¹ Ms. Sphatt had included her affirmative defenses of race and age discrimination, which the Board rejected, but she has dropped those claims. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2). Case: 20-1451 Document: 52 Page: 5 Filed: 04/07/2021 SPHATT v. DHS 5 might also have been reasonable, Jones v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 834 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Con- solo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 619–20 (1966); Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). A 6 SPHATT v. DHS doubts about the legitimacy of the marriage, J.A. 1806–08 (Day 2 Tr. 81:17–83:11). When asked directly, Ms. Sphatt confirmed that including her credentials was done to en- hance her credibility in her attestation. See J.A. 1812 (Day 2 Tr. 87:3–11). Based on these and other facts, the Board reasonably found that Ms. Sphatt improperly used her po- sition and credentials to attempt to influence the petition process to aide her good friend and his wife, which here amounts to use for a form of personal gain, whether or not the adjudicator of the immigration matter was actually in- fluenced. J.A. 18–20; see also 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702 (“An em- ployee shall not use his public office for his own private gain, . . . or for the private gain of friends, relatives, or per- sons with whom the employee is affiliated in a nongovern- mental capacity . . . .”). Although Ms. Sphatt asserted her lack of such intent, the Board reasonably found otherwise. See Bieber v. Dep’t of the Army, 287 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (affording great deference to an administrative judge’s credibility determinations). The Board’s upholding of Charges 1 and 2, we conclude, is supported by substantial evidence. SPHATT v. DHS 7 Positions (the SF-86 form) in 2015, and one specification involves her withholding of information during an official inquiry into her responses on the SF-86 form. Section 19 of the SF-86 form at issue asked Agency employees if, dur- ing the previous seven years, they “have had, close and/or continuing contact with a foreign national . . . with whom [they] are bound by affection,” J.A. 480, with “foreign na- tional” defined as “any person who is not a citizen or na- tional of the [United States],” J.A. 455. The form also included questions about living with or financially support- ing foreign nationals during the same period. J.A. 480–81. On the SF-86 form Ms. Sphatt submitted May 4, 2015, she answered “No” to those questions. The Board reasonably found that the Agency proved the allegation of two specifications that Ms. Sphatt was not candid in the SF-86 form. Specifically, the evidence sup- ports the finding of lack of candor about Ms. Sphatt’s rela- tionships and contacts with Ms. Gan, a foreign national within the seven-year period, and with her nephew, who also was a foreign national within the period and who lived with Ms. Sphatt for part of the time and received financial support from her. As to the former, there was evidence that Ms. Sphatt had herself told OSI officials that she had weekly contact with Mr. Mao and “closely observed [Ms. Gan] over the past 2 years.” J.A. 420. In her affidavit (in support of the mar- riage) filed two weeks after she submitted the SF-86 form, Ms. Sphatt asserted, “we have close contact with each other,” which the Board reasonably found was referring to both Mr. Mao and Ms. Gan (whom she saw together fairly often). J.A. 27–28. The Board also reasonably determined: “[I]t is axiomatic that if one knows enough about a person to vouch for his or her marriage, the person who vouches for it can be considered ‘bound by affection.’” J.A. 27. Regarding her relationship with her nephew, Ms. Sphatt testified to the closeness of her relationship, stating Case: 20-1451 Document: 52 Page: 8 Filed: 04/07/2021 8 SPHATT v. DHS that because of her familial ties, she “would give [her nephew’s family] anything, everything I have,” and indeed she had given her nephew and his father a large sum of money as a gift when they arrived in the United States. J.A. 1790–91 (Day 2 Tr. 65:8–66:3). In addition, Ms. Sphatt’s nephew used her address when he first came to the United States and continued to use her address to re- ceive mail until at least May 2015. J.A. 1791 (Day 2 Tr. 66:4–8), 1797–98 (Day 2 Tr. 72:20–73:6). The Board rea- sonably found it “improbable” that Ms. Sphatt’s failure to list her nephew was “merely an inadvertent oversight,” J.A. 33, especially given her “unblemished work record” as an employee “well-versed in immigration laws,” J.A. 34. See Ludlum, 278 F.3d at 1284 (lack of candor “may involve a failure to disclose something that, in the circumstances, should have been disclosed in order to make the given statement accurate and complete”). The remaining