UNITED STATES of Am., Ex Rel. Charles H. GLASS, Appellant, v. MEDTRONIC, INC., Appellee, 957 F.2d 605 (8th Cir. 1992). · Go Syfert
UNITED STATES of Am., Ex Rel. Charles H. GLASS, Appellant, v. MEDTRONIC, INC., Appellee, 957 F.2d 605 (8th Cir. 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
197 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Crysteal Davis v. Trevor Spear (ca8, 2022-05-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1992 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Crysteal Davis v. Trevor Spear
8th Cir. · 2022 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir. 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fabula v. American Medical Response of Connecticut,Inc.
D. Conn. · 2019 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 608 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding defendant did not submit false claim where Medicare’s rules and regulations permitted its conduct); United States ex rel.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States Ex Rel. Davis v. District of Columbia
D.D.C. · 2008 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, 957 F.2d 605, 608 (8th Cir.1992)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States Ex Rel. Ramadoss v. Caremark Inc.
W.D. Tex. · 2008 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 608 (8th Cir.1992); United States ex rel.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield Of Utah
10th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 606 (8th Cir.1992), to require "some sort of affirmative action on the part of a defendant before imposing liability [under the FCA]." Motivating the district court was its concern that too broad an interpretation of the "causes to be presented" language in the FCA "would impose liability on parties merely for failing to prevent the fraudulent acts of others." We share this concern. 32 Generally, mere knowledge of the submission of claims and knowledge of the falsity of those claims is insufficient to establish liability under the FCA.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States Ex Rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield (2×)
10th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Glass v. M edtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 606 (8th Cir. 1992), to require “some sort of affirmative action on the part of a defendant before imposing liability [under the FCA].” M otivating the district court was its concern that too broad an interpretation of the “causes to be presented” language in the FCA “would impose liability on parties merely for failing to prevent the fraudulent acts of others.” W e share this concern.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Prabhu
D. Nev. · 2006 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 608 (8th Cir.1992) (a statement cannot be “false” or “fraudulent” under FCA when the statement is consistent with regulations governing program). 5.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Marvin Klehr v. Charles R. Crafts
8th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Madonna Towers, Inc.
8th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992). 8 The FCA prohibits any person from knowingly presenting a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval by the federal government. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States Ex Rel. Quirk v. Madonna Towers, Inc.
8th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Transport Administrative Services
8th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir. 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States Ex Rel. Gebert v. Transport Administrative Services
8th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States Ex Rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp.
D.D.C. · 2001 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, 957 F.2d 605, 608 (8th Cir.1992)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) U.S. Ex Rel. Shaver v. Lucas Western Corp.
8th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 606 (8th Cir. 1992) (defendant told relator to submit medical bills to Medicare); Hyslop v. United States, 261 F.2d 786, 792 (8th Cir. 1958) (under prior civil false claims statute, reversing grant of summary judgment where there was no proof that defendant had any transactions with prime contractors who submitted false claims to government); Boushea v. United States, 173 F.2d 131, 133-34 (8th Cir. 1949) (defendant liable under criminal false claims statute for false claim presented to government by innocent third party based on defendant's representatio…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States Ex Rel. Shaver v. Lucas Western Corp.
8th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 606 (8th Cir.1992) (defendant told relator to submit medical bills to Medicare); Hyslop v. United States, 261 F.2d 786, 792 (8th Cir.1958) (under prior *934 civil false claims statute, reversing grant of summary judgment where there was no proof that defendant had any transactions with prime contractors who submitted false claims to government); Boushea v. United States, 173 F.2d 131, 133-34 (8th Cir.1949) (defendant liable under criminal false claims statute for false claim presented to government by innocent third party based on defendant’s represent…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pat Costner v. Urs Consultants, Inc.
8th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 608 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Redman v. West Business Resources, Inc.
8th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Redman v. U.S. West Business Resources, Inc.
8th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc.
8th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 608 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Erik Gundacker v. Unisys Corporation
8th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir. 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Erik Gundacker v. Unisys Corporation
8th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
United States ex. r-el Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jerry L. Fast v. Southern Union Co.
8th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir. 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jerry L. FAST, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN UNION COMPANY, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Appellee
