2021 IL 125513

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS (Docket No. 125513) ALFRED EVANS JR., Appellant, v. THE COOK COUNTY STATE’S ATTORNEY et al., Appellees. Opinion filed September 2, 2021. JUSTICE MICHAEL J. BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Theis and Overstreet concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Carter dissented, with opinion, joined by Justices Garman and Neville. OPINION ¶1 Petitioner, Alfred Evans Jr., applied to the Illinois State Police (ISP) for a Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card. The ISP denied the request, and petitioner filed a petition for review with the Cook County circuit court. The Cook County State’s Attorney objected to the petition, and the circuit court sustained the objections. The circuit court found that federal law barred petitioner from obtaining a FOID card and that petitioner had not met his burden of showing that issuing him a FOID card would not be contrary to the public interest. The Appellate Court, First District, affirmed. 2019 IL App (1st) 182488. The court disagreed with the circuit court that issuing petitioner a FOID card would be contrary to the public interest. Id. ¶¶ 26-28. The court held, however, that petitioner was barred from obtaining a FOID card because federal law prohibited him from possessing a firearm. Id. ¶¶ 30- 42. The court believed that petitioner was caught in a statutory loop between state and federal law that prohibited him from obtaining a FOID card. Id. ¶ 37. ¶2 We allowed petitioner’s petition for leave to appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. ^[1], 2019). ¶3 BACKGROUND ¶4 In March 1994, petitioner was convicted of Class 2 felony manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance and Class X felony manufacture or delivery of more than 15 grams of cocaine. He was sentenced to three years in the Department of Corrections for the Class 2 offense. The sentence for the Class X offense does not appear in the record. In addition, defendant’s criminal history shows numerous contacts with the police that did not result in convictions. In 1987, he was arrested for battery and theft. In 1992, he was arrested for aggravated assault. 1n 1993, he was arrested for battery. In 1999, he was arrested for various controlled substance offenses, and in 2008 he was arrested for battery. ¶5 In January 2018, petitioner applied to the ISP for a FOID card. The ISP denied the application, explaining in a letter that he was ineligible because of his felony convictions. In Illinois, felons are prohibited from owning firearms pursuant to section 24-1.1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018)). ¶6 Petitioner then filed a pro se complaint in the circuit court to have his firearm rights restored pursuant to section 10(c) of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (FOID Card Act) (430 ILCS 65/10(c) (West 2018)). In petitioner’s complaint,

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he stated that he was not contesting the validity of his past infractions. However, he noted that his felony convictions were more than 20 years in the past.

¶7 Section 10(c) provides a mechanism for the restoration of firearm rights. That section provides as follows:

“(c) Any person prohibited from possessing a firearm under Sections 24-1.1 or 24-3.1 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or acquiring a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card under Section 8 of this Act may apply to the Director of State Police or petition the circuit court in the county where the petitioner resides, whichever is applicable in accordance with subsection (a) of this Section, requesting relief from such prohibition and the Director or court may grant such relief if it is established by the applicant to the court’s or Director’s satisfaction that:

(0.05) when in the circuit court, the State’s Attorney has been served with a written copy of the petition at least 30 days before any such hearing in the circuit court and at the hearing the State’s Attorney was afforded an opportunity to present evidence and object to the petition;

(1) the applicant has not been convicted of a forcible felony under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction within 20 years of the applicant’s application for a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card, or at least 20 years have passed since the end of any period of imprisonment imposed in relation to that conviction;

(2) the circumstances regarding a criminal conviction, where applicable, the applicant’s criminal history and his reputation are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety;

(3) granting relief would not be contrary to the public interest; and (4) granting relief would not be contrary to federal law.” Id.

