In re the Guardianship of Aaron D., 403 N.E.2d 451 (NY 1980). · Go Syfert
Search
In re the Guardianship of Aaron D., 403 N.E.2d 451 (NY 1980). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
48 citation events (16 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Matter of Jesten J.F. (Ruth P.S.) (nyappdiv, 2018-12-21)
Treatment trajectory · 1980 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1980 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Jesten J.F. (Ruth P.S.)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · confidence medium
Given "the magnitude of the rights at stake [in a termination proceeding], as well as the allegations of mental illness" ( Matter of Daniel Aaron D. , 49 NY2d 788, 790 [1980]), we conclude that the court erred in failing to hold a hearing on whether a guardian ad litem should have been appointed for the mother.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stergiou v. New York City Department of Education
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Petitioner’s exclusion from the administrative hearing during the testimony of the only eyewitness to her alleged hitting of a student—the student himself—violated her constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her (see Matter of Daniel Aaron D., 49 NY2d 788, 791 [1980]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stergiou v. New York City Department of Education
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Petitioner’s exclusion from the administrative hearing during the testimony of the only eyewitness to her alleged hitting of a student—the student himself—violated her constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her (see Matter of Daniel Aaron D., 49 NY2d 788, 791 [1980]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Arielle Y.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
The petitioner bears the burden of establishing each of these facts in issue by clear and convincing proof (see Family Ct Act § 622; Social Services Law § 384-b [3] [g] [i]; Matter of Natasha RR., 42 AD3d 769, 771 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 812 [2007]), and “[t]here must be strict adherence to [this] statutory mandate” (Matter of Daniel Aaron D., 49 NY2d 788, 790 [1980]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Lina Catalina R.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2005 · confidence medium
We disagree with the Family Court’s determination that the petitioner met its burden of adherence to the strict statutory mandate of clear and convincing evidence (see Matter of Daniel Aaron D., 49 NY2d 788, 790 [1980]; Matter of Edon F., 256 AD2d 577 [1998]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Möllerson v. City of New York
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 1998 · confidence medium
As a matter of elementary fairness, all parties to an action have the right to appear at and participate in all pretrial and trial stages of an action, unless they waive their right to do so or exceptional circumstances occur, such as disruptiveness by the party (see, Matter of Daniel Aaron D., 49 NY2d 788, 791 [1980]; Lunney v Graham, 91 AD2d 592, 593 [1st Dept 1982]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Dean L.
N.Y. App. Div. · 1985 · confidence medium
In Matter of Daniel A.D. ( 49 NY2d 788 ), the Court of Appeals, in holding that the trial court erred in temporarily excluding from the hearing a mother allegedly unable to provide for her child because of mental illness, stated, “There is nothing in the record to indicate that there was a compelling necessity for her exclusion” (Matter of Daniel A.D., supra, p 791).
discussed Cited "see" Matter of Duane II. (Andrew II.) (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
In our estimation, petitioner's proof did not meet its burden ( see Matter of Arielle Y. , 61 AD3d 1061, 1062-1063 [2009]; Matter of Jennifer HH. , 193 AD2d 850, 852 [1993]; see generally Matter of Daniel Aaron D. , 49 NY2d 788, 790 [1980], revg 66 AD2d 728 [1978]).
discussed Cited "see" In re Joseph ZZ.
N.Y. App. Div. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
It is well settled that for termination of parental rights by reason of mental illness the petitioner must establish that the parent was “presently and for the foreseeable future unable, by reason of mental illness or mental retardation, to provide proper and adequate care for a child who has been in the care of an authorized agency for the period of one year immediately prior to the date on which the petition is filed” (Social Services Law § 384-b [4] [c]; see, Matter of Daniel Aaron D., 49 NY2d 788, 790 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re G./A. Children
N.Y.C. Fam. Ct. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
(Matter of Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs. v Mark M., 196 AD2d 196 [2d Dept 1994] [Per Curiam]; see, NY Const, art I, § 6 [under State constitutional law, the right to appear and defend in person applies to both criminal and civil actions]; see also., Matter of Daniel Aaron D., 49 NY2d 788 [1980]; Carlisle v County of Nassau, 64 AD2d 15 [2d Dept 1978].) Further, the corollary right of a respondent to face-to-face confrontation of witnesses who testify against him or her is a fundamental element of American jurisprudence.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of the Guardianship of Daniel Aaron D., an Infant. Louise Wise Services, as Guardian and Custodian of Daniel Aaron D., Respondent Phoebe D.
New York Court of Appeals.
Feb 20, 1980.
403 N.E.2d 451
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Terry Milburn for appellant., Michael A. Neff for respondent.
Cited by 26 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the matter remitted for a new hearing for the reasons stated and in accordance with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Arnold L. Fein at the Appellate Division.

Under former section 384 (subd 7, par [a]) of the Social Services Law, the constitutionality of which has not been challenged here, before a court severs parental ties in a proceeding of this sort the parent must have been found to be "presently and for the foreseeable future unable to provide proper and adequate care, by reason of mental illness”. Section 384 (subd 7, par [d]) requires that the finding of mental illness be made "only upon clear and convincing proof’. There must be strict adherence to that statutory mandate. In this proceeding the agency did not meet its burden.

The record of the hearing presents a sharp conflict in the opinions expressed by the psychiatrists as to the present condition and future capacity of the mother to care for and assume custody over her child. Although the matter of credibility is clearly one for the trial court, we agree with the dissenters at the Appellate Division that the doctor testifying on behalf of the agency was equivocal as to the natural mother’s inability to provide adequate care "for the foreseeable future”. In addition the doctor had last examined the mother 10 months prior to the hearing and could not render with assurance any positive opinion as to her present condition. Under these circumstances a new hearing should be held after a current psychiatric examination is directed by the Family Court.

CPLR 1201 provides, in part, that a person shall appear by guardian ad litem "if he is an adult incapable of adequately prosecuting or defending his rights”. Although we cannot say in this case that the appointment of a guardian to represent the interests of the mother was mandated by statute, the magnitude of the rights at stake, as well as the allegations of mental illness, indicate that the court on the rehearing of this matter should seriously consider whether the mother’s inter[*791] ests can be adequately protected except by the appointment of a guardian.

We also agree with the dissenters that the exclusion of the mother from the courtroom during the testimony of the court-appointed psychiatrist was error. There is nothing in the record to indicate that there was a compelling necessity for her exclusion nor is there an indication of a knowing and intelligent waiver by her of her right to be present during the crucial testimony upon which the court relied to terminate her rights.

Judges Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Meyer concur. Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen and Gabrielli dissent and vote to affirm for reasons stated in the memorandum of the Appellate Division (66 AD2d 728).

Order reversed, with costs, and the motion remitted to the Family Court, New York County, for a new hearing in a memorandum.