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Illinois Compiled Statutes

720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (2026)

Armed violence-Elements of the offense

✓ current as of May 2026
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(720 ILCS 5/33A-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 33A-2)
    Sec. 33A-2. Armed violence-Elements of the offense.
    (a) A person commits armed violence when, while armed with a dangerous weapon, he commits any felony defined by Illinois Law, except first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, intentional homicide of an unborn child, second degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, reckless homicide, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated battery of a child as described in Section 12-4.3 or subdivision (b)(1) of Section 12-3.05, home invasion, or any offense that makes the possession or use of a dangerous weapon either an element of the base offense, an aggravated or enhanced version of the offense, or a mandatory sentencing factor that increases the sentencing range.
    (b) A person commits armed violence when he or she personally discharges a firearm that is a Category I or Category II weapon while committing any felony defined by Illinois law, except first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, intentional homicide of an unborn child, second degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, reckless homicide, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated battery of a child as described in Section 12-4.3 or subdivision (b)(1) of Section 12-3.05, home invasion, or any offense that makes the possession or use of a dangerous weapon either an element of the base offense, an aggravated or enhanced version of the offense, or a mandatory sentencing factor that increases the sentencing range.
    (c) A person commits armed violence when he or she personally discharges a firearm that is a Category I or Category II weapon that proximately causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement or death to another person while committing any felony defined by Illinois law, except first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, intentional homicide of an unborn child, second degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, reckless homicide, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated battery of a child as described in Section 12-4.3 or subdivision (b)(1) of Section 12-3.05, home invasion, or any offense that makes the possession or use of a dangerous weapon either an element of the base offense, an aggravated or enhanced version of the offense, or a mandatory sentencing factor that increases the sentencing range.
    (d) This Section does not apply to violations of the Fish and Aquatic Life Code or the Wildlife Code.
(Source: P.A. 95-688, eff. 10-23-07; 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 272 cases (94 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821 (Ill. 2012).
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People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821 (Ill. 2012). · cites it 4× “23, 2007) (amending 720 ILCS 5/33A-2). ¶ 16 The State contends that the legislature’s purpose in adopting Public Act 95-688 was to “correct” Hauschild and “clarify” what the legislature considered to be the statute’s meaning all along, i.”
People v. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728 (Ill. 2016). · cites it 4× “See 720 ILCS 5/33A-2, 12-4(a) (West 2010). By contrast, aggravated battery with a firearm requires the State to prove that (1) in committing a battery, defendant (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) caused any injury to another person (4) by means of discharging of a firearm.”
People v. Hauschild, 871 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2007). · cites it 4× “Therefore, we agree with the appellate court in Harvey that, because the penalty for armed robbery while armed with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b) (West 2000)) is now greater than the penalty for armed violence predicated on robbery with a category I or category II weapon…”
People v. Coats, 2018 IL 121926 (Ill. 2018). · cites it 2× “Again, we need not apply defendant's "crux" theory to analyze these cases.”
People v. Malone, 2012 IL App (1st) 110517 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). · cites it 5× “” 720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 1998). In pertinent part, Public Act 91-404 created subsections (a), (b), and (c) of the armed violence statute.”
People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940 (Ill. 2020). · cites it 2× “¶2 BACKGROUND ¶3 On September 29, 2014, defendant was charged by information with a count of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2014)) in that, while armed with a shotgun, defendant possessed less than 15 grams of cocaine.”
People v. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728 (Ill. 2016). · cites it 5× “See 720 ILCS 5/33A-2, 12-4(a) (West 2010). By contrast, aggravated battery with a firearm requires the State to prove that (1) in committing a battery, defendant (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) caused any injury to another person (4) by means of discharging of a firearm.”
People v. Gillespie, 2012 IL App (4th) 110151 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). · cites it 11× “¶ 44 Having concluded that armed robbery while armed with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2000)) and armed violence predicated on robbery with a category I or category II weapon (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2000)) were indeed comparable, the supreme court compared the two…”