¶8 The Cook County State’s Attorney filed an objection to the petition. See id. § 10(b). The State’s Attorney objected on two grounds. First, the State’s Attorney argued that petitioner was prohibited from owning a firearm under federal law. Section 10(c)(4) of the FOID Card Act provides that relief should not be granted

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when it would be contrary to federal law (id. § 10(c)(4)), and section 10(b) provides that the court shall not issue an order to grant the petitioner a FOID card if the petitioner is “otherwise prohibited from obtaining, possessing, or using a firearm under federal law” (id. § 10(b)). Section 922(g)(1) of the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968 (Gun Control Act) prohibits an individual from possessing a firearm when that person “has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018). Alternatively, the State’s Attorney argued that, if the court determined that petitioner was not prohibited from possessing a firearm under federal law, then it should find that granting petitioner relief would not be in the public interest. The State’s Attorney focused on petitioner’s criminal history. While acknowledging that petitioner’s felony convictions were not for “forcible felonies,” the State’s Attorney contended that they showed a decided contempt for the law. The State’s Attorney pointed out that petitioner was arrested on other charges after he was released from prison. The State’s Attorney conceded that petitioner has had no documented contacts with the police for the past 10 years but argued that his adult transgressions and criminal history cast substantial doubt on whether he is an honest individual with a responsible and mature nature.

¶9 Petitioner retained counsel to file a response to the State’s Attorney’s objections. Counsel argued that granting relief would not be contrary to federal law. According to counsel, the references to federal law in sections 10(b) and 10(c)(4) meant “a disqualifying offense based on Federal Law and not a prohibition.” Counsel also cited a New Hampshire case, DuPont v. Nashua Police Department, 113 A.3d 239 (N.H. 2015). In that case, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire noted that a conviction for which a person has had his civil rights restored is not considered a conviction for purposes of the federal firearms ban. Id. at 244 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2012)). The court concluded that, for purposes of this section, the second amendment right to keep and bear arms is a civil right. Id. at 247. Accordingly, when the petitioner in that case had his right to possess firearms restored under state law, he was not barred from possessing a firearm under section 922(g)(1). Id. at 248-50.

¶ 10 Counsel also argued that granting petitioner a FOID card would not be contrary to the public interest. Counsel noted that petitioner’s felony convictions were not for forcible felonies. Counsel argued that petitioner has turned his life around and

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that his last arrest was more than 10 years ago. He pointed out that petitioner has been working as a tow truck operator for over 10 years and has worked with the City of Chicago and the Chicago Police Department. Because towing vehicles often results in irate motorists, petitioner wants a firearm for protection. He claimed to have been threatened with bodily harm over 100 times in the past 10 years.

¶ 11 Petitioner supported his petition with four character references, and he also supplied his own statement in which he took responsibility for his past mistakes and argued that he had transformed himself into a productive individual who is not a threat to society. Petitioner’s wife explained in a letter that her husband has been operating his own towing business since 2005. She acknowledged the “blemishes in his past” but explained that he is now a changed man. She argued that he has paid his debt to society and is now an upstanding and trustworthy citizen. Dr. Althea Jones explained in her letter that she has known petitioner since childhood. She said that petitioner is not a person to create danger or put others in harm’s way. She believed that petitioner has changed his life tremendously. Kristi Brown, of Catholic Charities, wrote that she has been petitioner’s friend for 37 years. She believed that his criminal history was the result of the poor choices he made as a young man. She said that he has since become a responsible person and has been free from criminality for over two decades. Brown explained that petitioner is now an upstanding member of the community who gives back by teaching young men the value of staying free of the penal system, working a tax-paying job, and owning a business. Finally, petitioner’s sister, Charlotte Hogan, wrote that petitioner was a hardworking, trustworthy individual who owns his own towing business. She said that he works long hours and is an upstanding and reliable person. She is confident in his ability to discern right from wrong, and she said that he is always willing to lend a helping hand. He is a good family man and strives to set a positive example for his children. She was confident in petitioner’s ability to possess and handle firearms.

¶ 12 The trial court set the matter for a hearing, but the record does not disclose what happened at the hearing. There is no transcript, and petitioner did not prepare a bystander’s report. The trial court entered a written order sustaining the State’s objections to the petition. The court agreed with the State’s Attorney that petitioner is barred by federal law from obtaining a FOID card. The court further found that

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petitioner had not sustained his burden of showing that issuing a FOID card to him would not be contrary to the public interest.

