D_ G_ K v. D_ G_ K, 545 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). · Go Syfert
D_ G_ K v. D_ G_ K, 545 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
16 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: S.G.W. v. R.B. (moctapp, 1988-06-14)
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) S.G.W. v. R.B.
Mo. Ct. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
Adoption proceedings in Missouri are governed by statute, In the Matter of D.G.K. v. D.G.K., 545 S.W.2d 81, 82 [1] (Mo.App.1976), and pursuant to § 453.030, the written consent of both parents is required to proceed with the adoption of a minor.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re Adoption of S. E. F.
Mo. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
D_ G_ K_ v. D_ G_ K_, 545 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Mo.App.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wellington v. Grieshaber (2×)
Mo. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
K., 545 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Mo.App.1976), and while it is often said that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in an adoption proceeding, questions regarding the fitness of the petitioners and the child’s welfare are not reached if willful abandonment (here neglect) is not proved, In re E.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re the Adoption of Baby Girl Doe
Mo. Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
At page 712[3-7] of In re E.C.N., supra, this quotation from In re Perkins, supra, is made: “ ‘It is of course true that the statute is to be liberally construed with a view to promoting the best interests of the child, but such liberal construction is obviously not to be extended to the question of when the natural parents may be divested of their rights to the end that all legal relationship between them and their child shall cease and determine.’ ” See also In re Fuller, 544 S.W.2d 345, 349 [6] (Mo.App. 1976); and D.G.K. v. D.G.K., 545 S.W.2d 81, 82 [2] (Mo.App. 1979).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Willard v. Doyle
Mo. Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
D_ G_ K_ v. D_ G_K_, 545 S.W.2d 81, 82-83 [3-5] (Mo.App.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Adoption of Pearson
Mo. Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
The trial court’s decree is to be sustained unless there is no substantial evidence to support it or it is against the weight of the evidence or it erroneously declares or applies the law, Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976).” In the Matter of D_ G_ K_, Jr. v. D_ G_ K_, Sr., 545 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Mo.App.1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Young v. Young
Mo. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
K., 545 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Mo.App.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Adoption of RAB v. RAB (2×)
Mo. · 1978 · confidence medium
K., 545 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Mo.App. 1976), and while it is often said that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in an adoption proceeding, questions regarding the fitness of the petitioners and the child's welfare are not reached if willful abandonment (here neglect) is not proved, In re E.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Adoption of R. A. B. v. R. A. B. (2×)
Mo. · 1978 · confidence medium
K., 545 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Mo.App.1976), and while it is often said that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in an adoption proceeding, questions regarding the fitness of the petitioners and the child’s welfare are not reached if willful abandonment (here neglect) is not proved, In re E.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of D____ G____ K____, Jr.
v.
D____ G____ K____, Sr.
No. 37445.
Missouri Court of Appeals.
Nov 23, 1976.
545 S.W.2d 81
Mcllrath, Black & Williams, Gary R. Black, Sr., Flat River, Mo., for petitioners-appellants., Charles W. Medley, James E. Alexander, Farmington, Mo., for respondent.
McMillian, Rendlen, Stewart.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published
McMILLIAN, Judge.

This is an appeal by appellants B_S_ and L_ S_, from a judgment denying a petition for adoption of D_G_K_, Jr., a minor child. Petitioners have had continuous custody of the child since his original placement with them as a foster child in 1970. The adoption petition was filed December 13, 1973. The natural father opposed granting the adoption. After a lengthy hearing, the trial court denied the petition finding that the natural father had not wilfully abandoned the child or wilfully neglected to provide him with proper care and maintenance for a period of at least one year prior to the filing of the petition for adoption. We affirm.

Adoption proceedings in Missouri are governed by statute, In re E. C. N., 517 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Mo.App.1974). Pursuant to these statutes, adoption of a person under the age of 21 requires the written consent of natural parents unless one of the statutorily enumerated exceptions to consent is applicable, § 453.030(3), RSMo 1969. The exception pleaded in the present case, § 453.040, RSMo 1969, provides that:

“The consent of the adoption of a child is not required of .
(4) A parent who has for a period of at least one year immediately prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, either willfully abandoned the child or willfully neglected to provide him with proper care and maintenance. . . .”

While it is often stated that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in adoption proceedings, “. ‘Questions in regard to the fitness of the petitioners and the welfare of the child are not reached if abandonment is not proved.’ . ” 2 Am.Jur.2d, Adoption, § 60; In re E. C. N., supra, at 712. Consent or the proper waiver thereof under § 453.040 is jurisdictional, In re D, 408 S.W.2d 361, 365 (Mo.App.1966).

The words “wilfully abandoned” have been consistently interpreted since In re Watson’s Adoption, 238 Mo.App. 1104, 195 S.W.2d 331, 336 (1946), to mean

“. . . first, a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of the custody of the child to another, with the intent to never again claim the rights of a parent or perform the duties of a parent; or, second, an intentional withholding from the child, without just cause or excuse, by the parent, of his presence, his care, his love, and his protection, maintenance, and the opportunity for the display of filial affection.”

Moreover, “. . . [t]he abandonment must be absolute, complete, and wilful. There must be a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims. . . . ” In re Adoption of J., 396 S.W.2d 257, 261 (Mo.App.1965). See also In re Adoption of Rule, 435 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Mo.App.1968).

“Wilful neglect” as used in the statute has been construed to mean neglect that is “. . . intentional, deliberate, and without just cause or excuse, evincing a settled purpose to forego . . . parental duties over the period of time which the statute prescribes . . . ” In re E. C. N., supra, 517 S.W.2d at 712.

The conduct of the parent constituting wilful neglect or abandonment must have occurred during the year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition, see, e. g., In re K. M. B. and R. M. B., 544 S.W.2d 590 (Mo.App.) St. Louis, November 2, 1976; cf. Uniform Adoption Act § 6(a)(2) (1970). Abandonment and neglect[*83] are, however, matters of intent and evidence of a parent’s conduct, either before or after the statutory period, may be considered to determine the purpose and intent of the parent . . . ” In re Adoption of K, 417 S.W.2d 702, 709 (Mo. App.1967).

The result in this case is dictated by this court’s limited scope of review. Rule 73.01 directs the court to review the case upon both the law and the evidence, giving due regard to the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court’s decree is to be sustained unless there is no substantial evidence to support it or it is against the weight of the evidence or it erroneously declares or applies the law, Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). Our review of the record indicates that the decree denying the petition for adoption should be sustained as there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the natural father had not wilfully abandoned or wilfully neglected the child during the one year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition. Although respondent indicated little concern for the child from the period 1970 to July of 1972, the record does reveal some extenuating circumstances. The respondent actively initiated efforts to regain custody of the child after July of 1972. During the relevant statutory period, respondent repeatedly called the juvenile authorities regarding his son, retained an attorney to initiate legal proceedings and ultimately petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. Many of respondent’s efforts were thwarted by the Division of Welfare, arguably with good intentions. While respondent’s conduct before the statutory period may be considered to determine his purpose and intent, it cannot be said that respondent’s sporadic interest in his son during the prior period is sufficient to show a “. . . settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims. . .” In re E. C. N., supra, 517 S.W.2d at 715.

Judgment affirmed.

STEWART and RENDLEN, JJ., concur.