Marzec v. DeBuono, 739 N.E.2d 742 (NY 2000). · Go Syfert
Marzec v. DeBuono, 739 N.E.2d 742 (NY 2000). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
33 citation events (32 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Matter of Harry's Nurses Registry, Inc. v. New York State Off. of Medicaid Inspector Gen. (OMIG) (nyappdiv, 2025-03-14)
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Harry's Nurses Registry, Inc. v. New York State Off. of Medicaid Inspector Gen. (OMIG)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2025 · confidence medium
Here, petitioner submitted the relevant documentation to OMIG well after the issuance of the final audit report, and the ALJ's refusal to consider that documentation was rational and reasonable ( see generally Matter of Marzec v DeBuono , 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000], rearg denied 96 NY2d 731 [2001]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of SCO Family of Servs. v. New York State Dept. of Health
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
An administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulations must be upheld unless the determination is unreasonable or irrational (see CPLR 7803 [3]; Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000]; Matter of Cedar Manor Nursing Home v Novello, 63 AD3d 833, 834 [2009]; East Acupuncture, P.C. v Allstate Ins.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Ralex Servs., Inc. v. Shah
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Hosp. v Axelrod, 70 NY2d 467, 473 [1987]; cf. Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Entergy Nuclear Operation, Inc. v. New York State Department of State
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
As respondents correctly note, “[a]n agency’s interpretation of its regulations must be upheld unless the determination is irrational and unreasonable” (Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see CPLR 7803 [3]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2014 · confidence medium
Where, as here, an agency’s determination is rationally based, it will be upheld by the court which will defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations which is not manifestly irrational or unreasonable (Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bulmahn v. New York State Office of Medicaid Inspector General
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
We further conclude, however, that the determination concerning the amount that was overpaid was “ ‘irrational and unreasonable’ ” (Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000], rearg denied 96 NY2d 731 [2001]; see Matter of Gignac v Paterson, 70 AD3d 1310, 1311 [2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 714 [2010]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bulmahn v. New York State Office of Medicaid Inspector General
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
We further conclude, however, that the determination concerning the amount that was overpaid was “ ‘irrational and unreasonable’ ” (Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000], rearg denied 96 NY2d 731 [2001]; see Matter of Gignac v Paterson, 70 AD3d 1310, 1311 [2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 714 [2010]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Arias v. Pascal
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
The court properly deferred to respondents’ interpretation of Rent Stabilization Code (9 NYCRR) § 2522.9 and Operational Bulletin 2005-1, as their interpretation is rational (see Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Arias v. Pascal
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
The court properly deferred to respondents’ interpretation of Rent Stabilization Code (9 NYCRR) § 2522.9 and Operational Bulletin 2005-1, as their interpretation is rational (see Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jno-Charles v. New York City Housing Authority
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
Respondent’s determination, and its interpretation of its own standards of admission, are rational and reasonable and should be sustained (see Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000]; see also Matter of Muhammad v New York City Hous.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jno-Charles v. New York City Housing Authority
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
Respondent’s determination, and its interpretation of its own standards of admission, are rational and reasonable and should be sustained (see Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000]; see also Matter of Muhammad v New York City Hous.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Raymond Hadley Corp. v. New York State Department of State
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
On this record, we find the Board’s interpretation of the Building Code of New York State (2007), as well as its reliance on the commentary to the International Building Code, to be reasonable (see Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000]; Matter of County of St.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) County of St. Lawrence v. Daines
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
Although an agency’s interpretation of its regulations will not be disturbed unless the determination is irrational or unreasonable (see Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000]), we find that DOH’s interpretation fails to satisfy this test.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re Deanna W.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
