Kenneth L. Maynard v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 984 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1993). · Go Syfert
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Kenneth L. Maynard v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 984 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
41 citation events (22 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ingrassia v. Chicken Ranch Bingo and Casino (caed, 2009-12-16)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#7 25 U.S.C. § 1701-1716 cited 1× in this case · 21 total citations of statute #6 25 C.F.R. § 83.11 cited 1× in this case · 36 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ingrassia v. Chicken Ranch Bingo and Casino
E.D. Cal. · 2009 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Maynard v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 984 F.2d 14, 15-16 (1st Cir.1993) (relying on Indian tribe’s sovereign immunity against claims after removal).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Narragansett Indian v. State of Rhode Islan
1st Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
That holding may or may not be correct—the case at hand does not require us to say—but to the extent that Maynard contains dictum that is susceptible to a broader reading, see, e.g., id. at 16, that dictum is flatly incorrect, and we disavow it. 8 50 In a last-ditch effort to salvage its case, the Tribe proffers a Ninth Circuit case holding that tribal sovereign immunity prohibits a state from executing a search warrant against an Indian tribe.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Narragansett Indian v. State of Rhode Islan (2×) also: Cited "see"
1st Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
That holding may or may not be correct—the case at hand does not require us to say—but to the extent that Maynard contains dictum that is susceptible to a broader reading, see, e.g., id. at 16, that dictum is flatly incorrect, and we disavow it. 8 In a last-ditch effort to salvage its case, the Tribe proffers a Ninth Circuit case holding that tribal sovereign immunity prohibits a state from executing a search warrant against an Indian tribe.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sanchez v. Santa Ana Golf Club, Inc.
N.M. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Maynard v. Narragansett Indian Tube, 984 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wiener v. Wampanoag Aquinnah Shellfish Hatchery Corp. (2×)
Mass. Super. Ct. · 2003 · confidence medium
Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head v. MCAD, 63 F.Sup.2d at 123-24; Maynard v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 798 F.Sup. 94, 97 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd., 984 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1993) (concluding that language in Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act that tribal lands would be “subject to the civil and criminal laws and jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Island” did not constitute Congressional abrogation of tribe’s sovereign immunity). 5 Moreovér, the fact that substantive law applies to the conduct of a tribe on its land does not mean that the tribe no longer enjoys immunity from suit.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Florida
11th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. County of Cook, Ill., 167 F.3d 381, 390 (7th Cir.1999) (noting the Supreme Court’s “thoroughgoing equation of sovereign immunity to a jurisdictional shortcoming”); Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1326 (10th Cir.1997) (holding that the Osage Tribal Council and its members "properly and adequately challenged federal jurisdiction on the ground of tribal sovereign immunity”); Kreig v. Prairie Island Dakota Sioux (In re Prairie Island Dakota Sioux), 21 F.3d 302, 305 (8th Cir.1994) (finding that tribal "sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional consideratio…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Florida v. Seminole Tribe
11th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. County of Cook, Ill., 167 F.3d 381, 390 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting the Supreme Court’s “thoroughgoing equation of sovereign immunity to a jurisdictional shortcoming”); Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1326 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Osage Tribal Council and its members “properly and adequately challenged federal jurisdiction on the ground of tribal sovereign immunity”); Kreig v. Prairie Island Dakota Sioux (In re Prairie Island Dakota Sioux), 21 F.3d 302, 305 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that tribal “sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional consi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Narragansett Indians v. State of RI
1st Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
The court found that it did not need to make a determination regarding whether state regulations regarding property with historical and/or archeological significance applied, since the Rhode Island Historical Preservation Commission had notified the Tribe that it had no objection to the project as planned. -7- court below, Narragansett I, 878 F. Supp. at 353-55, as well as _______________ in prior decisions of the courts of this circuit, see Rhode ___ _____ Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 689 (1st Cir.), ______ _________________________ cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 29…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island v. Narragansett Electric Co.
