Virginia B. King v. Geoffrey P. Emery, 871 F.2d 1088 (6th Cir. 1989). · Go Syfert
Search
Virginia B. King v. Geoffrey P. Emery, 871 F.2d 1088 (6th Cir. 1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
46 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In re: Terrance Alexander Tomkow Zafar David Khan (bap9, 2017-01-05)
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" In re: Terrance Alexander Tomkow Zafar David Khan
9th Cir. BAP · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See 5 May v. Warner Amex Cable Commc’ns, 871 F.2d 1088 (6th Cir. 1989) 6 (table); see also McCall v. Deeds, 849 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1988) 7 (denial of Civil Rule 54(b) certification is not appealable); 8 Mem’l Hosp. for McHenry Cty. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 9 1981) (court of appeals reviewed matter by petition for writ of 10 mandamus after denial of 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) certification). 11 Even if such an order is final and subject to review when 12 joined with the final decision on summary judgment, for the 13 reasons discussed above, we conclude that the bankruptcy court 14 did…
discussed Cited "see" In re: Terrance Alexander Tomkow Zafar David Khan
9th Cir. BAP · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See May v. Warner Amex Cable Commc’ns, 871 F.2d 1088 (6th Cir. 1989) (table); see also McCall v. Deeds, 849 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1988) (denial of Civil Rule 54(b) certification is not appealable); Mem’l Hosp. for McHenry Cty. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1981) (court of appeals reviewed matter by petition for writ of mandamus after denial of 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) certification).
discussed Cited "see" In re: Terrance Alexander Tomkow Zafar David Khan
9th Cir. BAP · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See 5 May v. Warner Amex Cable Commc’ns, 871 F.2d 1088 (6th Cir. 1989) 6 (table); see also McCall v. Deeds, 849 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1988) 7 (denial of Civil Rule 54(b) certification is not appealable); 8 Mem’l Hosp. for McHenry Cty. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 9 1981) (court of appeals reviewed matter by petition for writ of 10 mandamus after denial of 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) certification). 11 Even if such an order is final and subject to review when 12 joined with the final decision on summary judgment, for the 13 reasons discussed above, we conclude that the bankruptcy court 14 did…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Maxwell
E.D. Ky. · 2013 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Montgomery v. United States, 871 F.2d 1088 , at *1 (6th Cir.1989) (table) (“It was proper ... to charge both of the conspiracy’s ’objectives in one count ... because there was only one agreement to commit unlawful acts.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Paul R. Peterson Construction, Inc. v. Arizona State Carpenters Health & Welfare Trust Fund
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 102, 112 (8th Cir.1948) (contract enforcement action brought under 40 U.S.C. § 270a and b); see also Rosenbaum v. Davis Iron Works, Inc., 669 F.Supp. 813 (E.D.Mich.1987), aff'd in part and reversed in part, 871 F.2d 1088 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 890 , 110 S.Ct. 235 , 107 L.Ed.2d 186 (1989) (action to compel distribution of assets in ERISA pension plan).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Parrett v. American Ship Building Company
6th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence low
We held that the 1959 plan precluded an amendment that would allow money once contributed to be reclaimed, because "[a]n agreement that provides that an act can occur in no event and under no circumstances cannot be converted into one that permits the act by a series of amendments that first deletes the reference to the prohibition and then adds a provision permitting the forbidden act." Id. at 123 ; see also Rosenbaum v. Davis Iron Works, Inc., 669 F.Supp. 813, 819 (E.D.Mich.1987) (where pension plan states that no funds contributed to trust nor assets of trust shall ever revert to or be made…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Parrett v. American Ship Building Co.
6th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence low
We held that the 1959 plan precluded an amendment that would allow money once contributed to be reclaimed, because “[a]n agreement that provides that an act can occur in no event and under no circumstances cannot be converted into one that permits the act by a series of amendments that first deletes the reference to the prohibition and then adds a provision permitting the forbidden act.” Id. at 123 ; see also Rosenbaum v. Davis Iron Works, Inc., 669 F.Supp. 813, 819 (E.D.Mich.1987) (where pension plan states that no funds contributed to trust nor assets of trust shall ever revert to or be …
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Virginia B. King
v.
Geoffrey P. Emery
88-5364.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Mar 28, 1989.
871 F.2d 1088
Unpublished

871 F.2d 1088

Unpublished Disposition
NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.
Virginia B. KING, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Geoffrey P. EMERY, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 88-5364.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

March 28, 1989.

Before KEITH, BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr. and RYAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

1

King appeals the district court's dismissal of her civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against defendant Benny Walker, for wrongful eviction in March of 1985, as time barred under the one-year Tennessee Statute of Limitations governing Sec. 1983 actions. We affirm.

2

In 1985, an application for execution on a General Sessions Court judgment was issued by the General Sessions Court clerk. Defendant Benny Walker, a deputy sheriff, evicted plaintiff King from her home in accordance with the order of execution received from the General Sessions Clerk, in March of 1985. That execution was the last action alleged by King that involved officer Walker. King brought this action on January 7, 1987, some twenty-two months after the last action of defendant Walker with regard to King in this case.

3

King alleges that her constitutional rights to notice and a hearing before being deprived of her property were violated when she lost her home during a non-judicial foreclosure sale. Following eviction from her home, King also lost her personal property in a warehouse fire. King filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and asked for declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. Secs. 2201 and 2202. The district court dismissed all the defendants stating that a private foreclosure sale pursuant to a deed of trust was not "state action" or "under color of state law" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The district court also dismissed defendant Walker stating that his actions were taken in good faith in the execution of judicial process and, therefore, were not actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing the action against all defendants except for Walker. The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's judgment dismissing the action against Walker declaring that the district court applied the wrong standard when it used a good faith subjective test to determine whether the deputy sheriff was immune. The Court of Appeals remanded for further proceedings for the purpose of applying an objective test whether plaintiff's rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See Davis v. Cherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).

4

In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985), the Supreme Court held that the personal injury statutes of limitations of the various states control actions under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. See also Owens v. Okure, --- S.Ct. ----, 57 U.S.L.W. 4065 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1989). The Sixth Circuit has consistently applied the Tennessee one-year statute of limitations for personal injury in Sec. 1983 actions subsequent to the decision in Wilson v. Garcia. Cf. Bernt v. State of Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879 (6th Cir.1986); Carol v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir.1986) cert. denied 107 S.Ct. 330. Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 28-3-104 (1988) provides that the statute of limitations for personal injury accidents is one year from the time of the accrual of the action. At the latest, her cause of action accrued at eviction in March, 1985. King did not file her cause of action until twenty-two months later. Her action, therefore, is time barred under the applicable Tennessee statutes.

5

For the reasons stated above, we affirm.