¶ 13 Petitioner appealed, and the Appellate Court, First District, affirmed. 2019 IL App (1st) 182488. The court disagreed with the trial court that granting petitioner a FOID card would be contrary to the public interest. The court first considered the appropriate standard of review when a trial court determines whether a petitioner is entitled to relief under section 10(c)(3) of the FOID Card Act. The court rejected the State’s argument that manifest weight review applied. Id. ¶ 26. The court noted that the Fourth District in Baumgartner v. Greene County State’s Attorney’s Office, 2016 IL App (4th) 150035, ¶ 25, held that de novo review applies to section 10 determinations. 2019 IL App (1st) 182488, ¶ 26. The court explained that “Baumgartner did not distinguish between the subsections of section 10, and we see no need to either.” Id. The court went on to explain that it found de novo review appropriate for three additional reasons: (1) only documentary evidence was considered, (2) the State did not present contrary evidence or challenge the legitimacy of petitioner’s evidence, and (3) nothing in the record suggested that the court held an evidentiary hearing. Id.

¶ 14 The court then held that the trial court erred in finding that granting petitioner a FOID card would be contrary to the public interest. The court noted that the only thing the State had raised in opposition to the petition was petitioner’s criminal history. Id. ¶ 27. That history, however, was now 25 years old and consisted of nonviolent offenses. Id. Moreover, the State had failed to account for the strides petitioner has made or the person he has become. Id. The court noted that it was uncontradicted that petitioner has a stable family life and runs a viable business. Id. Finally, petitioner had taken responsibility for his past actions and had not tried to reassign blame for them. Id. ¶ 28. The court noted that it would have reached the same conclusion even if it had applied manifest weight review. Id. ¶ 26.

¶ 15 Nevertheless, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision because it determined that petitioner was caught in an “unending statutory loop” that prevented people in his situation from ever obtaining a FOID card. Id. ¶ 7. The appellate court described the problem as follows. The ISP can deny an application for a FOID card if, inter alia, the applicant has been convicted of a felony in any jurisdiction or if the applicant is prohibited from acquiring or possessing firearms

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under Illinois or federal law. 430 ILCS 65/8(c), (n) (West 2018). If the ISP denies a FOID card application, the applicant may appeal to the Director of State Police (Director), unless he has been convicted of certain enumerated offenses, in which case the applicant may petition the circuit court for relief. Id. § 10(a). Here, petitioner’s violations of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (570 ILCS 570/100 (West 2018)) required him to petition the circuit court. 2019 IL App (1st) 182488, ¶ 20; see 430 ILCS 65/10(a) (West 2018). The State’s Attorney may object to the petition, and the trial court then considers whether “substantial justice has been done.” 430 ILCS 65/10(b) (West 2018). If the court determines that it has not, then it must order the ISP to issue a FOID card unless the applicant is “otherwise prohibited from obtaining, possessing, or using a firearm under federal law.” Id. The section 10(c) factors govern whether the circuit court may grant relief, and one of the factors that a petitioner must demonstrate is that “granting relief would not be contrary to federal law.” See id. § 10(c)(4).

¶ 16 Petitioner was prohibited from possessing a firearm under section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018)) because his convictions were for crimes that were punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. 2019 IL App (1st) 182488, ¶ 30. The Gun Control Act, however, limits what is considered a conviction:

“a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter ***.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2018).

Petitioner’s convictions had not been expunged or set aside, and he has not received a pardon, so the appellate court considered whether his civil rights had been restored. The court noted that in Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 28 (2007), the United States Supreme Court held that the relevant civil rights for purposes of section 921(a)(20) are the rights to vote, serve on a jury, and hold office. 2019 IL App (1st) 182488, ¶ 32. The State conceded that petitioner’s civil rights had been restored within the meaning of this section. Id. ¶ 34.

¶ 17 The State argued, nevertheless, that petitioner fell within an exception. Section 921(a)(20) provides that a person whose civil rights had been restored may possess

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a firearm “unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not *** possess *** firearms.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2018). Petitioner’s civil rights had been restored by operation of law, but Illinois places a ban on the possession of firearms by convicted felons. 720 ILCS 5/24- 1.1(a) (West 2018). That section, however, does “not apply if the person has been granted relief by the Director of the Department of State Police under Section 10 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act.” Id. But this brings the petitioner back to where he started. To obtain relief under section 10, he must demonstrate that granting relief would not be contrary to federal law. 430 ILCS 65/10(c)(4) (West 2018).