1st Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Background The background of the relationship between the Tribe and the State has been addressed in some detail by the district court below, Narragansett I, 878 F.Supp. at 353-55 , as well as in prior decisions of the courts of this circuit, see Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 689 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 298 , 130 L.Ed.2d 211 (1994); Maynard v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 984 F.2d 14, 15-16 (1st Cir.1993); Town of Charlestown v. United States, 696 F.Supp. 800, 801-05 (D.R.I.1988), aff'd, 873 F.2d 1433 (1st Cir.1989); Narragansett Tribe of Indians v…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gavle v. Little Six, Inc.
Minn. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Consent may not be inferred, see Maynard v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 984 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir.1993), even if similar acts would constitute an implied waiver by a non-Indian government.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Federico v. Capital Gaming International, Inc.
D.R.I. · 1995 · confidence medium
See also Davids, 869 F.Supp. at 1408 (although plaintiffs argue that tribes waive immunity with regard to compliance with the IGRA’s provisions by engaging in gaming regulated by the IGRA, court is constrained by “Supreme Court precedent ... from finding an unequivocal expression of a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity through inference from a tribe’s actions”); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Ok., 498 U.S. 505, 509 , 111 S.Ct. 905, 909 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991) (although tribe consents to court’s jurisdiction over claims brought by it, that consent …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe (2×) also: Cited "see"
1st Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
To the extent that the district court’s opinion in Maynard v. Narragansett Tribe, 798 F.Supp. 94, 98-99 (D.R.I.1992), aff'd on other grounds, 984 F.2d 14, 15 (1st Cir.1993), suggests a contrary view, we reject it. .Because our analysis is specific to. the Settlement Act, we need not join the debate over the general applicability of the Bryan distinction.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of RI v. Narragansett Tribe
1st Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
As a general ____________________ 10To the extent that the district court's opinion in Maynard _______ v. Narragansett Tribe, 798 F. Supp. 94, 98-99 (D.R.I. 1992), __________________ aff'd on other grounds, 984 F.2d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 1993), suggests _____ __ _____ _______ a contrary view, we reject it. 11Because our analysis is specific to the Settlement Act, we need not join the debate over the general applicability of the Bryan distinction.
discussed Cited "see" Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
D. Mass. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Maynard v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 798 F.Supp. 94, 96 (D.R.I.1992), aff'd, 984 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.1993).
discussed Cited "see" Davids v. Coyhis
E.D. Wis. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Maynard v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 984 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir.1993) (“[Plaintiff] invites us to infer a waiver or abrogation of the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, citing to the settlement agreement, the enacting legislation, and excerpts from the legislative history---- [H]owever, the proposed inferential leap is impermissible.”); American Indian Agrie.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Frey
1st Cir. · 2021 · signal: see also · confidence low
See id. at 709 (construing the phrase "internal tribal matters" in the MIA and noting that it is a "general principle[] that inform[s] our analysis of the statutory language" that "special rules of statutory construction obligate us to construe 'acts diminishing the sovereign rights of Indian tribes . . . strictly,' 'with ambiguous provisions interpreted to the [Indians'] benefit'" (third and fourth alterations in original) (first quoting Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 702 (1st Cir. 1994); and then quoting County - 131 - of Oneida, 470 U.S. at 247 )); see also Maynard …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sac & Fox Nation v. Hanson
10th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Credit Consortium, Inc. v. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374 , 1378-79 (8th Cir.1985) (holding that a Native American tribe’s sovereign immunity cannot be waived by implication in contract actions); see also Maynard v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 984 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir.1993) (declining to evaluate several factors to infer a tribe’s waiver of sovereign immunity).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sac and Fox Nation v. Hanson
10th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Credit Consortium, Inc. v. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374 , 1378-79 (8th Cir.1985) (holding that a Native American tribe's sovereign immunity cannot be waived by implication in contract actions); see also Maynard v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 984 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir.1993) (declining to evaluate several factors to infer a tribe's waiver of sovereign immunity).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Kenneth L. MAYNARD, Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
NARRAGANSETT INDIAN TRIBE, Defendant, Appellee
92-2106.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Jan 27, 1993.
984 F.2d 14
W. Mark Russo with whom Adler, Pollock & Sheehan, Inc., Providence, RI, on brief, for plaintiff, appellant., John F. Killoy, Jr. with whom Law Office of H. Jefferson Melish, Wakefield, RI, on brief, for defendant, appellee.
Cyr, Campbell, Boudin.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published
Pinpoint authority: bottom 54%
CYR, Circuit Judge.

