William Joseph Phillips v. Officer B. E. Irvin, 222 F. App'x 928 (11th Cir. 2007). · Go Syfert
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William Joseph Phillips v. Officer B. E. Irvin, 222 F. App'x 928 (11th Cir. 2007). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
13 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Megan Garcia v. Pamela Casey (ca11, 2023-07-28)
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Megan Garcia v. Pamela Casey
11th Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
Appx. 298 (11th Cir. 2018) (arguable probable cause when plaintiff prevented officers from abating a nuisance on his property without a search warrant); Phillips v. Irvin, 222 Fed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Martinez Verde v. Pasco County Sheriff's Department
M.D. Fla. · 2023 · confidence medium
Phillips v. Irvin, 222 F. App'x 928, 929 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that to defeat a claim at summary judgment, the defendant “only needed to establish arguable probable cause, which [he] did”); Lawson v. City of Miami Beach, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1289 (S.D.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hernandez v. Pasco County Sheriff's Department
M.D. Fla. · 2023 · confidence medium
Phillips v. Irvin, 222 F. App'x 928, 929 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that to defeat a claim at summary judgment, the defendant “only needed to establish arguable probable cause, which [he] did”); Lawson v. City of Miami Beach, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1289 (S.D.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David Marshall v. City of Farmington Hills (2×)
6th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
See, e.g., McCabe v. Parker, 608 G.3d 1068, 1075 (C.A. 8 2010); Phillips v. Irvin, 222 Fed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) David Marshall v. City of Farmington Hills
6th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
See, e.g., McCabe v. Parker, 608 G.3d 1068, 1075 (C.A. 8 2010); Phillips v. Irvin, 222 Fed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McCoy v. City of Columbia
D.S.C. · 2013 · confidence medium
McCabe v. Parker, 608 F.3d 1068, 1075 (8th Cir.2010); Phillips v. Irvin, 222 Fed.Appx. 928, 929 (11th Cir.2007); Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 719 (6th Cir.2006); cf. McBeth v. Himes, 598 F.3d 708, 719 (10th Cir.2010) (applying the Hartman framework in the context of claim based on suspension of business license in retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eddie Ford v. City of Yakima (2×)
9th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
See, e.g., McCabe v. Parker, 608 F.3d 1068, 1075 (C.A.8 2010); Phillips v. Irvin, 222 Fed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reichle v. Howards (2×)
SCOTUS · 2012 · confidence medium
See, e. g., MeCabe v. Parker, 608 F. 3d 1068, 1075 (CA8 2010); Phillips v. Irvin, 222 Fed.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Howards v. McLaughlin (2×)
10th Cir. · 2011 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare McCabe v. Parker, 608 F.3d 1068, 1075 (8th Cir.2010), Phillips v. Irvin, 222 Fed.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
William Joseph PHILLIPS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Officer B.E. IRVIN, Defendant-Appellant, W.M. (Mike) Coppage, Individually and in His Official Capacity as the Director, Defendant
06-13640.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Mar 28, 2007.
222 F. App'x 928
Jack M. Curtis, Alabama Department of Public Safety, Montgomery, AL, for Defendantr-Appellant., Weyman W. McCranie, Jr., Law Offices of Brown, Hudgens, P.C., Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Hull, Marcus, Barzilay.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Unpublished
PER CURIAM:

This case arises out of defendant-appellant Officer B.E. Irvin’s March 2003 arrest of plaintiff-appellee William Joseph Phillips. Irvin interlocutorily appeals from the district court’s summary judgment order, which granted in part and denied in part Irvin’s motion for summary judgment. The district court granted Irvin qualified immunity with regard to several of Phillips’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and dismissed others of Phillips’s claims as legally insufficient, but denied Irvin qualified immunity as to Phillips’s excessive force claim and Phillips’s First Amendment retaliation claim. The district court also denied Irvin state-agent immunity as to Phil[*929] lips’s state law claims arising out of Irvin’s use of force. [1]

After review and oral argument, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary-judgment as to Phillips’s excessive force claim and as to Phillips’s state law claims arising out of Irvin’s use of force. We find no reversible error in the district court’s well-reasoned analysis on those issues.

However, we conclude that the district court erred in denying Irvin qualified immunity on Phillips’s First Amendment retaliation claim. The district court mistakenly concluded that Irvin needed to establish actual probable cause for Phillips’s arrest. Under our precedent, Irvin only needed to establish arguable probable cause, which Irvin did. See Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir.1998) (stating that “[bjecause we hold that the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest ... for disorderly conduct, we must hold that the officers are also entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims”) (emphasis added).

Moreover, in granting Irvin qualified immunity on Phillips’s false arrest claim, the district court itself determined that Irvin had arguable probable cause to arrest Phillips for obstruction of governmental operations, in violation of Ala.Code § 13A-10-2. We agree with the district court that Irvin had arguable probable cause to arrest Phillips for obstruction, based on the totality of the undisputed facts in this case, including (as shown by the in-dash recording from Irvin’s patrol car) that Irvin asked Phillips to “back off’ at least eight times so that Irvin could complete his “federal traffic stop” and “federal DOT inspection.”

Because we agree with the district court that Irvin had arguable probable cause to arrest Phillips, we reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Irvin on Phillips’s First Amendment retaliation claim. [2]

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.

1

. Under the collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction to review the denial of state-agent immunity when the defendant appeals “both the denial of [state-agent] immunity and the denial of qualified immunity from the same procedural posture and under the identical assumption regarding the validity of the district court’s summary-judgment facts.” Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1260 n. 9 (11th Cir.2000).

2

. To the extent that Phillips argues that actual probable cause is required to establish qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim, we also conclude that Irvin had actual probable cause in any event.