive the right to a jury trial, relieving the State of its burden to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d 543, 547 (2004) (citing Hill v. Cowan, 202 Ill. 2d 151, 154 (2002)). As such, by pleading, a defendant “waives all nonjurisdictional defenses or defects,” including

124946 constitutional ones. People v. Burton, 184 Ill. 2d 1, 27 (1998); Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d at 545.

¶ 28 Because a plea entails significant consequences for both parties, the State argues that defendant cannot now assert a claim of innocence. Specifically, the State highlights the defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial, to present defenses, and to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It also contends that allowing a claim of innocence would dissuade it from entering plea negotiations where the benefit of finality and certainty that motivates it to make concessions may be collaterally attacked. We disagree.

¶ 29 In Washington, this court held that our constitution affords additional due process when newly discovered evidence shows that a convicted person is actually innocent on the basis that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2; Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 487-89. We clarified that the claim does not depend on—and is separate from—a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence or an allegation of error in the court below. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 487.

¶ 30 In addressing the federal precedent on the matter, we explicitly rejected the notion that a defendant must be viewed as guilty absent a constitutional error in the underlying proceedings. Id. at 488. This is so because a strong claim of innocence undermines the legal construct that precludes a substantive due process analysis and dictates defendant be viewed as guilty. Id. At the point where the evidence undermines the court’s confidence in this legal construct, the additional due process afforded by our constitution is triggered. Id.

¶ 31 Upon a closer examination of Washington and the precise contentions of an actual innocence claim, the State’s arguments are unconvincing. Because the claim does not assert a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence or any error in the proceedings that led to the conviction (id.), defendant’s waiver of his right to challenge the State’s proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial should not impact his actual innocence claim. Significantly, the State and appellate court overlooked that a “ ‘truly persuasive demonstration of innocence’ ” breaks the barriers established by the legal construct that precludes a substantive due process

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analysis and dictates that the defendant be viewed as guilty. Id. We find this rationale applies with no less force in the context of guilty pleas.

¶ 32 The purpose of our criminal justice system is to seek justice. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975) (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)); Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 493 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring). Justice means not only punishing the guilty but also ensuring the innocent do not suffer. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 230 (citing Berger, 295 U.S. at 88). We note that, as a part of the criminal justice system, the prosecution has the same duty and interest in seeking the truth and justice. People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 73 (2008) (“The prosecutor’s interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

¶ 33 Plea agreements, while vital to our criminal justice system (Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 325), are not structured to “weed out the innocent” or guarantee the factual validity of the conviction (Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 788 (Iowa 2018)). See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (“ ‘To a large extent . . . horse trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel] determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is.’ ” (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992))); Brady, 397 U.S. at 757-58 (“This is not to say that guilty plea convictions hold no hazards for the innocent or that the methods of taking guilty pleas presently employed in this country are necessarily valid in all respects. This mode of conviction is no more foolproof than full trials to the court or to the jury.”). The plea system encourages defendants to engage in a cost-benefit assessment where, after evaluating the State’s evidence of guilt compared to the evidence available for his defense, a defendant may choose to plead guilty in hopes of a more lenient punishment than that imposed upon a defendant who disputes the overwhelming evidence of guilt at trial. See Jones, 144 Ill. 2d at 269; Brady, 397 U.S. at 756. As such, it is well accepted that the decision to plead guilty may be based on factors that have nothing to do with defendant’s guilt. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 757-58; Talarico, 177 Ill. 2d at 195. Empirical data related to exonerations further prove that innocent people plead guilty, as 18% of all exonerees and 11% of those exonerated through DNA pled guilty. Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Post-Conviction Relief After a Guilty Plea? 35 Crim. Just. 53, 55 (Summer 2020).

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¶ 34 Importantly, our rules allow the court to accept a plea of guilty even where defendant asserts his innocence, as long as a sufficient factual basis exists and the court satisfies the other requirements delineated in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 2012). People v. Gaines, 2020 IL 125165, ¶ 36. Unlike a conviction after trial, where the State’s evidence is scrutinized and must meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the factual basis to support the plea is held to a less stringent level of proof, requiring only a basis from which the court could reasonably conclude that defendant actually committed the acts constituting the offense to which defendant is pleading guilty. People v. Barker, 83 Ill. 2d 319, 327- 28 (1980).

¶ 35 Accordingly, pleas are no more foolproof than trials. Brady, 397 U.S. at 758. When met with a truly persuasive demonstration of innocence, a conviction based on a voluntary and knowing plea is reduced to a legal fiction. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 488. At that point, the additional due process afforded by the Illinois due process clause is triggered despite the legal construct—the entire plea proceedings including defendant’s waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects—that precludes a guilty-plea defendant’s claim. Id.

¶ 36 Moreover, we emphasize this court’s long-established preference for life and liberty over holding defendant to his plea. People v. King, 1 Ill. 2d 496, 500 (1953) (per curiam); People v. McKirdie, 45 Ill. 2d 300, 302 (1970). Recently, in Gaines, 2020 IL 125165, ¶¶ 43-44, we reaffirmed that courts may allow defendants to withdraw their pleas based on claims of innocence or where the court doubts the truth of the pleas, even where the court already accepted the plea. In People v. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d 378, 383 (2002), we also allowed a defendant to file a motion to withdraw his plea based upon a misunderstanding of law regarding his insanity defense for the first time on appeal. While the issue of waiver by plea was not raised in the above cases, they support the conclusion that sometimes a manifest injustice outweighs the consequences of defendant’s voluntary plea.

¶ 37 In light of these considerations, we find the defendant’s waiver of his right to challenge the State’s proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial in the proceedings that led to his conviction does not prevent him from asserting his right to not be deprived of life and liberty given compelling evidence of actual innocence under the Act.

