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Treatment trajectory · 1987 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1987
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Craig Orrock
As we said more than thirty years ago, “[e]ven if the taxes evaded were due and payable more than six years before the return of the indictment, the indictment is timely so long as it is returned within six years of an affirmative act of evasion.” United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 1987). 3 Indeed, it would be a “surprising assertion that Congress intended the limitations period to begin to run before [the defendants] committed the acts upon which the crimes were based.” United States v. Habig, 390 U.S. 222 , 224–25 (1968); see id. at 225–27 (holding that the sta…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Ravneet Singh
See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991); United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1987).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Ravneet Singh
See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991); United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1987).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. James Murphy
United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Jordan Graham
Graham has not shown a particularized or compelling need for the transcripts sufficient to outweigh the policy of grand jury secrecy, and it was insufficient for her to assert she had “no way of knowing whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred.” United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1987). 5.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Brad Fisher
(2×)
Relying on Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 , 85 S.Ct. 1004 , 13 L.Ed.2d 882 (1965), the court concluded that a § 7203 instruction was not required, because: (1) the only element of § 7201 that was in dispute was willfulness; (2) the willfulness required for §§ 7201 and 7203 were the same; and, thus, (3) a rational jury could not convict on § 7203 without also convicting on § 7201. 1 That, however, is precisely the reasoning we rejected in United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113-14 (9th Cir.1987).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Jensen
United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Bennett
Testimony and physical evidence at trial established Bennett’s “wilfulness,” “the existence of a tax deficiency,” and “an affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of the tax.” Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 , 85 S.Ct. 1004 , 13 L.Ed.2d 882 (1965). “[U]s[ing a] family trust,” “insisting] that [clients] pay ... in cash,” and “[other] similar devices” provide “sufficient evidence to support an inference of intent to evade the payment of taxes.” United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Bennett
Testimony and physical evidence at trial established Bennett’s “wilfulness,” “the existence of a tax deficiency,” and “an affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of the tax.” Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 , 85 S.Ct. 1004 , 13 L.Ed.2d 882 (1965). “[U]s[ing a] family trust,” “insisting] that [clients] pay ... in cash,” and “[other] similar devices” provide “sufficient evidence to support an inference of intent to evade the payment of taxes.” United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Rodriguez-Torres
“It is not sufficient for [Defendants] to assert that [they have] no way of knowing whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred.” United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1987); see also United States v. Edelson, 581 F.2d 1290, 1291 (7th Cir.1978) (holding that a “showing” under Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e) must be based on a particularized need for disclosure of the transcript and that mere speculation that prosecutorial abuse may have occurred is insufficient.) Defendants offer nothing more than a speculative assertion that other portions of the grand jury transcript may reveal prose…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Thompson
In Anderson, 319 F.3d at 1219 , we adopted the rule, embraced by many of our sister circuits, “that when a defendant commits a series of evasive acts over several years after incurring a tax liability, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the last evasive act.” See also United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 236 (4th Cir.1997); United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1355 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 974 (11th Cir.1992); United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Ferris, 807 F.2d 269, 270-71 (1st Cir.1986).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Atwood v. Schriro
To establish selective prosecution, a petitioner must show “(1) that similarly situated persons have not been prosecuted and (2) that he was selected for prosecution on the basis of an impermissible ground such as race, religion or the exercise of constitutional rights.” United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Fuentes
See Martel v. County of L.A., 56 F.3d 993, 996-97 (9th Cir.1995) (en banc); cf. United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1987) (“baseless speculation” cannot compel production of grand jury records).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Gossman
See United States v. Klinger, 128 F.3d 705, 708 (9th Cir.1997); United States v. De Tar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.1987). 6.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Richard Titterington
(2×)