People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122 (Ill. 2013). · cites it 3× “720 ILCS 5/33A-2, 33A-3 (West 1994). Applying the identical elements test for proportionality review, we held that the penalty for armed violence predicated on robbery committed with a category I weapon violated the proportionate penalties clause.”
People v. Anderson, 2018 IL App (4th) 160037 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). · cites it 4× “BACKGROUND ¶ 3 On July 1, 2015, the State charged defendant with (1) armed violence ( 720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a), 33A-3(a) (West 2014) ) (count I), a Class X felony, for knowingly possessing cocaine ( 720 ILCS 570/402 (West 2014) ) while armed with a handgun; (2) unlawful possession of…”
People v. Smith, 732 N.E.2d 513 (Ill. 2000). · cites it 3× “Because the facts are not in dispute, defendant's guilt is a question of law, which we review de novo.”
People v. Neylon, 762 N.E.2d 1127 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). · cites it 3× “Justice KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court: After a jury trial in Macon county circuit court, defendant, Thaddeus Neylon, was found guilty of armed violence (personally discharging a firearm while committing a felony not excepted by statute) (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(b) (West…”
Show all 272 citing cases →
— 720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) — 179 cases
People v. Hauschild, 871 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2007). “Therefore, we agree with the appellate court in Harvey that, because the penalty for armed robbery while armed with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b) (West 2000)) is now greater than the penalty for armed violence predicated on robbery with a category I or category II weapon…”
People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821 (Ill. 2012). “23, 2007) (amending 720 ILCS 5/33A-2). ¶ 16 The State contends that the legislature’s purpose in adopting Public Act 95-688 was to “correct” Hauschild and “clarify” what the legislature considered to be the statute’s meaning all along, i.”
People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940 (Ill. 2020). “¶2 BACKGROUND ¶3 On September 29, 2014, defendant was charged by information with a count of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2014)) in that, while armed with a shotgun, defendant possessed less than 15 grams of cocaine.”
People v. Anderson, 2018 IL App (4th) 160037 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). “BACKGROUND ¶ 3 On July 1, 2015, the State charged defendant with (1) armed violence ( 720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a), 33A-3(a) (West 2014) ) (count I), a Class X felony, for knowingly possessing cocaine ( 720 ILCS 570/402 (West 2014) ) while armed with a handgun; (2) unlawful possession of…”
People v. Gillespie, 2012 IL App (4th) 110151 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). “¶ 44 Having concluded that armed robbery while armed with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2000)) and armed violence predicated on robbery with a category I or category II weapon (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2000)) were indeed comparable, the supreme court compared the two…”
— 720 ILCS 5/33A-2(b) — 13 cases
People v. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728 (Ill. 2016). “See 720 ILCS 5/33A-2, 12-4(a) (West 2010). By contrast, aggravated battery with a firearm requires the State to prove that (1) in committing a battery, defendant (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) caused any injury to another person (4) by means of discharging of a firearm.”
People v. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728 (Ill. 2016). “See 720 ILCS 5/33A-2, 12-4(a) (West 2010). By contrast, aggravated battery with a firearm requires the State to prove that (1) in committing a battery, defendant (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) caused any injury to another person (4) by means of discharging of a firearm.”
People v. Malone, 2012 IL App (1st) 110517 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). “” 720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 1998). In pertinent part, Public Act 91-404 created subsections (a), (b), and (c) of the armed violence statute.”
People v. Neylon, 762 N.E.2d 1127 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). “Justice KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court: After a jury trial in Macon county circuit court, defendant, Thaddeus Neylon, was found guilty of armed violence (personally discharging a firearm while committing a felony not excepted by statute) (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(b) (West…”
People v. Cherry, 2014 IL App (5th) 130085 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
— 720 ILCS 5/33A-2(c) — 13 cases
People v. Malone, 2012 IL App (1st) 110517 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). “” 720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 1998). In pertinent part, Public Act 91-404 created subsections (a), (b), and (c) of the armed violence statute.”
People v. Gillespie, 2012 IL App (4th) 110151 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). “¶ 44 Having concluded that armed robbery while armed with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2000)) and armed violence predicated on robbery with a category I or category II weapon (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2000)) were indeed comparable, the supreme court compared the two…”
People v. Foster, 2022 IL App (2d) 200098 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
People v. Murray, 848 N.E.2d 160 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
People v. Stanford, 953 N.E.2d 992 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
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