- 10 - ¶ 38 For the same reasons, we also reject the State’s contention that the record of the plea proceedings positively rebuts any claim of actual innocence. An admission of guilt—while often sufficient to support the acceptance of the plea and a conviction—is not guilt in fact. Gaines, 2020 IL 125165, ¶ 32 (trial judge decides whether to accept the plea and “legally deem the defendant guilty of the relevant charge”); see Talarico, 177 Ill. 2d at 195 (It is not always reasonable to presume that defendant’s admission of guilt pursuant to his negotiated plea establishes a fact that cannot be relitigated.). ¶ 39 The State’s application of the invited error doctrine is equally unpersuasive. The invited error doctrine is akin to equitable estoppel in that a party “may not request to proceed in one manner and then later contend *** that the course of action was in error.” People v. Carter, 208 Ill. 2d 309, 319 (2003). Under this doctrine, the State claims defendants cannot voluntarily and knowingly plead guilty to the trial court then turn around and complain to a reviewing court that the trial court found them guilty. ¶ 40 As explained above, a claim of innocence is not based on the defendant’s misapprehension of the quality of the State’s case nor an error of the court in finding defendant guilty. Rather, it is a request for the additional due process that is triggered by new and compelling evidence demonstrating defendant’s innocence. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 487. Defendant did not invite the deprivation of his liberty despite compelling evidence of his innocence when he lacked knowledge of and could not reasonably discover such evidence at the time of his plea. ¶ 41 This court refuses to turn a blind eye to the manifest injustice and failure of our criminal justice system that would result from the continued incarceration of a demonstrably innocent person, even where a defendant pleads guilty. See id. at 489; id. at 493 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring). Accordingly, we find defendants who plead guilty may assert an actual innocence claim under the Act. Shaw, 2019 IL App (1st) 152994, ¶ 54; People v. Knight, 405 Ill. App. 3d 461, 472 (2010). ¶ 42 Despite the State’s contentions, we do not believe our decision will diminish its motivation to engage in plea negotiations, nor does it ignore the interests of finality and certainty involving guilty pleas. An actual innocence claim is not unrestrained and still must be proven. This hurdle has proven to be difficult for defendants, and a successful claim of innocence is rare. See People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, - 11 - ¶ 94. As such, we find the State’s interests and policy concerns are more appropriately accounted for and protected by the standard applicable to actual innocence claims involving defendants who plead guilty. ¶ 43 Defendant argues that this court should apply the standard expounded by Washington, which requires “supporting evidence be new, material, noncumulative and, most importantly, of such conclusive character as would probably change the result on retrial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 489. While defendant contends Washington can be expanded to apply to defendants who plead guilty, he fails to specify such standard and only notes that the court should compare the new evidence against that in the plea proceedings below. ¶ 44 The State asserts that guilty-plea defendants are incapable of meeting the Washington standard because the court cannot determine whether the new evidence would probably change the result on retrial where there was no trial. Instead, this court should adopt a standard of reliability similar to that in federal courts, Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), particularly, that guilty-plea defendants must provide new forensic evidence. ¶ 45 While defendant’s plea does not prevent him from asserting an actual innocence claim under the Act, it necessarily places the court in a different position than in Washington. Defendant’s waiver of a trial prevented the State from admitting the entirety of its evidence against defendant into the record, leaving only defendant’s admission of guilt and stipulation of the factual basis of the plea. Without the developed record produced by a trial, a court cannot determine whether the new evidence sufficiently undermines the evidence presented at trial such that it would probably change the result on retrial. The strict application of Washington is therefore impractical in cases where defendants plead guilty. ¶ 46 Moreover, unlike a trial where reviewing courts often lack the insight on how the jury weighed the evidence in making its determination, the guilt of defendants who plead guilty is entirely dependent upon their admission of guilt and stipulation of the factual basis. Consequently, the court is left to weigh the new evidence against voluntary and knowing admission of guilt. ¶ 47 A plea of guilty is a grave act that is not reversible at the defendant’s whim. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 326. Leave to withdraw a plea of guilty should not be granted - 12 - because defendant is now dissatisfied with the deal but “as required to correct a manifest injustice.” Id. ¶ 48 Upon these considerations, the standard for actual innocence claims for guilty- plea defendants requires a more stringent standard than in Washington. See People v. Schneider, 25 P.3d 755, 761 (Colo. 2001) (en banc). Yet, the standard must be less than redeciding the defendant’s guilt, as that is not the determination the court must make. See People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 136 (1984) (“this does not mean that [the defendant] is innocent, merely that all of the facts and surrounding circumstances *** should be scrutinized more closely to determine [his] guilt or innocence”); Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 97. “If it were, the remedy would be an acquittal, not a new trial.” Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 97. ¶ 49 We therefore find a successful actual innocence claim requires a defendant who pleads guilty to provide new, material, noncumulative evidence that clearly and convincingly demonstrates that a trial would probably result in acquittal. New means the evidence was discovered after the court accepted the plea and could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence. Id. ¶ 96. This is a comprehensive approach where the court must determine whether the new evidence places the evidence presented in the underlying proceedings in a different light and “undercuts the court’s confidence in the factual correctness” of the conviction. Id. ¶ 97. ¶ 50 This higher standard strikes an equitable balance between the defendant’s constitutional liberty interest in remaining free of undeserved punishment and the State’s interest in maintaining the finality and certainty of plea agreements, while vindicating the purpose of the criminal justice system to punish only the guilty. Because the evidence must be clear and convincing, the standard inherently requires the court to consider the evidence to be reliable. ^[2] We therefore see no reason to further limit defendants who plead guilty by requiring them to support their petition with forensic evidence.