8th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Goldman A. Dillon v. Yankton Sioux Tribe
8th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir. 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Golman A. Dillon, Jr., Also Known as Bill A. Dillon v. Yankton Sioux Tribe Housing Authority
8th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Leroy Thompson v. Board Of The Special School District No. 1
8th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Thompson Ex Rel. Buckhanon v. Board of the Special School District No. 1
8th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Paul J. Kiel v. Select Artificials
8th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir. 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Paul J. Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc. (2×)
8th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States Ex Rel. Cox v. Iowa Health System
S.D. Iowa · 1998 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 608 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Deanna Roberts v. Darryl Francis
8th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Deanna Slagle Roberts v. Darryl Francis, M.D. St. Edward Mercy Medical Center
8th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Stanley D. Rabushka, Ex Rel. United States of America Stanley D. Rabushka v. Crane Company
8th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 608 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Stanley Rabushka v. Crane Co.
8th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 608 (8th Cir. 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Paul Ferguson v. Cape Girardeau County
8th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Paul Ferguson v. Cape Girardeau Cty.
8th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Billingsley v. St. Louis County
8th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Billingsley v. St. Louis County
8th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Anderson v. Little Machine Company
8th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
The district court held that the Andersons made no showing of failure to warn, and that the warning Ronald Anderson received was "legally sufficient." The court held: "Plaintiff admits knowledge of the danger and concedes that it was open and obvious." The court entered summary judgment for Allied. 5 We review an entry of summary judgment de novo, Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992), using the same standard applied by the district court.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Anderson v. F.J. Little Machine Co.
8th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
We review an entry of summary judgment de novo, Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992), using the same standard applied by the district court.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Michael D. Ashby v. Robert Schneck
8th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir. 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mikes v. Strauss
S.D.N.Y. · 1995 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 608 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Bouchey, 860 F.Supp. 890, 893 (D.D.C.1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) A.J. ex rel. L.B. v. Kierst
8th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992), applying the same standards used by the district court.
cited Cited as authority (rule) A.Y. McDonald Industries, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America
8th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir. 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barnard v. Jackson County, Missouri
8th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992). 9 Barnard makes the following contentions about his discussion with the Star concerning the medical examiner's audit: (1) this private contact related to matters of public concern and is protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendants did not establish that the County's interest in maintaining efficiency in the workplace outweighed his First Amendment interests; (3) this contact was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate his employment; and (4) his First Amendment right to speak and associate with the members of the Sta…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Clyde Weiler v. James Purkett, Superintendent at FCC Leah Embly, Mailroom Supervisor, Fcc, Clyde Weiler v. James Purkett, Superintendent Leah Embly, Mailroom Supervisor Priscilla F. Gunn, Special Assistant Attorney General
8th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir. 1992), applying the same standards as the district court.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Barnard v. Jackson County
8th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sherrer v. Stephens
8th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sherrer v. Stephens
8th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Medicare & Medicaid Guide P 40,093 United States of America, Ex Rel. Charles H. Glass
v.
Medtronic, Inc.
91-1160.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Feb 26, 1992.
957 F.2d 605
Stewart C. Loper, St. Paul, Minn, and Charles H. Johnson & Associates, New Brighton, Minn., for appellant., Sherwin J. Markman, Martha Roadstrum Moffett and Robert A. Begotlca, Washington, D.C., and G. Alen Cunningham, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee.
Lay, Gibson, McMillian.
Cited by 185 opinions  |  Published
McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Charles H. Glass appeals from a final order entered in the United States District Court [1] for the District of Minnesota granting partial summary judgment in favor of Medtronic, Inc. and dismissing his claims under the False Claims Act. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 et seq. (West 1983 & Supp.1991). United States ex rel. Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 3-88-547, 1990 WL 357536 (D.Minn. Aug. 28, 1990). For reversal, Glass argues that the district court erred in finding there was nothing false or fraudulent about Medtronic’s advice to him to submit his medical bills to Medicare for payment. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the order of the district court.