See United States v. Soriano-Hernandez, 310 F.3d 1099, 1103-04 (8th Cir.2002); United States v. Najjar, 283 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir.2002); Acevedo-Ramos v. United States, 961 F.2d 305, 307 (1st Cir.1992); United States v. Cooper, 956 F.2d 960, 962 (10th Cir.1992); United States v. Arky, 938 F.2d 579, 581-82 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Karlin, 785 F.2d 90, 92-93 (3d Cir.1986); United States v. Meeker, 701 F.2d 685, 687-88 (7th Cir.1983); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 855-56 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Williams, 684 F…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Cole
(Spaziano, supra, at pp. 456-457 ; cf. United States v. DeTar (9th Cir. 1987) 832 F.2d 1110, 1112-1115 [trial court in a noncapital case committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on a time-barred lesser included offense because the defendant had waived the statute of limitations by requesting an instruction on the lesser included offense].) In contrast to Spaziano, supra, 468 U.S. 447 , and Beck, supra, 447 U.S. 625 , the jury in defendant’s case was not given an all-or-nothing choice between capital murder or innocence.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Titterington
Here, in marked contrast, the (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Najjar, 283 F.3d 1306 , 1309 indictment does mention the year in which the alleged crimes (11th Cir. 2002); Acevedo-Ramos v. United States, 961 F.2d took place and that year falls within the eight-year limitations 305, 307 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Cooper, 956 F.2d period (five years plus three years) under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3282 960, 962 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Arky, 938 F.2d & 3292. 579, 581–82 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Karlin, 785 Even if a r…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Thomas K. Schoppert
Similarly, the Third Circuit has described the deficiency element of § 7201 as “tax due and owing,” United States v. McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 229 (3d Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1023 , 113 S.Ct. 664 , 121 L.Ed.2d 588 (1992), and “equivalent to a failure to pay a tax,” id. at 240, and the Ninth Circuit has described the element as “an unpaid tax,” United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Thomas K. Schoppert
Similarly, the Third Circuit has described the deficiency element of § 7201 as "tax due and owing," United States v. McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 229 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1023 (1992), and "equivalent to a failure to pay a tax," id. at 240, and the Ninth Circuit has described the element as "an unpaid tax," United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 1987).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Bougas
See United States v. Williams, 684 F.2d 296, 299-300 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983); United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Anderson
See United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 236 (4th Cir.1997) (limitations period for violation of § 7201 begins to run at date of last affirmative act of evasion); United States v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 973-75 (11th Cir.1992) (acts of evasion following the filing of tax return may satisfy affirmative act element of the offense of tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 ; therefore, prosecution is timely so long as last affirmative act of evasion occurred within six years of filing indictment); United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1987) (“Even if the taxes evaded were due and …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Ronald S. Carlson
Because the six year limitations period in evasion of payment cases runs from the last act of evasion, see United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1987), the government had to prove that Carlson *471 had committed at least one affirmatively evasive act after August 20, 1992.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Timoteo
(6×)
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit specifically “agree[d] with this view.” United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1115 (citing Williams, 684 F.2d at 299-300 ).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Lacy v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc.
Cf. United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.1987) (criminal case).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cowan v. Superior Court
Cir. 1977) 551 F.2d 418, 421-425 [ 179 App.D.C. 232 ]; Acevedo-Ramos v. U. S. (1st Cir. 1992) 961 F.2d 305, 307 ; United States v. Walsh (2d Cir. 1983) 700 F.2d 846, 855-856 ; United States v. Karlin (3d Cir. 1986) 785 F.2d 90, 92-93 ; United States v. Williams (4th Cir. 1982) 684 F.2d 296, 299-300 ; U. S. v. Arky (5th Cir. 1991) 938 F.2d 579, 581-582 ; U.S. v. Del Percio (6th Cir. 1989) 870 F.2d 1090 , 1093-1094; United States v. Meeker (7th Cir. 1983) 701 F.2d 685, 687-688 ; U.S. v. DeTar (9th Cir. 1987) 832 F.2d 1110, 1114 [102 A.L.R.Fed. 117]; United States v. Gallup (10th Cir. 1987) 812 F…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
David Tyrone Samuel v. W.A. Duncan, Warden James Gomez, Director Attorney General of the State of California
See United States v. Caldwell, 859 F.2d 805, 806 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1039 , 109 S.Ct. 1173 , 103 L.Ed.2d 235 (1989); United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1114-15 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hubbard v. State
See, e.g., Acevedo-Ramos v. United States, 961 F.2d 305, 308-09 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 905 , 113 S. Ct. 299 (1992); United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1987); State v. Weimer, 533 N.W.2d 122, 132-33 (Neb.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Maximiliano GOMEZ-LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellee
For example, in vindictive prosecution cases, there must be “vindictiveness on the part of those who made the charging decision.” United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Arthur W. Ross, Sr.
