¹ Although, on appeal, AT&T filed an appearance and requested multiple extensions of time to file an appellee brief, which were granted, it never did so.

² We note that the arbitrary-and-capricious and abuse-of-discretion standards are viewed as equivalents. See ManorCare Health Services, LLC v. Illinois Health Facilities & Services Review Board, 2016 IL App (2d) 151214, ¶ 21. - 10 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200579-U for review were not in the record for petitioner’s second request for review, which led to the decision at issue on appeal, we should not consider documents the Commission did not review in rendering its decision. The Commission represented that the record before us was complete because it included all documents it considered in entering its final administrative decision. On January 13, 2021, we granted the Commission’s motion to reconsider. Petitioner moved us to reconsider, pointing out that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 335(d) (eff. July 1, 2017) provides that the “entire record before the administrative agency shall be the record on review,” 3 and essentially arguing that the entire record here consists of all documents before the Department and Commission that led to the initial dismissal, the remand for more investigation, the second dismissal, and the Commission’s order affirming the dismissal. On January 21, 2021, we denied petitioner’s motion to reconsider. ¶ 26 Setting aside the documents that were the subject of plaintiff’s ultimately-denied motions, our consideration of the parties’ substantive appellate arguments raised for this court new questions

³ Rule 335(d) provides in full: “(d) The Record. The entire record before the administrative agency shall be the record on review unless the agency and the petitioner stipulate to omit portions. Omitted portions shall be transmitted to the Appellate Court at any time on the request of the agency, the petitioner or any other party, which request shall be served on all parties, or on order of the court. The record shall be filed with the Appellate Court and shall contain, be arranged, prepared numbered, and certified as required for the record on appeal under Rules 321 through 325 and the Standards and Requirements for Electronic Filing the Record on Appeal.” Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 335 (d) (eff. July 1, 2017). - 11 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200579-U about the record. Specifically, certain documents referenced within the Commission’s order (including an email from the first request for review) and which underly the Department’s and Commission’s findings are not in the record. As such, on November 9, 2021, to be certain that we received the full administrative record, we entered the following order: “On the court’s own motion, respondent Illinois Human Rights Commission shall submit a supplement to the record containing any documents explicitly referenced in its September 28, 2020, decision (for example, including, but not limited to, emails), any other documents submitted for its review, and any other documents upon which it relied. Further, as the Commission reviewed the Department of Human Rights’ addendum report, which referenced 10 exhibits purportedly attached to that report, those exhibits shall also be submitted. The supplements to the record shall be submitted within 14 days of this order.” ¶ 27 The Commission has now moved this court to reconsider our sua sponte order. Specifically, the Commission represents that the documents our order identifies were either not part of the administrative record that it considered or it has already provided the entire record. It explains that certain documents are not part of the record because: (1) petitioner submitted no additional materials, such as the exhibits to the investigative and addendum reports, with his request for review; and (2) the documents were not among the materials that the Department is required to transmit to the Commission. Indeed, the Commission notes that, although its order references certain emails between petitioner and his employer, the Department “does not” (suggesting a routine procedure) provide those original documents to the Commission with its response. “The references to emails in the Commission’s decision are therefore based on the summaries of the evidence in the Department’s reports. So, the Commission did not review the emails themselves when deciding the second request for review[.]” Similarly, as to the 10 exhibits - 12 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200579-U that were purportedly attached to the addendum report, the Commission again represents it did not receive or review those exhibits in making its decision. “While the Department’s investigative report lists the exhibits that were attached to the report when it was reviewed by the Department’s Director, those exhibits are not among the materials that [petitioner] and the Department sent to the Commission in connection with the second request for review.” The Commission notes again that petitioner could have attached relevant documents in support of his request for review, as he did in his first request for review, but that he did not do so. ¶ 28 Given the Commission’s representations in its motion, we grant its motion to reconsider our November 9, 2021, order. We have apparently received all documents that the Commission had before it when deciding the issues and rendering its decision. On administrative review, we are limited to considering the record that was before the agency and cannot consider new or additional evidence; therefore, it would be improper for us to order the Commission to obtain documents from the Department that