¶ 18 The appellate court did not believe that this “statutory merry-go-round” was what the legislature intended, as the FOID Card Act contemplates that convicted felons should have a legitimate opportunity to seek the restoration of their firearm rights. 2019 IL App (1st) 182488, ¶¶ 37-38. The court believed, however, that it was required to adopt an interpretation contrary to legislative intent because that is where the plain language of the statute led it. Id. ¶¶ 38, 42. The court also believed that its construction raised “serious constitutional concerns.” Id. ¶ 39. The court was concerned that its interpretation could deprive people in petitioner’s situation of their procedural due process rights. Id. ¶ 40. The court believed that its interpretation guaranteed an erroneous deprivation of the private interests intended to be safeguarded by section 10. Id. Nevertheless, the court held that it could not develop this theory further because petitioner had not argued it. Id. The court thus concluded that the current statutory scheme operated as a permanent ban on the possession of firearms by convicted felons. Id. ¶ 42.

¶ 19 We allowed petitioner’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. ^[1], 2019). Following oral argument, we retained jurisdiction of the case but remanded it to the circuit court for the limited purpose of setting forth its reasoning in finding that the petitioner did not sustain his burden of showing that issuing him a FOID card would not be contrary to the public interest.

¶ 20 The circuit court entered a written order explaining why it found that petitioner had not met his burden. The court began by recounting defendant’s criminal history and noted that the State had objected to the FOID card application due to petitioner’s adult transgressions and criminal history. The court explained that it

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had considered the character references petitioner submitted but found them lacking because they failed to address the responsibilities inherent in firearm ownership. The court found that the letters were devoid of fact-specific reasons why the authors believed petitioner would be able to satisfy the significant responsibilities that he would have if granted a FOID card. The court found this significant because “each of the authors clearly knew that their letters were being submitted for the very purpose of supporting Mr. Evans’s FOID application, which could lead to the ownership of a potentially deadly weapon.” The court noted that petitioner’s wife did not even mention gun ownership and that the three other character witnesses offered only general assurances that petitioner is able to discern right from wrong. However, they did not provide sufficient information about their interactions with petitioner or how often these interactions occurred.

¶ 21 Next, the court noted that petitioner apparently wanted the FOID card so that he could conceal a loaded weapon in his vehicle and use it for protection in his employment. The court explained that even if petitioner were granted a FOID card it would not be permissible for him to transport a loaded weapon or carry a firearm in a concealed manner unless he separately obtained a concealed carry license.

¶ 22 The court further found petitioner’s submissions to be defective for the following reasons: (1) petitioner failed to offer any evidence about the circumstances of either of his two felony convictions, (2) petitioner did not offer specifics as to how he would be able to carry out the significant responsibilities of owning a firearm, and (3) petitioner’s felony convictions were for drug offenses but petitioner failed to explain whether he had been addicted to drugs and, if so, whether he had received drug treatment. The court found the third reason to be particularly significant because it would have allowed the court to understand the genesis of petitioner’s underlying criminal conduct and could have “provided a basis for it to conclude that Mr. Evans could be responsible to own and operate a firearm consistent with the public interest.”

¶ 23 The court further noted that, although petitioner had filed his initial complaint pro se, he had at all other times been represented by highly competent counsel. The court explained that it would have expeditiously conducted an evidentiary hearing had one been requested. However, rather than request an evidentiary hearing, petitioner elected to stand on his problematic submissions.

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¶ 24 The court summed up as follows:

“This Court was favorably impressed that Mr. Evans has clearly made great strides in his life and that information was taken into consideration. Further, this Court fully recognized that Mr. Evans’ convictions were not ‘forcible felonies’ and Mr. Evans’ multiple felony charges, spanning over 20 years, the last of which was approximately 10 years ago, did not result in any convictions. However, this Court concluded, based upon Mr. Evans’ criminal history and the clearly deficient submissions that failed to address the issue of Mr. Evans’ potential gun ownership, that there was insufficient evidence to find that it would not be contrary to the public interest to award Mr. Evans a FOID card.”