See also United States v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 974 (11th Cir.1992); United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Ferris, 807 F.2d 269, 271 (1st Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 950 (1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Barbara J. Zegzula, Defendant-Apellant
(2×)
United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1987).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Paul Suren Mosesian, United States of America v. Lawrence Clay Rocker
It is not apparent that either defendant raised the statute of limitations issue before trial or the judgment of conviction, as required by United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Jennifer Susan Edelman, United States of America v. Harold J. Edelman
Disclosure "may not be ordered unless the defendant demonstrates with particularity the existence of a compelling need that is sufficient to outweigh the policy of grand jury secrecy." United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Yount
(2×)
Second, by holding a defendant’s request for the limitations-barred offense waives the statute of limitations, we avoid “... the alternative evils of misleading the jury or denying a defendant an instruction that he desires and would be entitled to, but for the bar of limitations.” United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Longhibler v. State
See, United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 422 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 , 97 S.Ct. 2178 , 53 L.Ed.2d 226 (1977); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 855 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 , 104 S.Ct. 96 , 78 L.Ed.2d 102 (1983) United States v. Karlin, 785 F.2d 90, 92-93 (3rd Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 907 , 107 S.Ct. 1351 , 94 L.Ed.2d 522 (1987); ; United States v. Williams, 684 F.2d 296, 299 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 , 103 S.Ct. 739 , 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); United States v. Arky, 938 F.2d 579, 582 (5th Cir.1991) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112…
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States of America, in 91-1201 v. Thomas L. McGill Jr., in 91-1122
(4×)
However, McGill's argument overlooks the fact that it is exactly in the situation where proof of the affirmative act to evade payment fails, that the lesser included offense of willful failure to pay may become relevant. 83 Moreover, the willfulness inquiry is identical under §§ 7201 and 7203, United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360-61 , 93 S.Ct. 2008, 2017-18 , 36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973), and courts addressing the lesser-included charge have repeatedly stated that § 7203 is included within § 7201. 31 See United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1987) ("It is undisputed that § 7…
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Emmett Donald Doyle
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Cf. United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1987) (under § 7203, elements of misdemeanor offense of failure to pay tax *75 are willfulness and failure to pay the tax when due).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Richard R. Harris
Instead, however, Harris "supported his request for production of grand jury records on nothing but baseless speculation," United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1987), and failed to tailor his request to cover only needed materials; Harris, in short, "was simply on a fishing expedition." United States v. Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d 832, 835 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 934 (1981).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Elijah Albert Boone, Dehlia E. Boone, Jerry Boone and Roger Swayze
United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Bartrug
United States v. De Tar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1987) (“Even if the taxes evaded were due and payable more than six years before the return of the indictment, the indictment is timely so long as it is returned within six years of an affirmative act of evasion.”); United States v. Ferris, 807 F.2d 269, 271 (1st Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 950 , 107 S.Ct. 1613 , 94 L.Ed.2d 798 (1987); United States v. Trownsell, 367 F.2d 815, 816 (7th Cir.1966).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Lambrechts
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Some Circuit Courts held that it was an affirmative defense that could be waived under certain conditions. *647 See United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.1987) (waived unless raised); United States v. Karlin, 785 F.2d 90, 92-93 (3d Cir.1986) (waived unless raised); United States v. Meeker, 701 F.2d 685, 688 (7th Cir.1983) (knowing and voluntary waiver required); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 855-56 (2d Cir.1983) (must raise first at trial); United States v. Williams, 684 F.2d 296, 299 (4th Cir.1982) (may be waived by request for lesser included offense); see also Padie v…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Johnson