it did not possess during its review and to submit them to this court. See, e.g., Deen v. Lustig, 337 Ill. App. 3d 294, 304-05 (2003). ¶ 29 We note that the administrative framework here effectively permits the Commission to base its review and ultimate findings on the Department’s summary of what the evidence showed, not necessarily through independent inspection of the underlying evidence. From our perspective, this is somewhat troubling, as it is our obligation to review the Commission’s decision under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. Yet, the applicable statutes and regulations do not appear to require the Department to transmit underlying evidence to the Commission. Although one might expect that, where the Department is required to submit to the Commission its “investigation report,” the exhibits referenced therein and attached to that report would be included (for example, we generally deem exhibits attached to a complaint, referenced therein, as being part - 13 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200579-U of the complaint. Kucinsky v. Pfister, 2020 IL App (3d) 170719, ¶ 33 (Exhibits attached to the complaint, incorporated by reference, are part of the complaint)). Nevertheless, it appears that there is no requirement that, in its response, the Department attach supporting evidence to its report, and the regulations do not define “investigation report.” Rather, as noted, when listing what must be included with the Department’s response, the regulations require only the “investigation report” (56 Ill. Admin. Code § 5300.430) and the statute mentions only the “report” (775 ILCS 5/8-103(B) (West 2018)). See, e.g., Cannon v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 2021 IL App (3d) 190280-U, ¶ 25 (“There is no requirement to include the full investigative file, or the exhibits referenced in the Department’s report.”). Moreover, again, it is the petitioner’s burden to establish his case (see Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 131 Ill. 2d 172, 178-79 (1989)). Indeed, it appears that the Commission must adopt the Department’s factual findings unless the petitioner, in the request for review and through supplemental evidence, if appropriate, demonstrates those findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Marinelli, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 253. The Act allowed the petitioner here to submit any evidence that he believed the Commission should have considered for its review of his claims of error (775 ILCS 5/8-103(B) (West 2018)), and while not detailed in the statutes and regulations, the Commission’s instructions to the request for review specifically explained that petitioner could: submit documents with his request; arrange to access all documents in the Department’s investigative file; and make copies of evidence in the file that he wished to have the Commission consider. As the Commission points out, petitioner attached documentary support to his first request for review, but did not follow those procedures with the second request for review. ¶ 30 Technicalities aside, we note that it is not wholly unreasonable for a pro se petitioner to presume, albeit incorrectly, that the record from an initial request for review would be part of the - 14 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200579-U administrative record for a second request for review based on the same charges. Apparently, the Commission treats each review request as a separate case number and proceeding, and the records are not merged. Yet, the first review request resulted in a remand for additional investigation; that additional investigation resulted in the report that gave rise to the second request for review. Further, the Department’s addendum report specifies that it should be read along with the initial report (which was the subject of the first request for review), and the Commission’s decision on the second request for review references emails that petitioner submitted with his first request for review. As such, it seems to us that the second report and request for review could be considered a continuation of the first report and request for review, such that the administrative record would include both, but it is not for us to decide or comment on the Commission’s case management processes. In the end, to the extent that petitioner submitted documents with his first request for review, that evidence was apparently served upon the Department with the petitioner’s request and before it agreed in its response to a remand. Therefore, the documents were presumably incorporated into the additional investigation and encompassed in the addendum report and findings. ¶ 31 In sum, given the various burdens, requirements, and case management processes at play here, the record before us is apparently complete. ¶ 32 C. Racial Harassment ¶ 33 We turn now to the merits of this appeal. Addressing first petitioner’s claim of racial harassment, the Commission found that petitioner failed to present substantial evidence of actionable harassment. To establish a racial-harassment claim, the petition must provide substantial evidence that the employer’s conduct was so severe and pervasive that it altered the terms and conditions of the petitioner’s employment and created an abusive working environment. - 15 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200579-U See Village of Bellwood Board of Fire & Police Commissioners v. Human Rights Comm’n, 184 Ill. App. 3d 339, 350 (1989). “Racial harassment has been defined to include a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comment. [Citation.] More than a few isolated incidents of harassment, however, must have occurred; racial comments that are merely part of casual conversation, are accidental, or are sporadic do not trigger civil rights protective measures.” Id. “[O]ffhand comments, isolated incident[s,] and simple teasing do not rise to the level of conduct that alters the terms and conditions of employment.” Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co., 587 F.3d 832, 840-41 (7th Cir. 2009). ¶ 34 Here, the Department and Commission found that petitioner identified roughly two incidents where Egler laughed at petitioner’s accent and mocked him. While the incidents related to petitioner’s race, they were isolated incidents and not a “steady barrage” of racial harassment. Village of Bellwood, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 350. Although petitioner claimed that Egler harassed him on other occasions, those incidents concerned work-performance issues, as opposed to petitioner’s race. Indeed, in his opening brief, petitioner points to eight incidents of alleged harassment (which it appears he did not identify below and is improperly raising for the first time on appeal), but all concern Egler purportedly misidentifying petitioner as being responsible for perceived work errors or mishaps and petitioner “fighting back.” He provides similar, non-racially-connected examples in his reply brief. None describe racial comments or constitute substantial evidence that the incidents were racially motivated. ¶ 35 Although petitioner claims that emails submitted with his first request for review established racial harassment, the Department and Commission found that those emails did not concern his race. The Commission noted in its order, “[p]etitioner provided emails between he and Egler with his initial Request [for review], and nothing in these emails constitutes actionable - 16 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200579-U racial harassment.” (Emphasis added.) On appeal, petitioner notes that the emails are not in the record and that we denied his motion to supplement the record, in part, on the basis that documents he referenced were purportedly not before the Commission during its review of the second request. At the same time, however, he points out that the Commission’s order explicitly references and relies upon an email and, so, he contends, “either the record is incomplete or the order is wrong.” Not necessarily. As we discussed above, the record is not incomplete. Further, the Commission was familiar with the relevant documents, as petitioner’s claims previously came before the Commission during petitioner’s first request for review and the evidence was discussed in the Department’s first investigative report (which, in turn, was incorporated into its second report). Again, when, after the Department’s second decision dismissing his claims, petitioner filed a second request for review, he did not attach documents to support his claims of error, although the instructions provided that he could do so. Thus, it could be true both that the emails were not in the record before the Commission during the second review request and that the Commission was aware of their contents for purposes of addressing petitioner’s claims. In any event, the Commission’s order reflects that it considered documents that petitioner asserts support his claims, but it found that they did not establish racial harassment. Our review of the Commission’s factual findings is not de novo; rather, we consider them with deference and assess only whether they were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. See, e.g., Stone, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 314. Here, petitioner did not rebut the Department’s findings that the emails did not mention race. Indeed, even on appeal, petitioner identifies only two isolated incidents of comments relating to race. Petitioner describes only in conclusory fashion that the emails support his claims, but he does not describe with any specificity exactly what they said or how they established race harassment, so as to rebut the Department’s and Commission’s findings. As such, we cannot conclude that the - 17 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200579-U Commission’s finding that petitioner did not provide substantial evidence of actionable racial harassment was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence or, ultimately, that dismissal of his claims was an abuse of discretion. ¶ 36 D. Racial Discrimination ¶ 37 With respect to his termination, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that petitioner did not present substantial evidence of employment discrimination based upon race. In cases involving employment discrimination under the Act, Illinois courts have adopted the analytical framework used for addressing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (2012)) and other federal statutes. See Zaderaka v. Human Rights Comm’n, 131 Ill. 2d 172, 178 (1989). Within this framework, a plaintiff can prove discrimination through direct evidence or through an indirect method of proof. See Lalvani v. Human Rights Comm’n, 324 Ill. App. 3d 774, 790 (2001). For the indirect method, at issue here, courts use the analysis in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Specifically, petitioner here bore the initial burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 190 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1048 (1989). As his claim concerns his termination, to establish a prima facie case, petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was performing satisfactorily; (3) despite the adequacy of his work, he was discharged; and (4) a similarly situated employee who was not a member of the protected group was not discharged. See Owens v. Department of