Home Care v New York State Dept, of Health, 5 NY3d at 506 ; Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000]; East Acupuncture, EC. v Allstate Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Northern Metropolitan Residential Healthcare Facility, Inc. v. Novello
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
Inasmuch as the challenged determination was based on a rational interpretation by DOH of its own regulations (see generally Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000]; Matter of Northern Metro.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gignac v. Paterson
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
“An agency’s interpretation of its regulations must be upheld unless the determination is irrational and unreasonable” (Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000], rearg denied 96 NY2d 731 [2001] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Seittelman v Sabol, 91 NY2d 618, 625 [1998]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fullwood v. Lamy
N.Y. App. Div. · 2006 · confidence medium
As we regard CORC’s determination to be based upon a rational and reasonable interpretation of the directive, we defer to it (see Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000]; Matter of Elcor Health Servs. v Novello, 295 AD2d 772, 774 [2002], affd 100 NY2d 273 [2003]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Northern Metropolitan Residential Healthcare Facility, Inc. v. Novello (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2005 · confidence medium
This interpretation is entitled to deference by this Court (see Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000]; Matter of Elcor Health Servs. v Novello, 295 AD2d 772, 774 [2002], affd 100 NY2d 273 [2003]) and is, in any event, a logical and reasonable explanation of thé regulatory terms.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Janes v. Doar
N.Y. App. Div. · 2005 · confidence medium
Because we can discern no rational basis for respondents’ interpretation of the relevant statutes and regulations for the creation of the administrative directive that petitioner may not apply as an individual for safety net assistance (s ee generally Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000], rearg denied 96 NY2d 731 [2001]), and because that administrative directive conflicts with the express language of 18 NYCRR former 352.30 (a), we conclude that the administrative directive is unreasonable and that 18 NYCRR former 352.30 (a) controls (see generally Matter of Harbolic v Berger,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Stop & Shop Supermarket Cos., Inc. v. Office of Consumer Affairs of the County of Nassau
N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty. · 2004 · confidence medium
Notably, "[i]t is settled law that an agency's interpretation of the statutes it administers must be upheld absent demonstrated irrationality or unreasonableness" (Seittelman v. Sabol, 91 NY2d 618, 625 [1998] see , Elcor Health Services, Inc. v. Novello, 100 NY2d 273, 280 [2003 ]; Marzec v. DeBuono , 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000]; Maggio v. DeBuono , 4 AD3d 362 ; Nelson v. Roberts , 304 AD2d 20 , 24 ; 23 Realty Associates v. Teigman , supra ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Elcor Health Services, Inc. v. Novello
NY · 2003 · confidence medium
This interpretation does not conflict with the plain language of the regulation, is neither arbitrary and capricious nor irrational and, as a result, should not be disturbed (see Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000]).
discussed Cited "see" Elcor Health Services, Inc. v. Novello
N.Y. App. Div. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
Generally, “courts will defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations if not irrational” (Matter of Silver Lake Nursing Home v Axelrod, 156 AD2d 789, 790 ; see, Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 ; Matter of County of Rockland v Axelrod, 157 AD2d 960, 961 ), and the agency’s interpretation is not rendered irrational simply because the regulation may be susceptible to a different rational interpretation (Matter of Jennings v New York State Off. of Mental Health, 90 NY2d 227, 239 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Matter of The Hurlbut, LLC v. New York State Off. of Medicaid Inspector Gen.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Finally, we reject petitioner's contention that the ALJ's determination was arbitrary and capricious ( see CPLR 7803 [3]; see also Matter of Marzec v DeBuono , 95 NY2d 262, 266 [2000], rearg denied 96 NY2d 731 [2001]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Raymond Marzec, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated
v.
Barbara A. DeBuono, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health
New York Court of Appeals.
Oct 24, 2000.
739 N.E.2d 742
POINTS OF COUNSEL, Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, Albany (Victor Paladino, Preeta D. Bansal, Daniel Smirlock and Peter G. Crary of counsel), for appellants., Legal Services for the Elderly, Disabled or Disadvantaged of Western New York, Inc., Buffalo (Anthony Szczygiel of counsel), for Raymond Marzec, respondent.
Smith.
Cited by 30 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