I. FACTS

This case is a qui tam action on behalf of the government under the False Claims Act. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730 (West Supp.1991). Qui tam plaintiff Charles Glass claimed that Medtronic violated the False Claims Act by telling him to submit his medical bills to Medicare when in fact Medtronic knew that it was liable for his medical bills. Glass sues on behalf of the government for all others similarly situated.

Medtronic is a company which designs and manufactures pacemakers for implantation. The sale of these pacemakers is[*607] controlled by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq. (West 1972 & Supp.1991). The Medical Device Amendments require that entirely new medical devices receive premarket approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Id. § 360e. Newly-manufactured devices which are “substantially equivalent” to a device that was marketed prior to May 28, 1976, need only file a 510(k) “premarket notification” with the FDA. Id.

On May 27, 1980, Medtronic filed a 510(k) report for a new pacemaker lead, model 4002. This premarket notification stated that both the inner and outer insulation of the 4002 lead would be polyurethane. After several months of production, the 4002’s inner insulation was changed to silicone, but no new 510(k) notification was filed. Medtronic had used silicone insulation on pacemakers for many years and did not believe it significantly affected the safety or effectiveness of the pacemaker and thus believed that no new report was required.

The model 4002 was discontinued in 1984 due to the introduction of a more advanced pacemaker. In 1987, Medtronic issued a Medical Device Safety Alert for the 4002. This alert did not recall the pacemaker, but did warn doctors to monitor patients closely because the complication rate with the 4002 was higher than with other Medtronic models.

When the 4002 was marketed, it included a disclaimer which disclaimed all liability for defects. Effective January 4, 1984, Medtronic issued a limited warranty for all of its pacemakers which was applied retroactively. This warranty provided that if a defect in the pacemaker resulted in malfunction, Medtronic would issue a credit equal to the original purchase price and pay up to $600.00 of a patient’s uninsured medical expenses associated with the replacement.

Charles Glass was implanted with a model 4002 pacemaker in February 1983. He began to experience an irregular heartbeat problem in mid-1985 and underwent surgery to replace the pacemaker in May 1986. In April 1986, prior to his replacement surgery, Glass called Medtronic to ask if it would pay for the medical expenses associated with the surgery. The Medtronic representative told Glass about the limited warranty and that his medical bills should be submitted to Medicare. His medical bills were submitted to and paid by Medicare. Medicare covers the reasonable costs of replacing pacemakers where medically necessary. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(v) (West 1992).

Glass filed his initial complaint in August 1988 and the government filed a notice declining to prosecute in December 1988. In May 1989 Medtronic moved to dismiss on the ground that Glass was not an original source of the information on which the suit was based and thus the suit was juris-dictionally barred under 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (West Supp.1991). The district court denied this motion. On June 25, 1990, Medtronic filed a motion for partial summary judgment. This motion was granted and Glass now appeals. [2]

II. ANALYSIS

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. The question' before the district court, and this court on appeal, is whether the record, when viewed in light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

We agree with the district court that Glass has failed to demonstrate that a[*608] false or fraudulent claim was made and therefore summary judgment was proper. The False Claims Act holds any person liable who:

(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government.

31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a) (West Supp.1991). In applying this statute, the district court found that two elements were necessary for Glass to prove a cause of action: (1) a claim for payment from the government was made and (2) the claim was false or fraudulent. United States ex rel. Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 3-88-547, slip op. at 5, citing Boisjoly v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 706 F.Supp. 795, 808 (D.Utah 1988).

Glass contends that Medtronic, not Medicare, is responsible for the costs associated with the replacement of his pacemaker because the 4002 model with the changed inner insulation was illegally marketed without a new 510(k) premarket notification. Therefore, Glass argues, Medtronic caused a false claim to be filed when it told him to submit his claim to Medicare for reimbursement, when Medtronic knew it was responsible for any costs.

We need not decide whether Medtronic should have filed a new 510(k) report when it changed the inner insulation on the 4002 lead. Even assuming that Medtronic should have filed an updated 510(k) report and could therefore be liable for medical expenses relating to complications with the changed model 4002, Medtronic is not liable under the False Claims Act. The district court properly considered the Medicare statutes to make this determination.

The Medicare Intermediary Manual explicitly states that Medicare covers the cost of medical services associated with replacing defective medical devices even when the manufacturer of the device is liable under warranty for such devices. Health Care Financing Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Medicare Intermediary Manual § 3152(D) (Apr.1988). Medicare, after it pays, is subrogated to the rights of the patient and can seek reimbursement from the manufacturer. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii) (West 1992). The payment of Medicare benefits is only improper when a prior determination is made that payment from another source is expected promptly. Id. § 1395y(b)(2)(A). Here, no prior determination had been made that payment could be expected promptly under Medtronic’s liability insurance policy. Medicare, following its payment to Glass, could seek reimbursement from Medtronic. Therefore, it was proper for Glass to submit his claims to Medicare, and Medtronic’s advice to Glass to do so was not false or fraudulent.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment.

1

. The Honorable Edward J. Devitt, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.

2

. Following the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment, Charles Glass’s various state law claims which were not dismissed pursuant to the partial summary judgment were, according to a joint stipulation, dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. United States ex rel. Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 3-88-547 (D.Minn. Dec. 3, 1990).