We think the better option is that the defendant be given the choice. [ 468 U.S. at 456 , 104 S.Ct. at 3160 , 82 L.Ed. 2d at 350 .] See also State v. Sullivan, 541 A. 2d 450, 453-455 (R.I. 1988), in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, in a non-capital murder case, the trial court did not err in declining to instruct the jury on manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder, the crime for which the defendant was indicted, where the statute of limitations had expired for manslaughter; United States v. DeTar, 832 F. 2d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir.1987), in which the court addressed whet…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kolek v. Engen
First, to establish selective prosecution, Kolek had to demonstrate that the FAA failed to bring enforcement actions against similarly situated certificate holders and selected Kolek for enforcement action “on the basis of impermissible grounds such as race, religion or the exercise of constitutional rights.” United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Joseph Kolek v. Donald D. Engen, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, Joseph Kolek v. Donald D. Engen, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration
We find merit in neither claim. 29 First, to establish selective prosecution, Kolek had to demonstrate that the FAA failed to bring enforcement actions against similarly situated certificate holders and selected Kolek for enforcement action "on the basis of impermissible grounds such as race, religion or the exercise of constitutional rights." United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Nicholas J. Phlipot
Accordingly, the government need only have shown that Phlipot willfully attempted to evade paying taxes which were due. "[T]he necessary intent may be inferred from conduct 'the likely effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal.' " United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943)).
discussed
Cited "see"
Jason Bontrager v. Commissioner
See United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that the first two elements of a section 7201 offense are the same as the elements of an offense under section 7203, which criminalizes any willful failure to pay tax); - 13 - United States v. Fisher, 607 F. App’x 645, 646 (9th Cir. 2015) (“It is undisputed that § 7203 is a lesser included offense of § 7201.”).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Ascension Soriano-Hernandez
See United States v. Gomez, 38 F.3d 1031 , 1033 n. 4 (8th Cir.1994) (upholding district court decision to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which was based on the statute of limitations) (citing United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1114-15 (9th Cir.1987)).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Soriano-Hernandez
See United States v. Gomez, 38 F.3d 1031 , 1033 n.4 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding district court decision to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which was based on the statute of limitations) (citing United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 1987)).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Javier Dario Gomez
See United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1114-15 (9th Cir.1987). 5 .
discussed
Cited "see"
William Little v. United States
(2×)
See United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.1987).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Lonnie Schmidt
See United States v. De Tar, 832 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir.1987), --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2811 (1991).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The Republic of the Philippines
v.
Ferdinand E. Marcos
v.
Ferdinand E. Marcos
86-6091.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Nov 16, 1987.
Published
RICO Bus.Disp.Guide 6817
The REPUBLIC OF the PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Ferdinand E. MARCOS, et al., Defendants/Appellants.
Nos. 86-6091, 86-6093.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Nov. 16, 1987.
Before BROWNING, Chief Judge, GOODWIN, WALLACE, KENNEDY, ANDERSON, HUG, TANG, SCHROEDER, FLETCHER, FARRIS, PREGERSON, ALARCON, POOLE, NELSON, CANBY, NORRIS, REINHARDT, BEEZER, HALL, WIGGINS, BRUNETTI, KOZINSKI, NOONAN, THOMPSON, O'SCANNLAIN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
[*~1115]2
Upon the vote of a majority of the nonrecused regular active judges of this court, it is ordered that this case be reheard by the en banc court pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-3. The previous three-judge panel assignment is withdrawn.