Smith, J.

The issue here is whether Medicaid regulations governing eligibility for benefits authorized a reduction in the applicant’s income in an amount necessary to meet the needs of his ineligible spouse. The Appellate Division answered in the affirmative. For reasons stated in this Opinion, we now reverse.

On October 1, 1996, petitioner Raymond Marzec applied for Medicaid benefits to the Erie County Department of Social Services (“DSS”). At that time petitioner’s gross income, derived solely from Social Security, was $717 per month. Thereafter, petitioner was hospitalized from October 8 until October 16, 1996.

In November 1996, DSS notified petitioner that his hospitalization would be covered by Medicaid. DSS calculated petitioner’s costs based on a six-month period beginning October 1, 1996 and ending March 31, 1997 (see, 42 CFR 435.831 [a] [1]). After taking into account all available income and resources, DSS concluded that petitioner had excess income of $138 per month, which he was required to spend on medical expenses before Medicaid would pay his medical bills (see, 42 USC § 1396a [a] [17]; 18 NYCRR 360-4.8 [c] [1]). Thus, DSS required petitioner to spend down a total of $828 (six months times $138) before receiving benefits, leaving him with $711 in medical bills. DSS determined further that 18 NYCRR 360-4.6 did not entitle petitioner to an “income disregard” — a deduction in the amount of income and resources deemed available to the applicant — for the care of his ineligible spouse.

Petitioner requested a hearing to review the determination, arguing that inasmuch as his spouse was entirely dependent upon him for financial support, DSS should have made a dependent family member deduction from his income pursuant to[*265] 18 NYCRR 360-4.6 (a) (2) (i). At the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge disagreed, concluding the calculations were in accordance with the Federal SSI-guidelines and State budgeting methodology for determining Medicaid benefits. The Commissioner of Health upheld that determination. Petitioner then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking review of the agency’s determination. Concluding that the administrative determination was “unreasonable and irrational,” Supreme Court granted the petition and directed DSS to recalculate petitioner’s medical assistance eligibility. The Appellate Division affirmed, with two Justices dissenting. This Court granted leave to appeal.

Under 18 NYCRR 360-4.6 (a) (2) (i), a Medicaid applicant is allowed a disregard, for the “amount of income determined in accordance with Federal guidelines to meet the needs of dependent family members who live with the applicant/recipient and who are not certified blind or certified disabled.” Petitioner contends that this regulation authorizes an income disregard of an amount necessary to meet the needs of his wife. Appellants, the Commissioner of Health and DSS Commissioner, argue that there should be no deduction because the Federal guidelines do not provide for an income disregard for petitioner’s spouse in this instance. We agree with appellants.

The procedure for determining Medicaid eligibility, set out in 18 NYCRR 360-4.1, requires (1) a determination of the size of a household, (2) a determination of all income and resources available to the applicant during the period for which assistance is sought, (3) a disregard of certain kinds of income and resources* and (4) a comparison of the available resources with the eligibility standards. There is no dispute that petitioner is considered a one person household for purposes of the regulations, that petitioner’s resources are limited to Social Security or that the comparison of available resources and eligibility is appropriate. Only the issue of whether there should be a disregard for petitioner’s dependent spouse — the third factor — is before us.

The applicable regulation, 18 NYCRR 360-4.6 (a) (1), enumerates the disregards for all applicants and recipients of[*266] medical assistance. Paragraph (2) of that regulation itself explicitly requires that DSS and the Department of Health look to “Federal guidelines” in order to determine the amount of the income disregard, if any, to which petitioner is entitled, in order to meet the needs of certain family members (see, 18 NYCRR 360-4.6 [a] [2] [i]).

Significantly, there are no Federal guidelines supporting the deduction petitioner seeks. Federal regulations do permit a disregard, for example, from the income of an ineligible spouse that would be deemed available to the applicant for the care of ineligible children (see, 20 CFR 416.1163). There is, however, no Federal guideline authorizing an income disregard for the amount of money needed to support a spouse who is not 65 years of age, blind or disabled. The absence of such a disregard is consistent with the efforts to assist only those who are most in need of the limited public funds available (Matter of Glosenger v Perales, 83 NY2d 984, 989).

DSS determined that there should be no disregard for the support of petitioner’s wife. An agency’s interpretation of its regulations must be upheld unless the determination is “irrational and unreasonable” (Seittelman v Sabol, 91 NY2d 618, 625; Matter of Cortlandt Nursing Care Ctr. v Whalen, 46 NY2d 979, 980; Matter of Sigety v Ingraham, 29 NY2d 110, 114). Appellants’ interpretation of the regulation is not irrational or unreasonable and should be sustained.

Given this disposition, we need not and do not reach the question of class action certification.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, without costs, and the petition dismissed.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Levine, Ciparick, Wesley and Rosenblatt concur.

Order reversed, etc.

In the words of the regulation, 18 NYCRR 360-4.6: “Not all of the income and resources available to an applicant/recipient is counted in determining his/her financial eligibility for MA [medical assistance]. Certain types and amounts of income and resources are disregarded. After these disregards have been applied, what remains is the applicant’/recipient’ [sic] net available income and resources.”