Channel One Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & the United States of Am., 848 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1988). · Go Syfert
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Channel One Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n & the United States of Am., 848 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
4 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (cadc, 1988-07-08)
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#8 47 C.F.R. § 1.4 cited 3× in this case · 36 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission
D.C. Cir. · 1988 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See also Hardin v. City Title & Escrow Co, 797 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C.Cir.1986) (“where ... a time limitation is jurisdictional, the doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply”); cf. Channel One Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 848 F.2d 1305, 1306 (D.C.Cir.1988) (time limitations for filing FCC petitions for review are “a jurisdictional prerequisite”) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission
D.C. Cir. · 1988 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See also Hardin v. City Title & Escrow Co, 797 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C.Cir.1986) ("where ... a time limitation is jurisdictional, the doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply"); cf. Channel One Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 848 F.2d 1305, 1306 (D.C.Cir.1988) (time limitations for filing FCC petitions for review are "a jurisdictional prerequisite") (per curiam). 23 The very existence of the transit tariff exception to, or qualification of, subsection 11706(g), however, somewhat weakens the dictum in Midstate Horticultural concerning the jurisdictional nature of the 11706 limitation provisions.
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Gangi
S.D.N.Y. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Channel One Systems Inc. v. FCC, 848 F.2d 1305, 1306 (D.C.Cir.1988) (interpreting “day” in FCC regulations to mean calendar days); Burgo v. General Dynamics Corp., 122 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir.1997) (“Because the most natural interpretation of the bare phrase ten days is clearly ten calendar days, we will not find an ambiguity in the legislative language simply because Congress could have reinforced its meaning with the use of additional language.”).
discussed Cited "see" Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Authority
D.C. Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Channel One Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 848 F.2d 1305, 1306 (D.C.Cir.1988) (per curiam). 4 The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after disposition of any timely petition for rehearing.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
CHANNEL ONE SYSTEMS, INC., Petitioner,
v.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and the United States of America, Respondents
88-1100.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
Jun 14, 1988.
848 F.2d 1305
Christopher D. Imlay, Washington, D.C., for petitioner., Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate Gen. Counsel, and Gregory M. Christopher, Counsel, F.C.C., Washington, D.C., were on the respondents’ motion to dismiss. Laura Heiser, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., also entered an appearance for respondents.
Mikva, Edwards, Williams.
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published

On Motion to Dismiss

Before MIKVA, EDWARDS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:

This case is before the court on respondent Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) motion to dismiss as untimely the petition for review by Channel One Systems, Inc. (“Channel One”). The contested issue is whether the 60-day filing period, which begins at 3 p.m. on the date public notice is given, terminates at 3 p.m. on the 61st day, or, on the 60th day. The parties agree that the order was released on December 10, 1987, public notice was given on December 11, and the first day to be counted for computing the filing period was December 12. See 47 U.S.C. § 405 (1982); 47 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2) (1987) (as modified); see also Western Union Telegraph Co. v. FCC, 773 F.2d 375, 376-77 (D.C.Cir. 1985). Channel One filed its petition on February 10, the 61st day, and argues that a 60-day filing period beginning at 3 p.m. should end on the 61st day at 3 p.m., to allow a full 60-day period, rather than 59 days plus a few hours. The FCC disagrees.

This circuit has not ruled on the regulation in question, 47 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2), but we take this opportunity to do so. The guidance afforded us in similar cases and the FCC’s new regulation indicates that the 60th day, not the 61st day at 3 p.m., is the last day on which a petition may be filed. First, this circuit has determined that a 30-day filing period, prescribed under this same FCC statutory scheme, ends on the 30th day, rather than at 3 p.m. on the 31st day. See Reuters Limited v. FCC, 781 F.2d 946, 952 (D.C.Cir.1986); National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 760 F.2d 1297, 1299 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1985).

Second, the FCC issued on December 15, 1987, a Report and Order and new Final Rule to explain more fully the time computation provision of 47 C.F.R. § 1.4. This rule was available to Channel One well before the filing deadline. In Example 10 of the new rule, the FCC clarifies that when given a 20-day filing period, under section 1.4(b) the 20th day is the terminal date upon which action must be taken.

Applying this construction of the regulation, we conclude that Channel One’s petition was untimely and must be dismissed. Filing within the time limitations is a jurisdictional prerequisite; accordingly, we have no authority to entertain this petition for review. See, e.g., National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 760 F.2d at 1298; Getter v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973, 977 (D.C.Cir. 1979) (per curiam).