specification of failure to be forthcoming in speaking to the OSI investigators rests on much the same nondisclosure of information as the SF-86 form spec- ifications. We cannot say that the Board lacked substan- tial evidence in finding this specification proved based on Ms. Sphatt’s guarded interactions with the investigators, when faced with facially contradictory statements in her affidavits and SF-86 form responses. Given Ms. Sphatt’s tenure and experience with immigration procedures, sub- stantial evidence supports the Agency’s determination that Ms. Sphatt was less than forthcoming. The Board’s upholding of Charge 3, we conclude, is sup- ported by substantial evidence. SPHATT v. DHS 9 (per curiam); see also 5 C.F.R. § 2635.704(a). The Board reasonably found that the Agency so proved. Ms. Sphatt does not dispute that she accessed TECS multiple times to place queries about herself and her rela- tives, but she argues that her queries were in the course of training new employees and therefore cannot support the Agency’s disciplinary decision. This argument fails. The Agency presented substantial evidence that use of TECS to make inquiries about oneself and one’s relatives was an un- authorized use, even if for training. Training materials for TECS, as well as the warning screen that Ms. Sphatt saw each time she used the system, expressly state that person- nel “cannot use the live system, TECS Production, to learn TECS by performing test queries.” J.A. 646; see also J.A. 38 (citing Day 2 Tr. 46:15–18). Ms. Sphatt completed train- ing on TECS multiple times during her tenure, and in the training she was notified that employees were not permit- ted to use TECS in such a manner. See J.A. 1777 (Day 2 Tr. 52:2–4). Ms. Sphatt also admitted to knowing that Agency policy prohibited such activity. See J.A. 1786 (Day 2 Tr. 61:7–10) (“Q Isn’t it true that while you were an Im- migration Services Officer that you were aware that you could not query yourself, relatives, or your spouse in TECS? A Yes, I know that.”). The Board’s upholding of Charge 4, we conclude, is sup- ported by substantial evidence. B Beyond challenging the finding that the Agency proved its charges, Ms. Sphatt argues that the conduct identified in the proven charges bore an insufficient nexus to the ef- ficiency of the service and that removal was an unreasona- bly harsh penalty for her conduct. Sphatt Opening Br. at 24–37. We disagree. Case: 20-1451 Document: 52 Page: 10 Filed: 04/07/2021 10 SPHATT v. DHS SPHATT v. DHS 11 Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305–07 (1981). Norris v. SEC, 695 F.3d 1261, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (ci- tation omitted). We see no basis for determining that the penalty here was “grossly disproportionate to the offense charged,” Bieber, 287 F.3d at 1365, or should be disturbed for any other reason. Ms. Sphatt first challenges the reasonableness of her removal, in part, based on the Agency’s initial response (a proposed 7-day suspension) to Charges 1 and 2, when those charges stood alone. Sphatt Opening Br at 28–29. But those charges ended up not standing alone. The decision about the appropriate penalty for the totality of the charges, after proper consideration by the deciding official, is to be respected unless it is “totally unwarranted in the circumstances such that it is constitutes an abuse of discre- tion” as to the full charges found supported. Robinson v. Dep’t of Veterans Aff., 923 F.3d 1004, 1016–17 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). The deciding official did not abuse the vested discretion in determining: “I have considered that the good order, in- tegrity, and reputation of [the Agency] was undermined by your misconduct”; and “I have completely lost trust and confidence in your judgment, reliability, and dependabil- ity.” J.A. 117. The same is true for the determination: “I find that your inability to accept any responsibility demon- strates that you have not learned from your conduct and have not reformed your behavior.” Id. The deciding official could determine, within the wide discretion permitted, that the conduct was serious enough, and the chances of Ms. Sphatt’s rehabilitation slim enough, to warrant removal. Moreover, Ms. Sphatt has not shown error in the Board’s affirmance of the deciding official’s determination that Ms. Sphatt’s situation was not comparable to the situation in any identified disciplinary matter involving another em- ployee in which a penalty less than removal was imposed. J.A. 58. Case: 20-1451 Document: 52 Page: 12 Filed: 04/07/2021 12 SPHATT v. DHS Given the deciding official’s consideration of the Doug- las factors, and our upholding all four charges against Ms. Sphatt, we cannot say the deciding official’s removal deci- sion represents reversible error. C Ms. Sphatt challenges aspects of the Agency’s decision as violating certain asserted procedural rights. In particu- lar, she alleges that the Agency improperly failed to impose lesser discipline before resorting to removal, improperly considered certain documents, and improperly punished her for conduct that took place too far in the past. See Sphatt Opening Br. at 19, 37–40. For these contentions, Ms. Sphatt must identify a law, rule, or regulation that the Agency improperly ignored or violated. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)(2); see also Diaz v. Dep’t of Air Force, 63 F.3d 1107, 1108–09 (Fed. Cir. 1995); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c). For all but the undue-delay challenge, Ms. Sphatt invokes, in this court, only the standard of harmful procedural error. See Sphatt Opening Br. at 1–2, 5–6, 19, 37–40. Under that standard, she must show that the error was “likely to have caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it would have reached in the absence or cure of the er- ror.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(r); see also Ward v. U.S. Postal Serv., 634 F.3d 1274, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2011). We reject these challenges. For the Agency’s choice to forgo progressive discipline, Ms. Sphatt has not identified any law, rule, or regulation that requires a progressive disciplinary procedure that starts with a measure short of removal. Agency policy in fact permits the opposite: Progressive discipline “is applied in all cases except . . . where management deems the mis- conduct is egregious enough to warrant more serious action up to and including removal.” J.A. 1071 (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Discipline and Adverse Actions, Management Directive No. 256-002 (2010)). Therefore, Ms. Sphatt has failed to identify harmful procedural error. Case: 20-1451 Document: 52 Page: 13 Filed: 04/07/2021 SPHATT v. DHS 13 Ms. Sphatt separately argues that the deciding official improperly used two categories of evidence beyond that considered by the Discipline Review Board. One category consists of “documents pertaining to [Ms. Gan and Ms. Sphatt’s relatives] . . . relied upon in support of Charge 3 – Lack of Candor.” J.A. 193. The other consists of documents about discipline of other employees that the deciding offi- cial looked at to see if they presented situations that were comparable to this matter and yet resulted in a lesser pen- alty than removal—a penalty adopted in this case based on the official’s analysis of the seriousness of the conduct, other Douglas factors, and the Agency’s Table of Offenses and Penalties, J.A. 116–18 (as to all of which Ms. Sphatt was given unchallenged notice, see J.A. 85–88 (notice of proposed removal)). As to both categories, Ms. Sphatt’s challenge fails, as the Board concluded. J.A. 47–49, 58–59. As to the first, Ms. Sphatt was given an opportunity to respond to the doc- uments and instead elected to “rely upon her prior oral re- ply,” J.A. 186, and she has not shown that the Agency would have reached a different outcome in the absence of this evidence. As to the second, even though she has had access to the documents (about potential comparables) since the discovery process that preceded the Board hear- ing, she has not shown how those documents, or what she would have said about them had she been given pre-termi- nation access to them, might have led to a penalty less se- vere than removal. In these circumstances, we see no basis in these challenges for setting aside the Board affirmance of the removal. See Harding v. United States Naval Acad., 567 F. App’x 920, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Finally, Ms. Sphatt suggests that the Agency improp- erly considered the TECS charge after a length of time that was “unreasonable, prejudicial and, as such, violative of due process.” See Sphatt Opening Br. at 19. We disagree. The only authority she cites is Baldwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 109 M.S.P.R. 392 (2008), which invokes Case: 20-1451 Document: 52 Page: 14 Filed: 04/07/2021 14 SPHATT v. DHS the key requirements of laches, stating: “[T]he Board has recognized that a charge may be dismissed if an agency’s delay in proposing the adverse action is unreasonable and prejudicial to the appellant.” Id. at 398; see also Cornetta v. United States, 851 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (requiring proof of prejudice for successful defense of laches). But, as the Board determined, J.A. 49–51, Ms. Sphatt has not shown unreasonable delay in discovering (or therefore acting on) the TECS violations or that the de- lay was prejudicial. We therefore see no basis in this chal- lenge for disturbing the Board’s decision. III For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board. AFFIRMED COSTS The parties shall bear their own costs.