Human Rights, 356 Ill. App. 3d 46, 52 (2005). Once a petitioner establishes a prima facie case, “the employer must articulate, not prove, a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its action.” Id. The burden then shifts back to the petitioner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s articulated reason was not true - 18 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200579-U and was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id. A petitioner’s failure “to present substantial evidence of a prima facie discrimination claim or to disprove an employer’s articulated reason for discharge warrants dismissal of the charge.” Id. ¶ 38 Here, the Commission found that petitioner did not present substantial evidence of a prima facie claim because he did not establish that similarly situated non-Asian employees were treated more favorably. Specifically, the Department’s investigation revealed that petitioner was not the only Asian member of his team; the other Asian team member received the second-highest score in evaluations and was not terminated. Further, four other employees (outside of the team) were laid off at the same time as petitioner, and three of those terminated employees were non-Asian. Petitioner did not present evidence during the second review request to establish that the Department’s findings were incorrect. On appeal, petitioner vaguely asserts that the difference between him and the non-terminated Asian team member is that he chose to oppose discrimination. In addition to lacking support, this explanation does nothing to rebut the evidence that non-Asian employees were also terminated at the same time. Nor has petitioner put forth evidence that, for example, a non-Asian employee who had a lower performance score than him was not terminated, which is not what the evidence demonstrated. ¶ 39 E. Retaliation ¶ 40 Finally, with respect to petitioner’s retaliation claims, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in determining that petitioner failed to establish that the alleged racial harassment or termination decisions were retaliatory. To prove a prima facie case of retaliation under the Act, a plaintiff must prove that (1) he or she was engaged in statutorily-protected activity; (2) the employer committed an adverse act against him or her; and (3) a causal connection existed between - 19 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200579-U the protected activity and the adverse act. Terada v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2015 IL App (5th) 140170, ¶ 25. ¶ 41 Preliminarily, with respect to the requirement of demonstrating an adverse action, while petitioner’s termination is clearly an adverse action, the Commission correctly found that petitioner did not establish racial harassment and, thus, the alleged harassment cannot serve as an additional adverse action. Moreover, the Commission’s finding that petitioner did not establish a nexus between the alleged adverse action and protected activity is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, as noted, both the Department and Commission found that the 2017 email to Savoor did not mention racial harassment. Petitioner has not presented evidence to rebut this finding. Thus, because petitioner complained only generally of harassment or unfair treatment, petitioner’s 2017 email complaining about Egler did not constitute protected activity. Although protected activity includes internal complaints to managers or other appropriate persons (see Burks v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 464 F.3d 744, 758 (7th Cir. 2006)), the substance of the complaint must be sufficient to notify the employer that the petitioner reasonably believes that prohibited discrimination has occurred. See Skiba v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 718 (7th Cir. 2018). “Merely complaining in general terms of discrimination or harassment, without indicating a connection to a protected class or providing facts sufficient to create that inference, is insufficient.” Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2006). ¶ 42 Moreover, although the Commission agreed that petitioner’s 2008 discrimination charge against his employer would constitute protected activity, it properly concluded that petitioner did not provide substantial evidence of a causal connection between that activity and his termination 10 years later. Indeed, as the Commission notes, an extended temporal proximity between the - 20 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200579-U protected activity and adverse action precludes a finding of causality. See, e.g., Clark City School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (20-month lapse between alleged protected activity and adverse action insufficient to infer causal connection); see also Samuelson v. Durkee/French/Airwick, 976 F.2d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 1992) (causal connection “discount[ed]” on account of three-year lapse between protected activity and adverse action). Petitioner’s assertion on appeal that the 10-year period is not an issue because AT&T has a long memory and is vindictive constitutes unsupported speculation, not evidence. See, e.g., Folbert v. Department of Human Rights, 303 Ill. App. 3d 13, 25 (1999) (speculation and conjecture does not constitute substantial evidence). In sum, without more, petitioner’s 2008 alleged protected activity is too remote from his termination to constitute substantial evidence of retaliation. ¶ 43 III. CONCLUSION ¶ 44 The decision of the Commission sustaining the Department’s dismissal of petitioner’s charges for lack of substantial evidence was not an abuse of discretion. We affirm. ¶ 45 Affirmed. - 21 -