¶ 25 ANALYSIS

¶ 26 Federal Law

¶ 27 We consider first whether granting petitioner a FOID card would be contrary to federal law. This requires that we determine if the appellate court was correct that state and federal statutes create a loop that prevents Illinois felons from ever having their firearms rights restored. Resolving this question is a matter of statutory interpretation, and the principles that guide our analysis are familiar. The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. All other canons and rules of statutory construction are subordinate to this principle. People v. Casler, 2020 IL 125117, ¶ 24. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. A court must view the statute as a whole, construing words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation. Id. The court may consider the reason for the law, the problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one way or another. Id. Statutes must be construed to avoid absurd or unjust results. People v. Hanna, 207 Ill. 2d 486, 498 (2003). When a plain or literal reading of a statute leads to absurd results or results that the legislature could not have intended, courts are not bound to that construction, and the literal reading should yield. Id. Issues requiring statutory interpretation are questions of law subject to de novo review. People v. Manning, 2018 IL 122081, ¶ 16.

- 10 - ¶ 28 After the appellate court issued its decision, this court decided Johnson v. Department of State Police, 2020 IL 124213. Although the issue in Johnson was slightly different, it is sufficiently similar that we deem Johnson controlling. In Johnson, the petitioner had her FOID card revoked because of a conviction for a misdemeanor crime involving domestic violence. Id. ¶ 1. Section 8(n) of the FOID Card Act provides that a ground for denial or revocation of a FOID card is that a person “is prohibited from acquiring or possessing firearms or firearm ammunition by any Illinois State statute or by federal law.” 430 ILCS 65/8(n) (West 2018). And section 922(g)(9) of the federal Gun Control Act prohibits the shipping, transport, possession, and receipt of firearms and ammunition by any person “who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006). The petitioner petitioned to have her firearm rights restored pursuant to section 10 of the FOID Card Act. Following a hearing, the circuit court determined that the petitioner had satisfied the requirements of section 10(c)(1)-(3) but that she was prohibited from obtaining a FOID card under section 10(c)(4) because of her federal disability. Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, ¶ 9. The circuit court then declared section 922(g)(9) of the Gun Control Act and sections 8(n), 10(b), and 10(c)(4) of the FOID Card Act (430 ILCS 65/8(n), 10(b), 10(c) (West 2018)) unconstitutional as applied to the petitioner and ordered the Director of State Police to reissue her a FOID card. Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, ¶ 10. ¶ 29 The Department of State Police appealed directly to this court. Citing the principle of constitutional avoidance, this court first considered the petitioner’s argument that a proper construction of state and federal statutes led to the conclusion that the federal prohibition no longer applied to her. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. This court noted that it was undisputed that the petitioner had satisfied the first three criteria of section 10(c) (see 430 ILCS 65/10(c)(1)-(3) (West 2018)), thus leaving as the only question whether the petitioner had established that granting her relief would not be contrary to federal law (see id. § 10(c)(4)). Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, ¶ 19. As noted above, section 922(g)(9) of the Gun Control Act bars a person from possessing firearms if that person has a misdemeanor conviction of a crime involving domestic violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006). However, the Gun Control Act places a limit on what is considered a conviction: “A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an offense for purposes of this chapter if the conviction has been expunged or set aside, or is - 11 - an offense for which the person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under such an offense) unless the pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.” Id. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). This court noted that the petitioner had not received a pardon, nor had her conviction been expunged or set aside. Accordingly, she could obtain relief only if her civil rights had been restored within the meaning of section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, ¶ 24. ¶ 30 This court, citing Logan, 552 U.S. at 28, explained that the relevant civil rights under section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) had historically been considered the rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury. Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, ¶ 28. The petitioner never lost any of these civil rights because her conviction was for a misdemeanor and she had not been sentenced to confinement. Id. ¶ 29. This court, however, held that a limited “three rights” view was not sustainable after District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), and that firearms rights should be considered “civil rights” within the meaning of section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, ¶ 30. This court reached that conclusion for three reasons. First, the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “civil rights” would include firearms rights because “civil rights” include “ ‘the rights secured to citizens of the U.S. by the *** 14th amendment[ ] to the constitution.’ ” Id. ¶ 37 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 413 (1993)). Second, the statutory language supported that conclusion. This court noted that the phrase “civil rights restored” appears alongside the words “ ‘ “expunged,” “set aside,” and “pardoned.” ’ ” Id. ¶ 39 (quoting Logan, 552 U.S. at 32). The Supreme Court in Logan explained that these terms describe “ ‘a measure by which the government relieves an offender of some or all of the consequences of his conviction.’ ” Id. (quoting Logan, 552 U.S. at 32). This court noted that restoration of firearms rights under section 10(c)(1)-(3) “similarly relieves an offender of some of the consequences of a conviction and extends a measure of forgiveness by finding *** that the offender no longer poses a risk to public safety.” Id. ¶ 40. Finally, interpreting “civil rights” as including firearms rights is consistent with the statute’s purpose because a “state regulatory scheme that restores a person’s eligibility for firearm rights by affirmatively and expressly evaluating that person’s - 12 - future dangerousness *** is entirely consistent with the trustworthiness rationale that underpins the ‘civil rights restored’ provision.” Id. ¶ 41. This court explained that ignoring the “express and measured finding under a section 10 hearing that an individual no longer poses a risk to public safety would frustrate the very legislative purpose underlying the federal statute.” Id. ¶ 43. ¶ 31 This court noted that the “civil rights restored” exemption has been interpreted to apply only to someone who lost civil rights in the first place. Id. ¶¶ 45-46. This court determined that the petitioner met that test. She lost her eligibility to obtain a FOID card and thus her right to possess firearms because of her misdemeanor domestic violence conviction. Id. ¶ 47. And, as part of her sentence, she was statutorily required to “ ‘refrain from possessing a firearm or other dangerous weapon.’ ” Id. (quoting 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(a)(3) (West 2000)). She then had her rights restored pursuant to Illinois’s regulatory scheme, which the court referred to as section 10(c)(1)-(3). Id. This court noted that its holding was consistent with the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s decision in DuPont. Id. ¶¶ 38, 49. The DuPont court held that firearms rights are civil rights under the federal Gun Control Act and that, when the only civil right that a person lost following a conviction was the right to keep and bear arms but that right was restored under state law, that person has had his civil rights restored for purposes of section 921(a)(20). DuPont, 113 A.2d at 247-49. Because the petitioner had satisfied her burden under section 10(c)(1)-(3), granting her relief would not be contrary to federal law under section 10(c)(4). Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, ¶ 51. ¶ 32 Although the firearm disability in the present case arose under a different subsection of the Gun Control Act, the Johnson analysis applies equally here. Like the petitioner in Johnson, petitioner here was prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law. However, petitioner’s ban arose from his having been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year rather than from a misdemeanor conviction for a crime of domestic violence. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018). Just as with the statutory provision in Johnson, federal law limits what is considered a conviction: “[A] conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has - 13 - had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter ***.” Id. § 921(a)(20). Here, the State conceded that petitioner’s rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury have been restored by operation of law. And, pursuant to Johnson, firearm rights are “civil rights.” Petitioner lost those rights, but as Johnson holds, Illinois provides a mechanism to restore those rights. Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, ¶ 47. If petitioner can satisfy the criteria of section 10(c)(1)-(3), then he would have his civil right to own a firearm restored. ^[1] ¶ 33 The appellate court noted that that “civil rights restored” provision of section 921(a)(20) comes with an exception. A felon may possess a firearm if his civil rights have been restored “unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not *** possess *** firearms.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2018). Illinois places an affirmative ban on felons possessing firearms. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018). However, it does not apply if the person has been granted relief under section 10 of the FOID Card Act. ^[2] Id. The appellate court believed that this trapped people in petitioner’s position in a never- ending statutory loop because this just takes them right back to where they started— possession of a firearm must be legal under federal law to grant relief under section 10. The State points out that this result can be avoided by construing the reference to granting “relief under Section 10 of the [FOID] Card Act” as meaning granting relief under section 10(c)(1)-(3). We agree, as this is consistent with what we held in Johnson. The mechanism for restoring firearms rights is contained in section 10(c)(1)-(3). See Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, ¶¶ 27, 40, 47. Thus, if a petitioner can