Kenneth L. Maynard appeals from a judgment dismissing his claim for injunc-tive relief against the Narragansett Indian Tribe. The district court determined that the Tribe possessed sovereign immunity from suit. We affirm for substantially the same reasons stated in Section III.A of the district court memorandum and order of dismissal. 798 F.Supp. 94.

“Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978); see Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, -, 111 S.Ct. 905, 909, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991); Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 599 F.2d 1061, 1066 (1st Cir.1979). Although sovereign immunity may be waived by the tribe, or abrogated by Congress, see Oklahoma Tax, 498 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 910, its relinquishment “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 953, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976) (emphasis added); see also Fluent v. Salamanca Indian Lease Auth., 928 F.2d 542, 546 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 74, 116 L.Ed.2d 48 (1991) (“When Congress has chosen to limit or waive the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes, it has done so in clear language.”) (citing Act of July 22, 1958, Pub.L. No. 85-547, § 1, providing that tribes may “commence” and “defend” actions against each other) (emphasis added).

Maynard contends that the Narragansett Indian Tribe’s sovereign immunity should not appertain in these circumstances because its actions encroach on lands to which the Tribe affirmatively relinquished all legal claim and title.

The present action arose out of a boundary dispute with the Tribe, relating to Maynard’s allegations that tribal officials re[*16] peatedly trespassed on his property. [1] The Tribe acquired the land abutting Maynard’s property in 1978, as part of an overall settlement of its legal claim that the Tribe possessed superior, aboriginal title to 3200 acres in the State of Rhode Island. In return for eventual congressional approval of the land claims settlement terms, see Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1716 (1978), the Tribe agreed that its claims to non-settlement lands in Rhode Island would be extinguished and that the settlement lands by and large would be “subject to the civil and criminal laws and jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Island.” Id. §§ 1705(a), 1708.

Maynard invites us to infer a waiver or abrogation of the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, citing to the settlement agreement, the enacting legislation, and excerpts from the legislative history. As the district court correctly noted, however, the proposed inferential leap is impermissible. [2] Maynard cites no provision or source which even alludes to the concept of tribal sovereign immunity, much less its relinquishment. [3] The Tribe’s surrender of its right to sue for non-settlement lands neither says nor implies anything about a surrender of its sovereign immunity from suit relating to its territorial or extraterritorial actions. Absent explicit congressional authorization to the contrary, the district court had no choice but to dismiss the present action for lack of jurisdiction.

Affirmed.

1

. Maynard elected not to name individual members of the Tribe as defendants, contending that permanent injunctive relief against the Tribe would be the only effective remedy.

2

. Moreover, were the proposed inference otherwise permissible, the provisions cited by Maynard would have to be construed to afford the Tribe the benefit of any ambiguity on the waiver-abrogation issue. See, e.g., Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 582 n. 4 (1st Cir.) (protective statutes enacted for benefit of Indian tribes are liberally construed in their favor), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866, 100 S.Ct. 138, 62 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979).

3

. The Narragansett Indian Tribe acquired federal status in 1983, see Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.2d 4, 4-5 (1st Cir.1991), a process which entails recognition that the Tribe enjoys "a government-to-government relationship to the United States.” 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(a) (1992). Even though it would be of no small significance in defining the Tribe’s sovereign status, Maynard cites no reference during the 1983 recognition process to an abrogation of the Tribe’s sovereignty, or to an acknowledgement of any past abrogation or waiver of its sovereign immunity.